NELSON (KEVIN), ET AL. VS. BAKER (MARY), ET AL.
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RENDERED: APRIL 1, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000165-MR
REV. KEVIN NELSON; GREGORY
DOWNS; BILLY WILLIAMS;
AND ANTHONY SILMON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O’MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-001120
MARY BAKER; DONALD BARBOUR;
DORIS BARBOUR; DORIS CARTER;
CAROL LUMPKINS-COCHRAN;
SCOTT COX; JACKIE FREEMAN;
MONNIE HANKINS; PEGGY HANKINS;
CLARENCE HAMBRICK; MATTIE
HASKINS; MILTON HASKINS;
EVA HOUSEAL; ALEX JONES; TONI
JONES; CHUCK MATTHEWS; NANCY
MATTHEWS; LINDA MCGHEE;
EUGENE MORROW; LUCILLE O’BANNON;
BRENDA PAYNE; ANN PLEASANT;
MELVIN PLEASANT; ELOIS SIMS;
PATRICIA STROTHER; CHUCK TRICE;
WALTER TYTUS, DECEASED; JERRY
WILLIAMS; AND PATRICIA WILLIAMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Before this Court is a fourth appeal arising from a suit filed
by members (now former members) of the First Baptist Church of Jeffersontown
seeking injunctive relief related to the Church’s business and financial affairs. The
issues before this Court are whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the
dispute as it concerns the internal governance of the Church, whether the circuit
court erred in failing to dismiss the claims due to lack of standing and because the
controversy is moot, and whether the relief granted exceeded what was permitted
by the Church’s constitution and bylaws. After careful review of the record and
the parties’ briefs, we reverse.
The First Baptist Church of Jeffersontown (the Church) is a
Congregationalist church in Jefferson County, Kentucky. When a previous pastor
decided to retire, the congregation voted to adopt a constitution and bylaws to
govern the practices of the Church, including membership, the selection and roles
of the Church leaders, and the roles of the various committees. The constitution
and bylaws went into effect in 2000.
Because this case’s convoluted procedural history bears directly on
our decision, we shall set forth the lengthy history of this suit in detail. In 2006,
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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three members of the Church, Monnie Hankins, Jackie Freeman, and Chuck
Matthews, filed a verified complaint against the Church’s current pastor, Rev.
Kevin Nelson; Anthony Silmon, the Church’s financial chairman; Billy Williams,
the co-financial chairman; and Gregory Downs, the chair of the Deacon Board (the
defendants). In their complaint, the members alleged that the Church’s money was
being spent in disregard of its constitution and bylaws and that the defendants had
refused to provide information concerning the Church’s financial status and affairs
to them when requested. The members demanded that the defendants be required
to repay to the Church any improper expenditures made, and that a Certified Public
Accountant be appointed to conduct an independent audit. They additionally
sought injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from disbursing Church funds.
Shortly thereafter, the circuit court permitted the filing of an amended complaint
naming additional plaintiffs. A second amended complaint was later filed
concerning the holding of Church business meetings.
On July 8, 2006, prior to filing an answer, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
They alleged that the circuit court could not interfere with the internal affairs of the
Church, because such is to be decided by the congregation by majority vote. By
order entered December 12, 2006, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss.
As a basis for this ruling, the Court noted that the members were alleging that the
will of the majority, as set forth in the constitution and bylaws, was not being
followed, specifically related to the audit process. It ultimately held that, “[a]t this
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juncture in time, Defendants have not shown that this is an ecclesiastical matter in
which this Court should not be involved.”
Following the entry of this order, the defendants filed an answer to all of the
allegations in the complaints. In September 2007, the members filed a motion to
compel an independent audit and expense review of years 2005, 2006, and 2007
year to date, by someone other than Toni Levy, who had performed such audits in
the past. The circuit court denied this motion following a hearing later that year.
On March 20, 2008, the members, having apparently abandoned their prior
accusations of financial impropriety, moved to file a third amended complaint, this
time alleging failure to: 1) conduct regular business meetings four times per year;
2) provide monthly financial reports to the Church; 3) conduct annual audits; and
4) make annual reports of receipts and disbursements. The members requested
injunctive relief to require the defendants to immediately produce annual reports
for 2006 and 2007. The defendants objected to the motion, arguing that the new
claims were purely ecclesiastical in nature and were for a different time period than
the original complaint. Additionally, the members moved the court to compel the
defendants to produce an official active membership list for 2005 through 2008,
stating that member-plaintiffs were being kicked out of the Church. The circuit
court granted the motion to compel production of the membership list on April 7,
2008, and granted the motion to file a third amended complaint on June 4, 2008.
