HORN (CLAY), ET AL. VS. MESSAMORE (ROBERT), ET AL.
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000504-MR
CLAY HORN AND
SUSAN KAY HORN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00271
ROBERT MESSAMORE
AND JANET MESSAMORE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND COMBS, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Clay Horn and Susan Kay Horn bring this appeal from
a March 5, 2010, Second Amended Order & Judgment of the Garrard Circuit
Court, amending earlier orders entered February 8, 2010, and December 7, 2009,
that dismissed the Horns’ complaint as being time barred and awarding Robert
Messamore and Janet Messamore attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
The relevant facts are uncontroverted. In July of 1999, the Horns
purchased Lot 17 in the Nature’s Trace Subdivision in Garrard County and built
their house thereon. Thereafter, in July 2001, construction started upon a house
located on Lot 43 by C.T. Conn Builders, Inc., which was completed in August
2001. On September 22, 2003, the Messamores purchased Lot 43 and the new
house built thereon.
In the recorded covenants and restrictions for Nature’s Trace
Subdivision,1 Restriction number 9 required any dwelling on Lot 43 to front
Palisades Pointe Drive. However, the house on Lot 43 was built fronting on
Sylvan Way rather than Palisades Pointe Drive, clearly contrary to the subdivision
restrictions.
On July 26, 2008, the Horns filed a complaint against the Messamores
alleging breach of Restriction number 9. The Horns sought a “permanent
mandatory injunction requiring removal of the offending dwelling and prohibiting
the building of any dwelling in violation of the restriction on lot 43.” Eventually,
the circuit court rendered summary judgment for the Messamores, concluding that
the Horns’ action was time barred by the five-year limitation set forth in Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.120(4). The circuit court further awarded the
1
The record reflects that these restrictions were recorded on October 2, 1998, in the Garrard
County Clerk’s Office.
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Messamores attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $17,973.16, pursuant to
Restriction number 23 of the subdivision restrictions. This appeal follows.
The Horns contend that the circuit court erred by concluding that their
action was time barred under KRS 413.120(4). Specifically, the Horns argue that
the Messamores were estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations as a
defense. In support thereof, the Horns maintain:
When the Horns first noticed the Messamore house
was being built on Lot 43 in violation of the subdivision
restrictions, they met in person with the developer,
Danny Irvin. In his affidavit Mr. Horn explains that Irvin
said he knew of the violation, but that the committee
responsible for enforcement did not intend to do anything
because it had approved the building plans, as provided
in Restriction No. 21. That restriction reads:
A three member Architectural Review [B]oard is
to approve all buildings, including outbuildings.
There must be written approval of plans by a (sic)
least two members. The Review Board shall
consist of Danny Irvin, Cliff-Ed Irvin, and Donnie
Lane.
Horns’ Brief at 7 (citations omitted). The Horns argue that the developer misled
them into believing that an architectural review board had given written approval
for the home on Lot 43 to face Sylvan Way; because of the Horns’ reliance on this
misrepresentation, the Messamores should be estopped from asserting the
limitations defense.
In this Commonwealth, our Supreme Court has set forth the rule upon
estoppel as to a defense against the statute of limitations:
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[A] party may be estopped to plead limitations where he
has induced inaction on the part of plaintiff by his false
representations or fraudulent concealment. However, the
fraudulent action must be of a character to prevent
inquiry or elude an investigation or otherwise mislead the
party having cause of action, and such party is under the
duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence.
Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky. 1961).
Herein, we do not believe the Horns have set forth a prima facie case of
estoppel. First, the alleged false representation made by the developer in no way
prevented the Horns from bringing an action seeking enforcement of the
subdivision covenant. Restriction number 22 specifically states that all
“restrictions shall continue in force unless changed by a vote of at least threefourths (3/4) of all property owners.” In fact, the Horns admitted that the current
action was filed even though they still believed that the architectural review board
had given its written approval. Second, there are no allegations made against the
Messamores nor evidence in the record that they in any way made
misrepresentations to the Horns. Finally, regardless of the developer’s alleged
misrepresentation, the Horns were still required to exercise reasonable care and
diligence to protect their rights to enforce the restrictions. Clearly, the Horns
should have conducted a reasonable inquiry into the basis of the alleged written
approval by the developer and sought legal advice concerning their rights in 2001.
