FLEMING (JANET R.) VS. TONEY (MARGARET RENEE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001264-MR
JANET R. FLEMING
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00216
MARGARET RENEE TONEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
LEON B. FLEMING; WILLIAM C.
ABBOTT; AND SHARON A. ABBOTT
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, MOORE, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Janet Fleming appeals the order of the Trigg Circuit Court
granting partial summary judgment in favor of Margaret Renee Toney (Renee),
and its subsequent order denying her motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment, with regard to the issue of ownership of a joint bank account. Because
we find that the orders appealed from were interlocutory, we dismiss.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Leon and Janet Fleming were married and shared equal ownership in
their business, Lee Rents. In 1999, Leon and Janet separated, and Janet filed for
divorce. A decree was never entered, but Leon and Janet remained separated until
Leon’s death on August 24, 2006.
Following the separation, and prior to his death, Leon made several
estate planning decisions without Janet’s knowledge. In particular, Leon held an
individual account containing $51,418.59 (the “Integra account”), to which he
added Margaret Renee Toney (Renee), a non-relative, as a joint owner with rights
of survivorship. Within the month prior to his death, Leon then transferred
$432,347.13 into the Integra account from his Vanguard IRA,1 along with
$156,552.13 from various other sources.2 In total, the balance of the Integra
account amounted to $635,110.24 on the date of Leon’s death. Leon also executed
a document purporting to transfer his ownership interest in Lee Rents to his
daughter, Sharon Abbott, and her husband, William Abbott. He subsequently
executed a will containing a provision transferring his share of Lee Rents to Sharon
and William.3
1
This account was held by Leon individually, although Janet was named the beneficiary at the
time he withdrew the funds.
2
Although Janet does not address the issue on appeal, we note that Leon made bequests of
$300,000 to charity, in addition to all remaining cash or cash equivalents, in his will.
3
Leon’s daughter and son-in-law have operated Lee Rents since shortly after Leon’s retirement.
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When Leon died on August 24, 2006, all of the assets he owned
jointly with Janet, valued at $2,067,190.04, passed to Janet. Janet renounced
Leon’s will and elected to receive her dower interest in Leon’s estate. Thereafter,
Janet filed an action in Trigg Circuit Court seeking to bring the funds that Leon
had placed into the Integra account he shared with Renee back into Leon’s estate.4
Janet alleged that Leon’s various transfers into the Integra account constituted a
fraud on her dower interest, or, alternatively, that Leon had either intended a
different use for those funds when placing them in the Integra account, or that he
had placed the funds in that account by mistake. Additionally, Janet sought to
recover a dower interest in the Lee Rents stock that Leon had previously
transferred to Sharon and William, which is valued at $288,049.00.
Janet and Renee each filed cross-motions for partial summary
judgment with respect to the funds in the joint account, and the Trigg Circuit Court
granted Renee’s motion. In doing so, the court found that Janet had not produced
clear and convincing evidence that Leon had had a different intention with respect
to the funds in the Integra account, or that he had mistakenly deposited the funds
into that account. The court also relied upon Harris v. Rock, 799 S.W.2d 10 (Ky.
1990), and Hannah v. Hannah, 824 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1992), in finding that,
because Janet was otherwise provided for by her receipt of the jointly held assets
4
On appeal, Janet raises only her rights to the $432,347.13 from the Vanguard IRA. We note
however that Leon’s transfer of the entire $635,110.24 is relevant with respect to the issue of
whether Leon intended to defeat Janet’s dower interest as will be analyzed infra.
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and not destitute, the transfer of the funds into the Integra account did not
constitute a fraud on her dower.
Janet subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment arguing that each of the trial court’s bases for granting summary
judgment in favor of Renee was legally insufficient.
Nevertheless, the court denied Janet’s motion. As it related to the
issue of whether Janet had been left destitute, the trial court added that the fact that
Janet was not destitute was merely one factor in considering whether there was
fraud on the dower. The court further rejected Janet’s argument that the will
executed after the creation of the joint account constituted evidence of a different
intent “at the time the account was created,” pursuant to KRS5 391.315.
Renee moved the trial court to make its order granting Renee partial
summary judgment final and appealable. The trial court granted Renee’s motion,
and this appeal followed. However, all issues regarding the ownership of the Lee
Rents stock remain pending before the trial court.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Janet asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Renee because, as she argues, an issue of fact exists with
respect to whether Leon defrauded her dower interest and as to whether he
intended a different use for the funds or mistakenly deposited them into the Integra
account. We are unable to review the merits of this appeal in the absence of a final
5
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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adjudication from the trial court regarding the Lee Rents stock, but further
explanation is warranted on this point.
Generally speaking, Kentucky’s statutory scheme was designed to
prevent a decedent from disinheriting his surviving spouse. Hannah, 824 S.W.2d
at 868. To this effect, KRS 392.020 entitles the surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies intestate to one-half (1/2) of the surplus of all real and personal property
which the decedent owned in fee at the time of death. In similar fashion, if a
decedent dies testate, KRS 392.080 entitles the surviving spouse to renounce the
decedent’s will and receive one-half (1/2) of the surplus of the decedent’s personal
property and one-third (1/3) of the surplus of the decedent’s real property. These
are essentially the contours of a spouse’s “dower interest” rights under Kentucky
law at issue in this action.