On June 30, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the third amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing
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that the relief requested was not authorized by the Church’s constitution or bylaws.
The members also moved for summary judgment on the third amended complaint,
arguing that no issues of material fact existed and that the defendants had failed to
comply with the constitution and bylaws related to the provisions described in the
complaint. On October 6, 2008, the circuit court entered an opinion and order
ruling on these motions and addressing the members’ demands regarding hard
copies of monthly reports, business meetings, and the hiring of an external auditor.
The court first held that it had jurisdiction to decide these issues based upon the
law of the case as well as upon the holding in Music v. United Methodist Church,
864 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1993), that permits a court to intervene where an issue
pertains to property rights rather than to matters of faith. The court then stated that
the constitution and bylaws constituted a contract, subject to the laws governing
contract interpretation. Finally, it addressed the specific issues raised in the
motions. The court declined to order an external audit because there was no
requirement for one in the constitution or bylaws; it interpreted the documents to
require that the Church hold business meetings at least three times per year; and it
declined to require that hard copies of the financial documents be provided at the
business meetings, again because this was not required by the constitution or
bylaws. However, the court set forth several requirements as to what data must be
kept in the Church’s finance room and that any reports be prepared and made
available to the members for review at least one week before each business
meeting.
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On November 5, 2008, the defendants filed a notice of appeal from the
above opinion and order (Appeal No. 2008-CA-002093-MR). However, on
October 16, 2008, the members filed a timely motion to amend the opinion and
order, requesting that the circuit court amend that order to include a provision that
it would maintain jurisdiction over the matter for enforcement purposes. In
support of the motion, the members related that they were still being denied access
to the financial records due to their alleged “bad standing” in the church. The
defendants objected to the motion, arguing that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction over the sole issue raised; namely, membership and discipline.
On December 2, 2008, the members moved the circuit court to order the
defendants to show cause for their failure to comply with the provision of the
October 6, 2008, order imposing a permanent injunction that financial data be
maintained in the finance room and made available to all active members. In an
order signed on December 5 and entered on December 8, 2008, the circuit court
opted to continue the case for a show-cause hearing later that month. In addition,
the court specifically stated that “[t]he Plaintiffs are all active members of the
church, having attended church during the past year” and that “[o]ne or more
Plaintiffs have been denied access to the books, records and accounts in the finance
room of the church.”
On December 5, 2008, the defendants moved the circuit court to suspend the
injunctive relief ordered so that the status quo could be maintained during the
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appeal. They asserted that damage would be done if the members were permitted
to view the documents and then the order was reversed on appeal.
Following the hearing of December 9, 2008, the circuit court entered a
supplemental and amended order on December 11, 2008. This order slightly
revised language in orders entered October 6 and December 8, 2008, and
specifically reserved a ruling on the pending motion to suspend injunctive relief
until after the scheduled show-cause hearing.
At the show-cause hearing on December 19, 2008, the members
argued that the defendants failed to comply with previous orders concerning access
to the financial records. Discussion ensued concerning a church meeting on
December 12, 2008, to review the requested the documents, which apparently went
well. The members then asked for more documents, and the next scheduled
meeting was canceled by the defendants due to a conflict. During the hearing, the
defendants stated that they would be producing the rest of the documents on
January 16, 2009. At that point in the hearing, the circuit court indicated that the
matter was remanded unless further problems arose. The parties discussed the
existence of the pending appeal and whether the defendants would be filing a
motion to dismiss the appeal. They then discussed that a new final judgment had
been created, made up of all three orders and amendments. However, the court
stated that the order entered October 6, 2008, was final and appealable, but that the
members’ motion for the court to retain jurisdiction became part of the final
judgment.
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On December 29, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the pending
appeal of the October 6, 2008 opinion and order. A three-judge motion panel of
this Court granted the motion on February 4, 2009.
