LOWE (MATTHEW J.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000619-MR
MATTHEW J. LOWE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00090
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Matthew J. Lowe was convicted following a jury trial in the
Breckenridge Circuit Court on a charge of assault in the second degree2 and was
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
KRS 508.020, a Class C felony.
acquitted on a charge of wanton endangerment in the first degree.3 He received a
sentence of five years’ imprisonment. He now appeals alleging prosecutorial
misconduct and errors in the court’s instructions to the jury require reversal of his
conviction. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Lowe’s indictment was the result of an altercation between himself and
Eddie O’Donoghue on July 3, 2009.4 Lowe and O’Donoghue were travelling in
separate vehicles in the same direction along O’Donoghue Farm Lane. Each was
carrying a passenger. Lowe attempted to overtake the slower moving O’Donoghue
by leaving the roadway and driving partially in a field; the field belonged to the
O’Donoghue family. O’Donoghue, unhappy that Lowe was driving in his field,
sped up and swerved his vehicle toward Lowe’s vehicle, making minor contact.
Both men stopped and exited their vehicles. A verbal altercation ensued. After a
short time, the altercation became physical and Lowe punched O’Donoghue in the
side of the face, knocking him to the ground. As O’Donoghue attempted to regain
his footing, Lowe kicked him in the face. O’Donoghue’s wife then exited their
vehicle and broke up the fight. O’Donoghue retrieved his cell phone and contacted
the local sheriff. Lowe left the scene before law enforcement officers arrived.
3
KRS 508.060, a Class D felony.
4
Conflicting testimony was given regarding the specifics of the incident. For purposes of this
appeal, we have pared the facts to their bare minimum without regard to the conflicting
testimony, since resolution regarding such conflicts is within the province of the finder of fact.
Our treatment of the facts in this way has in no way limited or hindered our review of the issues
presented.
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The following day, O’Donoghue went to Breckenridge Memorial
Hospital seeking treatment for his injuries. He was referred to the University of
Louisville Medical Center for treatment of a fractured jaw. He was informed the
fracture would heal within a few weeks’ time without further intervention. He also
sustained a concussion, a sprained right thumb and scrapes to his left arm.
O’Donoghue suffered from a “sneezing fit” a few weeks after the incident which
reinjured the fracture and ultimately required his jaw to be wired shut for
approximately six weeks. During his recovery, O’Donoghue was unable to eat
solid food, perform his usual farming work or wear his oxygen mask while he
slept.
A jury trial was held on February 19 and 22, 2010. The jury acquitted
Lowe of the wanton endangerment, but convicted him of assault in the second
degree. Following further deliberations, the jury recommended the minimum
sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The trial court entered a final judgment and
sentencing order on March 4, 2010. This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, we must comment on a patent error in Lowe’s
notice of appeal. The notice indicates this appeal is being taken from the trial
court’s final judgment and sentence entered on October 1, 2008. Because the
crimes charged in this matter did not occur until some nine months later, we are
confident this date is erroneous. Our review of the record reveals no orders were
entered in this matter in October of any year. The failure to properly state the
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order being appealed from could prove fatal to an appeal. However, in the case
sub judice,
[d]ismissal is not an appropriate remedy for this type of
defect so long as the judgment appealed from can be
ascertained within reasonable certainty from a complete
review of the record on appeal and no substantial harm or
prejudice has resulted to the opponent. While our court
continues to have a compelling interest in maintaining an
orderly appellate process, the penalty for breach of a rule
should have a reasonable relationship to the harm caused.
Likewise the sanction imposed should bear some
reasonable relationship to the seriousness of the defect.
While dismissal still may be appropriate where the
breach of the rule and the harm to the opponent is
sufficiently serious, under CR 73.02(2) the appellate
court is charged with the burden of deciding the
appropriate sanction on a case by case basis.
