HILLOCK (WILLIAM E.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 6, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000793-MR
WILLIAM E. HILLOCK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00007-001
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: William E. Hillock appeals from the final judgment of the
Adair Circuit Court sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment for criminal abuse
in the second degree, following a jury trial. For the following reasons, we vacate
the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Hillock was indicted by the Adair County Grand Jury on two counts of
criminal abuse in the first degree, based on allegations that he abused his daughter,
who at the time of the indictment was less than a year old. Count one of the
indictment charged Hillock with committing the offense of criminal abuse in the
first degree on or about October 15-29, 2008. Count two charged him with
committing the same offense on or about December 15, 2008.
Before the trial commenced, the Commonwealth moved to amend count two
of the indictment to include a period of time from November 28, 2008 to
December 17, 2008 during which the alleged abuse occurred. Hillock objected on
the basis that these dates did not conform to the proof and that the grand jury had
not indicted him for actions occurring during this period of time. Hillock noted
that three separate incidents were alleged and the grand jury chose to indict on only
two of them. Hillock argued that amending the indictment to include actions
between November and December 2008 would include the third alleged incident,
which the grand jury had already chosen not to indict him on. The trial court
allowed the Commonwealth to amend the indictment.
Following voir dire and the exercise of peremptory challenges by both
parties, the trial court sua sponte asked counsel for Hillock why she peremptorily
struck the sole African-American venire member. Counsel explained that she had
reason to believe the member was a former police officer and that Hillock did not
want a police officer serving as a juror. The Commonwealth objected,
emphasizing that no inquiry was made during voir dire about anyone being a police
officer. The trial court refused to strike the member, and the member ultimately
sat on the jury that convicted Hillock.
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The trial court then asked counsel for Hillock to explain exercising eight of
nine peremptory strikes against females, excepting the three females also struck by
the Commonwealth. The court accepted counsel’s explanations except for the one
female venire member at issue, who counsel stated she struck because the member
was sitting next to and talking with another female venire member who had a
hostile demeanor when counsel questioned the venire members about child abuse.
Counsel stated that she had reason to believe these two venire members were
related. The female member with the hostile demeanor was struck from the panel,
but the trial court refused to strike the female member in question and she
ultimately sat on the jury that convicted Hillock.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Hillock moved for a
directed verdict and the trial court dismissed count two. At the close of all the
evidence, the jury was instructed on one count of criminal abuse in the first degree,
as well as second and third-degree lesser offenses, covering the period of time on
or about October, November, or December 2008. The jury returned a guilty
verdict on criminal abuse in the second degree and recommended a sentence of
five years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Hillock in accordance with the
jury’s recommendations. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Hillock claims the trial court erred by: (1) denying him the right
to exercise all of his peremptory challenges when it refused to strike the AfricanAmerican venire member and the female venire member, (2) allowing the
Commonwealth to amend count two of the indictment to cover a period of time
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between November and December 2008, and (3) not allowing Hillock’s expert, Dr.
George Nichols, to testify about the results of an MRI which were interpreted by a
radiologist who was not present at trial. Hillock also contends the evidence was
insufficient to permit the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Since
we agree that the trial court erred by setting aside Hillock’s peremptory strikes, we
vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. Nonetheless, we will address all
of Hillock’s claims of error since their resolution may affect the second trial.
First, Hillock maintains the trial court erred by not allowing him to
peremptorily strike the venire members at issue, constituting a violation of his
substantial rights. We agree.
Under Kentucky law, the exercise of peremptory strikes is viewed as a
“substantial right,” the denial or misallocation of which is per se reversible error.
Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007). The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits one from discriminating against potential jurors on the basis of
race or gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Wiley v. Commonwealth,
978 S.W.2d 333 (Ky.App. 1998). The United States Supreme Court has articulated
a three-step process to be used in evaluating claims that a peremptory challenge
was exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).1
1
While the Batson test has often been applied in situations in which the prosecution’s
peremptory strike is challenged, “a criminal defendant is characterized as a state actor and is
thereby precluded from the exercise of peremptory challenges based on race or gender.” Wiley,
978 S.W.2d at 335.
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The first step requires the prosecution to make a prima facie showing of
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. If a race or genderneutral explanation is provided and the trial court rules on the issue, the
determination as to whether a prima facie showing was made is, as here, mooted.
Harris v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Ky. 2004) (citations omitted).
The second step requires the defendant to articulate a race or gender-neutral
explanation for the strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. This
explanation “need not be persuasive, or even plausible, nor does it need to rise to
the level of a challenge for cause. It must simply be facially valid.” Harris, 134
S.W.3d at 611. Further, “‘[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
[defendant’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race [or gender]
neutral.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, counsel for Hillock explained that she had reason to believe the
African-American venire member was a former police officer and that Hillock did
not want a police officer to serve as a juror. See Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, 831
S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky. 1992) (a neutral explanation for peremptorily striking a
potential juror may be based upon information received from a source other than
information derived from voir dire). In addition, counsel explained that she
peremptorily struck the female venire member because she was seated next to, and
conversing regularly with, another female venire member who counsel believed to
be her relative and whose demeanor was hostile when counsel questioned the
jurors about child abuse. Counsel reasoned that if one relative had an adverse
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reaction, then the other might likely have similar feelings but may not be so
noticeable in her disgust. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Ky. 2004) (assumptions drawn from demeanor, inattentiveness, posture, and
manner of dress have been recognized as neutral explanations). These facially
valid explanations offered by counsel for Hillock satisfy the second step of the
Batson test.
