COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. GARRISON (REESE)
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RENDERED: APRIL 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000042-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00034
REESE GARRISON
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky has appealed from the
Harrison Circuit Court’s December 8, 2009, order which granted Reese Garrison’s
motion to suppress the evidence seized during his arrest and dismissed all charges
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
levied against him. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter
for further proceedings.
The facts surrounding Garrison’s arrest are relatively simple and
undisputed. On July 31, 2009, Kentucky State Police (KSP) Detective Lance
Hutchinson received a phone call from a known cooperating witness regarding the
whereabouts of Steve Alexis, a person of interest in an ongoing criminal
investigation regarding illegal drug sales. Det. Hutchinson knew Alexis to have
outstanding arrest warrants and to have completed several “controlled buys” of
illicit drugs with law enforcement investigators. The caller informed Det.
Hutchinson that Alexis was planning on leaving town for an extended period of
time, he was currently at a residence in Harrison County known for drug
trafficking, and was in possession of a firearm.
Det. Hutchinson decided to attempt to serve the outstanding warrants
on Alexis. Determining the situation to be potentially dangerous, Det. Hutchinson
requested assistance from the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office and the KSP
Special Response Team (SRT). Upon arrival at the residence, Det. Hutchinson and
Detective Paul Olin, a Harrison County Deputy Sheriff, observed Alexis and
Garrison exit the home and get into a vehicle. Det. Hutchinson did not know
Garrison but recognized Alexis. With Garrison at the wheel, the pair left the area.
Detectives Hutchinson and Olin followed in an unmarked police vehicle, hoping
back-up would arrive.
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After traveling some distance, but before other officers could arrive,
Garrison stopped and parked his vehicle between two apartment buildings. Based
on the circumstances, Det. Hutchinson believed it was necessary to attempt to
apprehend Alexis without waiting for the back-up officers to arrive. He and Det.
Olin exited their vehicle and, following the procedure for a dangerous felony stop,
did not approach Garrison’s vehicle but gave verbal commands to Garrison and
Alexis while remaining behind the protective barrier of the car doors. As the
driver of the vehicle, Garrison was first ordered to exit the vehicle and walk
backwards toward the officers with his hands raised.
Once he reached the officers, Det. Hutchinson patted Garrison down
for weapons. Det. Hutchinson then placed Garrison in handcuffs for the safety of
all involved and turned him around to escort him toward the rear bumper of the
police cruiser. Upon seeing Garrison’s face for the first time immediately after
placing the handcuffs on him, Det. Hutchinson noticed Garrison was sweating
profusely and his eyes were noticeably drooped as if he were “half-asleep.”
Garrison was placed on the curb while Det. Hutchinson returned his attention to
Alexis. Other officers soon arrived and noticed Garrison’s appearance and
condition after being alerted to same by Det. Hutchinson. Those officers
summoned a KSP trooper who was specially trained in administering field sobriety
tests for individuals suspected of being impaired by a substance other than alcohol.
Garrison was determined to be intoxicated and he was placed under arrest for
driving under the influence (DUI).
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Following his arrest, officers requested permission to search the
vehicle, but Garrison denied the request. A canine unit was called to the scene and
arrived a short time later. The canine alerted on the driver’s side door of
Garrison’s vehicle indicating the presence of drugs. Subsequently, officers
searched the vehicle and discovered multiple pills and drug paraphernalia
containing marijuana residue under the driver’s seat and in the center console. A
Harrison County grand jury indicted Garrison on one count each of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree,2 possession of a controlled substance in the
first degree,3 possession of a controlled substance in the third degree,4 possession
of drug paraphernalia,5 and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,
second offense.6
Garrison moved the trial court to suppress all of the evidence seized
alleging the warrantless search of the vehicle violated the mandates of Arizona v.
Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009),7 regarding searches
2
KRS 218A.1412, a Class C felony.
3
KRS 218A.1415, a Class D felony.
4
KRS 218A.1417, a Class A misdemeanor.
5
KRS 218A.500(2), a Class A misdemeanor.
6
KRS 189A.010(5)(b).
7
Garrison’s motion to suppress contended that the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was inapplicable to
his case as he had been removed from his vehicle, could not reach into the area searched to gain
possession of a weapon or destroy evidence, and officers may only search an arrestee’s person
and the area within his immediate control. He based his argument solely on the holding in Gant
and his motion mimicked the language contained in that opinion.
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of vehicles incident to arrest and was thus unconstitutional. Garrison did not
challenge the stop of the vehicle, his detention, nor his eventual arrest. A hearing
was held on the motion on December 4, 2009. After referencing an off-the-record
discussion with defense counsel, the trial court orally sustained the motion. In so
ruling, the court stated the officers had “arrested” Garrison when he was placed in
handcuffs but at that time they had no probable cause to place him under arrest.
