MAGGARD (BRETT) VS. WARREN (ASHLEY)
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RENDERED: APRIL 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000857-ME
BRETT MAGGARD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00204
ASHLEY WARREN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Brett Maggard (Appellant) appeals from an order
of the Rowan Circuit Court naming Ashley Warren (Appellee) as the primary
residential parent of the parties’ child. In doing so, the court modified the parties’
prior timesharing arrangement, which had the child spending an equal amount of
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
time with each parent. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in modifying
timesharing in this manner because Appellee’s husband had demonstrated a history
of substance abuse and violent proclivities. However, after reviewing the record,
we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error. Therefore, we
affirm.
The parties are the parents of A.S.M., who was born on May 21, 2006.
They were never married, and after their relationship ended Appellant filed a
petition to establish custody. The parties subsequently entered into an agreed order
establishing joint custody of A.S.M. as well as an alternating timesharing schedule.
This arrangement was intended to afford equal parenting time to each party and
required the child to live with one parent on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday,
Saturday, and Sunday and the other parent on Wednesday and Friday, with the
parties switching this schedule every week. The agreed order further provided that
this arrangement would be revisited when A.S.M. began school.
On June 3, 2009, Appellee filed a domestic violence petition against
her boyfriend Travis Archer, with whom she had been cohabitating. The petition
stemmed from a series of events that had occurred during several days in May after
Appellee had ended her relationship with Archer. According to the petition,
Appellee and Archer had an argument that ended with Appellee telling Archer that
she was leaving him. Archer told Appellee that he would rip up the hardwood
laminate in Appellee’s mobile home or tear the entire home down if she left him.
He also threatened to cut the brake lines in her vehicle and told her that he “knows
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people” that could get her son taken away from her. Archer also threatened to kill
himself, put a handgun to his head, and pulled the trigger. Appellee believed the
gun had jammed, but Archer later revealed that it had not been loaded. Two of
Archer’s friends subsequently took the gun from him and tried to help him with his
suicidal feelings.
The petition further revealed that Appellee called Archer’s parents the
following morning and told them to come and pick him up. This occurred after he
had asked for his gun back. As Archer and his parents were leaving Appellee’s
home, Archer jumped out of the vehicle and ran into the woods, after which he
would not leave the property for two hours. At some point, Archer also told
Appellee that if she left him, she would be sorry and that he knew someone that
could “take care” of her. When asked what he meant, Archer told her that he could
pay this man to hurt, rape, or kill someone. He then told her that he could never
think of someone raping her, so he would just have the guy “beat [her] up.” He
also threatened to shoot anyone that she began dating. Appellee also alleged that
Archer had followed her around Wal-Mart and a party after the break-up and had
repeatedly called her to see what she was wearing and what she was doing. A
domestic violence order was subsequently entered, but sometime later Appellee
had the order dismissed because she had reconciled with Archer.
On November 10, 2009, Appellant filed a motion asking the trial court
to modify the parties’ timesharing arrangement pursuant to KRS 403.320 because
the child was “seriously endangered” by his exposure to Archer. Appellant
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specifically alleged that Archer was “violent and unstable” and was “known to
have a substance abuse problem.” Appellant asked the court to severely restrict
Appellee’s time with the child and to order that Archer not be present during any
visits with her. Appellee responded to this motion with her own motion to modify
timesharing. She alleged that the parties’ current timesharing arrangement made it
difficult for the child to have stability in his life because he was constantly being
shuttled back and forth between the parties’ homes. Appellee also noted that the
child would be starting preschool soon and needed a more structured routine. She
indicated that her job enabled her to be readily available if he needed to be picked
up from school or taken to the doctor. She further noted that Appellant was living
in the home of his girlfriend’s parents and that this only added to any instability.
Essentially, then, each party sought to be named as A.S.M.’s primary residential
parent.