On January 23, 2009, the members filed a renewed motion for a showcause hearing, citing the defendants’ continuing refusal to comply with the court’s
orders and allow meaningful access to the financial records. The same day, the
members also filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 65.04 motion for a
temporary injunction ordering the defendants to produce the financial records for
inspection. On February 9, 2009, the circuit court granted the members’ motion
for an injunction and ordered that “the defendants shall, beginning on February 11,
2009, produce the financial records described as Exhibit 44, a monthly financial
statement, along with the cash assets balance sheets, for each month from January,
2006 through date, from 9 to 5 on business days on the church premises.” The
order further permitted the members to take whatever notes they wished and did
not provide any time limitation for reviewing the data. The order concluded with a
recitation that it was final and appealable, and that it “supplements the court’s prior
orders in this matter.” Immediately following the entry of this injunction, the
defendants filed a notice of appeal of the December 12, 2006, October 6, 2008,
December 8, 2008, December 11, 2008, and February 9, 2009, orders (Appeal No.
2009-CA-000248-MR).
The defendants then moved the circuit court for interlocutory relief during
the appeal so that the injunctive relief granted on February 9, 2009, would be
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suspended. Also on February 9, 2009, the circuit court denied this motion. The
defendants then filed a CR 65.08 action for relief with this Court (Appeal No.
2009-CA-000245-I), which included a motion for emergency relief. The Court of
Appeals granted emergency relief in an order entered February 10, 2009, staying
the circuit court’s February 9, 2009, order until such time as a three-judge panel
could resolve the underlying CR 65.08 motion. In this order, the Court questioned
the authority of the circuit court to continue to enter orders while Appeal No. 2008CA-002093-MR was still pending, and expressed reservations about whether
Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1993), supported its
decision that it had jurisdiction to proceed.
On February 16, 2009, the defendants moved this Court to reconsider the
order dismissing Appeal No. 2008-CA-002093-MR and reinstate that appeal or
clarify the order to state that the October 6, 2008, order was not final or appealable.
On March 13, 2009, this Court denied a second motion for emergency relief
in which the members sought an order precluding the defendants from taking steps
to affect the application or operation of the Church’s constitution and bylaws. In
denying the motion, this Court stated that the members failed to demonstrate that
the relief they were requesting had first been presented to and ruled on by the
circuit court. The Court went on to explain as follows:
At the February 9, 2009 hearing on respondents’ motion
for a temporary injunction, they specifically asked the
trial court to withhold ruling on the question of whether
the Church could hold a meeting on March 15, 2009, for
the purpose of repealing its by-laws. CR 65.08 itself
makes clear that this Court is without authority to rule
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upon respondents’ entitlement to a temporary injunction
until the trial court has had an opportunity to rule. Here,
although review of the February 9 hearing confirms that
the matter was addressed to the circuit court, respondents
unequivocally requested that it not rule upon its motion
for stay of the March 15 meeting until a later, specified
date. Further, the trial court itself, having considered the
arguments of counsel, agreed not to rule on the motion,
assuming the matter would go forward on March 15,
2009.
We note that the record certified for the present appeal does not include a
recording of the February 9, 2009, hearing.
During the church meeting of March 15, 2009, the congregation voted to
rescind the Church’s constitution and bylaws.
On April 17, 2009, this Court issued an order in the two pending appeals
(2009-CA-000245-I and 2009-CA-000248-MR), directing the
defendants/appellants to show cause why the appeals should not be dismissed as
moot due to the repeal of the Church’s constitution and bylaws at the March 15,
2009, meeting. Both parties responded, and the Court entered an order dismissing
the appeals as moot on July 22, 2009. The order reads, in part, as follows:
On April 17 this Court directed the appellants to show
cause why these appeals should not be dismissed as
moot. In their response the appellants concede that the
church’s March 15 vote to rescind its bylaws rendered
these appeals moot. The appellants also point to the
circuit court’s statement that its “rulings, based on the
Constitution and Bylaws, are subject to amendment
consistent with the procedure set forth therein,” and
request that this Court determine that the circuit court
orders are moot. The appellants cite Thomas v. Lewis,
224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255 (1928), in support of its
argument that the church has the authority to determine
its bylaws.
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Having considered the appellants’ response to the April
17 show cause order and the appellees’ reply, this Court
finds insufficient cause to allow these appeals to proceed.