Accordingly, we do not believe that the Horns set forth a prima facie case of
estoppel. There being no grounds for estoppel, the time for bringing an action for
breach or violation of the restrictions for the subdivision began to run in 2001,
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when the Horns discovered that the house on Lot 43 was fronting on Sylvan Way.
The Horns filed their complaint in 2008. They were clearly beyond the five-year
limitation period.
Next, the Horns alleged that the circuit court erred in its award of attorney’s
fees to the Messamores. We disagree.
The law is well settled that a contractual provision providing for the award
of attorney’s fees is valid and enforceable. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Com.,
179 S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2005); Cummings v. Covey, 229 S.W.3d 59 (Ky. App. 2007).
The Horns’ and Messamores’ lots were subject to recorded restrictions
applicable to Nature’s Trace Subdivision. In particular, Restriction number 23
reads:
Any lot owner may enforce the restrictions and covenants
aforesaid by appropriate legal procedure. Invalidation of
any one or more of these covenants by judgment or court
order shall in no way affect any of the other provisions
which shall remain in full force and effect. In any action
to enforce these restrictions, the successful party shall be
entitled to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in said action.
Under Restriction number 23, the “successful party” is entitled to an award
of attorney’s fees in an action to enforce the restrictive covenants. We view a
recorded restrictive covenant providing for attorney’s fees as essentially
constituting an enforceable contract providing for attorney’s fees. KRS 411.195;
Triple Crown Subd. Homeowners Ass. Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138 (Ky. 2009).
Additionally, valid restrictions and covenants set forth in deeds constitute property
rights which run with the land. McFarland v. Haney, 258 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1953).
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Accordingly, the restrictions are valid and enforceable as to the enforcement of a
provision for attorney’s fees.
Herein, the Horns filed a complaint seeking enforcement of Restriction
number 9 and seeking attorney’s fees “as provided in the restrictions.” As the
Messamores clearly prevailed in this action, we believe that the Messamores were
entitled to attorney’s fees under Restriction number 23.
Alternatively, the Horns argue that the award of attorney’s fees and costs
was excessive. The circuit court awarded the Messamores $17,973.16 in
attorney’s fees and costs. Specifically, the Horns maintain that a $200 per hour fee
was unreasonable and that certain attorney’s fees and costs should be disallowed.
As to the amount charged per hour, we think $200 is both reasonable and
well within the circuit court’s discretion for which we find no abuse. Angel v.
McKeehan, 63 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. App. 2001). However, we think the court erred by
awarding any attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the Messamores in pursuit of
their third-party complaint against Charles T. Conn and Cathe M. Conn. In the
third-party complaint, the Messamores claimed breach of warranty, fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation. The Messamores’ third-party complaint essentially
alleged that the Conns sold Lot 43 with the home thereupon in violation of
Restriction number 9.
Since the fees related to the third-party complaint were incurred to enforce
the warranty provisions of the Messamores’ deed, the circuit court erred by
requiring the Horns to pay any attorney’s fees associated therewith. The Horns
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were not a party to the Messamores’ third-party complaint and certainly cannot be
considered the unsuccessful party responsible for the Messamores’ attorney’s fees
and costs related thereto. As to the third-party complaint, attorney’s fees are
simply not recoverable from the Horns under Restriction number 23, and related
costs are not recoverable from the Horns under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
54.04. In all other respects, we conclude the circuit court’s award of attorney’s
fees and costs was proper. Upon remand, the circuit court should recalculate its
award of attorney’s fees and costs and exclude any fees and costs associated with
proceedings related to the third-party complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the second amended order and judgment of the
Garrard Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Richard Clay
Danville, Kentucky
Bruce E. Smith
Nicholasville, Kentucky
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