HARSTON (JIMMY), ET AL. VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 4, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000615-MR
JIMMY HARSTON; NORMAN COTTRELL;
AND BILL SULLIVAN
v.
APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00045
AND
APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00026
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, SENIOR JUDGE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
and
APPELLEE
NO. 2010-CA-001124-MR
JIMMY HARSTON; DONNIE KIMBRO;
AND BRENDA KIMBRO
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01262
APPELLANTS
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Jimmy Harston and Norman Cottrell appeal an opinion and
order granting summary judgment to the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet,
Department of Highways (Cabinet) entered on February 16, 2010, by the Hart
Circuit Court. The court found Harston and Cottrell in violation of Kentucky’s
Billboard Advertising Act2 by maintaining a “billboard, sign, [or] advertising
device” in a protected area. The same opinion and order was entered in LaRue
Circuit Court Civil Action No. 08-CI-00026 against Harston and Bill Sullivan.
Both cases present identical issues and were consolidated by the trial court on
motion of the parties. This Court has become aware of a third case, Jimmy
Harston; Donnie Kimbro and Brenda Kimbro v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways, No. 2010-CA-001124-MR,
with similar issues and on its own motion has consolidated it with the Hart and
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
KRS 177.830 through 177.890.
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LaRue actions. Having considered the briefs, the record and the law, the opinion
and orders entered by the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts are affirmed. The final
order and judgment entered by the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed in part, and the
language requiring appellants to apply for a permit is reversed.
FACTS
On or about November 7, 2004, without securing a permit from the
Cabinet, Harston erected a 14 foot by 30 foot sign within 660 feet of the right-ofway of Interstate 65 in Hart County on land leased from Cottrell. The sign reads,
“If you died today, where would you spend Eternity?”
On or about March 2, 2005, again without securing a permit, Harston
erected a second 14 foot by 30 foot sign within 660 feet of the right-of-way of
Interstate 65, this time in LaRue County, on land leased from Sullivan. One side
of the sign reads, “Hell is Real.” The other side reads, “Thou Shall Not Commit
Adultery, Thou Shall Not Kill, Thou Shall Not Steal, Thou Shall Not Bear False
Witness, Thou Shall Not Covet.”
In March of 2007, Harston erected a third 14 foot by 30 foot sign
within 660 feet of Interstate 65 in Warren County on property leased from Donnie
and Brenda Kimbro. The messages on the Warren County sign read “Jesus Died
For Our Sins” and “Jesus Saves.”
Harston maintains he erects the signs as a ministry to the traveling
public. He claims Cottrell, Sullivan and the Kimbros share his Christian beliefs
and erecting the signs is the only means by which they can practice their religion.
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He admits the signs evangelize and proselytize, but argues they do not advertise in
the traditional sense of that word and therefore, are not subject to regulation under
the Billboard Advertising Act. In the alternative, he argues that if the signs are
advertising devices, they fall within the “on-premises” exception to the prohibition
on billboard advertising because Christianity is practiced on the farms where the
signs are located and the ministry to the traveling public occurs at the site of the
signs. Finally, Harston argues placement of the signs is protected by the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), codified in 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc(a)(1), which prohibits application of a land use regulation “that imposes a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person” unless it furthers “a
compelling governmental interest” and does so in “the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Harston argues the Billboard
Advertising Act is a zoning regulation that must comply with RLUIPA.
On February 15, 2008, the Cabinet filed complaints in the Hart and
LaRue Circuit Courts alleging the signs: are advertising devices that violate
Kentucky’s Billboard Advertising Act; were erected after January 1, 1976; are
“visible, legible, and identifiable from the main travelway;” are not located in an
area that qualifies as an “unzoned commercial” area under KRS 177.830(8); do not
qualify as “on-premises” signs; are located in a “protected area” as that term is
defined in 603 KAR3 3:080 §1(29); are located in an area that was neither
industrial nor commercial nor within an incorporated municipality as of September
3
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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21, 1959; and, do not have an approved permit from the Cabinet. As a result, the
Cabinet sought an injunction to have the signs declared a public nuisance and
removed. A similar complaint was filed in Warren Circuit Court on July 11, 2008.