The circuit court is the appropriate forum to first
determine whether its appealed orders are moot or
unenforceable. The Court ORDERS that the abovecaptioned actions be DISMISSED. The motions for CR
65.08 relief and the appellants’ motion for leave to file a
reply to the response are DENIED AS MOOT.
Also on July 22, 2009, this Court denied the defendants’ motion to reconsider the
order dismissing Appeal No. 2008-CA-002093-MR without any further discussion
as to whether the October 6, 2008, order was final and appealable.
At this point procedurally, the matter returned to the circuit court. On
September 17, 2009, the members filed a renewed motion for the court to enter a
show-cause order. In the motion, the members requested that the defendants be
ordered to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to
comply with the February 9, 2009, order once their appeals from that order had
been dismissed. In support of the motion, the members attached a copy of their
attorney’s letter, dated September 2, 2009, to the attorney representing the
defendants:
The Court of Appeals entered dismissal orders in both
pending appeals on July 22, 2009. As more than thirty
days have passed since the entry of those orders, the final
judgment in this action is Judge Shake’s February 9,
2009 order, along with the earlier orders incorporated
with it. My clients expect that your clients will comply
with Judge Shake’s final order, and are prepared to
review the documents ordered produced within the next
72 hours. Please confirm that the documents are ready
for review.
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They also attached a letter in response, dated September 3, 2009, rejecting their
request to review the documents within the next seventy-two hours because the
basis for the members’ demand was no longer valid, since the Church’s
constitution and bylaws had been repealed. The letter went on to state that “as
these day-to-day decisions are in the hands of Pastor Nelson, the Church has
decided not to allow your clients to review any documents. Any further action on
this case by your clients will be deemed an act of defiance against the Church
leadership and the Church and your clients will be dealt with accordingly.”
Finally, the letter pointed to the Court of Appeals’ statement in its order
concerning its reservations about whether the circuit court had jurisdiction at all,
and stated that it would appeal the jurisdiction issue to the Court of Appeals if the
circuit court were to again order production of the documents.
On October 8, 2009, the defendants filed a response to the show-cause order,
which the circuit court later converted into a motion for summary judgment, upon
the defendants’ request. The defendants argued: 1) that the members lacked
standing to seek compliance with the February 9, 2009, order because they were no
longer members of the church, and 2) that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over
the case and subject matter, upon the repeal of the constitution and bylaws, because
the court is not permitted to involve itself in the internal operations of a church on
issues of membership and discipline. Furthermore, the defendants asserted that the
court’s earlier orders were based upon its interpretation of the constitution and
bylaws, which no longer existed. In response, the members argued that a material
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issue of fact remained as to the propriety of the rescission of the constitution and
bylaws, that the rescission did not apply retroactively, and that the “reservation”
concerning jurisdiction made in the order of the Court of Appeals was not binding
because that issue was not before the Court at that time. In reply, the defendants
asserted that it was appropriate to revisit subject matter jurisdiction because the
nature of the case had changed. They also asserted that the members waived any
opportunity to challenge the vote to rescind when they failed to raise a timely
objection during the meeting.
On January 8, 2010, the circuit court entered an opinion and order partially
granting and partially denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
After a lengthy analysis of cases addressing the role of Kentucky courts as arbiters
among church members, which the court essentially concluded was limited to
deciding property rights for purposes of this case, the court held:
[T]his Court has jurisdiction to decide the property rights
of the Plaintiffs asserted prior to the March 15, 2009
vote, pursuant to the rights granted by the constitution
and by-laws that existed prior to March 15, 2009. Those
rights which represented the will of the majority until
purportedly repealed on March 15, 2009, have been
affirmed by prior final orders of this Court and the
Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief heretofore granted,
including review of the financial records pursuant to
Injunction Order entered February 9, 2009. However, the
Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the
Plaintiffs’ status as church members since being
informed of their removal or the validity of the vote
rescinding the by-laws and constitution of the church.
With respect to those issues, summary judgment in the
Defendants’ favor, based on jurisdiction, is proper.
This appeal by the defendants (hereinafter, the “appellants”) follows.
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In their brief, the appellants raise three arguments. First, they assert
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction based upon the First Amendment’s
prohibition against interfering with religion. Second, they argue that the circuit
court erred when it failed to dismiss the members’ suit upon remand, both because
the suit became moot when the constitution and bylaws were repealed, and because
the now former members lacked standing. Finally, the appellants argue that the
circuit court exceeded the bounds of the constitution and bylaws in the relief it
granted.
