MAY (TOMMY JAKE) VS. MAY (JAMES MICHAEL), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 6, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001208-MR
TOMMY JAKE MAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01475
JAMES MICHAEL MAY;
AND CONNIE MAY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Tommy Jake May appeals from the order of the Pike
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of James Michael May and
Connie May. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In 2005, James and his wife Connie filed a complaint against Tommy,
asserting ownership to a certain parcel of property referred to by the parties as the
“homeplace.” They claimed ownership by way of a deed dated March 16, 1990,
executed and delivered by James’s and Tommy’s parents, Ralph and Fern May. In
that deed, Ralph and Fern reserved a life estate interest in the property and resided
on the property until their deaths in 2002 and 1995, respectively. The deed was
recorded on September 11, 1990 in the Pike County Clerk’s office.
In 2002, the last will and testament of Ralph May was probated and filed of
record. In his will, Ralph left James “the home I live in.” In 2003, Tommy
recorded a deed dated April 6, 1994, in which Ralph and Fern conveyed to him a
parcel of property bearing approximately the same description as the deed to
James, but no life estate was reserved. Thereafter, a dispute arose as to ownership
of the “homeplace.”
Before the trial court, Tommy disputed the validity of the 1990 deed to
James, arguing that the signatures of Ralph and Fern were forged and that the date
of the deed had been altered. Tommy also for the first time contested the validity
of Ralph’s will, claiming that it did not bear genuine signatures executed in the
presence of witnesses. The trial court held a hearing on the matter and
subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of James and Connie, finding
them to be the true owners of the “homeplace” by way of the 1990 deed and
Ralph’s bequest in his 2002 will. The court further found the 1994 deed to be
invalid. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment shall be granted only if “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
-2-
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03.
The trial court must view the record “in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991) (citations omitted). Further, “a party opposing a properly supported
summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
On appeal from a granting of summary judgment, our standard of review is
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Lewis B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001) (citations omitted).
Because no factual issues are involved and only legal issues are before the trial
court on a motion for summary judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our
review is de novo. Hallahan v. Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Ky.App.
2004).
Kentucky law is clear that the possession of a deed and its recording by the
grantee creates a presumption of delivery and acceptance. Wells v. Butcher, 299
Ky. 332, 335, 185 S.W.2d 406, 407 (1945); Fisk v. Peoples Liberty Bank & Trust
Co., 570 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky.App. 1978). Furthermore, reservation by a grantor
of a “life estate” interest in the property conveyed by the deed is evidence that the
grantor contemplated the deed would pass title immediately. Rodgers v.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3-
Hendrickson, 293 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Ky. 1956). With regards to an alleged forgery
of a deed, clear and convincing proof must be presented to void a deed which
purports to be signed and acknowledged by the grantor. Gose v. Perry, 302
S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ky. 1957) (citations omitted).
On appeal, Tommy contends that the trial court erred by finding no genuine
issue of material fact existed concerning the validity of the 1990 deed and Ralph’s
will. In particular, Tommy claims that affidavits addressing the signatures on the
1990 deed and Ralph’s will were sufficient to defeat James’s and Connie’s motion
for summary judgment. We disagree.
The trial court found that the 1990 deed from Ralph and Fern to James bore
the signatures of Ralph and Fern, was notarized, duly recorded by the Pike County
Clerk, and met all of the requirements for recordation in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. In addition, the court found that when Tommy recorded his deed in
2003, the 1990 deed was on record. See KRS2 382.270 (requires recording of all
instruments affecting real property); KRS 382.280 (deeds take effect in the order in
which they are legally acknowledged and recorded). The court emphasized that
the 1990 deed was recorded while both Ralph and Fern were alive; thereby
strengthening the presumption that James received delivery of the deed. The deed
to James also contained “life estate” language, which is strong evidence that Ralph
and Fern contemplated the deed would pass title immediately. The court further
found that the 1994 deed to Tommy did not contain “life estate” language and that
Tommy did not record his 1994 deed until 2003, after both of his parents had died.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
With respect to the validity of Ralph’s and Fern’s signatures on the 1990
deed, the court referred to Tommy’s deposition testimony, in which he admitted
that Ralph’s signature on the 1990 deed appeared to be valid and that the signature
of the notary (now deceased) on the 1990 deed was genuine. The court also found
that while the typed date “1989” on the 1990 deed was replaced with the
handwritten date “1990”, nonetheless, the deed was notarized in 1990. Thus, the
court held that the handwritten alteration did not invalidate the deed.
Concerning Tommy’s challenge to the validity of Ralph’s will, the trial court
found that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to KRS
394.240(1), which provides, in part:
Any person aggrieved by the action of the District Court
in admitting a will to record or rejecting it may bring an
original action in the Circuit Court of the same county to
contest the action of the District Court. Such action shall
be brought within two (2) years after the decision of the
District Court.
Since no litigation had been filed contesting the validity of the will, which
was probated and recorded in 2002, the court found that Tommy’s present
challenge was untimely. We agree. Thus, even if Tommy could successfully
challenge the validity of the 1990 deed, we note that the “homeplace” still passed
to James by virtue of Ralph’s will, which was probated prior to Tommy’s
recording in 2003 of the 1994 deed, and not contested until now.
Finally, Tommy asserts that the affidavits of record sufficiently create a
genuine issue of material fact so as to defeat James’s and Connie’s motion for
summary judgment; however, the deeds of record, Tommy’s deposition testimony,
-5-
and Ralph’s will overwhelmingly support the trial court’s finding that no genuine
issue of material fact existed and that James and Connie were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
The order of the Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Tommy R. May
Pikeville, Kentucky
Donald H. Combs
Pikeville, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.