On January 26, 2009, the Cabinet moved for summary judgment in
Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts claiming there were no material issues of fact and
the Cabinet was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Cabinet argued KRS
177.841, with few exceptions, prohibits all advertising devices within 660 feet of
interstate rights-of-way “as far as the eye can see from the main traveled way
outside urban areas.” Exempt from the general prohibition are:
(a) Directional and official signs and notices;
(b) Signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon
which they are located; or
(c) Signs advertising activities conducted on the property
on which they are located.
KRS 177.841(2). Item (c) is the “on-premises” exemption. An “advertising
device” is defined in KRS 177.830(5) as “any billboard, sign, notice, poster,
display, or other device intended to attract the attention of operators of motor
vehicles on the highways . . . .”
To determine whether an advertising device is exempt from
regulation, the Cabinet imposes a permit requirement. 603 KAR 3:080, § 4(1).
Any advertising device within the protected area4 and visible from the main
4
“Protected area” is defined in 603 KAR 3:080 §1(29) as “all areas within the boundaries of this
Commonwealth which are adjacent to and within 660 feet (210.17 meters) of the state-owned
highway right-of-way of the interstate, parkway, NHS, and FAP highways and those areas which
are outside urban area boundary lines and beyond 660 feet (210.17 meters) from the right-of-way
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traveled way must have a permit. It is undisputed that the signs at issue in this
appeal do not have permits. Furthermore, the appellants admitted in interrogatories
that the signs are intended to be seen by motorists. Therefore, the Cabinet argues
the signs satisfy the definition of advertising devices, regardless of their religious
messages, and are subject to removal from the protected areas due to the lack of a
permit.
Anticipating a challenge on constitutional grounds, the Cabinet argued
the prohibition on advertising devices is content neutral and narrowly tailored to
serve substantial government goals making the message displayed irrelevant to
enforcement of the Act. Moreover, the Cabinet argued, since the Act does not
apply to areas zoned commercial or industrial, urban areas beyond 660 feet of the
right-of-way, signs located on the premises where the activity related to the
message is conducted, and areas away from interstate or federal-aid primary
highways, there are ample alternate channels for the communication of the desired
message.
On June 2, 2009, the appellants responded to the Cabinet’s motion for
summary judgment and moved for summary judgment in their own right. On
February 16, 2010, the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts entered summary judgment
in favor of the Cabinet and ordered removal of the signs within sixty days. The
of an interstate, parkway, NHS, or FAP highway within the Commonwealth. If this highway
terminate (sic) at a state boundary which is not perpendicular or normal to the center line of the
highway, “protected area” also means all of these areas inside the boundaries of the
Commonwealth which are adjacent to the edge of the right-of-way of an interstate highway in an
adjoining state.”
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analysis was based in part upon United Sign, Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d
794, 799 (Ky. App. 2000), in which a panel of this Court stated:
The permitting requirements are rationally related
to the Billboard Act's objectives because a permit
requirement prevents a proliferation of unregulated
advertising devices in an area. Without the permit
requirement, any person or entity could erect advertising
devices in an area in such a manner as to distract or
impair the visibility of drivers and destroy the scenic
beauty of the area around the highways. Those
potentially dangerous or distracting signs could remain in
place for a period of several years while the Cabinet went
through the legal process of having them removed, which
is precisely the scenario present in the case at hand. If a
permit requirement is utilized, no sign may be erected
without receiving prior expert permission from the
Cabinet that the sign falls within the exceptions to the
Billboard Act's general ban on advertising devices in
affected areas. Such a plan provides the maximum
amount of safety to drivers and passengers on affected
highways.
Furthermore, the permit process ensures that one
centralized entity will make a determination as to
whether a prospective advertising device complies with
the objectives of the Billboard Act, rather than have
circuit courts make those decisions throughout the state.
Finally, although factually distinguishable,
Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v.
Central Kentucky Angus Association, Ky. App., 555
S.W.2d 627 (1977) found that the Billboard Act
“envision[s] a program under which only carefully
selected signs, deemed by an administrative agency to be
in the interest of the traveling public, shall be erected.”
