COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. GERALD (STEVE)
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RENDERED: JULY 1, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000015-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-000618
STEVE GERALD
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, STUMBO, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an opinion and
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting a motion to suppress evidence. The
Commonwealth argues that although the trial court’s findings of fact were accurate
and supported by substantial evidence, its application of the law to those facts was
incorrect. We agree, reverse, and remand this case for further proceedings.
On November 14, 2008, Detective Richard Wilkerson of the Jefferson
County Sheriff’s Department, along with other officers, was attempting to serve an
arrest warrant on a man named Gregory Roberts. In an effort to secure the area in
front of the house, Detective Wilkerson approached a vehicle parked in front of the
residence. From outside the vehicle, Detective Wilkerson observed Steve Gerald
rolling a marijuana cigarette. Detective Wilkerson then removed Gerald from the
vehicle, handcuffed him, and charged him with possession of marijuana. Detective
Wilkerson then searched the passenger compartment of the car where he found
marijuana and cocaine. Detective Wilkerson then searched the trunk where he
found a 9 millimeter handgun and more cocaine.
A Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Gerald with first-degree
illegal possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm, illegal possession of
marijuana while in possession of a firearm, and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia while in possession of a firearm. Gerald eventually filed a motion to
suppress the evidence found during the search of the car. A hearing was held on
the matter and the trial court ultimately ruled in Gerald’s favor. This appeal
followed.
In its opinion and order, the trial court relied on the recent case of
Arizona v. Gant, __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). In that case,
the United States Supreme Court rejected the long-standing rule that when an
officer arrests an occupant of a vehicle, he may search the vehicle as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest. The Gant Court held that a search of the
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vehicle incident to an arrest is only authorized when the arrestee is “unsecured and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
Id. at 1719. The Court also stated
that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might
be found in the vehicle.” In many cases, as when a
recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there
will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains
relevant evidence. But in others . . . the offense of arrest
will supply a basis for searching the passenger
compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers
therein.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Gant, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license,
handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car. His vehicle was then searched. The search
revealed a gun and cocaine. The Supreme Court found that because Gant was
secured in the patrol car and the officers could not reasonably believe to find more
evidence of driving with a suspended license in the car, his car was illegally
searched and any evidence found had to be suppressed.
A trial court’s findings of fact regarding the admissibility of evidence
seized during a search are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002). An appellate court
must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to
those facts. Id. The Commonwealth concedes that the trial court’s findings of fact
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were supported by substantial evidence; however, it argues that the trial court erred
in its application of the law.
The Commonwealth claims that the trial court only relied on the first
issue of the Gant court regarding unsecured occupants and did not consider the
alternate evidentiary basis for the search. We agree with the Commonwealth. In
the case at hand, Gerald was arrested for possession of marijuana when he was
observed rolling a marijuana cigarette while in his vehicle. We find it was
reasonable to believe more evidence of drug possession might be found in the car.
The Commonwealth brings our attention to the case of Owens v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2009). In that case, a man named Thornton
was stopped by the police because he was driving with a suspended driver’s
license. When he was arrested and his person searched, a suspected crack pipe was
found. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that once the pipe was found, this
“gave rise to another reason for Thornton to be arrested. It was then reasonable for
the arresting officer to believe that the vehicle Thornton was driving contained
evidence of the offense of the de facto second offense giving rise to the arrest (i.e.,
possession or trafficking in drugs).” Id. at 708. Here, Gerald was found in his car
and in possession of marijuana. Under the rationale of Owens, it was reasonable
for Detective Wilkerson to believe more evidence of Gerald’s crime might be
found in the car. Under the holding in Gant, this made the search of the vehicle’s
passenger compartment valid.
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Once the search of the passenger compartment revealed more drugs,
this gave Detective Wilkerson probable cause to search the trunk of the car. In
Gant, the Court stated:
Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement
authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances
when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For
instance, Michigan v. Long, 43 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct.
3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), permits an officer to
search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has
reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not
the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehicle
to “gain immediate control of weapons.” Id., at 1049,
103 S.Ct. 3469 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). If there is probable
cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821,
102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a
search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence
might be found.
Gant at 1721 (emphasis supplied).
Ross allows, as an exception to the search warrant requirement, a
warrantless search when supported by probable cause as to any part of the vehicle,
inclusive of the trunk. In the matter at bar, an officer observed Gerald rolling a
marijuana cigarette while sitting in his vehicle, which led to a reasonable belief
that that evidence of criminal behavior might be found in the passenger
compartment. Pursuant to Gant, a search of the passenger compartment yielded
both marijuana and cocaine. Based upon such facts, probable cause then existed
for the issuance of a search warrant for the vehicle and, therefore, pursuant to Ross
a warrantless search of the vehicle’s trunk was constitutional. Ross, 456 U.S. at
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809 (“a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance
of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.”). The search
of the trunk was also proper.
