SULLIVAN (JOSEPH LEE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 20, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000169-MR
JOSEPH LEE SULLIVAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-01232
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, LAMBERT AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Joseph Lee Sullivan appeals from the Fayette Circuit
Court’s judgment of conviction based on a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in
marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school and first-offense possession of drug
paraphernalia. Pursuant to his conditional guilty plea, Sullivan reserved the right
to appeal the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
On April 16, 2009, while patrolling in a high crime area, which had
been the subject of numerous citizen complaints of drug activity, Lexington Police
Detectives Danny Page and Byron Smoot observed a Lincoln Town Car, with
lightly tinted windows, legally parked on the side of the street. In a Ford Explorer,
Detective Page drove toward the Lincoln where he observed a person counting
money inside the car. When Detective Page looked through the car’s front
windshield, he observed a man counting money, an object that he believed was a
digital scale, and a green leafy substance that he suspected was marijuana.
When Detective Page drove directly beside the Lincoln and looked
through the driver’s side window, he observed a bag of marijuana beside the right
leg of the driver of the car. Detective Page drove past the Lincoln and parked his
vehicle. At this point, the detectives approached the Lincoln from opposite sides.
Standing on the sidewalk and looking through the open passenger side window,
Detective Page observed a passenger with money, marijuana, and a digital scale.
He further observed a large Ziploc bag of marijuana beside the driver’s leg. From
his training and experience, he believed that a drug transaction was occurring.
The detectives then requested the two men to exit the vehicle,
informed them that they were being detained, and placed the men in handcuffs.
Detective Smoot then observed the digital scales and marijuana on the center
console of the vehicle. After searching the vehicle, Detective Page found 6.5
grams of marijuana on the digital scale and 240 grams of marijuana in the Ziplock
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bag. He also found 4.2 grams of marijuana in a Starburst candy bag. Following
the driver’s arrest, he was identified as Sullivan and was later indicted.
Subsequently, Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence from the
search of his vehicle. He argued that police did not have reasonable suspicion to
execute a Terry1 stop of his vehicle. He argued that his mere presence in a high
crime area and his counting of money in a car did not provide a sufficient basis to
permit the warrantless search of his vehicle. After conducting a suppression
hearing, the trial court denied Sullivan’s motion by ruling that there was probable
cause for police to search Sullivan’s car. The trial court found that Detective Page
was lawfully in a position where he could observe contraband in plain view.
Following the denial of his suppression motion, Sullivan entered a
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school
and first-offense possession of drug paraphernalia. In accordance with the plea,
Sullivan was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Sullivan contends that the trial court erred by not suppressing the
evidence from the search of his car in violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section Ten of the Kentucky
Constitution. Specifically, he contends that his presence in a high crime area, his
counting of money inside of a legally parked car, and anonymous tips of drug
activity were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to search his car. He
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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further contends that Detective Page’s testimony about observing drugs through
the Lincoln’s tinted windows was not credible and should have been disregarded.
Our standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
requires that we first decide if the trial court's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App.
2002). If supported by substantial evidence, the trial court’s factual findings are
conclusive and will not be disturbed by an appellate court. Roberson v.
Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Ky. 2006). A de novo review of the trial
court's application of the law is then conducted to determine whether it correctly
applied the law. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998).
Sullivan argues that the trial court’s findings of fact were erroneous
because they were based on conflicting evidence and incredible testimony. He
contends that Detective Page’s suppression hearing testimony explained why he
slowed down as he approached Sullivan’s car but not his grand jury testimony. He
further contends that Detective Page testified that he was within arm’s length from
the Lincoln Town Car when he first saw movement in the car. However, Detective
Smoot testified that the detectives were approximately eight feet from the car. He
also argues that the amount of time Page observed him in the car changed by a
matter of seconds during his testimony. He next argues that Page’s testimony
placed the marijuana bag next to his right leg and then later next to his right arm.
“The determination of the weight of conflicting evidence and of the
credibility of witnesses rests exclusively within the province” of the finder of fact.
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Cross v. Clark, 308 Ky. 18, 22-23, 213 S.W.2d 443, 446 (1948). “It may believe
any of the witnesses in whole or in part, and may accept the testimony of one set of
witnesses to the exclusion of that of another or the testimony of one witness as
against the testimony of a number of witnesses.” Id. While there were some minor
inconsistencies in the record, the trial court was within its discretion to believe
Detective Page’s testimony regarding the facts leading up to Sullivan’s arrest.
Because an appellate court must give due weight to the factual inferences drawn by
the trial court, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous. Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Ky. 2006). We
now turn to the trial court’s application of the law.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Section Ten of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee citizens the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, which is effectuated by the general rule
prohibiting searches not authorized by a valid search warrant. Commonwealth v.
Wood, 14 S.W.3d 557, 558 (Ky.App. 1999). However, a few exceptions have
evolved to permit limited uses of warrantless entries and searches, including the
automobile exception. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Ky.App.
2006). This exception permits police to search a legally stopped automobile where
probable cause exists that evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. Id.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Page testified that he observed
marijuana and a digital scale from his Ford Explorer and from the sidewalk. At
both of these locations, Detective Page was legitimately in a position where he
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could and did observe evidence of a drug crime. Commonwealth v. Banks, 68
S.W.3d 347, 350 (Ky. 2001) (police are free to approach or observe people in
public areas). Consequently, when Detective Page observed the contraband in
plain view from outside of Sullivan’s car, he was authorized to search the vehicle
under the automobile exception pursuant to the plain view exception. Hazel v.
Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1992); Dunn, 199 S.W.3d at 776.
While Sullivan argues that his presence in a high crime area, his
counting of money, and anonymous tips were insufficient to permit the warrantless
search of his vehicle, the search was valid because of the totality of the
circumstances, including the observance of the marijuana, digital scale, and
counting of money. Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky.App.
2003) (probable cause is an objective standard based on the totality of the
circumstances in each case). Based on the totality of the circumstances in the
instant case, police had probable cause because their observations provided
reasonable grounds to believe that contraband was located in the car. Id. at 538.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Sullivan’s motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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