Id. at 628 (Emphasis in original). In short, the Cabinet
did not exceed its statutory authority by enacting
administrative regulations requiring a permit to be
obtained before a billboard advertising device may be
erected.
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(Footnote omitted). The opinion also cited Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 822 F.2d 586, 588-90 (6th Cir. 1987), which held:
The Billboard Act and regulations were adopted in
response to the federal Highway Beautification Act of
1965. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131-136 (1982) (“Act”). This Act
provides for the regulation and control of outdoor
advertising devices adjacent to interstate and federal-aid
primary highways. Its purpose is “to protect the public
investment in such highways, to promote the safety and
recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural
beauty.” Id. § 131(a). The Act requires each state
participating in the highway beautification program to
exercise “effective control” over outdoor advertising. It
prohibits advertising devices located within 660 feet of
the interstate or federal-aid primary highway, or if
located outside urban areas, such devices are prohibited
beyond 660 feet if visible from the highway. “Effective
control” means that signs, displays, or devices within the
prescribed area shall be limited to directional and official
signs, signs advertising the sale or lease of property on
which they are located, signs advertising activities
conducted on the property on which they are located,
signs of historic or artistic significance, and signs
advertising the distribution by nonprofit organizations of
free coffee to individuals traveling on the interstate or
primary system. Id. § 131(c). The penalty for not
complying with the Act is the forfeiture of ten percent of
the state's federal highway funds until such time as the
state provides for effective control. Id. § 131(b).
....
The Supreme Court has recognized that the first
amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate
one's views at all times and places or in any manner.
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69
L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Expression, whether oral or written,
is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. Clark v. Community For Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82
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L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). Such restrictions are valid provided
that they are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial governmental interest, and they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information. Id. Accord Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 104
S.Ct. 2118, 2130, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Heffron, 452
U.S. at 647-48, 101 S.Ct. at 2563-64.
We believe that the statute and regulations in the
present case are valid place and manner restrictions. The
statute and regulations subject on-premises signs adjacent
to interstate highways to size and spacing restrictions.
The statute and regulations also prohibit all off-premises
signs containing any message in protected areas adjacent
to interstate highways. The regulations permit offpremises signs in urban areas if the sign is more than 660
feet from the interstate highway. Additionally, they
permit off-premises signs in areas adjacent to the
interstate or federal aid primary highways which were
zoned commercial or industrial prior to September 21,
1959. These permissible off-premises signs are also
subject to size and spacing restrictions. It is apparent
from the express purpose and effect of the Billboard Act
that the restrictions on the location of off-premises signs
regulate the secondary effects, not the content of these
signs.
Based upon the foregoing, the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts concluded: the signs
constitute advertising devices under KRS 177.830(5); the signs are located within
protected areas; the signs were erected without a permit; the Cabinet is authorized
to regulate the placement of advertising devices; the Cabinet has a “compelling
government interest in protecting the safety of, and preventing [confusion] to, its
motorists, as well as the natural beauty of the state[;]” and, because the signs have
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been placed in violation of the Billboard Advertising Act, they are public nuisances
under KRS 177.870 and must be removed.
On February 18, 2010, the Warren Circuit Court granted an injunction
to the Cabinet upon finding the sign located on the Kimbro property to be a visible
advertising device erected within a protected area and without a permit. Taking a
slightly different tack than the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts, the Warren Circuit
Court declined to address constitutional issues, specifically the application of
RLUIPA, finding those questions were not ripe because the appellants had not
exhausted their administrative remedies by seeking a permit from the Cabinet. On
June 4, 2010, the Warren Circuit Court denied a motion to alter, amend or vacate
its prior order,5 but stayed the injunction pending completion of appeal.
On February 22, 2010, the appellants moved to alter, amend or vacate
the Hart and LaRue Circuit Court opinion and order under CR6 59.05 arguing the
court’s reliance on Wheeler was misplaced because that case was decided prior to
passage of RLUIPA which they maintain is a complete bar to the Cabinet’s
complaint. Alternatively, the appellants moved for additional findings under CR
52.02 and CR 52.04 because the opinion and order did not address the applicability
of RLUIPA. That same day, appellants moved the court to stay enforcement of the
judgment until pending motions and a potential appeal were resolved. Three days
5
Appellants sought time to request a permit for the Warren County sign. The appellate record
does not indicate the status of said request.
