RISTAU (KAREN) VS. RISTAU (JEROLD WILLIAM)
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001052-MR
KAREN RISTAU
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JO ANN WISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-05053
JEROLD WILLIAM RISTAU
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Karen Ristau appeals from the Fayette Circuit Court’s
divorce decree and order finding that her ex-husband’s, Jerold Ristau, income had
been reduced by fifty percent and which failed to allocate to Karen any share of the
equity in the marital residence. After careful review, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Karen and Jerold Ristau were married on May 14, 1991, and have one
child, W.A.R., born on November 24, 1994. Karen filed a petition for dissolution
of marriage on October 3, 2008. The matter comes before this Court as a result of
the trial court’s order and decree entered on April 9, 2010, which found that Jerry’s
income was only $75,000.00 for purposes of maintenance and child support, and
which did not require Jerry to reimburse Karen for her share of the equity lost on
the marital residence as a result of missed mortgage payments.
This divorce action has been ongoing for more than two years. The
parties appeared before the trial court on numerous occasions to address the
multitude of issues that typically arise in divorce cases. Both parties were, and
have continuously been, represented by counsel. By the date of trial, which
occurred on February 2, 2010, and concluded on March 24, 2010, the trial court
was intimately familiar with the facts of the case, the circumstances of the parties,
and the parties themselves.
Karen and Jerry had a small amount of marital property and a large
amount of marital debt. The order and decree entered on April 9, 2010, lists those
marital debts, which, excluding the marital residence, total $353, 244.00. Karen
does not challenge the apportionment of marital debt on appeal.
Karen contends that the trial court erred in not requiring Jerry to
reimburse her one-half of the equity in the marital residence. The parties originally
purchased the marital residence for $375,000.00. However, by the time of the
divorce, the residence was encumbered by two mortgages totaling approximately
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$398,000.00. The first mortgage on the property was $328,146.75, and the second
mortgage totaled $69,569.92. Given this, and the current depressed real estate
market, the parties were “upside down” on the loan and had no equity in the
marital residence. Karen testified that the residence needed a substantial amount of
repairs due to water damage from a leak, damage from an ice storm, and general
lack of maintenance over several years. The parties presented testimony indicating
that the home was not marketable in its current condition.
Aside from the residence, the marital estate possessed a few divisible
assets. There were three retirement accounts totaling $107,545.00, twenty head of
cattle, a one-half interest in Madison Hall Rental Company, and funds held in
escrow in the amount of $22,542.00. The trial court awarded Karen forty percent
of the marital estate and awarded Jerry sixty percent of the estate.
Jerry also received the bulk of the marital debt. The trial court
ordered that Jerry be solely responsible for the first and second mortgages on the
marital residence (totaling $398,00.00); a $60,000.00 debt for Karen’s daughter’s
college tuition;2 $255,000.00 owed to the Ford Hall Company for loans taken out
during the marriage; a $7,239.00 American Express credit card debt; $4,326.00 in
debt, which is the difference between the amount held in escrow and the total debt
allocated to be paid by the escrow funds; and a GM credit card debt totaling
$2,200.00. All of these debts were either stipulated to as marital debts or were
found to be marital debts by the trial court. The other debts were paid from the
2
It should be noted that Karen’s daughter is not Jerry’s biological child. The student loan,
however, was taken out in Jerry’s name only.
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escrow account, including two substantial Internal Revenue Service (IRS) debts,
which were proven to be marital debts.
Karen testified as to both parties’ inabilities to properly manage
money or control their spending. Notwithstanding the evidence that the parties
jointly created the marital debt, the trial court apportioned 99.8% of the remaining
debt to Jerry.3 Karen was only ordered to pay a $1200.00 First Financial Visa
credit card debt that was in her daughter’s name and accumulated after the parties
separated.
