SCOTT (JERRY), ET AL. VS. MIHELIC (DONALD C.)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001270-ME
JERRY SCOTT; AND
BARBARA SCOTT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PAULA SHERLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-500918
DONALD C. MIHELIC
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, AND KELLER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Terry and Barbara Scott appeal from an order of the
Jefferson Family Court that granted the petition of Donald Mihelic for custody of
his son, Kyle. After reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of
the parties, we affirm.
Kyle was born in Jefferson County in 2002. Mihelic and Michelle Johnson,
Kyle’s mother, were never married and did not cohabitate either before or after his
birth. Johnson ended her relationship with Mihelic shortly after learning that she
was pregnant.
In 2004, Johnson moved with Kyle into the home of Barbara and Terry
Scott, Johnson’s mother and step-father. Barbara Scott cared for her grandson
while Johnson worked. Johnson and Kyle lived together in a self-contained,
finished basement, and the Scotts were thoroughly involved in Kyle’s day-to-day
activities.
Johnson lost her job in December 2007. In mid-February 2008, Johnson left
the Scotts’ residence at their urging. Kyle was enrolled in school, and he was to
remain at the Scotts’ house until Johnson could provide a home for him. On May
28, 2008, Johnson filed a paternity action against Mihelic.
By August 2008, Kyle had begun to reside again (at least intermittently)
with his mother. Because she had some appointments to keep, Johnson left Kyle at
the Scotts’ residence on Tuesday, August 12, 2008. A few days later, she was
arrested in Bullitt County; she was unable to make bail. Barbara Scott contacted
the Department for Community Based Services and filed a child protective services
report alleging neglect by Johnson.
At a hearing held September 18, 2008, the Scotts were awarded temporary
custody of Kyle by the Jefferson Family Court. As Kyle’s putative father, Mihelic
was represented by counsel at this hearing. Johnson eventually hired counsel,
appeared in the matter, and asserted her parental rights to custody. However, the
matter was continued until October 16, 2008, and then again until January 2009.
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In December 2008, after the results of genetic testing were obtained, a
judgment of paternity was entered determining Mihelic to be Kyle’s biological
father. Mihelic agreed to pay child support for Kyle’s benefit and to provide health
insurance for him. Although Kyle continued to reside with the Scotts, the
judgment designated Mihelic and Johnson as Kyle’s joint legal custodians.
On March 3, 2009, Johnson died as a result of multiple drug intoxication.
The neglect matter initiated by the Scotts had been set for a final hearing to be held
on March 5, 2009. On March 18, 2009, Mihelic filed a petition for custody of his
son. The neglect matter against Johnson was closed.
Kyle was introduced to Mihelic, and they began to work together with a
family therapist. Over the course of frequent visits, Kyle gradually began to build
relationships with his father, his step-mother, and the family’s other children. Kyle
continued to maintain a close relationship with his grandparents as well.
A trial was conducted before the Jefferson Family Court on March 16, 2010.
In its order entered of June 3, 2010, the court rejected the Scotts’ contention that
they had standing to participate in the custody matter as Kyle’s “de facto
custodians” and concluded that Mihelic was entitled to sole custody of his son as a
matter of law. This appeal followed.
The courts of the Commonwealth have consistently recognized the superior
right of a parent to the care, custody, and control of his children and the
constitutionally protected right of a parent to raise his or her own child. See Moore
v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003). Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (KRS)
-3-
405.020(1) provides explicitly that a “father and mother shall have the joint
custody” of their child. (Emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]f either of the parents
dies, the survivor, if suited to the trust, shall have the custody” of the child. Id.
(Emphases added).
Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 405.020(1), however, the General
Assembly has additionally addressed the issue of de facto custodians in this
context:
if either parent dies and at the time of death a child
is in the custody of a de facto custodian, as
defined in KRS 403.270, the court shall award
custody to the de facto custodian if the court
determines that the best interests of the child will
be served by that award of custody.
KRS 405.020(4). (Emphasis added).
A de facto custodian is defined by the provisions of KRS 403.270(1) as
follows:
a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child
who has resided with the person for a period . . . of
one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years
of age or older. . . . Any period of time after a legal
proceeding has been commenced by a parent
seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be
included in determining whether the child has
resided with the person for the required minimum
period.
(Emphasis added). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as evidence that is
substantially more persuasive than a preponderance of the evidence but not
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necessarily beyond a reasonable doubt. Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465 (Ky.
2004).
In their brief, the Scotts argue that the family court misinterpreted the
meaning of “primary caregiver and financial supporter” as that phrase is used in
KRS 403.270. They also argue that some of the court’s findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. The Scotts contend that they showed by clear and convincing evidence
that they had been the primary caregiver for and the financial supporter of Kyle,
who resided with them for at least a year, and that the family court erred by failing
to find that they were Kyle’s de facto custodians having standing to participate in
the custody proceedings. We disagree.
Following a lengthy hearing, the family court found, in part, as follows:
During the majority of the time that [Johnson] and Kyle
lived [with the Scotts], [Johnson] was employed and it is
clear that her parents played a major role in child care.
