UTSEY (YVON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 1, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000116-MR
YVON B. UTSEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 04-CR-000593 AND 05-CR-001691
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Yvon B. Utsey appeals from the denial of his motion
for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42 without an evidentiary hearing. Utsey argues that he is entitled to relief
because of various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
In an unpublished opinion affirming Utsey’s convictions, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky set forth the underlying facts as follows:
Utsey stayed in the home of his girlfriend, Tammy
Morton, and her two sons, A.D. and A.S. A.D., who was
then thirteen years old, was autistic. A.D. could not speak
and was physically inactive. A.S., who was then ten years
old, had recently moved back into his mother's home
after being sent to live with his father for a few months
following suspension from school.
One afternoon after school, A.S. called his mother at
work to tell her that A.D. was lying in bed and was
having difficulty breathing. She told him to have Utsey to
check on A.D. She also checked on A.D. herself when
she returned home from work later that evening.
The next day, the school personnel observed that A.D.
was not acting normally-in fact, he was acting much
differently than the day before. For instance, he walked
to his school bus rather than run as he usually did. His
facial coloring looked different, and he stumbled and
walked slowly when going into school. As the day
progressed, A.D. seemed to have difficulty sitting. He
showed little appetite for food and started shivering.
School personnel suspected that he might have the flu,
which was going around the school at the time. They let
him lie down and took him to the bathroom when he
became nauseated. At one point, they noticed that he
flinched when touched. After noticing several severe
bruises on A.D., they called police and Emergency
Medical Services. While waiting to be taken to the
hospital, A.D.'s condition continued to decline; and his
breathing became labored.
A.D. was admitted to a hospital for treatment.
Examination revealed several severe bruises, a serious
laceration to his liver, rib fractures, and a collapsed lung.
The collapsed lung caused his breathing difficulties, and
a chest tube was inserted to relieve pressure. Hospital
personnel determined that blunt force trauma had caused
his injuries, and an investigation ensued.
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A.D.'s mother, Tammy Morton, later testified that Utsey
arrived at the hospital when A.D. was admitted for
treatment. She stated that Utsey was limping badly. He
told Morton that he had a spider bite on his foot and that
he had struck his foot on a table. A nurse also testified to
seeing Utsey limping with a badly swollen toe.
When Utsey sought treatment a few days later, he told
the doctor he had banged his toe a few days before. The
doctor later testified to Utsey's having a badly swollen
toe, which made the doctor suspect dislocation or
fracture. An X-ray of Utsey's toe revealed a dorsal
dislocation with the front joint of the toe. The doctor
stated that significant force was required to cause such a
dislocation and in response to a question from the
Commonwealth, expressed an opinion that severely
kicking a child could cause such a dislocation.
Morton later testified to A.D.'s turning away from and
refusing to look at Utsey when Utsey entered the hospital
room. Morton interpreted this as evidence that A.D.
feared Utsey. She also testified that Utsey had asked her
to lie for him about his being at the house with the
children.
The investigating detective later testified concerning his
interactions with Utsey. He also reported Utsey telling
him that a spider bit his foot and that Utsey had some
trouble consistently recalling the details of what
happened around the time of A.D.'s injuries. Utsey did
inform the detective that he watched Morton's children
while she worked, including the days preceding A.D.'s
hospitalization. Utsey told the detective that the injuries
must have occurred while A.D. was at school or was with
someone else. Morton and A.S. were also interviewed by
authorities.
Utsey was indicted for first-degree assault, first-degree
criminal abuse, and for being a second-degree persistent
felony offender. A jury found him guilty of first-degree
assault and first-degree criminal abuse. Utsey pleaded
guilty to the PFO charge and agreed to the sentence of
twenty-five years' imprisonment. The trial court entered
judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and the
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plea agreement, imposing the agreed-upon sentence of
twenty-five years.
Utsey v. Commonwealth, (2007 WL 3226227)(2006-SC-000298-MR).
Subsequently, Utsey filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr
11.42, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal
followed.
Utley first argues that the trial court erred by finding that his claims
were not justiciable under RCr 11.42. He cites Martin v. Commonwealth, 207
S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006) and Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009)
in support of his argument.
The trial court set forth the correct law applicable to Utsey’s claims
and found that “[t]he Defendant has set forth no facts, and the record further
discloses none, which would demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was
deficient.” Thereafter, the trial court stated that Utsey’s claims could have been
raised on direct appeal. Our review of the opinion and order reveals that Utsey
received a ruling on the merits of his claims under the appropriate legal standard.
Further, an appellate court may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any
ground sustainable by the record. Moorman v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 325,
330 fn. 6 (Ky. 2010).
The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
is well established. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a movant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that,
but for the deficiency, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The standard for assessing counsel's performance is whether the alleged acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. The defendant bears the burden of
identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute deficient performance.
Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In measuring prejudice, the relevant inquiry is
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The burden is on the movant to overcome a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 689,
104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999).
An evidentiary hearing is warranted only when “‘the [RCr 11.42] motion on its
face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if
true, would invalidate the conviction.’” Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619,
622 (Ky. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322
(Ky.1967)). Furthermore, a hearing is not required where a movant makes only
conclusory assertions rather than allegations based on specific facts. Wedding v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ky. 1971).
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Utsey argues that his counsel was ineffective by denying him the right
to testify in his own defense.
Clearly, a defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf.
However, courts are not required to sua sponte inquire into the voluntariness of a
defendant’s waiver of the right to testify. Riley v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 560,
562-63 (Ky. 2002). There is no indication that Utsey made his desire to testify
known to the court at any time. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the failure of Utsey to testify was the product of anything other than
reasonable trial strategy. Utsey was a convicted felon. He had also made several
inconsistent statements to the police. There is no indication that counsel was
ineffective.
Next, Utsey argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and challenge whether the victim was truly unable to speak and
therefore, unable to testify at trial. He further asserts that counsel should have
requested a competency hearing.
Even assuming arguendo that counsel failed to adequately investigate
the extent of the victim’s ability to communicate, Utsey has not demonstrated any
prejudice. Utsey baldly asserts that if the victim could, indeed, communicate, then
he would have testified that Utsey did not assault him. “Conclusionary allegations
which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing
because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a discovery
deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002), cert.
-6-
denied, 540 U.S. 838 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).
Finally, Utsey argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain
an expert to interview the victim and to refute the timing of the victim’s injuries.
Again, Utsey has not provided any specific facts to support his
assertion. He has merely stated that an expert was needed to communicate with the
victim and to refute the timing of the victim’s injuries. There is no concrete
indication of what the expert would have actually testified to or how such
testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial. Therefore, relief is
unwarranted.
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Dixon Bullock
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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