Karen was a homemaker for a majority of the marriage and has not
completed her education at this time. Jerry is the vice president of Ford W. Hall
Company, Inc. (hereinafter Ford), in which he is a shareholder with an ownership
interest of 22.5%. Jerry’s step-father, Ford W. Hall, owns a 75% interest in Ford,
and Cheryl Page, Jerry’s sister, owns a 2.5% interest. Jerry was employed by Ford
during the majority of his marriage to Karen, and this was his main source of
income during the marriage.
In addition to his position as an officer at Ford, Jerry works full-time
as a salesman for the company. Ford manufactures a product called an “algae
sweep automation,” which is used for water treatment. Ford Hall invented this
product, and from 1989 through May 2009, Ford held a patent for the product.
In addition to selling the algae sweep, Jerry is an independent
contractor for Sullivan Environmental Technologies (hereinafter Sullivan), and he
3
The marital estate paid $22,542.00 of the debt. Jerry is responsible for paying 99.8% of the
remaining debt.
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sells and markets the algae sweep on its behalf pursuant to a contract between
Sullivan and Ford. Under the terms of the agreement, Sullivan pays Ford a
percentage of the commission Sullivan receives for Jerry’s work on its behalf.
From 2004 until the end of 2009, Jerry was Ford’s highest paid
salesman, earning $150,000.00 in salary per year. Evidence presented at trial
showed that 1099s from Sullivan for Jerry’s independent contractor work were as
follows: 2006-$116,511.00; 2007-$220,985.00; 2008-$117,377.00; and 2009$224,404.00. Jerry testified that in 2005, despite his commissions for Sullivan
being only around $62,000.00, Ford did not lower his income of $150,000.00, even
though the company made less money that year.
Jeannie Copper, CEO of Ford, testified that she has worked for Ford
for fifteen years and has been CEO of the company for five years. In 2009,
Jeannie recommended that Jerry receive a 50% pay reduction and that other cost
cuts be made within Ford. Jeannie testified at length about the condition of Ford at
the time of trial. She testified that the company needed to lower costs across the
board for numerous reasons. First, she testified that the company lost its patent in
2009 and began facing competition on the only profitable item it manufactures and
sells, the algae sweep. She also testified about the weak economy and the fact that
Ford experienced a 25% decrease in sales from 2008 to 2009. Ford was also
paying Jerry more in salary than he was actually earning for the company. She
testified that Ford had entered into a contract with Sullivan in 2005 where Jerry
sold miscellaneous equipment in exchange for commissions to be paid to Ford.
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However, Ford experienced a $235,000.00 loss attributable to Jerry through 2009.
Finally, Karen and Jerry had taken personal loans from Ford, and by the time the
order and decree was entered by the trial court, the parties owed Ford $255,000.00.
Jeannie testified that based on the factors above, Ford had legitimate reasons for
lowering Jerry’s salary, because at that time he was Ford’s highest paid employee.
On December 22, 2009, Jeannie circulated a memorandum to all Ford
shareholders (Ford Hall, part-time employee Cheryl Page, and Jerry)
recommending pay cuts due to an economic downturn and the loss of the algae
sweep patent. Jeannie testified that due to the 25% loss in sales from 2008 to
2009, Ford’s accountant recommended that corrective measures be taken to restore
the health of the company. The accountant suggested that the company needed to
either downsize or manufacture other products to make up for the lost revenue.
Because Ford did not profit from or manufacture any other products, the only
solution was to cut costs.
The proposed cost saving recommendations were as follows: (1) that
Ford Hall apply for Medicare benefits in order to reduce the amount of funds that
Ford spent on health insurance for him; (2) that one employee be laid off; (3) that
the shareholders and CEO reduce their salaries, which included Jeannie’s salary
being cut by 25% and Jerry’s pay being cut by 50% because he was costing Ford
substantially more than he was bringing in; (4) that Cheryl Page’s hourly wage be
reduced from $10.00 to $8.00 per hour; (5) that Janet Hall’s wages be reduced to
minimum wage; (6) that several properties owned by Ford be sold as well as all
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vehicles that were not actively used; and (7) that the company reduce its rent
payment by half.
