BOGGS (AMANDA LEIGH) VS. BOGGS (LARRY JACKSON)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002338-MR
AMANDA LEIGH BOGGS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOHN COX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00426
LARRY JACKSON BOGGS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT, 1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Amanda Leigh Boggs (Amanda) appeals from the family
court’s order finding that she was not under duress when she entered into a
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
separation agreement (the Agreement) with Larry Jackson Boggs (Jackie) and that
the Agreement was supported by sufficient consideration. On appeal, Amanda
argues that the family court did not consider evidence of Jackie’s abuse when it
determined the Agreement was not unconscionable and that the court did not make
sufficient findings of fact to support its order. Jackie argues that Amanda failed to
make a causal connection between any abuse and her signing the Agreement, and
that the court made sufficient findings of fact. Having reviewed the record and the
arguments of the parties, we affirm.
FACTS
Jackie and Amanda, who are the parents of two minor children,
married on July 6, 1999, and separated on August 10, 2008. During the course of
the marriage, Jackie made substantial improvements to a parcel of real estate that
he owned,2 expanding and improving an existing house and garage. He also
purchased some equipment for Amanda, who planned to open a beauty salon.
Shortly after the separation, Amanda contacted an attorney, Jennifer
Barker (Barker), who prepared the Agreement, which the parties signed on August
27, 2008. The Agreement provided for joint custody and equal parenting time; and
that Jackie would: assume $90,000.00 of marital debt; pay for the children’s
school, sports, and medical expenses; pay off Amanda's car loan; and pay
Amanda’s monthly bills, including car insurance, for “up to one year from the
2
The evidence is somewhat unclear whether the real estate is solely in Jackie's name or jointly in
Jackie's and his mother's names. However, it is uncontested that the real estate, absent any postmarriage improvements, is non-marital property.
-2-
execution of [the] agreement.” Under the Agreement, Amanda kept her car but
was not entitled to any share of the value of improvements to the real estate or to
any of the beauty salon equipment. However, she was absolved of liability for any
marital debt. We note that the Agreement also provided that the parties understood
its terms and those terms were fair and not unconscionable.
Amanda filed a petition for dissolution on September 2, 2008. On
November 18, 2008, approximately ten weeks after she signed the Agreement,
Amanda, through new counsel, moved to set aside the Agreement, stating that she
had entered into it under duress. In support of her motion, Amanda filed an
affidavit stating that Jackie had been both physically and verbally abusive to her
during their marriage and after they had separated. At or near that time, Amanda
also filed a domestic violence petition and the court entered an emergency
protective order.3 In December 2009, the court granted Amanda's petition for
dissolution but reserved all issues related to custody, visitation, property division,
and the Agreement.
Following some ongoing disputes regarding custody and visitation,
the court heard Amanda's motion to set aside the Agreement in September 2009.
At the hearing and in her deposition, which is part of the record, Amanda testified
that she met with Barker alone on one occasion and that both she and Jackie met
with Barker on one occasion. During her initial meeting with Barker, Amanda
3
We note that neither the domestic violence petition nor the emergency protective order are part
of the record before us; however, reference is made to those documents in the pleadings.
-3-
stated that she wanted the beauty salon equipment, her personal property,
$80,000.00, and for Jackie to pay all of her expenses for a year.
At the second meeting, Barker advised Amanda and Jackie that she
believed she represented both of them and if they could not agree, she could not
represent either. According to Amanda, Jackie stated that he was "broke" and
could not pay her $80,000.00. He then dictated the terms he thought would be
acceptable. Barker drafted the Agreement and the parties returned to Barker's
office and signed it. In addition to the Agreement, Amanda also signed an
affidavit indicating that she understood that she might have a claim to more than
what was contained in the Agreement, that she had been so advised, and that she
entered into the Agreement knowingly and voluntarily.
Amanda testified that she was under duress when she signed the
Agreement because of "the way [Jackie] would look at [her] and try to intimidate
[her] . . . ." She also testified that she was "confused . . . scared and . . . didn't
know what to do," and that she would "get yelled at" if she did not agree. She also
testified that Jackie had not permitted her to make any decisions for herself during
their marriage. However, after separating from Jackie, she began to make
decisions for herself, realized that the Agreement was not fair, and contacted an
attorney to have the Agreement set aside.
