THURMAN (DWIGHT), ET AL. VS. HUTCHISON (JOE OLIVER)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000050-MR
DWIGHT THURMAN;
JO CAROL THURMAN;
DWAINE THURMAN; AND
PAMELA JO THURMAN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00375
JOE OLIVER HUTCHISON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT, SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Dwight Thurman, Jo Carol Thurman, Dwaine
Thurman, and Pamela Jo Thurman (collectively referred to as appellants) bring this
appeal from a December 9, 2009, judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court
adjudicating that a prescriptive right-of-way easement exists over appellants’ real
property, to access adjoining real property owned by Joe Oliver Hutchison and
heirs. We affirm.
The genesis of this dispute lies with a paved roadway that begins at
Highway 1568 then travels across appellants’ real property and thereupon
continues across real property owned by Donald Dunagan and proceeds up a
mountain to real property now owned by Cobb-Vantress, Incorporated. CobbVantress currently operates chicken houses upon the property. The Cobb-Vantress
property was previously owned by Avian Farms, which also operated chicken
houses on the property. Avian had acquired the property from appellee, Joe Oliver
Hutchison. Joe currently owns other real property that is located adjacent to the
Cobb-Vantress property; Joe had also previously operated chicken houses thereon.
As Joe’s adjacent real property also can be accessed from the roadway, Joe’s son,
Gary Hutchison, sought to remove timber from his father’s real property and
requested permission from appellants to use the roadway for such purpose. The
request was ultimately denied by appellants.
Consequently, Joe filed the instant action claiming, inter alia, a
prescriptive easement existed in the roadway that crossed appellants’ real property.
The circuit court conducted a bench trial without a jury. By a December 9, 2009,
judgment, the circuit court found in favor of Joe and determined that a prescriptive
right-of-way easement existed in the roadway that crossed appellants’ real property
for the purpose of accessing adjoining properties.
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Appellants contend that the circuit court erroneously found that Joe
acquired a prescriptive right-of-way easement in the roadway that crosses their
respective properties. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we disagree.
This case was tried by the court without a jury pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Thereunder, the circuit court’s findings of
fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the . . . court to judge the credibility of the witnesses . . . .”
CR 52.01. A circuit court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous if not supported by
substantial evidence of a probative value. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484
(Ky. App. 2001). As fact-finder, it is within the sole province of the circuit court
to judge the credibility of testimony and evidence. Ironton Fire Brick Co. v.
Burchett, 288 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1956). However, we review issues of law de novo.
It is well-established that a right-of-way easement may be acquired by
prescription. Illinois Ctr. R. Co. v. Roberts, 928 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. App. 1996). To
do so, the claimant must prove “actual, hostile, open and notorious, exclusive, and
continuous possession” for a period of fifteen years. Columbia Gas Transmission
Corp. v. Consol of Ky., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Ky. 2000); see also Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.010. These elements must be demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence. See Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484 (Ky. App.
2001).
In its December 9, 2009, judgment, the circuit court found:
6. That testimony was presented that showed that the
passway had been in existence for a period in excess of
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50 years, that [Hutchison] has used the passway for
purposes of accessing the property described herein and
used it without permission from any person or entity.
7. The Defendant [Donald] Dunagan recognized the
right of Joe Oliver Hutchison to travel across said
passway.
8. That the Defendants Thurman and Defendant
Dunagan had leased property to Cobb-Vantress, which
leases repeatedly referred to an existing road.
....
1. The passway in question has been used by the
Plaintiff Joe Oliver Hutchison and his predecessors in
title openly, notoriously, continuously, adversely and
hostilely for a period of fifteen years or more.
2. That by virtue of the above, the Plaintiff has
established a prescriptive easement across the lands of
the Defendants Thurman and the lands of Defendant
Donald Dunagan.
3. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a private passway
across the roadway that exists that runs from Strawberry
Road to the property of Cobb-Vantress.
Specifically, appellants believe that Joe failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the elements necessary to obtain a prescriptive easement. In
particular, appellants maintain that the roadway was only utilized by Joe and his
son, Gary, with their express permission, was not otherwise utilized in a hostile
manner, was not utilized open and notoriously, was not utilized continuously, and
was not utilized for the requisite fifteen-year period.
The record demonstrates that the evidence presented at the hearing
was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that a prescriptive easement
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existed in the roadway that transverses appellants’ real property. Donald Dunagan
testified that since the late 1970s he owned a tract of real property over which the
roadway travels. He testified that a passway had existed for several years where
the current roadway is located. Dunagan stated that the passway was impassable to
motor vehicles and could be only walked by individuals or transversed by farm
machinery. He remembered one individual (Dave Ryan) who lived on the
mountain some fifty years ago near the passway and recalled that a postal
employee walked the passway to deliver mail to Ryan. Dunagan also recounted
that a coal company constructed a gravel roadway in place of the old passway in
the mid-1970s. In exchange for using the roadway, the coal company gave
Dunagan coal as compensation. Dunagan stated that the coal company ceased
operations sometime in the mid-1980s. After such time, Dunagan testified that Joe
operated chicken houses on his property located on the mountain and utilized the
roadway for ingress and egress thereto. Dunagan recounted that he executed a
“lease agreement” with Avian granting it a right-of-way easement to access their
chicken houses over the roadway for a term of twenty years on July 16, 1991.
Subsequently, Dunagan stated that Avian was sold to Cobb-Vantress and that
Cobb-Vantress also utilized the roadway for ingress and egress under a lease
agreement. Gary, Joe’s son, also testified that throughout his lifetime he had
traveled the roadway unencumbered and without permission from anyone for
ingress and egress to his father’s property on the mountain. He also stated that he
was unaware of his father, Joe, ever seeking permission from anyone to use the
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roadway.
The above testimony of Dunagan and Gary was sufficient to support
the circuit court’s finding that a prescriptive easement existed in the roadway that
crossed appellants’ real property. As to the element of hostile use, Gary testified
that he had utilized the roadway for ingress and egress throughout his lifetime to
access his father’s property and had done so without appellants’ permission. In
fact, Gary never believed it was incumbent upon him to request appellants’
permission to travel the roadway. We believe Gary’s testimony was sufficient to
establish that he traveled the roadway without permission and in a hostile manner
under a claim of right to do so.
The element of open and notorious use was satisfied by both Dunagan
and Gary’s testimony. Dunagan recounted a postal employee transversing the
roadway on foot to deliver mail to Ryan and stated that he remembered other
individuals also utilizing the roadway. And again, Gary testified to freely traveling
the roadway to access his father’s property throughout his lifetime.
Also, the evidence was sufficient to establish continuous use for the
statutory fifteen-year period. To prove this, Gary’s testimony alone was sufficient.
As noted, he affirmatively testified to traveling the roadway repeatedly during his
lifetime to access his father’s property. At the time of the bench trial, Gary was
sixty-one years old.
Based on the substantial evidence presented, we cannot conclude that
the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we must concur
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that the circuit court properly found that a prescriptive right-of-way easement
existed in the roadway that transversed appellants’ real property. We view any
remaining arguments as moot or without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ryan D. Morrow
Somerset, Kentucky
James M. Frazer
Monticello, Kentucky
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