Jeannie circulated two drafts of the memorandum detailing the above
recommendations, but the drafts differ very little. The first memorandum included
a line regarding Cheryl Page that read, “[a]nd since wages paid to you in the last 5
months have been solely for the purpose of supporting Jerry in his divorce, those
dollars actually go towards another Jerry expense.” The second memorandum did
not include this line. In her brief to this Court, Karen indicates that Jerry’s income
was reduced with knowledge and approval by Ford in anticipation of Jerry’s
upcoming divorce trial. However, Jerry argues that language that was missing
from the second memorandum only provides that Cheryl’s salary should be
reduced and Jerry should be credited with an expense.
Jeannie testified at trial regarding the two drafts and explained that
she drafted the memorandum and sent it to the shareholders. After she sent out the
original memo, it was brought to her attention that Cheryl Page did work for Ford
in a capacity other than helping Jerry with his divorce, and that she performed
ratings reviews, prepared binders for clients, and did other tasks. Thus, Jeannie
edited the memo to correct her errant belief that Cheryl had only assisted Jerry in
the divorce proceedings. No other substantial changes were made to the memo,
and Jerry agreed to a salary reduction to relieve his burden on the company.
The parties entered into a mediation agreement in October 2008. Per
the agreement, Jerry was to make the mortgage payments on the marital residence.
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Before the parties entered into the agreement, however, the mortgage had fallen
behind on several occasions. In May, 2008, Karen took out a “Home Saver
Advance” loan in the amount of $10,500.00 to get the mortgage current. However,
the loan only added to the growing debt accumulated by the parties. During the
time leading up to the mediation agreement, Karen still had access to Jerry’s
checking account, and Karen was still presumably making the mortgage payments.
When Jerry agreed to solely assume paying the mortgage, the parties were behind
on their obligations. In order to get current on the mortgage payments, Jerry sold
some cattle in the fall of 2008 and applied $10,000.00 of the proceeds to the
mortgage debt. Jerry then got behind again and was working with Bank of
America (BOA) to make the mortgage current.
Jerry testified that when he entered negotiations with BOA to renegotiate the loan, he was informed by BOA that making a mortgage payment
would be disruptive to the loan modification program. Thus, in hopes of
modifying the terms of the loan and based on professional advice directly from
BOA, Jerry ceased paying the mortgage obligation. The trial court was aware that
Jerry chose to modify the terms of the mortgage because Karen filed several
motions on the issue, and the trial court heard arguments of counsel during motion
hours.
Karen’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to order Jerry to reimburse her for her one-half interest in the
equity of the marital residence. The trial court determined in its final order and
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decree that Karen was entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital residence, but
ultimately concluded that the property was worth less than the debt, and thus there
was no equity in the marital residence. As a result, Karen received no money for
her share. Karen argues that the testimony at trial indicated that the default penalty
and costs totaled $46,990.82 and occurred as a result of Jerry not making timely
mortgage payments. Thus, Karen argues that the balance of the mortgage minus
the default penalties amounted to $350,724.00. Karen alleges that the difference in
the current value of the residence ($375,000.00) and the balance of the mortgage
($350,724.00) is approximately $24,000.00 in divisible equity in the marital
residence. Karen also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining Jerry’s salary for purposes of establishing maintenance and child
support.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining marital property,
allocating such property, and dividing up marital debt. Accordingly, we review the
trial court’s order in the instant case to determine if there was an abuse of that
broad discretion. See Kleet v. Kleet, 264 S.W.3d 610, 618 (Ky. App. 2007). See
also Lykins v. Lykins, 34 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ky. App. 2000). “The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Bailey v. Bailey, 246 S.W.3d 895, 897
(Ky. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted). In cases where the trial court has
broad discretion, “we are mindful that…unless absolute abuse is shown, the
appellate court must maintain confidence in the trial court and not disturb the
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findings of the trial judge.” Weldon v. Weldon, 957 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Ky. App.
