WILSON (CHARLES L.) JR. VS. WILSON (ANGELA KAY)
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RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001326-MR
CHARLES L. WILSON, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00474
ANGELA KAY WILSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Charles Wilson, Jr., appeals the June 11,
2010, order of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court, denying his motion pursuant to CR
60.02 for relief from an April 13, 2004, order requiring Charles to pay, upon his
retirement, the amount of $604.88 per month to the Appellee, his ex-wife Angela
Kay Wilson, for as long as his pension was received. Having reviewed the record,
the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm.
The parties filed for dissolution of their marriage on October 8, 2002,
and were divorced on September 24, 2003. A Separation and Property Settlement
Agreement was filed on October 9, 2003. Paragraph 10 of that Agreement stated
as follows:
The parties’ retirement benefits shall be equally divided
pursuant to agreement of the parties or as otherwise
ordered by the Court, it being acknowledged that as of
date of entry of the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, all
retirement benefits of HUSBAND and WIFE are marital.
In the event the parties cannot agree upon the method of
said division, same shall be adjudicated by the Court
upon subsequent motion.
On February 19, 2004, Charles filed a motion requesting that the court
adjudicate the retirement benefits, as the parties had been unable to agree on same.
Accordingly, on April 13, 2004, the court entered an order determining that Angela
was to receive 32% of Charles’s total retirement benefits as of the date of the entry
of the decree. Those benefits totaled $43,004.23, which meant that Angela would
receive $13,761.35, to be paid in increments of $604.88 per month for as long as
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Charles received those benefits.1 Charles did not appeal the order dividing the
retirement benefits.
Thereafter, on May 12, 2010, Angela filed a motion for judgment and
order of contempt alleging that Charles had retired and was receiving his
retirement benefits but was not paying Angela her share. Charles filed a CR 60.02
motion requesting relief from the order entered on April 13, 2004. At that time, an
August 24, 2009, letter from Charles R. Lewis, CPA, was presented to the court.
That letter stated that no amount was vested at the time of the decree and that
Charles was only entitled to his own contribution of $42,828.00. Thus, it was
argued that Angela should only be entitled to 32% of that amount. Moreover,
Lewis stated that allowing Angela to receive that amount for the rest of her life2
could result in her receipt of an amount greater than the total assets at the time of
divorce, thus converting the payments essentially to alimony as opposed to a
property settlement.
As noted, on June 11, 2010, following a hearing held on June 4, 2010,
the court entered an order denying Charles’s CR 60.02 motion. In denying that
1
The order stated as follows: “Petitioner shall receive her retirement benefits clear of any interest
of respondent and petitioner shall further receive 32% of respondent’s benefits as of date of entry
of decree of dissolution of marriage, respondent’s interest being $42,004.23, petitioner’s interest
therein totaling $13,761.35 and therefore petitioner shall receive the amount of $604.88 per
month commencing upon respondent’s receipt of his benefits and to continue as long as
respondent should receive said benefits. Said benefits shall be taxable to petitioner and
respondent shall be directed to immediately forward said sum to petitioner upon his receipt of
same.”
2
We note that Charles characterizes Angela’s receipt of these benefits as being “for the rest of
her life,” when in fact the court’s order stated that Angela was to receive the benefits only for as
long as Charles received the benefits.
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motion, the court found that Charles had failed to satisfy the requirements of CR
60.02(f), and that his motion for relief had not been filed within a reasonable time.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Charles argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion pursuant to CR 60.02(f).3 He argues that the April 13, 2004,
order required him to pay an unconscionable amount, thereby justifying
extraordinary relief. Charles correctly notes that the court ordered $13,761.35 to
be paid to Angela in its April 13, 2004, order. Charles asserts that if he were to
make payments of $604.88 as ordered by the court, then the entire amount owed
would be paid in 23 months. Charles thus argues that in awarding the amount to be
paid for as long as Charles receives the benefits, the court created an extremely
unconscionable result which would give Angela a windfall to Charles’s detriment.
Charles argues that the ruling of the court is internally inconsistent, highly
inequitable, and would be unreasonable and arbitrary as applied to him. He
therefore asserts that the court abused its discretion in denying his CR 60.02
motion.
In response, Angela first asserts that Charles’s motion for relief
pursuant to CR 60.02 was untimely. She notes that Charles is seeking relief from
an order entered more than six years ago from which he never appealed. Angela
3
CR 60.02(f) provides, in pertinent part: “On motion, a court may, upon such terms are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceedings upon the
following grounds . . . (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b) and (c) not more than one
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was taken. A motion under this rule does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.”
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further notes that during that six year period of time, Charles retained numerous
attorneys who filed multiple motions on his behalf relating to other matters, and
not addressing the order concerning his pension benefits. Angela argues that none
of the elements justifying the extraordinary relief required by CR 60.02(f) are
present sub judice. She thus argues that the trial court did not err in denying
Charles’s motion.