However, she took Kyle to the pediatrician, as evidenced
by the doctor’s records. She attended school
conferences. She also enrolled Kyle in the preschool at
Okolona Christian and paid the costs associated with the
program. [Johnson] also engaged in a variety of normal
parenting activities such as attending ballgames, going to
special events and providing physical care for Kyle. She
was employed by Humana until December of 2007.
[Johnson] declared Kyle as a dependent for income tax
purposes. Humana’s payroll records further show that
[Johnson] provided health insurance coverage for Kyle as
a “dependent child.” This coverage included health and
dental coverage. These coverages ended on December
21, 2007. After that date, Kyle was not covered by
insurance until [Mihelic] provided coverage beginning in
December 2008.
During 2007, Kyle attended St. Nicholas Academy.
[Johnson] paid his tuition of $400 out of her paycheck
-5-
each month. . . . [Johnson] and the Scotts were jointly
parenting and supporting Kyle while [Johnson] lived [at
the Scotts’ residence] and was employed although the
Scotts were arguably doing a substantial amount of
hands-on care.
* * * * *
[I]t is clear from the record that Kyle resided primarily
with [the Scotts], without his mother, beginning February
11, 2008 until the end of the school year, the last of May.
[After February 2008, Johnson] had regular unsupervised
parenting time at her home with Kyle.
*****
It is unclear to the Court where Kyle primarily lived from
the end of school until August. While the Scotts claim
the child lived with them . . . that claim loses credibility
due to Barbara’s call to CPS on August 19, 2008.
Barbara called CPS to report that [Johnson] had “dropped
off” Kyle with the Scotts on August 12th and had not
returned to pick him up. If Kyle had been living with the
grandparents that summer and [Johnson] had little or no
contact with him as claimed, there was no reason for
Barbara to call CPS on August 19th. However, if Kyle
had been living with the mother primarily or for
substantial periods from the end of school until August
12th, was dropped off at the Scotts and his mother failed
to come back to get him, then Barbara’s call to CPS was
reasonable. Therefore, any de facto status period may
have run from February to the end of May but stopped at
the beginning of June 2008.
* * * * *
[A]ny period of de facto custody would have began [sic]
anew on August 12, 2008, but was extinguished, at the
latest, when [Mihelic] asked for custody on March 5,
2009.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 - 5.
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Based on these findings, the court concluded, in part, as follows:
While there is substantial evidence on the de facto
custody issue favorable to the Scotts, there is no clear and
convincing evidence that they meet the statutory
threshold as defined by KRS 403.270. Kentucky law is
clear that even if the Scotts did more than their share of
parenting and support for the child, the de facto period
could not commence as long as they were co-parenting
with [Johnson] which occurred while she lived with them
until February 2008 and again during the summer of
2008.
*****
[Mihelic] promptly entered into a judgment providing
child support and health insurance coverage. Thus the
Scotts received $100.00 per week . . . to support Kyle by
a judgment of this Court that granted [Mihelic] joint
custody of Kyle. After [Johnson] died the Scotts began
to receive $966.00 per month from the Social Security
Administration. These facts, along with the prior
discussion, negate the Scotts [sic] clear and convincing
evidence of being Kyle’s primary financial supporter.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 10 – 11.
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Findings of fact
are not clearly erroneous where there is substantial evidence in the record to
support them. Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky.1986). If the findings are
supported by substantial evidence, our review on appeal is limited to an assessment
of the court’s legal conclusions. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Brewick v. Brewick, 121 S.W.3d 524 (Ky.App. 2003).
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Before the family court may find that a caregiver has become the “de
facto custodian” entitled to be placed on the same footing as a biological parent in
a custody proceeding, the court must determine that the biological parents have
abdicated the role of primary caregiver and financial supporter of the child for the
required period of time. London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351 (Ky.App. 2007). “It
is not enough that a person provide for a child alongside the natural parent; the
statute is clear that one must literally stand in the place of the natural parent to
qualify as a de facto custodian.” Consalvi v. Cawood, 63 S.W.3d 195 (Ky.App.
2001). If a nonparent provides care and financial support for a child in conjunction
with a natural parent, the nonparent will not qualify as a de facto custodian.
Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.App. 2007). The family court did not
misinterpret the requirements of KRS 403.270.
In this case, it is undisputed that Johnson and Kyle resided together in the
Scotts’ basement until February 2008. The family court found that Johnson was
providing substantial care and financial support for Kyle until that point and again
during the summer months of 2008. Although the Scotts contended otherwise,
these findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
The Scotts also argue that a contradiction exists between the court’s finding that
“the Scotts were arguably doing a substantial amount of the hands-on care,” and its
finding that the parties were engaged in a kind of “co-parenting” throughout these
periods. However, the caselaw is clear that the Scotts cannot claim de facto
custodian status during these periods of shared caregiving.
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It is also undisputed that Mihelic began providing financial support
(including health insurance) for Kyle after his paternity was established in
November 2008. While the Scotts provided care and support for Kyle (sometimes
without contribution from either of his parents), the family court did not err by
concluding that the Scotts had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that
Johnson and Mihelic had abdicated their roles as Kyle’s primary caregivers and
financial supporters for the required statutory period.
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Jefferson Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rocco J. Celebrezze
Jennifer S. Begley
Louisville, Kentucky
Dennis R. Carrithers
Louisville, Kentucky
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