BARBER (ROGER) VS BARBER (CAROL)
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RENDERED: JULY 22, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001269-ME
ROGER BARBER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00225
CAROL BARBER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 CHIEF SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Roger Barber appeals from an Order of the Clinton Circuit
Court overruling his Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate a child support
modification order. He contends that the trial court erred in its calculation of child
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Chief Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
support by improperly failing to acknowledge that an original child support
agreement had been altered by a valid, subsequent contract. We find no error, and
accordingly affirm.
On November 14, 2004, Carol filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Marriage in Clinton Circuit Court. At the time of the filing, Carol and her thenhusband Roger had two minor children, namely Levi (now age 15) and Sonya
(now age 20). Carol and Roger subsequently entered into a Settlement Agreement,
which provided in relevant part that the parties would share joint custody of the
children with Carol serving as the primary residential custodian. Additionally, the
Agreement gave Roger the right of visitation with Levi – but not Sonya – and
provided for Roger’s payment of $175 per week in child support until Levi
graduated from high school or was otherwise emancipated. The Agreement went
on to state that the child support obligation was not modified by the graduation or
emancipation of Sonya.
On December 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, which incorporated
and adopted the Separation Agreement in full. Slightly over two years later, Roger
moved to amend the Decree such that he would be the primary residential
custodian of Levi and would have a reduced child support obligation. Carol
responded with a motion to award her “full custody” of Levi with curtailed
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visitation by Roger. A hearing on the motions, conducted on April 29, 2008,
resulted in the court directing the parties to submit an Agreed Order reflecting the
parties’ resolution of the issues.
It appears from the record that the parties were unable to produce an
Agreed Order. After several months, on February 13, 2009, the court rendered a
Custody and Visitation Order reaffirming that the parties had joint custody of Levi
(Sonya having been emancipated) and ordering that Roger was obligated to pay
child support in an indeterminate amount “commensurate with the Kentucky Child
Support Guidelines.” The child support award was made retroactive to June 1,
2008.
On July 7, 2009, Carol alleged by way of motion that Roger had
stopped paying child support, and she asked the court to direct him to pay support
under the terms set out in the Final Decree rendered December 16, 2005. Roger
responded that the Clinton County Child Support Office had informed him that he
no longer owed child support.
In response to the parties competing child support motions, the court
rendered an Order on September 17, 2009, directing Roger to pay child support in
the amount of $782.76 per month. In fixing this amount, the court stated that,
Child support would have been calculated as $157.08, for
the Respondent [Roger], from the Petitioner [Carol], and
$618.32 for the Petitioner, from the Respondent. As the
Parties are sharing custody, the Court has calculated this
child support for one child, for each Party paying the
other Party. However, the Respondent was Ordered [sic]
in the December 16, 2005, [sic] Findings of Fact and
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Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, to continue to pay
child support for Sonya Barber. Therefore, calculating
that child support, the Respondent should be paying
$939.84, and giving him credit of $157.08, therefore, the
amount of child support ordered is $782.76.
Roger then moved to alter, amend or vacate the order. In
support of the motion, he argued that an Agreed Order was entered on
February 13, 2009, which dealt with the same subject matter as the
December 16, 2005 Decree which reflected a significantly altered
arrangement and hence superseded the existing terms of the 2005 Decree
relating to both custody and child support. He went on to contend that the
court failed to accurately calculate his income for purposes of establishing
support, and improperly required Carol to pay support only for Levi while
directing Roger to pay for both Levi and Sonya.
After the filing of Carol’s responsive brief, the court rendered
an order on May 28, 2010, in which it recalculated Roger’s obligation to be
$551.59 per month. It based this recalculation on the parties’ 2007 income
tax returns, and subtracted Carol’s obligation of $165.63 per month from
Roger’s obligation of $717.22 per month to reach the resultant $551.59 per
month owed by Roger. It went on to note that while the Separation
Agreement was somewhat unusual as it related to child support for Sonya, it
was mutually agreed to by the parties and was not then before the court for
further adjudication. This appeal followed.
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Roger now argues that the trial court erred in its calculation of
child support. He contends that he and Carol entered into a “valid
subsequent contract” which altered and abandoned the terms of their original
custody agreement. This valid subsequent agreement, he contends, was
reflected in the court’s February 13, 2009 Order providing that child support
would be calculated based on the statutory guidelines. At issue is Roger’s
contention that the latter agreement 1) was entered into nearly three and onehalf years after the Separation Agreement; 2) that the facts had substantially
changed during that period, with Levi spending about the same amount of
time with each parent; and, 3) that the latter agreement did not contain the
provision that support would not be modified by the emancipation or
graduation of Sonya. In sum, Roger contends that the new agreement – as
evidenced by the court orders documenting that agreement – voids the child
support language set out in the Separation Agreement and is a wholly new
agreement which the trial court improperly failed to acknowledge in fixing
Roger’s child support obligation at $551.59 per month. Additionally, Roger
contends that the court improperly failed to acknowledge that the Separation
Agreement’s language relating to Sonya (i.e., that her emancipation or
graduation would not affect Roger’s obligation) was no longer in effect, as it
had been superseded by the new agreement.
