D. (L.) VS. H. (O.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 1, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000792-ME
L.D.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE MARGARET RYAN HUDDLESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-J-00267
J.H.; M.H.; B.J.H.; O.H.; HONORABLE
CASEY HIXON, GUARDIAN AD LITEM;
AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, L.D., appeals from an order of the Warren Family
Court awarding permanent custody of her minor son, O.H., to Appellees, J.H. and
M.H., who are O.H.’s paternal grandparents. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
In November 2003, O.H., along with his older sister and younger brother,2
were removed from Appellant’s home pursuant to KRS 620.090, because of
environmental neglect and the fact that her husband was a registered sex offender.
The children were placed with Appellant’s parents, who were subsequently
awarded permanent custody in January 2006. However, on August 10, 2007, the
Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a dependency, neglect, and abuse
petition in the family court seeking emergency custody of all three children after
reports of physical abuse by the maternal grandparents were substantiated. The
children were thereafter placed in temporary foster care.
On September 8, 2008, temporary custody of O.H. was granted to Appellees.
In September 2009, Appellees filed a motion for a designation as de facto
custodians and an order of permanent custody. Following a hearing in March
2010, the family court entered an order finding that it was in O.H.’s best interest
for Appellees to be granted permanent custody. Appellant thereafter appealed to
this Court as a matter of right.
This Court’s standard of review of a family court’s award of child custody in
a dependency, abuse and neglect action is limited to whether the factual findings of
the lower court are clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01. Whether or not the findings are clearly erroneous depends on whether there
is substantial evidence in the record to support them. CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). If the findings are supported by substantial
2
All three children have different fathers.
-2-
evidence, then appellate review is limited to whether the facts support the legal
conclusions made by the finder of fact. The legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo. Brewick v. Brewick, 121 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Ky. App. 2003). If the factual
findings are not clearly erroneous and the legal conclusions are correct, the only
remaining question on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
applying the law to the facts. B.C. v. B. T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219 (Ky. App. 2005).
Finally,
[s]ince the family court is in the best position to evaluate
the testimony and to weigh the evidence, an appellate
court should not substitute its own opinion for that of the
family court. If the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence and if the correct law is applied, a
family court’s ultimate decision regarding custody will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Id.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in awarding permanent
custody to Appellees because they lacked standing to commence a custody action.
Specifically, relying upon KRS 403.270 and the decision in Mullins v.Picklesimer,
317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010), Appellant contends that Appellees did not meet the
requirements for de facto custodians.
KRS 403.270, provides in relevant part:
“[D]e facto custodian” means a person who has been
shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the
primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child
who has resided with the person for a period of six (6)
months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age
and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is
three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the
-3-
Department for Community Based Services. Any period
of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by
a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not
be included in determining whether the child has resided
with the person for the required minimum period.
Appellant does not dispute that O.H. has resided with Appellees for well
over six months. Rather, Appellant believes that because she has always “wished”
to regain custody of O.H. and the Cabinet’s permanency plan had a goal of
returning O.H. to her care, she “commenced” a legal proceeding within the
meaning of the statute. In other words, Appellant asks this Court to conclude that
her “actions” equated to her filing a petition to regain custody and thus, Appellees
failed to meet the requisite time requirements. We disagree.
As the family court found, Appellant has taken no legal action to regain
custody of O.H. since his initial removal in 2003.3 We simply cannot conclude that
the legislature intended mere compliance with a permanency plan to equate to a
legal proceeding under KRS 403.270. In any event, the family court further
determined that Appellant has not complied with the permanency plan, resulting in
the Cabinet’s specifically recommending against the return of O.H. to her care.
Notwithstanding Appellant’s interpretation of KRS 403.270, the family
court correctly determined that because this matter originated as a dependency,
abuse and neglect case under KRS Chapter 620, Appellees’ standing is conferred
by virtue of KRS 620.027, which provides in relevant part: “In any case where the
3
At a hearing on February 15, 2010, Appellant and her counsel were put on notice that the
failure to file a motion for return of O.H. would be considered at the permanent custody hearing.
Nevertheless, L.D. made no attempt to file any motion prior to the March 8, 2010 custody
hearing.
-4-
child is actually residing with the grandparents in a stable relationship, the court
may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as a parent for
evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child.” Once
the family court makes a finding of a stable relationship between grandparent(s)
and child, the court is to utilize KRS Chapter 403 to determine custodial
arrangements.
Interestingly, during the March 8, 2010 hearing, the family court specifically
asked Appellant’s counsel to address KRS 620.027, at which time he refused to do
so and instead focused on KRS 403.270. In this Court, however,
Appellant attempts to negate the application of KRS 620.027 by arguing that O.H.
did not have a stable relationship with Appellees. Appellant points to testimony at
the hearing that O.H. was sometimes disruptive and defiant of Appellees, and that
he had engaged in self-destructive conduct that had resulted in his being placed in
the Children’s Crisis Stabilization Unit for a short period of time. However,
O.H.’s therapist and the Cabinet’s counselors emphasized that his mental health
issues were due to his diagnosis of oppositional defiance disorder, not any problem
relating to Appellees. In fact, the family court found that Appellees were
cooperative and supportive of O.H.’s mental health treatment while Appellant was
not. We are of the opinion that substantial evidence supported the family court’s
finding that Appellees provided a stable environment for O.H. Accordingly,
Appellees had standing under KRS 620.027 to petition for permanent custody of
O.H.