Our standard of review is set forth in Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781
(Ky. App. 1996):
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. There is
no requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial
court since factual findings are not at issue. Goldsmith v.
Allied Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378,
381 (1992). “The record must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991). Summary “judgment is only
proper where the movant shows that the adverse party
could not prevail under any circumstances.” Steelvest,
807 S.W.2d at 480, citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v.
Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985). Consequently,
summary judgment must be granted “only when it
appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. . .”
Huddleston v. Hughes, Ky.App., 843 S.W.2d 901, 903
(1992), citing Steelvest, supra. (citations omitted.).
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The parties do not claim that any genuine issues of material fact exist for purposes
of the issues raised in this appeal. Therefore, our review is limited to whether the
circuit court erred as a matter of law in holding that it had jurisdiction to decide the
property rights asserted prior to March 15, 2009, and that the members were
entitled to the relief granted to them prior to that date.
The first issue we shall address is appellants’ argument that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in this case. For the reasons set
forth herein below, we agree with the appellants that the circuit court lacked the
requisite jurisdiction to decide the present matter.
Before we may reach the merits of this argument, we must first
address the members’ contention that the jurisdictional arguments are not properly
before this Court. They assert that the appellants are barred from seeking review
on this issue because jurisdiction was the subject of the 2008 appeal that was
dismissed on their motion. Therefore, the members argue that continuing litigation
of this issue is barred by the law of the case or by collateral estoppel. We disagree,
and hold that the members are permitted to raise this issue in the present appeal.
In support of this argument, the members cite to the recent opinion of
Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2010), in which the Supreme
Court of Kentucky discussed the law-of-the-case doctrine.
“Law of the case” refers to a handful of related rules
giving substance to the general principle that a court
addressing later phases of a lawsuit should not reopen
questions decided by that court or by a higher court
during earlier phases of the litigation. . . .
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Although in general the law-of-the-case doctrine applies
only to matters the merits of which an appellate court has
decided, Davis v. Island Creek Coal Company, 969
S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1998), an extension of the core law-ofthe-case doctrine is the rule that precludes an appellate
court from reviewing not just prior appellate rulings, but
decisions of the trial court which could have been but
were not challenged in a prior appeal. . . . Unlike the
core law-of-the-case doctrine, however, this extension
barring issues not raised in a prior appeal is more
accurately understood as a type of waiver. This is so
because the extension hinges not on a previous appellate
decision on the barred issue establishing the law of the
case, but instead on the party’s inaction in failing to raise
the issue in a manner consistent with the court’s general
policy against piecemeal appeals. Crocker v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735 (D.C.Cir. 1995). It is this
waiver extension of the law-of-the-case doctrine that the
Commonwealth would erect here against review of its
DNA evidence, but the waiver rule applies only where a
“ruling of law is made based on existing law and that
ruling has gone unchallenged during the original appeal.”
Sherley, 889 S.W.2d [794 (Ky. 1994)] at 798. See also
Crocker, 49 F.3d at 741 n. 2 (“The waiver rule ... applies
only when the trial court has expressly or impliedly ruled
on a question and there has been an opportunity to
challenge that ruling on a prior appeal.... If the trial court
has not affirmatively ruled, the waiver doctrine would be
inapplicable.”).
Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 610-11. The members rely upon this statement of the law to
argue that the appellants waived their right to raise the jurisdictional argument in
the present appeal because they had previously appealed the issue of jurisdiction,
but those appeals had been dismissed on the members’ motion. We disagree.
The issue of jurisdiction in this case has never been considered by an
appellate court, and the circumstances have been such that the appellants were
unable to do so prior to this appeal. First, we consider that the 2006 order denying
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the motion to dismiss was not a final order upon entry, but rather was an
interlocutory order subject to later modification by the circuit court or review upon
the entry of a final judgment. Upon the entry of the October 6, 2008 order, which
was undoubtedly a final judgment when it was entered because it decided all of the
claims of all of the parties, see CR 54.01, the jurisdictional rulings in both that
order and the 2006 order were subject to review on appeal. And the appellants did
file an appeal. However, prior to filing of the notice of appeal by the appellants,
the members filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to, we presume, CR
59.05, which tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal of the October order.
Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed while the motion to amend was still
pending was therefore premature. See Johnson v. Smith, 885 S.W.2d 944, 950
(Ky. 1994) (“We hold that these movants’ notices of appeal were not fatally
defective simply because they were filed before the trial court ruled on a postjudgment motion made by other parties. The notices of appeal filed forthwith
relate forward to the time when final judgment was entered disposing of postjudgment motions made by others.”). For further discussion related to the
premature filing of a notice of appeal, see James v. James, 313 S.W.3d 17 (Ky.
2010).
The circuit court then considered the motion to amend, among others,
and essentially granted the motion to amend by entering additional orders
amending and supplementing the original order. When the circuit court entered the
additional orders, the October 6, 2008 order became interlocutory. The
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jurisdictional issue was not subject to appeal until a subsequent final order had
been entered.
The next final order was the injunction entered February 9, 2009,
which was also appealed. And, while we cannot know what would have happened
with the 2009 appeals had this Court not issued the show-cause order, those
appeals were dismissed as moot based upon the repeal of the constitution and
bylaws prior to a decision being rendered. Therefore, the appellants have never
had the opportunity to seek review of the jurisdictional issue before an appellate
court, and we cannot hold that they waived their right to seek review from this
Court by any inaction in the past. Accordingly, the appellants are not prohibited
by the law-of-the-case doctrine from raising the jurisdiction issue in this forum.
For their second argument as to why the issue of jurisdiction is not
properly before this Court, the members state that the appellants are barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. They rely upon this Court’s discussion in Hisle v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 258 S.W.3d 422, 429-34 (Ky. App.
2008), addressing the difference between subject matter and particular case
jurisdiction. Based on this discussion, the members contend that the present matter
addresses the issue of particular case jurisdiction, rather than subject matter
jurisdiction. Because they contend that the October 6, 2008 opinion became final
once the appeal was dismissed, the members argue that the appellants are
impermissibly attempting to collaterally attack the now final judgment. In their
reply brief, the appellants dispute the applicability of Hisle to the present case and
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point out that this issue does in fact address whether the circuit court has subject
matter jurisdiction to proceed based upon the prohibition against courts involving
themselves in ecclesiastical matters. We agree with the appellants’ argument that
the members’ collateral estoppel argument has no merit.
In Hisle, this Court presented a detailed analysis of the legal concept
of jurisdiction, describing it as “a fundamental concept that goes to the very heart
of a court to act or decide a case.” 258 S.W.3d at 428. The Court recognized there
are three types of jurisdiction: personal jurisdiction, which addresses the court’s
authority over a specific person or persons; subject matter jurisdiction; and
particular case jurisdiction. Addressing the interplay of subject matter and
particular case jurisdiction, the Court explained:
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the very nature of
the court’s creation under constitutional provisions.
Particular case jurisdiction is a subset of subject matter
jurisdiction in that a court that lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over an action will also always lack
particular-case jurisdiction, but a court can have proper
subject-matter jurisdiction over an action, but nonetheless
lack particular case jurisdiction.
****
Particular case jurisdiction generally involves more
specific so-called “jurisdictional facts.” A “jurisdictional
fact” has been defined as “[a] fact that must exist for a
court to properly exercise its jurisdiction over a case,
party, or thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857
(7th ed. 1999). This definition is somewhat circular and
not particularly helpful. Some courts have linked
jurisdictional facts to factual prerequisites established by
statute or rule that are treated as affirmative defenses
such as limitations periods or failure to state a claim,
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although clearly not all affirmative defenses should be
treated as involving jurisdictional authority. . . .
Hisle, 258 S.W.3d at 429-30 (some internal citations, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).
The Hisle Court next addressed the effect that a lack of either subject matter
or particular case jurisdiction would have on a court’s judgment:
It is well-established that a judgment entered by a court
without subject matter jurisdiction is void. In addition,
since subject matter jurisdiction concerns the very nature
and origins of a court’s power to do anything at all, it
cannot be born of waiver, consent or estoppel, and may
be raised at any time.
On the other hand, lack of particular case jurisdiction
merely renders a judgment voidable, rather than void ab
initio. In Dix v. Dix, 310 Ky. 818, 822, 222 S.W.2d 839,
841 (1949) (holding judgment granting a wife fee title to
a house in a divorce action contrary to the statutory
requirements was not void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), the court commented that “where the court
has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, the
judgment, if erroneous, is voidable, not void.” . . . Any
error rendering a judgment voidable cannot be challenged
in a collateral action and is subject to consent, waiver, or
estoppel.