Thus, the court found the arrest was unlawful and any resulting search was thereby
rendered infirm. The trial court then sua sponte dismissed all of the charges
pending against Garrison. In a brief written order, the trial court restated its
holdings but made no factual findings. This appeal by the Commonwealth
followed.
The Commonwealth first contends the trial court erred in unilaterally
dismissing the indictment against Garrison. We agree.
It is well-settled in this Commonwealth that the authority to dismiss
criminal indictments prior to trial rests solely with the Commonwealth. Hoskins v.
Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 13-14 (Ky. 2004) (collecting cases). See also RCr8 9.64.
Trial courts may dismiss criminal charges only via a directed verdict following
trial. Commonwealth v. Isham, 98 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Ky. 2003). As was the case in
Isham, the trial court here passed upon the Commonwealth’s evidence and
improperly determined the case should not go forward. Such a determination prior
to trial is outside the province of the trial judge. Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
8
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Hicks, 869 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1994)). The circuit court “simply lacked the
authority to dismiss the complaint prior to trial. Consequently, such dismissal was
an abuse of discretion on the part of the [circuit] judge.” Id. Thus, reversal is
required.
Next, the Commonwealth contends the search in question was not
unconstitutional and the trial court erred in granting Garrison’s motion to suppress
the evidence seized following his arrest. The Commonwealth argues the trial
court’s ruling was completely unrelated to the arguments set forth in Garrison’s
motion and was otherwise legally inaccurate. The Commonwealth takes further
issue with the trial court’s failure to make adequate findings of fact.
Generally, reviewing courts defer to a trial court’s findings of fact on
issues of suppression, so long as those findings are supported by substantial
evidence. RCr 9.78. However, where no factual findings are made and the trial
court’s ruling consists solely of legal conclusions, we review its determinations de
novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911
(1996); Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43 (Ky. 2010); Cummings v.
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62 (Ky. 2007). We note that here neither party
requested the court make additional findings of fact; thus, we cannot take issue
with the trial court’s failure to do so. See CR 52.04.
The trial court ruled from the bench that as a matter of law Garrison
was “arrested” at the moment he was placed in handcuffs. The court further
believed that since the officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest
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at that moment, it was an illegal arrest and any subsequent search was unlawful.
The trial court stated its belief that once a person is placed in cuffs, “they know
they’re under arrest and they can’t run off.” In making its ruling from the bench,
the trial court stated “anything that followed after his detention, which I’m calling
an arrest, because he was in cuffs and obviously couldn’t go anywhere, that, um,
can’t come into the case, fruits of the poisonous tree.” We disagree with the trial
court’s assessment.
Contrary to the trial court’s belief, a “seizure” and an “arrest” are not
synonymous. As we observed in Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532,
537 (Ky. App. 2003), there are three types of interaction between the police and
citizens: consensual encounters, temporary detentions (generally referred to as
Terry stops), and arrests. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure
provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution applies only to Terry stops and arrests. Id. The Fourth Amendment
dictates that an official detention of a person must be supported by probable causeeven if no formal arrest of the person is made. Id. However, the courts have
recognized several limited exceptions based upon the nature and extent of the
intrusion and the government interest involved. Id.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court held that a brief investigative stop, detention, and
frisk for weapons does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the initial stop
was supported by reasonable suspicion, a far lighter standard than probable cause.
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Id. Terry recognized that there must be an actual “seizure” before the protections
of the Fourth Amendment are triggered. Id. Pursuant to Terry, a police officer
may approach a person, identify himself as a police officer, and ask a few
questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id. A “seizure” for Fourth
Amendment purposes occurs only when an individual is detained under
circumstances that would induce a reasonable person to believe that he or she is
not at liberty to leave. Id.9
The United States Supreme Court has opined that the totality of the
circumstances must be considered in determining when a temporary detention
turns into an arrest, and there is no bright-line rule governing such a determination.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605
(1985). When considering the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court
should take care not to view the factors upon which police officers rely in isolation.
Courts must consider all of the officers’ observations, and give due weight to the
inferences and deductions drawn by trained law enforcement officers. United
9
However, the Fourth Amendment does not automatically protect a “seized” citizen from a
search by law enforcement. In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 679,
83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held:
[a]lthough stopping a car and detaining its occupants constitute a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the
governmental interest in investigating an officer’s reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, may outweigh
the Fourth Amendment interest of the driver and passengers in
remaining secure from the intrusion. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653-655, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-1397, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979).
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States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 272-75, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740
(2002).
Upon even a cursory review of the above-noted decisions, it becomes
clear that our jurisprudence recognizes a distinction between a temporary detention
(or “seizure”) and an arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In the case
sub judice, the totality of the circumstances do not support the trial court’s ruling
that Garrison was arrested at the moment he was placed in handcuffs.
