ALI (RAFI) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000113-MR
RAFI ALI
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 03-CR-00609
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Rafi Ali appeals from an order of the Kenton Circuit
Court which denied his post-conviction motion made pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 and Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
60.02. Ali argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. We affirm the trial court’s
denial of his motion in all respects except as to Ali’s allegation that his attorney
was ineffective for advising him not to accept an advantageous plea offer from the
Commonwealth. We hold that this issue merits an evidentiary hearing.
Ali shot LaShawn Hughes after he learned that Hughes had severely
beaten Ali’s cousin. Several eyewitnesses identified Ali as the shooter. Ali’s first
murder trial ended in the declaration of a mistrial after the jury was deadlocked.
On retrial, he was convicted of murder and of being a first-degree persistent felony
offender. He was sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. His convictions
were affirmed on direct appeal. See Ali v. Commonwealth, 2007 WL 1159953(Ky.
2007)(2005-SC-000609-MR).
Following the mistrial, Ali’s counsel withdrew and new counsel was
appointed. Ali’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are directed at the
attorneys who represented him at his second trial. Ali argues that they were
ineffective for (1) failing to conduct pretrial investigation, adequately prepare for
trial, and effectively examine witnesses; (2) for waiving his constitutional right to a
speedy trial without his consent; (3) for failing to retain a ballistics expert to assist
in his defense; (4) for waiving Ali’s presence at a witness’s deposition; and (5) for
failing to investigate or present any mitigation evidence during the penalty phase
of the trial. He also argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims.
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In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to be
used in determining whether the performance of a convicted defendant’s trial
counsel was so deficient as to merit relief from that conviction:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Under the second, “prejudice” prong of the test,
[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
An evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion “is only required
when the motion raises an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the
record. To do this, the court must examin[e] whether the record refuted the
allegations raised[.]” Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Ky. 2008)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Ali contends that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to consult
with prior counsel regarding his first trial (which ended in a mistrial). Ali’s first
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attorney turned over her files and work product to Ali’s new counsel and offered
her assistance but she was never contacted by them. Ali argues that this lack of
personal consultation meant that his new counsel was unfamiliar with his case and
consequently unable effectively to examine witnesses and present proof. He
argues that this type of pretrial preparation cannot be assessed on the basis of the
record and that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine why his counsel
failed to consult with his former attorney and what counsel could have gleaned
from such a consultation.
It is well-settled that a movant seeking relief under RCr 11.42 “must
aver facts with sufficient specificity to generate a basis for relief.” Lucas v.
Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky.1971). Where the allegations are
“vague and general,” there is no basis to provide relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 390 (Ky.2002), overruled on other
grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.2009). Ali does not
explain with any specificity how the fact that his second counsel did not personally
consult with his first attorney affected his performance at trial or deprived Ali of a
fair and reliable trial. There was no need for an evidentiary hearing on this issue
because “the stated purpose of the rule [RCr 11.42]is to provide a forum for known
grievances, not to provide an opportunity to research for grievances.” Gilliam v.
Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1983).
Ali next argues that his counsel did not spend enough time prior to
trial with Maggie Parks, an eyewitness to the shooting. He further contends that
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his attorney’s eight-minute examination of this witness at trial was inadequate.
Like his previous claim, this argument is conclusory and fails to explain why his
attorney’s treatment of this witness was professionally deficient or how it affected
the outcome of his trial. Moreover, “[c]onclusionary allegations which are not
supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing[.]” Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002) overruled on other grounds by
Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151(Ky. 2009).
Ali also argues that his counsel was deficient in never reviewing the
transcripts of the first trial with him although Ali wished to do so. Again, he has
provided no explanation or tangible theory as to how such a review would have
aided his defense.
Ali’s next arguments relate to his counsel’s alleged failure to
adequately investigate a number of witnesses. Ali claims that his counsel did not
comply with his request to investigate and possibly call as a witness Ishmail
Powell, who testified against Ali at his first trial. Attached to Ali’s post-conviction
motion was an affidavit from Powell which stated that the testimony he had
provided at the first trial (that he was present at the shooting and heard Ali state,
“Somebody’s going to die today”) was untrue. Ali claims that he requested his
counsel to investigate this witness but that his counsel failed to do so. It was not
an indication of professional deficiency for Ali’s attorney to reject as a defense
witness an individual who had earlier testified that he actually saw Ali shoot the
victim. “Decisions relating to witness selection are normally left to counsel’s
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judgment and this judgment will not be second-guessed by hindsight.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 8787, 885 (Ky. 2000), overruled on other grounds by
Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005).
