COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND VS. ROGERS (JESSIE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001375-WC
&
NO. 2010-CA-001485-WC
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’ FUND
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-09-00270
JESSE ROGERS d/b/a QUALITY EXTERIORS;
WILLIAM WILLIS BALLARD; HON. EDWARD D.
HAYS, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
and
WILLIAM WILLIS BALLARD and JESSE
ROGERS d/b/a QUALITY EXTERIORS
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-09-00270
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’ FUND; HON.
EDWARD D. HAYS, Administrative Law Judge,
and WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, THOMPSON, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Uninsured Employers’
Fund (the Fund), appeals from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board
that vacated in part and remanded this matter to the Administrative Law Judge for
further proceedings. William Ballard, the injured employee, cross-appeals.
Following our review, we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
On February 27, 2009, Ballard fell about nine or ten feet onto a concrete
sidewalk from a roof that he was helping to install. He suffered injuries to his right
wrist, hand, knee, and ankle. He was taken to Bardstown Ambulatory Care Center.
Physicians at University of Louisville Hand Clinic immobilized Ballard’s fractured
wrist with a cast. On March 13, 2009, he filed this workers’ compensation claim
against Jesse Rogers d/b/a Quality Exteriors.
On June 10, 2009, Ballard underwent an Independent Medical Evaluation
with Dr. Mark Henderson, who diagnosed him with a right scaphoid fracture. Dr.
Henderson noted decreased grip strength in the right hand and decreased range of
motion in the wrist. He recommended occupational therapy to increase strength
and range of motion and to help relieve pain. Dr. Henderson found no indication
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of any pre-existing condition and assigned Ballard a 13% whole person impairment
rating attributable to the work injury of February 27, 2009.
After reviewing the medical records and reports and other evidence, the
administrative law judge made an award of benefits. The ALJ determined that
Ballard had suffered a work-related injury on February 27, 2009. He also
determined that Ballard had been an employee of Quality Exteriors on the day that
he suffered the injuries and that the employer had had no workers’ compensation
insurance in effect at that time. The ALJ noted that Ballard had worked for
Quality Exteriors for only three hours before he sustained the work-related injury
and that the employer had not participated in the defense of the claim until Jesse
Rogers arrived shortly after the final hearing had begun.
Rogers denied that Ballard had been his employee, but the ALJ discounted
his entire testimony, concluding that Rogers was not credible at all. The ALJ
found that Rogers agreed to pay Ballard at a rate of $10.00 per hour. The ALJ
accepted the unrefuted opinion of Dr. Henderson that Ballard suffered a13% whole
person impairment as a result of his work-related injury, but he rejected Ballard’s
contention that he was unable to return to his former job or similar work activities.
The ALJ awarded Ballard temporary total disability benefits for the period
February 27, 2009 - June 10, 2009.
Since Ballard had worked for Rogers for only three hours before he
sustained the work-related injury, the ALJ determined that his average weekly
wage must be calculated in accordance with the provisions of Kentucky Revised
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Statute[s] (KRS) 342.140(1)(e). This statute requires the fact-finder to ascertain
how much money the injured employee “would have earned had he or she been so
employed by the employer the full thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately
preceding the injury and had worked, when work was available to other employees
in a similar occupation[.]” KRS 342.140. (Emphasis added.) In making this
computation, the ALJ specifically rejected the Fund’s contention that roofing is
“exclusively seasonal” and found that Ballard’s wages were to be calculated on the
basis of a regular forty-hour work week. Ballard was awarded medical benefits
and the sum of $34.67 per week for the 425-week period following June 10, 2009.
The Fund filed a petition for reconsideration regarding the ALJ’s
computation of Ballard’s average weekly wage. It particularly challenged the
ALJ’s findings that roofing is not a seasonal occupation and that Ballard could
have expected to earn wages beyond what amounted to a short-term roofing
project. Additionally, the Fund contended that the ALJ’s calculation of Ballard’s
average weekly wage was erroneous as a matter of law. The ALJ rejected the
Fund’s calculation of Ballard’s average weekly wage at $0.38 per week as
inconsistent with the intention of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The ALJ
denied the petition.
The Fund appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board
concluded that under the circumstances of this case, the ALJ correctly concluded
that Ballard’s average weekly wage should be calculated pursuant to the provisions
of KRS 342.140(1)(e). However, it also concluded that the ALJ’s calculation of
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Ballard’s average weekly wage based upon a forty-hour work week (uninterrupted
for thirteen weeks) did not provide a realistic estimate of what he would have
expected to earn during a normal period of employment. The Board concluded
that the ALJ was unable to determine Ballard’s average weekly wage properly
since “there is insufficient evidence contained in the record to permit such a
calculation.” Board Opinion at 9.
Thus, the Board vacated the ALJ’s calculation of Ballard’s average weekly
wage and remanded the matter to the ALJ for additional proceedings. The Board
instructed the ALJ to reopen proof time for thirty days for the sole purpose of
revisiting the average weekly wage issue. It advised as follows:
During that period, the parties may submit relevant proof
concerning the amount Ballard would have earned had he
been so employed by Quality for the full 13 calendar
weeks immediately preceding the injury and had worked,
when work was available to other employees in a similar
occupation.
Board Opinion at 11-12.