Barker testified that it appeared to her that Amanda might have a
claim to more than what the Agreement provided. However, when she advised
Amanda of that, Amanda stated that "she just wanted out." Because of her
-4-
concerns about the terms of the Agreement, Barker had Amanda sign an affidavit
indicating that she had been advised that she had a right to claim additional
property, that she chose not to do so, and that she entered the Agreement
knowingly and voluntarily.
As to the issue of duress, Barker testified that she did not suspect there
were any domestic violence issues. Barker agreed that Amanda was more
animated when the two met alone than when all three met. However, she noted
that, during the second meeting, Amanda and Jackie appeared to be "getting along"
and were able to discuss and work through their differences. We note that this
differs significantly from Amanda's description of that meeting.
Amanda also presented testimony at the hearing from a real estate
appraiser who stated that the garage with the beauty salon had a value of
$33,104.00 and the residence had a value of $92,395.00 to $119,226.00.
Jackie testified at the hearing that he owed $50,712.83 for both
marital and non-marital loans related to the residence; $18,211.59 on a loan
secured by his truck; and $29,843.63 for a loan related to the beauty salon
improvements and equipment. Jackie also testified that some of the debt
associated with the residence had been paid down during the marriage; however,
because various loans had been consolidated, it was difficult to determine what
portion was marital and what was non-marital.
Following the hearing, the court entered an order denying Amanda’s
petition to set aside the Agreement. In doing so, the court stated that the
-5-
Agreement was supported by valuable consideration in that it: relieved Amanda
from liability for any of the marital debt; provided that Amanda could keep a 2003
Honda and that Jackie would pay any debt associated with that vehicle and the
insurance premiums until that debt was paid; provided that Jackie would pay all of
Amanda’s monthly bills for a period of one year; and provided that Jackie would
pay for the children’s school, sports, and medical expenses. Furthermore, the court
found that, based on the value of the property involved, the Agreement was not
unconscionable and that Amanda did not enter into it under duress. In support of
this later finding, the court noted that Amanda was represented by competent
counsel; that counsel advised Amanda that she might be entitled to a greater
portion of the marital estate; that counsel advised Amanda of the consequences of
entering into the Agreement; that Amanda signed an affidavit stating that she had
been so advised; and that Amanda’s decision to enter into the Agreement was
“knowing and voluntary.”
Amanda then filed a motion asking the court to make additional
findings of fact regarding the value of the marital property and debt, the economic
circumstances of the parties, and the relative income of the parties. Jackie
responded, arguing that the court’s findings were sufficient. The court agreed with
Jackie and denied Amanda’s motion, although the court stated that the amount of
debt exceeded the $90,000.00 set forth in the Agreement. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
-6-
"The doctrine of unconscionability is used by the courts to police the
excesses of certain parties who abuse their right to contract freely. It is directed
against one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not against the
consequences per se of uneven bargaining power or simply an old-fashioned bad
bargain." Louisville Bear Safety Service, Inc. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 571
S.W.2d 438 (Ky. App. 1978) (citing Willie v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976)). Because the trial court is in the best position to judge
the circumstances surrounding an agreement, we will not set aside its findings
regarding conscionability absent "evidence of fraud, undue influence, overreaching
or evidence of change of circumstances since the execution of the original
agreement." Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Ky. App. 1979).
Furthermore, we will not set aside the findings of fact by the trial court unless they
are "clearly erroneous." Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01; see also Patmon
v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. App. 2009). With these standards in mind,
we address the issues raised by Amanda on appeal.
ANALYSIS
Although Amanda only lists two issues in her brief – whether the
family court made sufficient findings of fact and whether she entered into the
Agreement under duress – we believe she actually raises three issues. Those issues
are: (1) whether the Agreement was unconscionable on its face; (2) whether the
Agreement is unconscionable because Amanda was under duress when she signed
it; and (3) whether the court made sufficient findings of fact to support its
-7-
conclusion that the Agreement is not unconscionable. We address each issue in
turn below.