Similarly, Ali argues that his counsel failed to investigate the
inconsistent statement of witness Jeffrey Ogle. In an interview with police prior to
Ali’s first trial, Ogle stated that he saw Ali shoot Hughes as Hughes stood over
Ali’s severely-beaten cousin. Ali points out that this statement was inconsistent
with the Commonwealth’s theory of the case on retrial, which is that Ali left the
scene when the beating victim was taken to the hospital and later returned to
commit the revenge killing of Hughes. Three police officers testified at the retrial
that Ali was ordered to leave the scene of the fight and that he did so. Ali argues
that his counsel was also ineffective for only cross-examining these witnesses for a
few minutes.
It was a matter of trial strategy to assess whether Ogle’s testimony
could be used effectively to impeach the police officers and to decide whether any
resulting benefit would outweigh the tremendous risk that the jury would believe
Ogle’s testimony that he witnessed Ali shoot Hughes. Counsel’s decision in this
regard was not indicative of deficient professional performance, nor can we find
any deficiency in the cross-examination of the police witnesses.
Ali contends that his counsel was also ineffective for failing to
impeach the testimony of witness Reginald Huff. At Ali’s first trial, Huff testified
that he saw the fight between Hughes and Ali’s cousin and then later saw Ali shoot
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Hughes. Prior to the retrial, Huff told defense investigator Dale Dorning that he
was not present at the shooting. At the trial, Ali’s defense counsel tried to impeach
Huff by using Dorning’s testimony, but the trial court refused to allow it as counsel
had failed first to confront Huff about prior inconsistencies in his testimony. Ali
contends that his trial counsel’s unfamiliarity with the evidentiary rules governing
impeachment precluded the jury from learning of Huff’s prior inconsistent
statement, and that his counsel also failed to “flesh out” the fact that Huff had
received a lighter federal sentence in exchange for his testimony for the
Commonwealth.
The trial record refutes Ali’s allegations. On direct examination, Huff
testified that he was a convicted felon in federal custody and that his testimony in
the case had had a “positive impact” on his federal sentence. On crossexamination, Huff was unable to describe what key individuals at the crime scene
had been wearing. He also admitted that he had not talked to the police on the
night of the shooting and waited until one year after the crime occurred, when he
was incarcerated on federal charges, to inform the police that he was a witness. He
also stated that he met with the defense investigator (Dorning) prior to the first
trial and gave him a statement in which he said that he not seen anything and did
not know anything. Huff admitted that he had lied to the investigator.
Thus, the jury was made fully aware that Huff’s testimony was
inconsistent, and that he had a motive for testifying against Ali. Because Ali’s
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claims regarding his counsel’s allegedly deficient treatment of witnesses are
refuted by the record, an evidentiary motion was not required on these claims.
Ali’s second main argument is that his counsel was ineffective for
waiving his right to a speedy trial. At his pretrial conference on January 10, 2005,
counsel preserved Ali’s objection to a continuance requested by the
Commonwealth on the ground that he was entitled to a speedy trial. Ali also
claims that his counsel told him not to accept an advantageous plea offer from the
Commonwealth because he felt he could have the case dismissed for a violation of
Ali’s speedy trial rights. The trial was rescheduled for April 6, 2005. At the
pretrial conference held on April 4, 2005, Ali’s counsel moved the court for a
continuance as a result of receiving a written ballistics report by firearms examiner
Ronnie Freels. Defense counsel explained to Ali that a continuance was necessary
to retain an independent ballistics expert. Ali argues that he did not agree to waive
his right to a speedy trial, but that his counsel’s request for a continuance waived it.
Ultimately, his attorney never consulted a ballistics expert. On direct appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Ali’s speedy trial argument in part because the
delay was attributable to Ali’s own action in requesting a continuance.
