WHITFIELD (DAREL), ET AL. VS. STANLEY (GLENN GARY), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000373-MR
DAREL WHITFIELD;
AND HIS WIFE,
ALVADA WHITFIELD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES C. BRANTLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00523
GLENN GARY STANLEY;
AND HIS WIFE,
JOYCE FAYE STANLEY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Darel and Alvada Whitfield (the Whitfields) appeal from a
judgment of the Hopkins Circuit Court concluding that Glenn and Joyce Stanley
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
(the Stanleys) own a piece of property that is subject to a 20-foot easement. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute.
Clyde and Mary Louise Brooks (the Brooks) owned a 62-acre tract of
land in Hopkins County, Kentucky. By a deed recorded on December 18, 1968,
the Brooks conveyed 20 acres of their tract to Jackie and Lydida Farmer (the
Farmers). This tract was located southeast of the Brooks’ remaining 40 acres. The
deed also conveyed an easement to the Farmers, which is described as follows:
There is also conveyed a 20 foot easement or roadway
for the purpose of ingress and egress to the above
described property, said easement or roadway running
over and across the [Brooks’] other property and running
along the northern line of Goebel Phillips’ property from
the New Salem Road in an easterly direction to the
northwest corner of the above described property.
Thus, the easement ran from Chicken Road2 in an easterly direction along the
southern boundary line of the Brooks’ remaining 40 acres.
The Brooks conveyed the remaining 40 acres of their tract to Estill Riley by
deed dated December 9, 1974, and Estill subsequently conveyed one-half of his
interest in the 40-acre tract to his wife. By deed dated April 12, 1977, the Rileys
conveyed the 40-acre tract to Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf Oil). That tract was
subject to the Farmers’ easement, which was described in Gulf Oil’s deed as
follows:
2
We note that Chicken Road and New Salem Road are the same road. For purposes of this
appeal, we will refer to it as Chicken Road.
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The above described property is subject to a 20 foot
easement or roadway granted by deed of conveyance
recorded in Deed Book 322, page 276, Hopkins County
Court Clerk’s office, and described as follows:
BEGINNING at a stone and fence post in the East Right
of Way of Chicken Road, said stone also being the
Northwest corner of William G. Phillips; thence with said
Phillips South 58° 19’ East – 497.94 feet to a fence
corner; thence South 12° 09’ East – 151.72 feet to a 48”
black oak, the Northwest corner of Jackie Farmer; thence
South 79° 35’ 30” East – 21.65 feet to a point; thence
North 12° 09’ West – 168.55 feet to a point; thence North
58° 19’ West – 510.41 feet to a point in the East Right of
Way of Chicken Road; thence South 20° 30’ West –
20.36 feet to the Beginning. (Survey by Associated
Engineers dated April 8, 1977).
Prior to the Rileys’ conveying this tract to Gulf Oil, the property was surveyed by
Associated Engineers. The survey reflected that the property was actually 38.184
acres instead of 40 acres.
Shortly after acquiring the property, Gulf Oil subdivided it into three
tracts of land. Gulf Oil retained the eastern portion of the property, which
amounted to 28.394 acres. By deed dated May 3, 1977, Gulf Oil conveyed 5.01
acres to Harold and Doris Crick (the Cricks). This 5.01-acre tract was located
directly west of the 28.394 acres Gulf Oil retained. The Crick deed provided that
Gulf Oil reserved “unto itself, its successors and assigns, an easement across the
above described property for ingress and egress to the remaining portion of the
tract purchased from Riley.”
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Also by deed dated May 3, 1977, Gulf Oil conveyed 4.79 acres3 to
the Stanleys, the Appellees in this case. This tract was located directly west of the
Cricks’ tract, with the front boundary line running along Chicken Road. As in the
Crick deed, the Stanley deed provided that Gulf Oil reserved “unto itself, its
successors and assigns, an easement across the above described property for
ingress and egress to the remaining portion of the tract purchased from Riley.”
By deed dated May 6, 1983, Gulf Oil conveyed its remaining 28.394
acres to the Whitfields, the Appellants in this case. The deed excepted the property
conveyed from Gulf Oil to the Stanleys and the Cricks in 1977. The deed also
provided that it was subject to the 20-foot easement granted to the Farmers in the
1968 deed.
A dispute arose between the Stanleys and the Whitfields in 2007 when
the Whitfields started to put in a waterline along the edge of the easement. Both
parties claimed to own the property subject to the 20-foot easement that ran from
Chicken Road in an easterly direction to the rear boundary line of the Stanleys’
property. The Stanleys filed a quiet title action in the Hopkins Circuit Court, and a
bench trial was held on June 17, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment on
January 26, 2010, concluding that the Stanleys were the owners of the 20-foot
easement in dispute. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
3
We note that the three tracts of property, the 28.394-acre tract, the 5.01-acre tract, and the 4.79acre tract equal 38.194 acres instead of 38.184 as reflected on the survey conducted by
Associated Engineers. However, this minor difference is insignificant to this appeal.
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Because this matter was tried before the circuit court without a jury, our
review of factual determinations is under the clearly erroneous standard. Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if it
is supported by “evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). In our review, we are
mindful that the trial court is in a better position to determine the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence. Uninsured Employers’ Fund v.
Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1991).
Further, the interpretation of a deed is a matter of law; therefore, our review of that
issue is de novo. Smith v. Vest, 265 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Ky. App. 2007).
ANALYSIS
Both parties agree that the description provided in the Stanley deed is
ambiguous. However, they disagree as to the proper interpretation of that deed and
whether it includes the 20-foot easement.