Ready v. Jamison, 705 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Ky. 1986). The Commonwealth has
not acknowledged the error nor alleged any prejudice resulting therefrom. Thus,
we believe it appropriate to review the allegations of error presented in the appeal
since the order being appealed from is easily discernible from this abbreviated
record.5 However, counsel is cautioned to take appropriate measures to ensure
such errors do not occur in the future because sanctions may be imposed under
different or more egregious circumstances.
Lowe advances three allegations of error in urging reversal of his conviction.
He first contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in her pattern of
questioning witnesses to elicit testimony amounting to “the functional equivalent
5
It is important to note that the substantial compliance rule set forth in Ready applies only to
nonjurisdictional defects. See City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1990).
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of instructing the jury that [Lowe] was not privileged to act in self-protection.”
Second, Lowe argues the trial court’s instructions to the jury failed to ensure a
unanimous verdict. Finally, he alleges the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury on the lesser-included offense of assault in the fourth degree.6
Lowe’s first two allegations of error are admittedly unpreserved for our
review. Instead, Lowe requests review for palpable error as set forth in Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. Thus, under that rule, we shall review
those two matters solely for the presence of manifest injustice. To demonstrate
manifest injustice, “the required showing is probability of a different result or error
so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.”
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).
First, Lowe argues the prosecution engaged in misconduct by essentially
instructing the jury that he was not privileged to act in self-protection. He
contends the prosecution elicited testimony that O’Donohgue was legally justified
in ramming “his jeep into [Lowe’s] jeep because [Lowe] could have been costing
O’Donoghue money by destroying hay.” Lowe alleges this line of questioning
introduced irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence, amounted to the prosecutor
improperly commenting on the law, and presented evidence of uncharged crimes.
We disagree.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed to “determine whether the
alleged misconduct is so egregious, improper, or prejudicial, as to have
6
KRS 508.030, a Class A misdemeanor.
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undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings.” Hood v. Commonwealth, 230
S.W.3d 596, 600 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d
343, 349 (Ky. 2006)). During redirect examination of O’Donoghue, the
Commonwealth was sua sponte instructed by the trial court to refrain from further
questioning of any witnesses regarding monetary losses incurred as a result of
Lowe’s driving through the hay field. The Commonwealth subsequently
questioned the sheriff about an individual’s right to engage in self-help to prevent
damage to his property. However, this testimony was elicited in an attempt to
provide the jury with a justification for O’Donoghue’s actions in swerving into
Lowe’s jeep. Therefore, the prosecutor’s conduct was not improper and did not
affect the overall fairness of the trial. We are unable to conclude from the record
before us that exclusion of the testimony regarding damage to the standing crop or
its value would have altered the outcome of Lowe’s trial. Nor can we conclude
Lowe was deprived of his right to due process of law. Thus, we conclude no
manifest injustice occurred and Lowe is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
Second, Lowe argues the trial court’s instructions to the jury failed to ensure
a unanimous verdict. He alleges the instruction defining “serious physical injury”
presented the jury with alternative theories of guilt which were unsupported by the
evidence adduced during the trial. We disagree.
The trial court instructed the jury that “serious physical injury” is defined as
“physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious
and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or
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impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” This definition mimics the
language found in KRS 500.080(15). Pursuant to RCr 9.54(2),
[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless the party’s position has been
fairly and adequately presented to the trial judge by an
offered instruction or by motion, or unless the party
makes objection before the court instructs the jury,
stating specifically the matter to which the party objects
and the ground or grounds of the objection.
The failure to comply with RCr 9.54(2) has consistently been held to render an
alleged error unpreserved and prohibit appellate review. Commonwealth v. Duke,
750 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. 1988). See also Commonwealth v. Collins, 821 S.W.2d
488 (Ky. 1991); and Evans v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1986). Lowe
concedes he did not object to the trial court’s giving of this instruction and thus
failed to comply with RCr 9.54(2). He therefore requests palpable error review.
We fail to discern any manifest injustice stemming from the trial court’s
instruction. Lowe tendered an instruction identical to that adopted by the trial
court. It has long been held that a party cannot predicate an error upon an
instruction given at its own request or substantially similar to one it has tendered.