6
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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later, appellants filed a supplemental motion to alter, amend or vacate the opinion
and order because the Warren Circuit Court had directed them to exhaust their
administrative remedies by applying for a permit. The Cabinet responded to the
motions arguing that the court had addressed RLUIPA; the appellants had not
shown removal of the signs would substantially burden their exercise of religious
freedom; and there was no need to wait for appellants to apply for a permit because
the Warren Circuit Court case was wholly separate from the Hart and LaRue
Circuit Court actions.
On March 17, 2010, the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts entered an
order denying the motions to alter, amend or vacate the opinion and order;
declining to make additional findings of fact; specifying appellants were not
entitled to administrative relief; consolidating the Hart and LaRue actions; and
granting a stay until conclusion of any appeal. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our inquiry focuses on
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996); CR 56.03. “[T]he
proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a matter
of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.
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Scansteel Serv. Ctr, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). For the reasons that
follow, we conclude summary judgment was properly granted to the Cabinet.
The Cabinet is authorized to implement Kentucky’s Billboard
Advertising Act. KRS 177.860. It has chosen to do this by requiring issuance of a
permit for any visible advertising device located within 660 feet of an interstate
highway. KRS 177.841(1). As previously noted, an “advertising device” is
defined in KRS 177.830(5) as “any billboard, sign, notice, poster, display or other
device intended to attract the attention of operators of motor vehicles on the
highways . . . .” The appellants admit they intend the signs to be seen by the
motoring public. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the signs are located within
660 feet of Interstate 65, which constitutes a protected area; are visible from the
main portion of the traveled roadway; and were erected without benefit of a permit.
Thus, as the trial court found, the signs constitute advertising devices and are
subject to removal as public nuisances due to the lack of a permit. Whether the
signs “advertise” in the traditional sense of that word is irrelevant in light of the
clear, unambiguous statutory definition of “advertising device” found in KRS
177.830(5). Consolidated Infrastructure Mgmt. Auth., Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.3d
852, 855-56 (Ky. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442 (Ky.
2004) (court without authority to construe clear and unambiguous statute to the
contrary)). Based on the foregoing, the grant of summary judgment to the Cabinet
was proper.
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However, that is not the end of our inquiry. Because the messages
displayed are religious in nature, appellants claim special consideration is required
so as not to run afoul of the Constitution. Specifically, they argue the “onpremises” exemption found in KRS 177.841(2)(c) applies because the signs
promote Christianity which is occurring on the family farms where the signs are
located. However, freedom of religion is not absolute. Its “[e]xpression, whether
oral or written, is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”
Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 589 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069).
Furthermore, a party’s religious belief cannot justify commission of an overt act
that contravenes civil law. “The claim of religious freedom cannot be extended to
make the professed doctrines superior to the law of the land and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
590 (Ky. 1973) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167, 1878 WL
18416 (1878)).
In United Sign, Ltd., 44 S.W.3d at 799, a panel of this Court reviewed
the permit requirement and found it to be “rationally related” to the objectives of
the Billboard Act. In Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 589-90, the Sixth Circuit found the Act
and its implementing regulations to be “valid place and manner restrictions.” It
also found the Act to be content neutral as it was directed at the secondary effects
of the signs and not the content of the messages displayed. Id., at 590. Both
decisions remain valid law today and dictate that the “on-premises” exemption not
be extended to the subject signs.
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Appellants’ next argument is that RLUIPA authorizes placement of
the signs. The Act specifies:
No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution-(A)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(B)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). We agree with the appellants and hold that Kentucky’s
Billboard Act is the equivalent of a zoning ordinance in that it “limits the manner
in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an
interest.” Prater v. City of Burnside, Kentucky, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, Kentucky’s Billboard Act is subject to analysis under RLUIPA.
As explained in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714-15, 125 S.Ct.