Hisle, 258 S.W.3d at 430-31 (emphasis in original, some internal citations,
quotation marks, brackets, and footnotes omitted).
The members contend that the present matter concerns the circuit
court’s particular case jurisdiction, rather than subject matter jurisdiction, as the
circuit court has the power to grant or deny injunctive relief and to decide disputes
based upon a written agreement, which is what was requested in this case. They
argue that, because the appellants failed to prosecute their prior appeals of the
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jurisdictional ruling, they have waived their opportunity to do so and may not now
collaterally attack that ruling. We specifically disagree with the members’
argument and hold that this issue addresses itself to subject matter jurisdiction,
since this case concerns the very nature and origin of the court’s power to act at all;
namely, whether the court can proceed in the realm of the traditionally mandated
separation of church and state. Therefore, the appellants are not collaterally
estopped from raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before this Court.
Because we have held that neither the law-of-the-case doctrine nor
collateral estoppel prevents the appellants from raising the jurisdictional argument
in this appeal, we shall now address the merits of that issue.
The appellants argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction based
upon the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I. For a
general statement of this body of law, we seek guidance in 66 Am. Jur. 2d
Religious Societies § 13 (2010).
Generally, courts have no authority to resolve religious
disputes. Civil courts will not interfere in religious
societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices.
Thus, so long as no civil or property rights are invaded, a
church member has no right to invoke the supervisory
power of a civil court in a matter of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. Ecclesiastical matters include doctrines,
creeds and proper modes of exercising one’s belief.
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However, secular courts will adjudicate religious disputes
under the “neutral principles of law doctrine” that calls
for a completely secular examination by civil courts into
church documents, deeds to the property in question,
state statutes, and other relevant evidence to determine
ownership; such determinations must be made
exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. In
applying neutral principles to resolve church-related
disputes, a court must not consider doctrinal matters,
deferring to the resolution of any doctrinal issue by an
authoritative ecclesiastical body. [Footnotes omitted.]
We turn next to 66 Am. Jur. 2d Religious Societies § 19 (2010), addressing
congregational churches:
In churches where each congregation is supreme, the
church may adopt rules and regulations as may meet with
the approval of the majority. If, in the adoption, there is
any error, mistake, or irregularity that does not affect
civil or property rights, the action may be corrected only
by the membership. All matters of membership and the
rights of members, as such, are addressed solely to the
society’s officers, except in cases where the civil rights
of an individual are at stake or property is involved. A
court lacks jurisdiction to grant any legal or equitable
relief on individual claims for exclusion from
membership in a church with a congregational form of
government. Any question of membership is
nonjusticiable, even in a dispute centering on church
property. [Footnotes omitted.]
In Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255, 257-58 (1928), the
former Court of Appeals presented a thoughtful and detailed examination of the
role of courts in church disputes. Describing the Baptist Church, the Court stated:
A Baptist Church is a pure democracy, and in all matters
relating to its government, election of its officers, its
articles of faith, and the management of its affairs the
local congregation present and voting at a meeting
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regularly held, on any question, determines the matter
finally until the decision is likewise revoked by the
congregation. The local congregation determines, by its
own by-laws, resolutions, or orders, the time and place as
well as the method of ascertaining the will of the
majority. From the determination of a question by a
majority of the congregation there is no appeal to any
ecclesiastical authority. A Baptist congregation, as long
as it acts as a local church functioning under its own laws
and regulations, may say to all mankind that, “Mine are
the gates to open and mine are the gates to close.” No
power may interfere with the authority of the local
congregation so exercised.