As stated in Hoskins Heirs v. Boggs, 242 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Ky. 2007):
Of course, “[t]he construction of a deed is a matter of
law, and [absent an ambiguity,] the intention of the
parties is to be gathered from the four corners of the
instrument.” Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky.
1972). Thus, the “court may not substitute what [a]
grantor may have intended to say for what was said.” Id.
“It is [however,] to be assumed that the parties to a deed
intended each of its provisions to have some effect from
the very fact that the words were used [and][t]he rule is
well settled that words in a deed that are not technical
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must be construed as having their ordinary connotation.”
Id.
Additionally, “[i]n determining the intention of the parties, courts look at the whole
deed, along with the circumstances surrounding its execution, and courts may also
consider the acts of the parties following the conveyance.” Arthur v. Martin, 705
S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ky. App. 1986).
Both parties agree that the description in the Stanley deed is
ambiguous because the description does not close. As a result of this ambiguity, it
is unclear whether the deed includes the 20-foot easement. Specifically, the
dispute in this case is whether the description of the front boundary line of the tract
which faces Chicken Road is 20 feet too long, or if the description of the rear
boundary line is 20 feet too short. The Whitfields contend that the trial court erred
in concluding that the description of the rear boundary line was 20 feet too short.
We disagree.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 117 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Ky.
1937), the former Kentucky Court of Appeals set forth the following standard for
determining boundary lines in deed descriptions:
In determining boundaries, the general rule is that natural
and permanent monuments are the most satisfactory
evidence and control all other means of description.
Artificial marks, courses, distances, and area follow in
the order named, area being the weakest of all the means
of description.
With this standard in mind, we now turn to the parties’ arguments.
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The Whitfields argue that although the description in the deed
provides that the front boundary line is 548.84 feet long, the distance should be
described as 528.84 feet in order for the tract to properly close. The Whitfields
contend that because the correct measurement is 528.84 feet, the deed did not
include the 20-foot easement. However, as correctly noted by the trial court,
548.84 feet is the only description of this boundary line provided in the Stanley
deed. There is no reference in the description to a natural or artificial monument.
Thus, the description of 548.84 feet controls. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in concluding that the description of this boundary line was not 20 feet too
long.
We now address the Stanleys’ argument that the ambiguity in the deed
is the result of the rear boundary line being described as 20 feet too short. The
Stanley deed describes the rear boundary line as follows: “thence with a new
division line South 12° 19’ West – 628.17 feet to a fence corner; . . .” Because the
“fence corner” is an artificial monument, it controls over the description of 628.17
feet. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 117 S.W.2d at 182. However, the parties disagree
about where the fence corner is located.
The Whitfields contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the
fence corner described in the deed is located beyond the easement. In support of
their argument, the Whitefields point to the testimony of Roger Lynn (Lynn), an
Associated Engineers Registered Surveyor. Although Lynn did not do an
independent survey of the parties’ property, he testified regarding the parties’
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deeds and the 1977 plat. According to Lynn, an “x” on the plat indicates a fence
line. Because there are fence lines marked across the rear boundary line, it can be
“assumed” that there is a fence corner before the easement.
However, the Stanleys point to a photograph they introduced into
evidence during the bench trial in support of their argument that a fence corner is
located beyond the easement. Glenn Stanley testified that the photograph is a
picture of where the fence post was located in 1977, and that it is located beyond
the easement. Additionally, Glenn Stanley testified that when he purchased his
property in 1977, a gate crossed the road where the easement was located. He
further testified that the gate was attached to a fence, and there was a fence corner
beyond the easement. Additionally, the Stanleys note that there is an “x” on the
1977 plat beyond the easement, which coincides with where the trial court
determined the fence corner was located.
Based on the evidence presented at the bench trial, the court’s
determination that the fence corner was beyond the easement was not clearly
erroneous. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 976 S.W.2d at 414. Thus, we
cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the description of the rear
boundary line was 20 feet too short and that the line runs to the fence beyond the
easement. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the Stanley deed
includes the 20-foot easement.
In addition to the above, we note that Gulf Oil’s intent to include the
20-foot easement in the Stanley deed is evidenced by the fact that it reserved itself
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an easement in the Stanley deed. As noted above, the description of the easement
in the Stanley deed states that Gulf Oil reserved “unto itself, its successors and
assigns, an easement across the above described property for ingress and egress to
the remaining portion of the tract purchased from Riley.” The Whitfields contend
that this easement is separate from the 20-foot easement in dispute. However, as
correctly noted by the trial court, reserving a separate easement across the
Stanleys’ property would be unnecessary if Gulf Oil intended to remain the owner
of the strip of land upon which the entire 20-foot easement exists. Specifically, if
Gulf Oil retained ownership of the entire 20-foot easement, it would be able to
access Chicken Road from its tract. Thus, an easement for ingress and egress
across the Stanleys’ property would have been unnecessary.
Lastly, we note the Whitfields’ argument that the final paragraph of
the trial court’s judgment should be stricken. This paragraph states as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that neither party, their
successor or assigns, shall in any way interfere with the
use and enjoyment of the easement by those, or their
successors in title, now served by the easement[.]
This appears to be a general statement of the law on easements - that an owner of
property subject to an easement cannot interfere with the rights of the holder of the
easement. Commonwealth, Dept. of Fish and Wildlife Resources v. Garner, 896
S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ky. 1995). Thus, the Whitfields’ argument that a portion of the
trial court’s order should be stricken is without merit.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hopkins
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Randall C. Teague
Madisonville, Kentucky
Thomas E. Springer III
Madisonville, Kentucky
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