City of Greenville v. Johnston, 244 Ky. 782, 52 S.W.2d 716, 718 (1932) (citing
Pope-Cawood Lumber & Supply Co. v. Cleet, 236 Ky. 366, 33 S.W.2d 360 (1930);
Turner Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Smith, 239 Ky. 428, 39 S.W.2d 649 (1931)). There
was no error.
Finally, Lowe contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested
instruction to the jury on assault in the fourth degree as a lesser-included offense.
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[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case . . . [including]
instructions applicable to every state of the case
deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony;
and . . . although a defendant has a right to have every
issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to his
defense submitted to the jury on proper instructions, the
trial court should instruct as to lesser-included offenses
only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury
might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt
of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense.
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 43 (Ky. 2002) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). We review a trial court’s ruling regarding instructions
for an abuse of discretion. Cecil v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Ky. 2009).
In addition, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Lowe
because the issue is sufficiency of the evidence to warrant an instruction on a
lesser-included offense. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky.
2005) (citing Ruehl v. Houchin, 387 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Ky. 1965)).
As is pertinent to the case at bar, a person is guilty of assault in the second
degree when he “intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person.”
KRS 508.020(1)(a). In contrast, a person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree
when he “intentionally or wantonly causes physical injury to another person.”
KRS 508.030(1)(a). “Physical injury” is defined in KRS 500.080(13) as
“substantial physical pain or impairment of physical condition.” We have
previously set forth the statutory definition of “serious physical injury.” Thus, the
difference between assault in the second degree and assault in the fourth degree, as
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relevant to this appeal, is whether O’Donoghue sustained a “serious physical
injury” or a “physical injury.” The trial court determined as a matter of law that
O’Donoghue’s injuries constituted a “serious physical injury” and declined to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault in the fourth degree.
Lowe contends the extent of injury is a question of fact properly determined by the
jury, citing Rowe v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 216 (Ky. App. 2001). After a
careful review, we agree with Lowe.
In Rowe, the defendant struck the victim in the mouth, fracturing his chin
and knocking four of his teeth back at approximately a forty-five degree angle.
The teeth were reset using an arch bar and the victim’s mouth was wired shut for
approximately six weeks. The victim suffered severe pain and was unable to eat
solid foods for several weeks. Medical testimony was presented indicating that
although complications could not be ruled out and that pain could continue for
some time, the victim’s prognosis for recovery was good. A panel of this Court
held that the proof at Rowe’s trial “failed to establish as a matter of law that [the
victim’s] injury could only reasonably be found to constitute a “serious physical
injury.” Id. at 221. This Court further concluded that the extent of the victim’s
injuries was a factual question to be decided by the jury and reversed and
remanded the matter for a new trial in light of the trial court’s failure to instruct on
the lesser-included offense.
The facts in Rowe are strikingly similar to the case at bar. While the
testimony elicited regarding O’Donoghue’s injuries was sufficient for the jury to
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conclude he suffered a serious physical injury and that Lowe was guilty of assault
in the second degree, it was insufficient for the trial court to so conclude as a
matter of law. The cases cited by the Commonwealth and its attempt to distinguish
Rowe are unpersuasive. The seriousness of a victim’s injuries is a question of fact
to be determined by the jury unless it can be concluded as a matter of law that the
injuries are serious physical injuries as defined by statute. Id. at 220-21.
No testimony was given that O’Donoghue’s injuries created a substantial
risk of death or that he suffered from serious or prolonged disfigurement or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. There was,
however, testimony that O’Donoghue was unable to eat solid foods or to work for
a period of time. This was sufficient for the jury to conclude he suffered from a
prolonged impairment of health. Nevertheless, because a reasonable juror could
conclude that O’Donoghue suffered only a physical injury rather than serious
physical injury, the instruction for assault in the fourth degree as a lesser-included
offense was warranted. Therefore, we reverse for a new trial on the assault in the
second degree charge. We need not address the appellant’s other arguments of
error by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, Lowe’s conviction for assault in the second
degree is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial on that charge
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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