In response, Carol asserts that the terms of the Separation
Agreement, as set out in the Decree of Dissolution, remained in effect until
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such time as the parties sought to modify child support. She maintains that
child support was to be amended only because Levi was spending more time
with Roger than he did at the time of dissolution, and that there never was
any valid, subsequent agreement which altered the terms of the Separation
Agreement.
We have closely examined the record and the law, and find no
error in the Clinton Circuit Court’s modification of child support. Roger’s
claim of error centers on his assertion that a valid, subsequent agreement
amended the terms of the Separation Agreement. In support of this claim, he
points to language set out in an order rendered on February 13, 2009, in
which the court stated that the parties have “reached agreement” as to the
joint care, custody and control of Levi. Roger does not, however, direct our
attention to any “valid, subsequent agreement” which has been
memorialized in the record setting out the terms of the purported agreement,
nor any proof that the purported agreement addressed the amount of child
support as to Levi or the issue of Sonya’s emancipation. Additionally, the
trial court went so far as to state in its May 28, 2010 Order that “at no time
has either Party agreed to change the Parties’ original divorce decree.” In
the absence of any basis for finding that the parties agreed to make void the
terms of the Separation Agreement as it relates to child support, we cannot
conclude that the trial court was bound by any such purported agreement.
This is especially true since the Separation Agreement was incorporated into
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the Decree of Dissolution. Any purported agreement to alter the terms of the
Separation Agreement would necessarily be memorialized in writing and
incorporated into the record by way of a pleading or court ruling. No such
agreement, pleading or ruling appears in the record.
Roger goes on to argue that the trial court did not properly
establish the respective incomes of the parties, and that the method utilized
by the court to calculate child support was arbitrary and inequitable. We are
not persuaded by this argument. The record indicates that at the April 2008
hearing, the court relied on the then-latest 2007 tax returns, and the issue of
income was not raised until Roger filed a subsequent motion to alter, amend
or vacate. As to the method utilized by the court to calculate child support,
we also find no error. In calculating the modification of support resulting
from Levi spending more time with Roger, the court relied on the statutory
income worksheets, which each party completed and which are set out in the
record. This change resulted in a reduction of Roger’s child support
obligation from $757.75 per month to $551.59 per month. It reflected the
court’s recognition that Roger’s income was approximately three times that
of Carol’s, and the court went so far as to acknowledge on the record that the
statutory method of calculating child support in the instant case was the
same as that utilized in the trial judge’s own divorce. We have no basis for
concluding that the court’s modification of child support was not in
conformity with KRS Chapter 403 and the supportive case law. See
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generally, Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. App. 1994).
Accordingly, we find no error.
Lastly, Roger contends that any interpretation of the Separation
Agreement requiring him to pay support to Carol after Sonya’s emancipation
or graduation is void as against public policy. He directs our attention to
Gordon v. Gordon’s Adm’r, 168 Ky. 409, 182 S.W. 220 (1916), which
provides that “. . . courts will not enforce any agreement which, in its
objective, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality, or to civil honesty.” He goes on to maintain that
the Separation Agreement violates public policy and is, therefore, not
enforceable because it could result in his payment of child support to Carol
for the rest of Sonya’s life.
We are not persuaded that the provision of the Separation
Agreement, which addresses Sonya’s emancipation or graduation, could
result in Roger paying child support to Carol for the remainder of Sonya’s
life. The provision at issue states that, “[T]he child support shall not be
modified by the emancipation or graduation from High School by the said
Sonya Barber.” Separation Agreement Paragraph 8, however, states,
“[C]hild support shall continue to be paid in the sum of $175 per week until
such time as the minor child Levi Barber is emancipated or graduates from
High School, which ever [sic] occurs first.” The plain meaning of this
provision makes it clear that – contrary to Roger’s claim - he is not obligated
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to pay child support to Carol for the remainder of Sonya’s life. Rather, the
clear language of the Separation Agreement provides that his obligation
terminate with the emancipation or graduation of Levi. We find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the September 27, 2009
Order of the Clinton Circuit Court overruling Roger’s Motion to Alter,
Amend or Vacate its prior child support order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ralph D. Gibson
Somerset, Kentucky
Thomas G. Simmons
Monticello, Kentucky
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