2113, 2118 (2005),
RLUIPA is the latest of long-running
congressional efforts to accord religious exercise
heightened protection from government-imposed
burdens, consistent with this Court's precedents. Ten
years before RLUIPA's enactment, the Court held, in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108
L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), that the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of
otherwise valid laws of general application that
incidentally burden religious conduct. In particular, we
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon
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from enforcing its blanket ban on peyote possession with
no allowance for sacramental use of the drug.
Accordingly, the State could deny unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of
their religiously inspired peyote use. Id., at 874, 890, 110
S.Ct. 1595. The Court recognized, however, that the
political branches could shield religious exercise through
legislative accommodation, for example, by making an
exception to proscriptive drug laws for sacramental
peyote use. Id., at 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.
Responding to Smith, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107
Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. RFRA “prohibits
‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’ a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability unless the
government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.’” City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-516, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138
L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (quoting § 2000bb-1; brackets in
original). “[U]niversal” in its coverage, RFRA “applie[d]
to all Federal and State law,” id., at 516, 117 S.Ct. 2157
(quoting former § 2000bb-3(a)), but notably lacked a
Commerce Clause underpinning or a Spending Clause
limitation to recipients of federal funds. In City of
Boerne, this Court invalidated RFRA as applied to States
and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded
Congress' remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id., at 532-536, 117 S.Ct. 2157. (Footnote
omitted.)
Congress again responded, this time by enacting
RLUIPA. Less sweeping than RFRA, and invoking
federal authority under the Spending and Commerce
Clauses, RLUIPA targets two areas: Section 2 of the Act
concerns land-use regulation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc;
(footnote omitted) § 3 relates to religious exercise by
institutionalized persons, § 2000cc-1.
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Previous courts have already held Kentucky’s Billboard Act is supported by
compelling state interests relating to public safety and aesthetics. Unisign, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 19 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Ky. 2000). Therefore, we need not revisit
the claim of the appellants that the Cabinet has not, nor can it, establish a
compelling governmental interest for the general prohibition on placing billboards
within 660 feet of interstate highways. We hold the Billboard Act is supported by
the same compelling state interests previously identified. Id.
This brings us to the remaining question of whether the Act uses “the
least restrictive means” to accomplish its goals. We hold the Act utilizes the least
restrictive means to meet its objectives because it does not totally ban
communication. For example, signs in urban areas beyond 660 feet of the
interstate right-of-way or areas away from interstate or federal-aid primary
highways are not prohibited. Further, while appellants claim the only way they can
conduct their evangelism is by erecting signs in protected areas, it appears to us
there are ample alternate channels for them to communicate their desired message
to the motoring public and to the public at large, especially in this ever-expanding
technological age.
While we recognize the right of the appellants to express and share
their religion with the motoring public, we also recognize the Commonwealth’s
right to place reasonable restrictions on the place and manner that message is
conveyed, particularly when aimed at protecting public safety and preserving the
public environment. While Wheeler was decided prior to enactment of RLUIPA,
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we deem its analysis equally applicable and its reasoning compelling in regard to
the present controversy. “[G]overnment acts often inadvertently frustrate certain
citizens’ “search for spiritual fulfillment,” yet the government “simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”
Prater, 289 F.3d at 429 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1327, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988)).
Finally, we take exception to that portion of the Warren Circuit Court
judgment requiring appellants to apply for a permit. “[A] party may have direct
judicial relief without exhaustion of administrative remedies when there are no
disputed factual questions to be resolved and the issue is confined to the validity or
applicability of a statute or ordinance.” Harrison's Sanitarium, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Health, 417 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1967). There are no
disputed factual questions here and the issue is confined to the validity of
Kentucky’s Billboard Act and the applicability of RLUIPA. Thus, requiring a
permit application is unnecessary.
For the reasons expressed above, the opinion and orders entered by
the Hart and LaRue Circuit Courts are affirmed. The final order and judgment
entered by the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed in part, and the language requiring
appellants to apply for a permit is reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Patrick A. Ross
Horse Cave, Kentucky
John B. Baughman
Frankfort, Kentucky
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