A hearing was held on February 12, 2010. At that hearing, the trial
court heard testimony from Appellant, Appellee, Archer, and Appellant’s fiancée,
Sarah Burchett. Appellant testified that he had been a union carpenter for
approximately two years and that while he had previously been living with his
fiancée’s parents, he had recently purchased his own mobile home. Appellant
noted that he often worked away from home in places like Lexington or Ashland,
so on days when he had A.S.M. and was working, the child was watched by
Burchett and his parents. He also noted that his mother had taken care of most of
A.S.M.’s doctor’s visits. Appellant testified that A.S.M. seemed to be well-4-
adjusted to his routine at Appellant’s home and that A.S.M. enjoyed spending time
with him and Burchett. As for the issue of schooling, Appellant wanted A.S.M. to
go to the preschool at Upper Tygart Elementary in Carter County in large part
because its location was convenient to both parties. Appellant believed that
modification of timesharing was necessary (and that the child needed to spend
more time with him) because of the presence of Travis Archer in Appellee’s life.
Appellant indicated that he was “surprised” and “alarmed” when the two
reconciled and were married because he was concerned about the events of May
2009 and Archer’s drug use during that incident. Appellant also noted that he,
unlike Archer, had never had a DVO or EPO issued against him.
Sarah Burchett, Appellant’s fiancée, testified that she and Appellant
were going to be married soon and that she and Appellant had never had any
incidents involving domestic violence or drug abuse and had never argued in front
of A.S.M. Burchett also testified that she was a stay-at-home mother capable of
watching A.S.M. as well as her own child. She also agreed with Appellant that
Upper Tygart Elementary was the most feasible education option for A.S.M.
Appellee testified that her relationship with Appellant had ended after
the two had had a series of verbal and physical conflicts that had occasionally left
her with visible bruising and marks. However, she acknowledged that she had
never called the police on any of these occasions and had never sought an EPO. In
terms of her current residential situation, Appellee indicated that while she had
moved in with her mother after her separation from Archer, she was now living in
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her mobile home again and was working from home handling financial and human
resource matters for a telecommunications company. Consequently, on days when
she had A.S.M., she was able to watch him herself. Appellee further testified that
she believed the current timesharing schedule had become unworkable because
A.S.M. “had no sense of belonging” or “stability.” She noted that A.S.M. seemed
to have a hard time dealing with a different set of rules for each parent –
particularly with respect to discipline – and with having to leave one home for
another so frequently. This was a specific concern given that A.S.M. was about to
begin preschool. Appellee expressed her desire that A.S.M. attend schools in the
Rowan County school system because she had previously worked as a teacher’s
aide in that system and was familiar with the schools. She did not want A.S.M. to
attend Upper Tygart because she was unfamiliar with the Carter County school
system and also because the middle school and high school were on the opposite
end of the county, creating potential difficulties in the future in terms of
transportation. Appellee also expressed concern about A.S.M. spending time at
Appellant’s parents’ home because it was “filled with mold.” She also indicated
that Appellant had confided in her that he was likely facing future financial
difficulties. Consequently, she believed that A.S.M. would be better off if he spent
the majority of his time with her.
As for her relationship with Travis Archer and the events leading to
Appellant’s motion to modify timesharing, Appellee testified that she had begun
dating Archer in early 2008 and that the two had begun cohabitating several
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months later. She acknowledged that the events leading to the DVO petition
against Archer had occurred and that the allegations therein were factual.
However, she indicated that Archer had consumed ten Valium pills in the previous
two or three days and had drunk a fifth of liquor on the day that the two fought
because of his inability to deal with the pressures of being unemployed. She also
acknowledged that the child had witnessed approximately four or five minutes of
an argument between her and Archer that had taken place during that weekend
while Archer was in an intoxicated state. Because of his conduct, Appellee ended
her relationship with Archer and asked him to move out. She subsequently
received a phone call from a member of Archer’s family in August 2009 and was
told that since then he had begun attending church and had made other positive
changes in his life. She and Archer began talking by phone and eventually
reconciliated, as a result of which she had the DVO dismissed. The two were later
married.
Archer was the final witness to testify. When questioned about the
events leading up to the DVO, he fully acknowledged that they had occurred.