This statutory dower interest applies only to assets in which the
decedent was “seized of an estate in fee simple at the time of death.” KRS
392.020. Therefore, joint assets are generally not considered for purposes of
determining statutory dower rights, as the joint owner’s interest swells at the death
of the other and the decedent is not “seized” of the property upon his death. See
KRS 381.050; KRS 391.315; see also 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators
§166 (2011). Likewise, a spouse does not ordinarily have a dower claim to funds
placed into a joint account with a third party. KRS 391.315. Rather, “[s]ums
remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the
surviving party or parties to the account as against the estate of the decedent unless
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there is clear and convincing written evidence of a different intention at the time
the account is created.” KRS 391.315 (1)(a).
As a caveat, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court has delineated a
“limitation, necessarily implied in law, that the survivor of parties to a joint
account cannot become the owner of the funds in the account upon death of the
other party if the party who deposited the funds was not legally entitled to dispose
of them in such a manner.” Harris, 799 S.W.2d at 12. Consequently, a spouse has
no legal right to place assets into a joint account, or otherwise dispose of assets,
with the intent to defeat his widow’s dower claim. Id. And, any funds found to
have been deposited for such a purpose will be subject to a surviving spouse’s
claim of fraud on the dower. Id. at 11.
On the other hand, a decedent will be deemed to have intended the
natural consequences of his actions. Anderson v. Anderson, 583 S.W.2d 504, 505
(Ky. App. 1979). As such, a decedent’s intent to defraud his spouse’s dower
interest depends upon the “condition of the parties and all the surrounding facts
and circumstances.” Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782, 783 (1949).
Or, stated differently, intent to defraud a spouse’s dower interest depends upon an
examination of the entirety of a decedent’s estate. See generally Anderson, 583
S.W.2d at 505; see also Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2, 3 (1930).
In considering the question of whether the circumstances surrounding
the entirety of a decedent’s estate reflect a decedent’s intent to defraud his spouse’s
dower interest, our courts “look primarily at the amount of the inter vivos transfer
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of personal property in proportion to the decedent’s estate.” Elizabeth S.
Muyskens, Note, Married in Kentucky: A Surviving Spouse’s Dower Right in
Personalty, 96 Ky. L.J. 99, 112 (2007-2008) (citing Patterson v. Patterson, 24
S.W. 880 (Ky. 1894); Payne, 33 S.W.2d 2). And, our courts will presume
fraudulent intent where a spouse has made an inter vivos transfer of the bulk of his
estate; i.e., generally more than half, without the spouse’s knowledge. Benge, 309
Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d at 783; see also Harris, 799 S.W.2d at 12.
Here, to determine whether Leon intended to defraud Janet of her
dower interest all of the “surrounding facts and circumstances” of his estate must
be evaluated. Benge, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d at 783. Furthermore, if Leon’s
inter vivos transfers reflect a transfer of more than half of his estate, the
presumption would apply. Id; see also Harris, 799 S.W.2d at 12. The burden
would then shift to Renee to prove an absence of fraud. Benge, 309 Ky. 354, 217
S.W.2d at 783. Consequently, 1) we must take into consideration that the record
before us does not evidence that the full value of Leon’s estate has been finalized
by the lower court, and 2) the trial court’s determination of who owns the Lee
Rents stock also necessarily becomes dispositive. The trial court not having noted
in its order the value of Leon’s estate, we are left with the conclusion that it did not
consider the proportionate value of the inter vivos transfer to the estate when
determining that there was not fraud on the dower.6 Furthermore, the exact value
6
We do note that the amended inventory from the probate court, which was filed in the circuit
court record, indicates that the Leon’s probate estate was valued at $712,256.48.
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of Leon’s estate cannot be ascertained absent the trial court’s determination with
respect to the Lee Rents stock. Even assuming that the inventory correctly values
Leon’s estate at $712,256.48,7 transfer of the Lee Rents stock and the funds in the
Integra account may ultimately amount to more than half of Leon’s estate (635K +
288K = 923K). Thus, the presumption of fraudulent intent may apply, which then
Renee must rebut to prevail.
Without this Court’s knowing the full value of Leon’s estate or the
disposition with respect to the Lee Rents stock, we cannot determine whether
Leon’s transfer of funds into the joint account amounted to a transfer of the bulk of
his estate prior to his death. Consequently, we cannot determine whether the trial
court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of Renee. Therefore, the
trial court failed to “conclusively determine the rights of the parties.” Hale v.
Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Ky. 1975). A judgment that does not adjudicate all
of the rights of the parties is interlocutory. Id. As a rule, we do not address
interlocutory orders on appeal because they are not final. KRS 22A.020(1).
Accordingly, it is ordered that this appeal is DISMISSED.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
ENTERED: August 19, 2011
7
/s/ Joy A. Moore
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
See id.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Glen S. Bagby
Daniel N. Thomas
J. Robert Lyons, Jr.
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
MARGARET TONEY:
Daniel N. Thomas
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
L. Rush Hunt
Madisonville, Kentucky
Lee T. White
L. Rush Hunt
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Madisonville, Kentucky
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