-5-
Appellant next argues that Appellees waived their right to seek permanent
custody of O.H. because they agreed to the Cabinet’s permanency plan that had a
stated goal of ultimately returning O.H. to Appellant’s care. Although we find no
indication that a waiver issue was presented to the family court, it is nevertheless
without merit.
M.H. testified at the hearing that at the time Appellees were initially granted
temporary custody of O.H., everyone involved hoped that he could eventually be
reunited with Appellant. However, M.H. explained that it had become increasingly
apparent that Appellant was not going to be able to care for O.H., and that the
continued court proceedings were taking a serious toll on his mental health. For
that reason, Appellees made the decision to proceed with permanent custody.
Appellant cites no authority and we find none for the proposition that
agreement with a permanency plan is somehow a waiver of the right to
subsequently seek custody. Appellees attempted to work with everyone involved
to achieve the desired goal of returning O.H. to Appellant’s care. However, as the
Cabinet employees testified during the hearing, it had become apparent to all that
returning O.H. to Appellant’s care was not going to be possible and that the
continued proceedings were damaging to O.H. To “penalize” Appellees or hold
that their cooperation with the Cabinet’s plan resulted in a waiver of their right to
seek permanent custody is a precedent that we are unwilling to establish. To do so
would certainly be detrimental to the Cabinet’s purpose.
-6-
Next, Appellant contends that even if Appellees had standing, the family
court did not give equal consideration to both parties in determining permanent
custody. Further, Appellant complains that the family court refused to hear
evidence about her fitness to have O.H. returned to her.
KRS 403.270 states in pertinent part:
(2) The court shall determine custody in accordance with
the best interests of the child and equal consideration
shall be given to each parent and to any de facto
custodian. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents, and
any de facto custodian, as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and
any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and
community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
(f) Information, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.720;
(g) The extent to which the child has been cared
for, nurtured, and supported by any de facto
custodian;
(h) The intent of the parent or parents in placing
the child with a de facto custodian; and
-7-
(i) The circumstances under which the child was
placed or allowed to remain in the custody of a de
facto custodian, including whether the parent now
seeking custody was previously prevented from
doing so as a result of domestic violence as
defined in KRS 403.720 and whether the child was
placed with a de facto custodian to allow the
parent now seeking custody to seek employment,
work, or attend school.
Furthermore, KRS 620.023 provides:
(1) Evidence of the following circumstances if relevant
shall be considered by the court in all proceedings
conducted pursuant to KRS Chapter 620 in which the
court is required to render decisions in the best interest of
the child:
(a) Mental illness as defined in KRS 202A.011 or
mental retardation as defined in KRS 202B.010 of
the parent, as attested to by a qualified mental
health professional, which renders the parent
unable to care for the immediate and ongoing
needs of the child;
(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS
600.020 toward any child;
(c) Alcohol and other drug abuse, as defined in
KRS 222.005, that results in an incapacity by the
parent or caretaker to provide essential care and
protection for the child;
(d) A finding of domestic violence and abuse as
defined in KRS 403.720, whether or not
committed in the presence of the child;
(e) Any other crime committed by a parent which
results in the death or permanent physical or
mental disability of a member of that parent's
family or household; and
-8-
(f) The existence of any guardianship or
conservatorship of the parent pursuant to a
determination of disability or partial disability as
made under KRS 387.500 to 387.770 and 387.990.
(2) In determining the best interest of the child, the court
may consider the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts
made by the parent or caretaker intended to address
circumstances in this section.
As previously noted, Appellant did not file a motion to regain custody of
O.H. As such, the proceeding at issue herein was essentially limited to Appellees’
motion for permanent custody. After reviewing the hearing and evidence
presented below, we are convinced that the family court thoroughly analyzed all of
the factors under both KRS 403.270(2) and KRS 620.023 in reaching its decision.
Not only did the court determine that Appellees have provided O.H. with a stable
and financially secure environment, and have worked with his school and
counselors to ensure he is receiving all necessary treatment, but the court also
made the following findings with respect to Appellant: (1) she has not sought
return of O.H. since his removal in 2003; (2) she was aware of the abuse occurring
to her children while in the maternal grandparents’ care yet failed to disclose it to
the Cabinet; (3) she has failed to obtain the court-ordered psychological evaluation
to address her life-long issues of domestic abuse; (4) she has failed to follow
through with the Cabinet’s recommendation of life skills counseling; and (4) the
Cabinet reported that she had threatened another child currently in her care.
Importantly, all of the therapists and counselors involved herein unanimously
agreed that O.H. needed permanency stability and that Appellees were providing
-9-
such. In reviewing all of the statutory factors, the family court determined that it
was in O.H.’s best interest for Appellees to be granted permanent custody. We
cannot conclude that the family court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. B.C.
v. B. T., 182 S.W.3d at 219.
Finally, Appellant argues that the family court erred in refusing to permit
O.H. to testify in chambers since his wishes were relevant under KRS
403.270(2)(b). The record reflects that the night before the hearing, Appellant’s
counsel actually served a subpoena directly on O.H. rather than serving the
guardian ad litem. Obviously such was in violation of CR 4.04(3). Moreover, it
was noted during the hearing that O.H. reacted very poorly and became
emotionally distraught. The subpoena was properly quashed by the family court
during the hearing, based upon not only improper service but also upon O.H.’s
therapist’s recommendation that testifying would not be in O.H.’s best interest.
Appellant did not thereafter seek to have O.H. properly served or have him testify
by deposition. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the Warren Family Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-10-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Jonathan Sacks
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Rebecca Gibson
Special Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.