However, he indicated that he had not intended to carry out any of the threats he
had made and that he had “said a lot of stuff to keep [Appellee] in my life” because
he had been scared of losing her. Archer testified that in the days leading up to
those events, he was in a bad mental state because he had been unable to find work
and was feeling, for the first time, the pressure of paying bills and putting food on
the table. He admitted that he had obtained a number of Valium pills from
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Appellee’s father to address sleep issues and had taken at least ten of them in the
days prior to the argument with Appellee, which caused him to act abnormally. He
also acknowledged drinking a considerable amount of alcohol at a party on the
night of the argument and claimed that he was intoxicated that night and the next
morning during the incidents in question. However, Archer noted that he was now
steadily employed as a heavy equipment operator and that he had passed numerous
drug screens since that time.
Archer further admitted that A.S.M. had witnessed him “yelling” and
“cussing” at Appellee for four or five minutes during their argument, but he noted
that no other such incident had occurred before or since then. He also spoke about
his relationship with A.S.M. and how much he enjoyed spending time with the
child. Archer additionally testified that he no longer owned the handgun that had
been part of the aforementioned events but that he did own a shotgun that he kept
locked in a gun safe. Further testimony reflected that Archer had previously pled
guilty to fourth-degree assault after a fight with his father several years ago but that
the two now had a good relationship. He also acknowledged that he had a prior
DUI conviction in 2001 or 2002 and that he had been the subject of another EPO
by an ex-girlfriend. However, he indicated that the EPO had been dismissed and
that the ex-girlfriend in question had made up the allegations leading to it because
he had told her that he no longer wanted anything to do with her because of her
issues with drug abuse.
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On March 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order modifying the
parties’ timesharing arrangement. As a result of this order, Appellee was named
the child’s primary residential parent and Appellant was given “timesharing with
the child pursuant to the standard visitation of the Rowan Circuit Court.” The trial
court justified its decision thusly:
1. The parties are the parents of a son, [A.S.M.], age 3½
years old.
2. The parties share the joint custody of [A.S.M.], and
exercise split timesharing of the child pursuant to an
Agreed Order entered in the Rowan Circuit Court on
May 16, 2008.
3. Brent Maggard, Petitioner, resides with his
girlfriend/fiancée in a mobile home he purchased since
filing his Motion for Modification of Timesharing. He is
employed in construction work and usually works on
projects in Lexington and Ashland, KY. He resides in
Carter County, KY.
4. Ashley Warren is employed by C-3 Communications
but works from a home office. She is married to Travis
Archer. She is able to provide care for the child while
working since she works from her home. She resides in a
mobile home that she owns which is located on her
grandparent’s farm.
5. The Timesharing arrangement is unworkable due to
the many rotations which take place each week and will
continue to be more difficult as the child ages.
6. Even the parties determined that this issue would need
to be revisited in its Agreed Order referenced above.
7. Ashley Warren secured a Domestic Violence Order
against Travis Archer, for verbal threats made to her
during a weekend when they were having relationship
difficulties. This was an isolated event.
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8. Ashley Warren and Travis Archer later reconciled and
are now married.
9. The Court finds that Travis Archer is not a danger to
the child.
10. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the
child for Brett Maggard to have timesharing with the
child in accordance with the standard visitation order of
the Rowan County Circuit Court and that the Respondent
have visitation at all other times.
11. In its Legal Analysis this Court has considered the
factors of KRS 403.320 and finds that timesharing with
the mother would not endanger the child’s physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health. The Court finds that
Ashley Warren took necessary steps to protect the child
after her relationship difficulties with Travis Archer. The
Court finds that the series of events were isolated and
that Mr. Archer does not impose any future threats to the
minor child. The Court considered KRS 403.270
regarding the issue of Domestic Violence and Abuse and
found that all threats made to Ashley Warren were
verbal, that she was not a victim of physical violence and
the child only heard the parties cursing on one occasion.
The child will not be endangered by timesharing in the
Archer household [since] he is not seriously in danger as
to his physical, mental, or emotional health and neither
are the custodial parents.