Det. Hutchinson testified at the hearing that it was not his intention to
place Garrison under arrest, but rather that he was handcuffing Garrison for safety
reasons. This decision was based upon the information Det. Hutchinson had
received from his informant that Alexis was armed with a pistol. Because there
were only two officers present at the time of the interaction, the uncertainty
surrounding felony arrests, and the knowledge that back-up officers would be
delayed in arriving on-scene, Det. Hutchinson believed it in everyone’s best
interests to temporarily restrain Garrison to avoid the possibility of a violent or
otherwise unfavorable confrontation. He testified that although he was completely
unfamiliar with Garrison, Det. Olin did recognize him from previous encounters.10
Although Det. Hutchinson became suspicious of Garrison’s impairment
immediately upon turning Garrison around to lead him to the rear of the police car,
the decision to place Garrison under arrest was not made until further information
regarding his impaired status was gleaned by other officers.
10
It is unclear from the record what those encounters were or whether Det. Hutchinson was
made aware of the facts and details from such interactions.
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In light of the totality of the circumstances known and observed by the
officers, including Garrison’s being seen leaving a residence known for illegal
drug activity while accompanied by a wanted felon who was reputed to be armed,
Det. Hutchinson was justified in undertaking a Terry stop and undertaking
additional investigation. Det. Hutchinson assuredly had reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Further, the slight intrusion was
necessary for the safety of all parties involved as well as the general public under
the circumstances, was reasonably related to the justification for the stop, and was
not unduly prolonged. Thus, we believe the trial court erroneously found the
interaction was violative of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule was
improperly applied to exclude the results of the ensuing search.
In addition to our belief that Garrison’s temporary detention was
permissible, and contrary to the trial court’s belief, we do not find Det.
Hutchinson’s actions were tantamount to effectuating an arrest even though
Garrison was placed in handcuffs. In Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 105 S.Ct. at 68384, the Supreme Court discussed the appropriateness of the arresting officers’
actions in detaining Hensley.
When the Covington officers stopped Hensley, they
were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain
the status quo during the course of the stop. The
Covington officers’ conduct was well within the
permissible range in the context of suspects who are
reported to be armed and dangerous. See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 34803481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
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434 U.S. 106, 110-111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333-334, 54
L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam).
In United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1989), a defendant was
handcuffed before officers conducted a pat-down of his person. As Garrison does
here, Crittendon argued that his being handcuffed converted his encounter with
police into an arrest. In rejecting his argument, the Court held
[b]rief, even if complete, deprivations of a suspect’s
liberty do not convert a stop and frisk into an arrest so
long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to
the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Perate, 719
F.2d 706, 708-09 (4th Cir. 1983) (fact that officers
approached suspect’s car with drawn weapons did not
convert stop into an arrest); and United States v.
Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (use of
handcuffs during stop and frisk does not convert
encounter into a custodial arrest).
Id. at 329. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that the use of handcuffs does not
“exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that
precaution.” Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d
809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). In Houston, the suspects were ordered
out of their vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffed, searched, and placed in the rear of a
police cruiser for approximately twenty minutes. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Houston Court found the officer’s actions to be reasonably
necessary to protect their safety, reasonably related to the investigation into the
underlying crime, and not tantamount to effectuating an arrest.
Likewise, we believe Det. Hutchinson acted permissibly under the
circumstances in restraining Garrison to maintain control of him and preserve the
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status quo. This is especially true when considering Det. Hutchinson was unaware
of whether Garrison had violent tendencies, was aware that at least one weapon
was believed to be in the vehicle, and a known felon was still unsecured in that
vehicle. Allowing Garrison to move about freely behind the officers’ backs would
have been imprudent and inherently risky. “Certainly it would be unreasonable to
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their
duties.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. The brief detention was amply
supported by reasonable suspicion and driven by the strong desire to maintain
safety for the officers, the parties involved, and the general public. Garrison was
not arrested until officers had probable cause to believe he had been operating his
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating substance.
Nevertheless, even if we were to believe Garrison’s detention was
unlawful, in Hardy v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433 (Ky. App. 2004) (quoting
Baltimore, 119 S.W.3d at 541 n.37), we noted that “a valid arrest may constitute an
intervening event that cures the taint of an illegal detention sufficient to rebut the
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence recovered in a search incident to an
arrest.” The intervening circumstances in this case dissipate any taint caused by
any allegedly unlawful detention or seizure.
After personally observing Garrison operating the vehicle prior to the
stop, Det. Hutchinson observed Garrison to be under the influence of an
intoxicating substance other than alcohol. Police are not required to ignore
violations that occur in their presence if they are involved in an investigation of
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another crime or have another intent or motivation behind the stop. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
Further investigation revealed Garrison was impaired. Accordingly, officers
obtained the right to arrest Garrison for DUI. Accompanying the right to
effectuate his arrest came the right to conduct a search incident to an arrest. This
included the right to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle as it would
be reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense precipitating
the arrest, especially in light of the canine’s alert on the driver’s door of the
vehicle. The existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest constituted an
“intervening circumstance” that outweighed any possible misconduct or error on
the part of the officers.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Harrison
Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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