Moreover, Angela asserts that the court correctly divided the parties’
pensions sub judice. She asserts that the record reflects that Charles requested the
court to use the delayed division method in dividing the parties’ respective
requirement benefits.4 She notes that the delayed division method consists of a
formula used to determine the division at the time of entry of the dissolution of the
marriage and takes into consideration the fact that the actual payments of monies
will not occur until the pension is received. See Young v. Young, 314 S.W.3d 306
(Ky.App. 2010). Angela argues that the trial court divided the monies properly
according to this method.
In reviewing the arguments of the parties, we note that we review a
court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. See Bethlehem
Minerals Co. v. Church and Mullins Corp., 887 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1994). Further,
we note that what constitutes a reason of extraordinary nature is left to judicial
construction, which must incorporate consideration of three specific factors: (1)
that relief under subsection (f) of CR 60.02 will not be available unless “none of
4
See Paragraph 9 of Appellant’s Motion for Visitation, to Determine Child Support, and for
Division of Retirement.
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that rule’s other specific provisions apply”; (2) whether the moving party had a fair
opportunity to present his claim at trial on the merits; and (3) whether the granting
of the CR 60.02 motion would be inequitable to other parties. See Snodgrass v.
Snodgrass, 297 S.W.3d 878 (Ky.App. 2009). We further note that the relief
afforded a party pursuant to CR 60.02 was an incorporation of the common law
writ of “coram nobis”. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983). The
purpose of coram nobis was to bring before the Court pronounced judgment errors
which either had not been heard or litigated, which were not known nor could have
been known by the party through the exercise of due diligence, or which the party
was prevented from presenting due to duress, fear, or some other sufficient cause.
Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761 (Ky. 2008).
Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we are
in agreement with Angela that Charles’s motion was not filed within a reasonable
time as required by CR 60.02. In so finding, we believe our holding in Fry v.
Kersey, 833 S.W.2d 392 (Ky.App. 1992) to be on point in this instance. In that
case, the trial court, while distributing the assets of the parties, failed to divide or
allocate the pension plan. More than five years later, Fry filed for a motion
pursuant to CR 60.02(f). The court found that nearly five years had elapsed
between the entry of the decree and the filing of the motion. The court noted that
during that time Fry had numerous opportunities to file motions concerning his
assets with the court, but did not do so. Accordingly, the court concluded that
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Fry’s motion, filed five years after entry of the judgment was not filed within a
reasonable time.
Sub judice, the facts are very similar. The order with which Charles
takes issue was entered six years ago. Between that time and the present, Charles
has retained numerous attorneys and filed multiple motions with the court. In none
of those did he take issue with the April 13, 2004, order. Accordingly, we find that
his CR 60.02(f) motion was not filed within a reasonable time and that the trial
court did not err in denying same.
In the alternative, we note that even had Charles’s motion been
timely, we are of the belief that the trial court correctly divided the pension sub
judice. We note that the “delayed division” method of dividing the pension
initially requested by Charles5 was established in Poe v. Poe, 711 S.W.2d 849
(Ky.App. 1986).6 In the delayed division method, a formula is used to determine
5
See Paragraph 9, Appellant’s Motion for Visitation, to Determine Child Support, and for
Division of Retirement.
6
Other methods utilized by Kentucky courts include the “net present value” method, and the
“reserve jurisdiction” method. In the net present value method, the trial court calculates the
present value of the pension and awards a percentage of that amount in a lump sum to the nonemployee spouse. This lump sum award is generally granted in the form of an equivalent value
of property rather than as a cash award. Thus, this method requires the availability of significant
additional marital assets to equalize the property distribution. Under this method, the employee
spouse retains all rights to the pension free of any claims from the non-employee. This method
has likewise been favorably utilized in Kentucky. See generally, Duncan, 724 S.W.2d at 233.
In the reserve jurisdiction method, the percentage of the pension to be received by the nonemployee spouse is not determined until the pension is fully vested and has matured. This
method utilizes the employee's salary at the time of retirement rather than at the time of divorce
to calculate the amounts due to the non-employee spouse. Although utilized by some of our sister
jurisdictions, this method has received unfavorable treatment in our courts. See Armstrong, 34
S.W.3d 83 at 85-87 (Ky. App. 2000)(Holding that precedents in Kentucky militate against use of
the reserve jurisdiction method).
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the division at the time of the decree but the actual distribution of monies is
delayed until payments under the pension are received. Each party then receives
the appropriate percentage of the pension payments as they are paid out in
accordance with the formula. The use of this method has long been approved in
this Commonwealth. See Poe; Duncan v. Duncan, 724 S.W.2d 231
(Ky.App.1987); Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App.1979).
Certainly, a trial court retains broad discretion in valuing pension
rights and dividing them between parties in a divorce proceeding, so long as (1) a
trial court does not abuse its discretion and (2) its findings are supported by the
evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Ghali v. Ghali, 596
S.W.2d 31 (Ky.App. 1980). See also Light v. Light, 599 S.W.2d 476
(Ky.App.1980). In this instance, the court utilized the method of division
requested by Charles and did so correctly. Accordingly, we decline to reverse on
this basis.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the June 11,
2010, order of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court, the Honorable Brian Wiggins,
presiding.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Corey Morgan
Russellville, Kentucky
Ralph D. Vick
Greenville, Kentucky
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