If Ali’s attorney had not made a motion for a continuance, his trial
would have gone ahead on April 6, 2005, and Ali’s claim that his right to a speedy
trial had been violated would have been even weaker in light of the Supreme
Court’s subsequent analysis. As it is, the Supreme Court described the six-month
period between the originally scheduled retrial date and the actual retrial date as “a
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substantial period but not a shockingly long one.” The court also noted that “Ali
was incarcerated during the interim on an unrelated charge and, therefore, was not
subject to longer incarceration due to the delay in going to trial. Although,
presumably, he suffered anxiety while awaiting his murder trial, he points to no
specific proof of any particular manifestations of this anxiety.” Even if we assume,
only for the sake of argument, that Ali’s counsel’s request for a continuance
constituted deficient performance, Ali has nonetheless failed to meet the second
prong of Strickland which requires a showing that the result of the proceeding
would have been different, i.e. that the Supreme Court would have agreed that his
right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Of greater concern is Ali’s allegation that his counsel informed him
that the Commonwealth had extended an offer of an eight-year sentence in
exchange for a plea of guilty to manslaughter in the second degree. The
Commonwealth has not addressed this allegation in its brief, nor has it provided
any citations to the record which would refute the allegation. As we have already
noted, Ali claims that his defense counsel advised him not to accept the offer
because he would have the case dismissed for a violation of Ali’s speedy trial
rights. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the right to the effective
assistance of counsel extends to the decision to reject a plea offer[.]” Turner v.
State of Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205 -1206 (6th Cir.1988), vacated on other
grounds, 492 U.S. 902, 109 S.Ct. 3208, 106 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989), reinstated, 726
F.Supp. 1113 (M.D.Tenn. 1989), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1991). Similarly,
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the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[T]he decision to reject a plea
bargain offer and plead not guilty is also a vitally important decision and a critical
stage at which the right to effective assistance of counsel attaches.” United States
ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir.1982). Advising a client
facing murder charges not to seriously consider a plea offer of eight years because
of the very slim chance that the court would dismiss the charges on speedy trial
grounds potentially constitutes the type of serious professional error that meets the
Strickland standard. Although Ali has not argued this point at any length in his
brief, his allegation is not refuted by the record and therefore warrants an
evidentiary hearing.
Ali’s third argument is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
retain a ballistics expert for the defense. The Commonwealth’s ballistics expert,
Ronnie Freels, testified that it was impossible to identify the type of gun used by
the shooter. The matter was complicated by the fact that other shots had been fired
from another handgun at the crime scene. Freels did testify that the copper
jacketing fragments recovered from the victim could not have been fired from a
Glock, which is a semi-automatic pistol. Ali contends that this testimony was
used by the Commonwealth to bolster its theory that he killed Hughes because he
allegedly brandished a revolver rather than a semi-automatic handgun.
It is not necessary, in every case, for defense counsel to hire rebuttal
expert witnesses to avoid being deemed ineffective. Thompson v. Commonwealth,
177 S.W.3d 782, 786 (Ky.2005). In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that an
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attorney was ineffective for failing to secure a rebuttal expert because “the
damning expert testimony was clearly erroneous” and the “error was of such a
nature that a non-mathematical expert discovered it on simple review of the
calculations.” Id. That was not the case with Freels’s testimony. Ali’s trial
counsel effectively cross-examined Freels, and made him reiterate his testimony
that the gun which killed Hughes was not identifiable. We are not convinced that
there is a reasonable probability that additional expert testimony would have
changed the outcome of Ali’s trial or that an evidentiary hearing on this issue was
required.
Ali next argues that his counsel was ineffective for waiving his
presence at the deposition of witness Iris Jennings. Jennings testified that on the
night of the shooting, while she was speaking with Ali, James Graves, originally a
co-defendant in the case, came running up and said, “Come on man, it is something
serious.” Ali argues that he could have assisted in refuting or explaining this
testimony from Jennings but does not explain with any specificity how he could
have done so. This claim therefore lacks the specificity necessary to bring it within
the purview of RCr 11.42.
Ali next argues that his counsel was deficient for failing to present
mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing. A failure to present mitigating
witnesses is not indicative of deficient performance if that decision is the result of
reasonable trial strategy. Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky. 2000),
overruled on other grounds by Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005). In
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his RCr 11.42 motion, Ali contended that various family members were willing to
testify on his behalf but provided no information as to the possible content of their
testimony or how it could have helped his case. His argument is conclusory and
also fails to meet the second prong of Strickland, which requires showing a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
As the trial court aptly observed,
[g]iven the penalty range of twenty to fifty years to life
imprisonment the jury recommended the median
sentence of thirty-five years, and although finding
defendant guilty of being a persistent felony offender in
the first degree [the jury] did not enhance that sentence,
indicating that there was no resulting prejudice to
defendant from any action of counsel during the penalty
phase of the trial.
The Kenton Circuit Court order denying Ali’s post-conviction motion
without a hearing is therefore affirmed except as to one issue: whether his attorney
advised him not to accept the Commonwealth’s advantageous plea offer because
he believed he could get the charges against Ali dismissed on speedy trial grounds.
The case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this allegation alone.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
M. Brooke Buchanan
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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