Based on the above, we find that the motion to suppress should have
been denied. We therefore reverse and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS, BUT WRITES SEPARATE
OPINION.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the majority
but write separately to emphasize the constitutionality of the search of the trunk of
the vehicle. Proper emphasis requires the consideration of several cases, namely
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 567 (1967), Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981 ), Arizona v. Gant,
___U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), and United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d, 572 (1982).
Katz establishes that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” Katz at 357. Thus, any warrantless search by law
enforcement must fit within an exception when the Fourth Amendment applies.
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Subsequently, the U.S Supreme Court decided Chimel, which allowed
warrantless searches by officers for purposes of removing weapons and seizing
evidence from an arrestee or from an area where the arrestee might procure a
weapon or access evidence. Later Belton was decided and applied the reasoning in
Chimel to vehicles and stated:
Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. …
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also
examine the contents of any containers found within the
passenger compartment, for if the passenger
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in it be within his reach.
Chimel at 460 (emphasis supplied and internal footnotes omitted).
Thus, under Belton the passenger compartment and containers are subject to a
warrantless search.
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gant. In Gant, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered when and under what circumstances the passenger
compartment of a vehicle may be searched. The Court explained, as is relevant to
our discussion, that allowing a warrantless search was a means to “ensure that
officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns
encountered during the arrest of a vehicle's recent occupant justify a search.” Gant
at 1721. As applied sub judice, the safety of the officers was not an issue.
However, the seizure of evidence in the passenger compartment and the trunk of
the vehicle are in issue and bear further discussion.
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Under Gant, the warrantless search for evidence in the passenger
compartment of the vehicle must be justified by a reasonable belief that evidence
supporting the crime for which Gerald was arrested, i.e. drugs, may be found there.
The Court clarified the search incident to arrest under Belton (which would have
appeared to allow such a search without a reasonable belief) in stating:
Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches
incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to
provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the
Fourth Amendment1 to permit a warrantless search on
that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the
State's arguments that a broad reading of Belton would
meaningfully further law enforcement interests and
justify a substantial intrusion on individuals' privacy.
Gant at 1721 (internal footnotes omitted).
The Court later stated: “If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into
the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the
search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant at
1716.
In considering the search of the vehicle, the Court concluded:
[T]hat circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify
a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might
be found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632, 124
S.Ct. 2127 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). In
many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to
1
This comment echoes Justice O’Connor’s concerns in her concurrence in Thornton that “lower
court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).” Thornton at S.Ct.
2133.
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believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. See, e.g.,
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324, 121 S.Ct.
1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 118, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998).
Gant at 1721. (emphasis supplied).
This limitation placed upon Belton by Gant appears merely to apply
the “reasonable to believe” criteria to warrantless searches for evidence. Thus the
warrantless search of the vehicle does not arise from the fact of an arrest, but from
the facts observed by the officers which then serve as a basis for the reasonable
belief that evidence of crime may be found in the passenger compartment of the
vehicle.
In the case sub judice, Gerald was arrested for possession of
marijuana based on the officers observing Gerald rolling a marijuana cigarette
while sitting in his vehicle. Few would opine that such facts do not give rise to a
reasonable basis to believe that the passenger compartment of the vehicle might
then be searched for evidence in further support of the crime, i.e. drugs. Therefore,
under Gant, the passenger compartment of the vehicle was properly within the
scope of a warrantless search. The question then posed is under what exception, if
any, might the trunk of the vehicle be searched?
This question is answered by Ross cited with approval by the Court in
Gant during a short synopsis of the jurisprudence surrounding the search of
vehicles. The Court stated:
Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to
conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within
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reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest. Other established exceptions to the warrant
requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional
circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns
demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 43 U.S. 1032,
103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), permits an
officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual,
whether or not the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might
access the vehicle to “gain immediate control of
weapons.” Id., at 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968)). If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle
contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d
572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle
in which the evidence might be found.
Gant at 1721 (emphasis supplied).
Ross allows, as an exception to the search warrant requirement, a
warrantless search when supported by probable cause as to any part of the vehicle,
inclusive of the trunk. Factually the officers had, prior to the search of the trunk,
seen Gerald rolling a marijuana cigarette while sitting in his vehicle, which led to a
reasonable belief that that evidence of crime might be in the passenger
compartment. Pursuant to Gant, a search of the passenger compartment yielded
both marijuana and cocaine. Again, few would opine that based upon such facts
probable cause did not exist for the issuance of a search warrant for the vehicle
and, therefore, pursuant to Ross a warrantless search of the vehicle’s trunk was
constitutional.
Therefore, I concur in reversing the circuit court and write separately
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only to offer a stepwise analysis based upon our jurisprudence.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Annie O’Connell
Assistant Public Defender
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky
J. David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
of Counsel
Louisville, Kentucky
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