1997) (emphasis in original).
A careful review of the record indicates that the trial court considered
the amount of equity, if any, in the marital residence. The order and decree states:
“The Court also determines that the amount of principal that [Jerry] would have
paid down on the [] residence from October 2008 through March 2010 could have
been paid and the Court determines that half of such amount should be allocated to
[Karen].” However, the Court then determined that Karen dissipated marital assets
well above the amount owed to her from the missed mortgage payments by selling
two marital vehicles and keeping the proceeds. Further, the trial court found that
Karen dissipated marital assets by purchasing a dog and incurring vet fees
associated with its illnesses. Ultimately, the trial court found that Karen dissipated
approximately $9,400.00 in marital assets. In contrast, the trial court found that
Jerry dissipated between $4,000.00 and $5,000.00 and determined that such
amount “is appropriate if not being high for what [Jerry] potentially dissipated.”
Due to the dissipation, the trial court deemed that any potential principal pay down
in the marital residence was a “wash.” Moreover, there was evidence presented
that the mortgages on the marital residence were continually behind, even during
the marriage, and that the residence needed substantial repairs.
Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in declaring any equity in the residence to be a “wash” and not awarding
any such equity to Karen. There was substantial evidence in the record indicating
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that Karen and Jerry failed to make the mortgage payments and care for the
residence during the marriage, as well as ample evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding that Karen dissipated assets equaling just as much, if not more, than
Jerry. Accordingly, the trial court’s holding that Karen would not receive any
equity from the marital residence was not an abuse of the broad discretion it is
afforded in dividing marital property.
Karen next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
Jerry’s salary to be reduced by fifty percent of his past earnings. Karen argues
there was not substantial evidence presented at trial indicating that Jerry’s salary
had been legitimately lowered due to a downturn in the economy. Karen contends
that Ford’s actions after the date of the memorandum indicate that the
memorandum was only written in anticipation of the divorce for purposes of
lowering maintenance and child support.
Again, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining Jerry’s salary to be $75,000.00 for purposes of setting maintenance
and child support. The trial court was in the best position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.
See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. See also Uninsured
Employers' Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1991) (“It is within the
province of the fact-finder to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given the evidence.”) (Citation omitted).
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The trial court heard the testimony of Jeannie Cooper regarding the
downturn in the economy, the loss of Ford’s patent, and the need for Ford to cut
costs or manufacture other items. Furthermore, the trial court had records of
Jerry’s earnings from the years leading up to the divorce, as well as Ford’s records
of sometimes paying Jerry more than he brought into the company. Finally,
Jeannie testified that her salary was also cut due to the economic downturn and the
loss of the algae sweep patent. Therefore, the record indicates that the trial court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court did not commit
an abuse of discretion in determining Jerry’s income to be reduced to half of his
previous income, or $75,000.00.
The trial court found that Karen could not support herself through
appropriate employment and determined that her reasonable needs were $3,729.00
per month. Because Karen was not working and did not have a degree, the court
imputed Karen with an income of $1,257.00 in minimum wage per month. Based
on his income of $75,000.00, the trial court determined that Jerry could not
simultaneously pay the substantial marital debts assigned to him and provide for
Karen’s reasonable needs. Therefore, the trial court ordered Jerry to pay Karen
$1,000.00 per month in maintenance and $543.00 per month in child support. In
light of the evidence presented and the substantial amount of debt allocated to
Jerry, the trial court properly divided the marital debt and properly determined
maintenance and child support in this case.
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Based on the foregoing, the April 9, 2010, order and decree of the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rocco J. Celebrezze
Jennifer S. Begley
Louisville, Kentucky
Carl D. Devine
Anna Dominick
Lexington, Kentucky
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