HYDEN-LESLIE WATER DISTRICT VS. HOSKINS (JESSE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000599-MR
HYDEN-LESLIE WATER DISTRICT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LESLIE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00265
JESSIE HOSKINS AND
PERRY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: The Hyden-Leslie Water District appeals from a Leslie
Circuit Court order which denied the District’s motion for summary judgment.
Because this appeal is taken from an interlocutory order, it must be dismissed.
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Senior Judges Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
On July 17, 2005, Jessie Hoskins filed a complaint against the District
alleging that he had been injured on a bridge which collapsed. He claimed that a
cable to the bridge had been damaged when a water line was being installed three
to four months before his fall. Hoskins filed suit alleging negligence against the
Hyden-Leslie Water District and BP Pipeline, LLC. BP Pipeline was later
dismissed as improperly named because it was not the contractor that had
performed the water line installation. Hoskins filed a second amended complaint
naming Perry Construction, Inc. as a defendant. It appears that Perry Construction
was never served with the complaint nor did it file an answer.
The depositions of Hoskins and of Leeman Howard, the manager of
the Hyden-Leslie Water District, were taken. The District thereafter moved for
summary judgment, contending that the complaint was filed outside the applicable
statutory limitations period; that the District is entitled to statutory immunity under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 65.2003; and that there was lack of proximate
cause and lack of notice. Hoskins filed no response. A hearing on the motion was
held on November 4, 2009, but neither Hoskins nor his counsel appeared.
The circuit court entered an order denying the motion for summary
judgment, stating only that there were “genuine issues of material fact to be tried.”
This appeal by the District followed.
The District raises several arguments in an effort to show that this
case is an exception to the general rule that “[a]n order denying a motion for
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summary judgment is not appealable.” Gumm v. Combs, 302 S.W.2d 616, 617
(Ky. 1957). First, because Hoskins did not respond to the District’s motion for
summary judgment, the District asserts that the circuit court’s denial of the motion
should be reviewable on the grounds that “a party opposing a properly supported
summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Brewster v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 279 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Ky. 2009), citing
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991);
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. While Hoskins’s failure to
respond to the motion was a factor for the circuit court to consider in determining
whether summary judgment was appropriate, it does not render the court order
reviewable on appeal. Hoskins presented enough evidence in the earlier stages of
the proceedings to support the circuit court’s refusal to grant summary judgment.
Second, the District argues that appellate review is permissible under
the exception which allows an appeal from the denial of a summary judgment
motion when “the only basis of the ruling is a matter of law.” Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Hall, 879 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky.App. 1994). This exception is inapplicable
because the basis of the court’s ruling in this case was its determination that
material issues of fact remain to be resolved.
Finally, the Water District argues that summary judgment should have
been granted on the basis of the statutory immunity that is provided for local
governments under KRS 65.2003, and that the circuit court’s denial of the motion
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is reviewable on those grounds. In Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292
S.W.3d 883, 887 (Ky. 2009), the Supreme Court held that an “order denying a
substantial claim of absolute immunity is immediately appealable even in the
absence of a final judgment.” In that case, however, the trial court expressly ruled
that the defendant school board’s actions were proprietary rather than
governmental and so did not come within the scope of the board’s immunity. Id. at
885. In the case before us, the circuit court made no such ruling as to immunity.
Arguably, by ruling that material issues of fact remain, the court may have already
determined that the District is not protected by statutory immunity. We hesitate to
impute such meaning to the order, however, and further note that the District did
not ask the trial court to clarify its ruling to specify whether the claim of immunity
was denied.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: March 18, 2011
/s/ Sheila Isaac
SENIOR JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Jason E. Williams
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JESSE
HOSKINS:
Bill Meader
Hyden, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE
PERRY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
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