12. The Court further finds that pursuant to KRS
403.320(3) this order modifying timesharing serves the
best interest of the child.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding Appellee
primary residential custody of A.S.M. because this left the child exposed to Travis
Archer, who Appellant describes as “a man with admitted and proven violent
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proclivities.” The standards for evaluating a trial court’s modification of a
timesharing arrangement on appeal are well-established. When a parent in a jointcustody situation seeks to become the primary residential parent, he or she is
actually seeking only to modify the existing timesharing arrangement. KRS
403.320 allows a timesharing arrangement to be modified at any time upon a
showing that a change would be within a child’s best interests. Pennington v.
Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 769 (Ky. 2008); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 326 S.W.3d
460, 464 (Ky. App. 2010); KRS 403.320(3).2 Moreover, a court “shall not restrict
a parent’s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger
seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” KRS
403.320(3).
Our review is governed by Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01,
which provides, in relevant part: “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
only if they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Frances v. Frances,
266 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Ky. 2008); Wells v. Wells, 412 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1967).
“When an appellate court reviews the decision in a child custody case, the test is
whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his
discretion.” Frances, 266 S.W.3d at 756; see also Pennington, 266 S.W.3d at 769
2
Appellant spends a considerable amount of time in his briefs asserting the applicability of KRS
403.340 to our review. However, that statute applies to motions seeking a change in custody of a
child – not mere modification of a timesharing/visitation arrangement. See Pennington, 266
S.W.3d at 765. Thus, it is inapplicable here.
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(holding that “modification of visitation/timesharing must be decided in the sound
discretion of the trial court.”). If no such error or abuse occurred, the fact that this
Court might have decided the case differently is irrelevant. See Cherry v. Cherry,
634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982); Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153, 153 (Ky.
1974).
As an initial matter, we note that it is fairly obvious that having
A.S.M. bounce back and forth between different residences multiple times per
week is an untenable situation given that he is approaching school-age. Indeed, the
parties recognized as such in their original agreed order. Thus, modification of the
original timesharing arrangement was inevitable and necessary. The question,
then, becomes whether the trial court erred in modifying timesharing in the manner
in which it did. After reviewing the record here, we see nothing that leads us to
conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous or that the
court abused its discretion in applying those facts to the law in naming Appellee as
A.S.M.’s primary residential parent.
Appellant mainly argues that it was not in A.S.M.’s best interest for
Appellee to be designated as the child’s primary residential parent because it
would increase the child’s exposure to Travis Archer. Appellant specifically
contends that the trial court erred in finding that the behavior displayed by Archer
in May 2009 was “isolated” in nature. In a related vein, Appellant also contends
that since the noted incident between Appellee and Archer occurred in May 2009
and the modification hearing occurred in February 2010, not enough time had
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passed for the trial court to conclude that Archer had “reformed himself” since the
two had only been reconciled for a short period of time. Appellant further
contends that A.S.M.’s continued exposure to Archer endangers the child’s
physical, mental, moral, and emotional health.
While there is certainly some merit to these arguments, we cannot say
that they compelled a different result below. The trial judge had a full opportunity
to observe Archer on the witness stand and to determine how much credibility and
weight his testimony about this matter carried. While we are deeply concerned
about Archer’s history of drug and alcohol abuse and violent behavior, the trial
judge apparently found his story to be convincing and concluded that the incidents
in questions were “isolated” events and that A.S.M. would not be exposed to harm
by living with Appellee and Archer. We cannot say that this conclusion was
clearly erroneous. The events of May 2009, while concerning, were confined to a
limited period of time and A.S.M. had little exposure to what took place.
Moreover, Appellee – while verbally threatened – was not physically harmed by
Archer, and Archer gave considerable and candid testimony regarding what had
led up to his conduct during that time and how he had attempted to change since
then. There was also no evidence produced suggesting that A.S.M. was somehow
adversely affected by his relationship with Archer or by Archer’s relationship with
Appellee. Ultimately, this is a classic case in which the trial court likely could
have modified timesharing in favor of either party based on the evidence presented
at the hearing and what the court chose to believe. Given the extensive discretion
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trial courts are afforded in these instances, we see no basis for reversal. See
Pennington, 266 S.W.3d at 769.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Rowan Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Preston Thompson
Grayson, Kentucky
Leah Hawkins
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
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