The third step “requires the trial judge to determine whether the
[prosecution] has met the burden of showing intentional discrimination.” Harris,
134 S.W.3d at 611 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724). In making
this determination, the trial court “must evaluate the reasons offered by the
[defendant] to determine if they are valid and neutral and not simply a pretext for
discrimination.” Harris, 134 S.W.3d at 612 (citing Gamble v. Commonwealth, 68
S.W.3d 367, 371 (Ky. 2002)). We afford great deference to the trial court’s
determinations since the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility
and demeanor of counsel. Harris, 134 S.W.3d at 612. The trial court’s decisions
will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Ky. 1990)).
In this case, though the trial court made no specific findings in this regard, it
did state on the record that it did not believe counsel for Hillock would
intentionally discriminate. Thus, since Hillock offered both race and genderneutral explanations for striking the venire members at issue, and the record
reveals no finding that the explanations were a pretext for discrimination, we
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believe the trial court erred by setting aside Hillock’s peremptory strikes of these
venire members. As a result of this error, Hillock was only permitted to exercise
seven peremptory strikes, while the Commonwealth exercised nine. Thus, reversal
is warranted.
Next, Hillock claims the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to
amend count two of the indictment to cover a period of time between November
and December 2008 because it included a separate incident for which Hillock was
not indicted. We disagree.
RCr2 6.16 provides that the court may permit an indictment or information to
be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense
is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. See
McPherson v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2005) (amending the dates on
which the crime occurred is permissible so long as amended date precedes return
of indictment); Berry v. Commonwealth, 84 S.W.3d 82 (Ky.App. 2001) (failure to
amend indictment to include dates shown by the proof and used in the instructions
did not affect defendant's substantial rights).
In this case, before the trial commenced, the trial court allowed the
Commonwealth to amend count two of the indictment to include a range of dates
from November 28, 2008 to December 17, 2008; the date on the original
indictment for count two was on or about December 15, 2008. Based on our
review of the record, we do not believe the amendment to count two charged an
additional or different offense. Furthermore, if any error occurred by amending the
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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indictment, such error was harmless since the trial court dismissed count two at the
close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. See RCr 9.24 (“[t]he court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). In addition, no argument is
now made that the court’s instructions to the jury on count one, which included the
months of October, November, and December 2008, did not conform to the proof.
Thus, the trial court’s decision to allow the Commonwealth to amend the
indictment to include a range of dates which preceded the return of the indictment
is not cause for reversal in this instance.
Next, Hillock contends the trial court erred by not allowing his expert, Dr.
Nichols, to testify about the results of an MRI which were interpreted by a
radiologist who was not present at trial. We disagree.
KRE3 703(a) addresses opinion testimony by experts and provides, in part:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
The record shows that Dr. Nichols, a pathologist, reviewed an MRI
performed on the victim and requested a radiologist to interpret the MRI and
provide a report. Dr. Nichols then relied upon the radiologist’s report to form
some of his opinions concerning what the MRI revealed. Following the
3
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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Commonwealth’s objection to Dr. Nichols testifying as to the radiologist’s report,
the trial court held an in-camera hearing on the matter.
During the hearing, the trial court confirmed that Dr. Nichols was available
to testify regarding the cause of the incident alleged in count one. The court
further confirmed, and Hillock conceded, that Dr. Nichols’ opinion was entirely his
own, exclusive of any information provided by the radiologist. As a result, we fail
to appreciate Hillock’s argument that Dr. Nichols should have been permitted to
testify as to the radiologist’s report since Dr. Nichols testified to the incident
alleged in count one. Thus, the trial court did not err by excluding reference to the
radiologist’s report in Dr. Nichols’ testimony.
Finally, Hillock asserts that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to
permit the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
Hillock moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s
case-in-chief on the basis that the evidence presented was insufficient to permit the
jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon consideration of a motion
for a directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not
be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
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On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citation omitted);
accord Banks v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Ky. 2010).
In this case, an expert for the Commonwealth, Dr. Melissa Currie, a child
abuse pediatrician, testified that the records of the victim were diagnostic of an
inflicted injury, rather than an accidental fall. Dr. Currie explained to the jury that
reviewing bruising patterns on children to distinguish accidental bruising from
abuse is part of her daily practice. Dr. Currie opined, based on her training and
experience, that the cause of the victim’s bruises was inflicted by blunt force
trauma, with a pattern most consistent of multiple strikes with the hand. Taking
the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we believe the
evidence presented was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict.
Based on the errors committed during voir dire, we vacate the final judgment
of the Adair Circuit Court and remand for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dawn Lynne Spalding
Lebanon, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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