Anticipating the Fund’s objection to the remand, the Board observed as
follows:
On a number of occasions, as in this instance, we have
been called upon to address issues related to the
calculation of wages where the proof has not been
adequately developed. In such instances we have
routinely disagreed that claimants such as Ballard, who
have proven permanent disability due to work-related
injuries to the satisfaction of an ALJ, should be denied
the permanent partial disability awards to which they are
otherwise entitled simply because insufficient proof has
been introduced up to that point in the administrative
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proceedings to permit a proper [average weekly wage]
calculation. In so ruling we have remained mindful that
the general purpose of KRS Chapter 342 is to wholly
compensate injured workers whenever possible. As
noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Beale v.
Shepherd, 809 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Ky. 1991), “[t]his
principle of protecting the interests of the injured worker
is a basic tenet of workers’ compensation law.”
Board Opinion at 9-10. This appeal (and Ballard’s cross-appeal) followed.
On review, we must show considerable deference to the Workers’
Compensation Board. Our function “is to correct the Board only where . . . the
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause
gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
1992).
On appeal, the Fund contends that the Board lacked any authority
whatsoever to remand this matter to the ALJ for additional proof. Referring to the
doctrine of res judicata and the concept of issue preclusion, the Fund argues that
the computation of Ballard’s average weekly wage must be based solely upon the
proof in the record as it stood before the ALJ. It also contends that Ballard’s
average weekly wage should have been calculated in accordance with the
provisions of KRS 342.140(2) pertaining to exclusively seasonal occupations. On
cross-appeal, Ballard contends that he introduced sufficient evidence from which
his average weekly wage could be (and was) properly determined and,
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consequently, that there was no basis for the Board’s decision to remand this
matter to the ALJ for recalculation.
The calculation of a workers’ compensation benefits award is controlled by
statute. It is a question of law and can be decided by the Board. Whittaker v.
Reeder, 30 S.W.3d 138 (Ky. 2000). Here, the Board was fully within its authority
to determine that the ALJ’s computation of Ballard’s average weekly wage failed
to provide a realistic estimate of his earning capacity in accordance with the
provisions of KRS 342.140. KRS 342.285(2)(c).
It is also within the Board’s authority to modify an award to insure that it
complies with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Whittaker,
supra. Under the circumstances of this case, where insufficient proof had been
introduced to permit a proper calculation of Ballard’s average weekly wage under
the unique requirements of KRS 342.140(1(e), we believe that the Board was
within its authority to remand the matter to the ALJ for further proceedings. In so
doing – despite the Fund’s contentions, the Board has not ignored or excused the
employee’s obligation to present the required proof. Instead, the Board has
insisted that Ballard provide to the ALJ the proof necessary to calculate correctly
the value of his award. Remand was not a misuse of the Board’s power but a
wholly proper and necessary procedural decision.
Workers’ compensation proceedings are administrative rather than judicial
in nature. The proceedings retained their administrative character while under the
Board’s review. Id. Under these circumstances, and keeping in mind the
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beneficent purpose of KRS Chapter 342 to wholly compensate injured workers
whenever possible, we conclude that the Board did not act outside its authority by
remanding the matter for additional proof.
Nor are we persuaded that the Board erred as a matter of law by determining
that the provisions of KRS 342.140(2) (pertaining to occupations which are
exclusively seasonal) are irrelevant to a determination of Ballard’s average weekly
wage. The question of whether particular work is seasonal depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case. Pike County Bd. of Educ. v. Mills, 260 S.W.3d
366 (Ky.App. 2008). While roofing projects may have been intermittent in this
area around the time of Ballard’s injury, the ALJ’s finding of fact that roofing is
not an exclusively seasonal occupational was adequately supported by the record.
It cannot be set aside.
The judgment of the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
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VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the well
written opinion of the majority. However, I am concerned that since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Davis v. Island Creek Coal Company, 969 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.
1998), this Court has repeatedly reviewed appeals from orders remanding to the
ALJ for further findings. I believe such appeals are frivolous.
Under the post-1987-Workers’ Compensation Act, the Board’s role is
appellate and CR 54 has no application to its orders. Id. at 713. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Davis, stating that:
It matters not whether the Board directs the ALJ to take
further evidence on remand or to reach a factual
conclusion based on the evidence of record. A decision
by the Board is final and appealable if it sets aside the
ALJ's decision and either directs or authorizes the entry
of a different award on remand because such a decision
divests the party who prevailed before the ALJ of a
vested right.
Sidney Coal Co., Inc./Clean Energy Mining Co. v. Huffman, 233 S.W.3d 710,
713 (Ky. 2007).
I concede that as a result of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act, an
order remanding the case to the ALJ is appealable. However, an appeal is
inevitably futile because the Workers’ Compensation Board has the absolute
discretion to remand a case to the ALJ for further findings of fact. Campbell v.
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Hauler’s Inc., 320 S.W.3d 707, 708 (Ky.App. 2010). Thus, an appeal from an
order remanding for findings of fact is invariably affirmed and results only in
additional expense and delay. Moreover, the potential for a second appeal
following the order entered on remand compounds the inefficiency. I am
convinced that orders such as in the present case should be deemed interlocutory
and not appealable until after remand and the opinion and order is entered.
I am not suggesting that this Court has the authority to ignore our Supreme
Court’s directive and dismiss this appeal. However, in view of the discretionary
authority of the Workers’ Compensation Board to remand a case to the ALJ for
findings of fact, I do suggest that it is frivolous.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS’ FUND:
C.D. Batson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT BALLARD:
Ben T. Haydon, Jr.
Bardstown, Kentucky
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