Thomas, 6 S.W.2d at 258. Addressing the involvement and jurisdiction of the
courts, Thomas provided:
The jurisdiction of courts of equity in certain cases
involving the use of church property has been recognized
by this court from the organization of this state. Gibson
v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 481; Gartin v. Penick,
68 Ky. (5 Bush) 112; Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. (12 Bush)
541. The church cannot control any civil right or duty,
and the civil power has no authority to secularize the
church, or to interfere with the exercise of its
constitutional ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The organic law
of the church has been held to be a contract between all
the parties to it, and, as these parties are entitled as
citizens to the protection of the paramount Constitution
of the state against all breaches of their contracts, civil
authority has jurisdiction over the constitution of the
church as a contract to protect the members of the church
against unconstitutional invasion of their civil rights
whenever such invasion is attempted by the ecclesiastical
government. It must never be overlooked that the church
alone has jurisdiction of communion, faith, or discipline,
and the members must submit to such rules and
regulations governing these matters as may be prescribed
by their church, but the church does not always have
exclusive jurisdiction over property or personal liberty,
or over any right which it is the duty of the civil power to
protect. Therefore, when a question arises involving the
right to use property belonging to a church or the
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ownership of such property, the jurisdiction of civil
courts may be invoked to determine property rights. In
determining property rights under such circumstances
courts must take into consideration the organization and
government of the church and restrictions in the title to
the property to determine where the rights of property lie.
Id. at 257. It concluded:
In rare instances where the local congregation [of a
Baptist church] has ceased to function, the jurisdiction of
courts may be invoked to determine property rights, but
no such question is presented by this record. All
questions as to whether the congregation has legally
acted are questions that must be determined by the
congregation itself, unless restrictions are found on its
rights to control its property. The minority is always
bound by the majority in a Baptist congregation.
Id. at 258. See also Prather v. Immanuel Baptist Church, 296 S.W.2d 224, 225
(Ky. 1956) (“church members may only invoke judicial relief if they can establish
that their civil rights (which would include property rights) have been violated.”);
Connoley v. Smith, 255 Ky. 630, 75 S.W.2d 222, 222 (1934) (“[a]ny error, mistake,
or irregularity in [a congregation’s] action must be corrected by the membership of
the church, and the courts will never interfere, unless some civil or property right is
violated.”).
Many years later, the Supreme Court of Kentucky recognized in
Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1993), that “the
United States Supreme Court has held that civil courts have no role in deciding
ecclesiastical questions.”
The United States Supreme Court has adhered to the
proposition that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
permit heirarchial [sic] religious organizations to
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establish their own rules and regulations for internal
discipline and government and to create tribunals
resolving disputes over these matters. . . . Civil courts
may intervene in ecclesiastical errors, however, if there is
fraud, collusion or arbitrariness.
Id. There is no allegation of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness in this case.
Additionally, Music addressed the United States Supreme Court’s adoption of a
“neutral principles” test, which would permit “a court to interpret provisions of
religious documents involving property rights and other nondoctrinal matters as
long as the analysis can be done in purely secular terms.” Id. However, this
exception is generally limited to cases that involve church property disputes. Id. at
288.
The appellants contend that the circuit court misconstrued controlling
precedent when it determined that it had jurisdiction to decide the claims raised in
this case based upon the property right exception. They argue that the members
never asserted or established that a civil or property right had been violated. They
also cite to a plethora of caselaw and secondary materials confirming that
membership in a church is not a property right, nor do contributions to a church
create a property right in the assets of the church. On the other hand, the members
contend that the court is permitted to intervene in this case because the matter may
be decided using neutral, secular principles of contract law.
We have examined all of the cases and materials relied upon by the
parties and, based upon this examination, we must conclude that the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. The Church’s financial
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records and method of presentation to the congregation are clearly matters of
internal governance and organization, and are, therefore, not subject to interference
by the court. Furthermore, we agree with the appellants that the members have not
asserted a property right as contemplated by the cases establishing and interpreting
the neutral principles exception. The exception applies in disputes concerning
actual church property, such as in the event of a schism or a dispute between
separate churches as to which body actually owns or has the right to a particular
piece of property. See Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed.
2d 658 (1969), for discussion of church property disputes. Here, there is no such
argument concerning the right to church property. Rather, this case concerns the
internal method by which the Church’s leaders permit the active members to view
the financial documents. This is clearly an ecclesiastical matter of internal church
governance, in which the court has no place. Therefore, the circuit court erred as a
matter of law when it concluded that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the present case, and declared that the members were entitled to the relief provided
under its earlier orders.
Because we have held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction in
this action, we need not address the appellants’ remaining arguments regarding
mootness, standing, or the extent of the relief granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is reversed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Bart L. Greenwald
Griffin Terry Sumner
Junis L. Baldon
Louisville, Kentucky
John H. Dwyer, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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