DASCH (BRIDGET) VS. KELLEY (STEVE)
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.2010-CA-000148-ME
BRIDGET DASCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LUCINDA MASTERTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01225
STEVE KELLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Bridget Dasch has appealed from the December 9, 2009,
order of the Fayette Circuit Court, Family Division, denying her motion to strike
Steve Kelley’s motion to modify the timesharing arrangement for the couple’s
children. She has further appealed from the family court’s January 13, 2010, order
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Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
modifying the parties’ timesharing arrangement, making Steve the primary
custodian during the school year and preventing her from relocating out-of-state
with the children. We affirm.
Steve and Bridget divorced in late 2006. They agreed to share joint
custody of their two minor children following the dissolution of their union.
Neither party was named as primary residential custodian. In the Separation
Agreement incorporated into their decree of dissolution, Steve and Bridget agreed
that while the children remained minors, neither parent would move from Fayette
County, Kentucky, except for the most compelling of reasons. The agreement
went on to state:
If such move becomes necessary, the moving parent shall
notify in writing the other of his/her intention to move no
less than three months in advance of the move and the
parties shall attempt to agree upon modification of this
agreement as to custody and timeshare. The parties agree
to apply the criteria of KRS 403.270 (best interest)
irregardless (sic) of the timing of the review, thus
foregoing the requirements of KRS 403.340
(modification).
Steve and Bridget each remarried. In April of 2009 Bridget e-mailed
Steve to inform him of her intention to relocate with the children to be with her
new husband upon his return from active military duty in Afghanistan. She
requested that the two attempt to negotiate a modification of the custody
arrangement. Steve did not respond. Bridget contacted Steve again in June
reminding him of the pending move, requesting a meeting to work out a new
timesharing schedule, and informing him of the likely move date of November 1,
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2009. A subsequent mediation on June 23, 2009, was unsuccessful in resolving the
matter. The following day, Bridget informed Steve she still did not have a
definitive move date nor location, but that she believed she would be moving to Ft.
Benning (near Columbus, Georgia) or Ft. Bragg (near Fayetteville, North
Carolina).
During a court appearance in a related domestic violence action
between the parties on August 12, 2009,2 Bridget informed the court of her
proposed move and her belief that Steve had no objection to the relocation as he
had failed to raise a formal objection or file a motion to oppose it. Steve verbally
objected to the move. The trial court directed Steve to file a formal motion in the
divorce action stating the basis for his objection to the move. The court also
appointed a guardian ad litem for the children.
On October 26, 2009, Bridget filed a notice of compliance with the
terms of the separation agreement regarding her proposed relocation which offered
a proposed timesharing schedule for Steve and requested the trial court enter an
order accepting the proposed timeshare arrangement. Three days later, Steve filed
a written response noting his objection to the relocation and requesting a hearing
on the matter. The trial court scheduled a hearing for December 8, 2009. At a pretrial conference, Bridget alleged Steve had acquiesced in the move as he had failed
to file an objection to the relocation or a motion to modify the timesharing
2
The record from the domestic violence action is not before us in this appeal. However, in their
briefs, the parties agree to the events that occurred at the August 12 hearing. We also note the
same judge presided over both actions.
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agreement in the seven months that had passed since receiving notification of same
from Bridget. Steve informed the trial court that a motion would be forthcoming
and the case was allowed to proceed.
On November 19, 2009, Bridget filed a renewed notice of compliance
and requested the trial court enter her proposed timesharing schedule. The
following day, Steve filed an objection to the proposed relocation and a motion
seeking modification of the timesharing agreement. In his motion, Steve alleged
the best interests of the children would be served by allowing them to live with him
during the school year and with Bridget during the summer. On November 24,
2009, Bridget moved the trial court to strike Steve’s motion as untimely. The trial
court overruled Bridget’s motion.
Following the evidentiary hearing on December 8-9, 2009, the trial
court entered its order finding the best interests of the children would be best
served by having them live with Steve during the school year and with Bridget
during the summer. The trial court also set forth a timesharing schedule for
holidays and school break periods. This appeal followed.
Bridget contends the trial court erred in failing to strike Steve’s
motion to modify the timesharing agreement as being untimely filed. She further
argues the trial court abused its discretion in entering an order preventing her from
relocating with the children. After a careful review of the record, the law, and the
briefs, we affirm.
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First, Bridget contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to
strike Steve’s motion to modify the timesharing agreement and in allowing the
motion to proceed. She alleges Steve’s failure to file his motion for more than
seven months following her notification to him of the proposed relocation resulted
in a waiver of his right to object. She further argues the trial court erred in
scheduling a hearing on the matter before Steve actually filed his motion. We
disagree.
Bridget and the trial court believed the burden was on Steve to file an
objection to the proposed relocation and a motion seeking modification of the
timesharing agreement. However, in Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759,
769-70 (Ky. 2008), our Supreme Court stated:
[t]he party seeking modification of custody or
visitation/timesharing is the party who has the burden of
bringing the motion before the court. A residential
parent who wishes only to change the
visitation/timesharing due to his relocating with the child
may bring the motion to modify visitation/timesharing
under KRS 403.320. If that parent believes that the
relocation will make a joint custody arrangement
unworkable, then the motion should be made for a
change of custody from joint to sole under KRS 403.340.
Likewise, when one parent indicates an interest in
relocating with the child, the parent opposed need not
wait, but could file his own motion. A parent who has
equal or nearly equal visitation/timesharing and who
wants to prevent a child’s relocation with the other
parent, but does not want to change custody from joint to
sole, could bring a motion for a change of
visitation/timesharing under KRS 403.320. This could
result in a designation of that parent as primary
residential parent if the child is not allowed to relocate
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because it is not in his best interests to do so. If that
same parent wants to change custody from joint to sole
custody to him, he must bring the motion for a change of
custody and proceed under KRS 403.340.
Thus, as Bridget was actually the party seeking modification of the timesharing
agreement based upon her impending relocation, the burden was upon her to bring
the matter before the trial court. Likewise, Steve was permitted to file a motion
seeking modification at any time after receiving notice of the proposed move and
he did so on November 20, 2009.
The central purpose of a motion is to notify the court and the parties
of claims and defenses regarding the issues to be decided, “[d]espite the
informality with which pleadings are nowadays treated.” Hoke v. Cullinan, 914
S.W.2d 335, 339 (Ky. 1995). Although not specifically captioned as a motion,
Bridget’s notice of compliance and request for entry of an order adopting her
proposed timesharing schedule, had the same effect as a motion as it placed the
controversy squarely before the trial court. Bridget had clearly asked the trial court
for relief and Steve had noted his objection to the matter. As early as October 29,
2009, Steve had requested a hearing on Bridget’s notice of compliance and
proposed timesharing arrangement. Thus, contrary to Bridget’s assertion, we are
unable to conclude the trial court set a hearing date for a “non-existent motion.”
To conclude otherwise would allow function to be circumvented by form. This we
are loath to do.
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It is the trial court that controls the docket and the admission of
evidence, not the litigants. Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 237 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Ky.
App. 2007). A trial court has the inherent power “to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and of effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants.” Rehm v. Clayton, 132 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Landis
v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed.2d 153
(1936)). Here, the trial court was keenly aware of the relative positions of the
parties with respect to the proposed relocation and the pressing time frame in
which the parties were operating. There were no surprises and all parties had
sufficient time to prepare and secure witnesses prior to the hearing. We have
reviewed the record and are unable to discern any prejudice to the parties relative
to the trial court’s scheduling of the hearing in this matter. There was no error.
Next, Bridget contends the trial court abused its discretion in
modifying the timesharing agreement and ordering the children to remain in
Kentucky with Steve during the school year. She contends the trial court’s
findings were contrary to the evidence and that the trial court completely
disregarded evidence she presented. We disagree.
Our standard of review in the area of child custody and visitation is
well-settled. “[T]he change of custody motion or modification of visitation/timesharing must be decided in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Pennington,
266 S.W.3d at 769. It is also well-settled that an appellate court may set aside a
lower court’s findings:
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only if those findings are clearly erroneous. And, the
dispositive question that we must answer, therefore, is
whether the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly
erroneous, i.e., whether or not those findings are
supported by substantial evidence. “[S]ubstantial
evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion” and evidence
that, when “taken alone or in the light of all the evidence,
. . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless of conflicting
evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact that the
reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding,
“due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses” because
judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing
evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the
trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of
[a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal,” and appellate
courts should not disturb trial court findings that are
supported by substantial evidence.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (footnotes omitted). See also
CR 52.01, Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986).
In her brief before this Court, Bridget recounts much of the testimony
she presented. She contends the weight of this testimony warranted a judgment in
her favor. Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the responsibility of the factfinder to determine and resolve such conflicts, as well as matters affecting the
credibility of the witnesses. Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Ky. 1998).
The finder of fact may believe any part or all of the testimony of any of the
witnesses, or may disbelieve all of it. Gillispie v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W. 671,
672 (Ky. 1926).
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The trial court conducted a lengthy hearing and took testimony from
numerous witnesses. The testimony was thorough and, at times, conflicting. The
trial court evaluated the evidence and made detailed findings of fact in its order
regarding the best interests of the children pursuant to KRS 403.270. Our review
of the record indicates there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
determination. It is reasonable for Bridget to assert there was substantial evidence
presented to support a contrary result. However, as we noted above, the mere fact
that conflicting evidence is presented does not form a sufficient basis for
overturning the judgment of a trial court who viewed the testimony firsthand.
Unless there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
findings, they will not be upset on appeal. W.A. v. Cabinet for Health and Family
Services, 275 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Ky. App. 2008). The findings here were amply
supported and shall remain undisturbed.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court, Family Division, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jennifer McVay Martin
Lexington, Kentucky
Catherine Ann Monzingo
Lexington, Kentucky
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