1. Facial Unconscionability
Amanda argues that the Agreement so inequitably distributes the
marital assets as to be facially unconscionable. At the outset of our analysis of this
issue, we note that a separation agreement is binding on the parties and "the court
unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any
other relevant evidence produced by the parties, . . . that the separation agreement
is unconscionable." KRS 403.180(2). Because the statute mandates that the court
consider the economic circumstances of the parties in determining conscionability,
we look first to the economics of the Agreement. In doing so, we note that a
discrepancy in the amounts received by each party under a settlement agreement,
in and of itself, is not enough to render the agreement unconscionable. Money v.
Money, 297 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. App. 2009).
We agree with Amanda that the Agreement does not equally divide
the marital assets. However, we also agree with Jackie that, under the Agreement
Amanda has no liability for any marital debt, which is significant, and Jackie
undertook liability for Amanda's expenses for one year as well as her car payments
and insurance. While Amanda may not have obtained the "best deal" she could,
we cannot say that the deal she made is so out of proportion on its face as to be
unconscionable. However, unconscionability also involves issues that are not
-8-
purely economic, such as fraud, undue influence, and overreaching. We address
those factors below.
2. Duress
Amanda argues that the Agreement is unconscionable because she
was under duress when she signed it. Although she does not specifically state as
much, we presume that Amanda believes that duress falls within the purview of
undue influence or overreaching and we address it as such.
In her brief Amanda states that she testified that Jackie had physically
abused her during her marriage, that she had obtained a domestic violence order
against Jackie, and that she signed the Agreement because she "thought [she] had
to . . . ." At the outset, we note that we could find no testimony from Amanda that
Jackie physically abused her. In the portion of the record to which Amanda cites,
she testified that she feared she would be "yelled at" if she did not sign the
Agreement and that Jackie liked to discipline through intimidation. However, she
did not state that Jackie had touched her or otherwise physically abused her.
As to the domestic violence order, it appears from what we have in the
record that the allegations supporting that order concerned Jackie's actions after the
Agreement had been signed. Therefore, those actions could not have had an
impact on Amanda's mental state at the time she signed the Agreement.
Having eliminated the preceding two assertions by Amanda, we are
left with her claim that she felt under duress because Jackie would "yell at her" and
try to intimidate her. The family court, having reviewed all of the preceding,
-9-
concluded that Amanda was not under duress when she signed the Agreement.
Granting the court its due deference regarding findings of fact, we cannot say that
its conclusion that Amanda was not under duress was clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we must concur with the family court's finding that Amanda was not
under duress when she signed the Agreement.
3. Sufficiency of Findings of Fact
Amanda argues that the family court should have made findings of
fact regarding the extent of the parties' marital and non-marital property, as well as
their marital and non-marital debt before making a determination regarding the
conscionability of the Agreement. While Amanda is correct that the family court
did not make specific findings regarding the preceding, the court did note the terms
of the Agreement and, based on the evidence presented to it, found that those terms
were not unconscionable. Because the evidence supported the family court's
ultimate finding, the court was not required to make the specific findings requested
by Amanda.
Furthermore, we disagree with Amanda's argument that the evidence
did not support the family court's specific finding that there was more than
$90,000.00 in marital debt. Jackie testified that he had a mortgage on the residence
of approximately $67,000 when the parties married. He also testified that, at the
time the parties separated, the mortgage on the residence amounted to a little more
than $50,000.00. However, according to Jackie, that amount included both premarital debt and debt incurred after the marriage that had been consolidated with
-10-
the pre-marital debt. Therefore, Amanda's argument that the $50,000.00 of debt
attributable to the residence is entirely pre-marital is not supported by the evidence.
If that amount is added to the $18,183.29 secured by Jackie's truck, the $29,790.06
attributable to the beauty salon, and the $2,291.15 attributable to Amanda's car, the
amount of marital debt exceeds $90,000.00. Thus, the family court's finding is not
clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Because the family court's findings were supported by sufficient
evidence that Amanda knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Agreement, we
affirm its finding that she did so free of duress. Furthermore, while the Agreement
may not have contained the most favorable terms Amanda could have obtained, its
terms are not so one-sided as to be unconscionable. Finally, while the family court
could have made findings regarding the exact amount of the parties' marital debt
and property, we discern no error in its failure to do so. Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
MaLenda S. Haynes
Grayson, Kentucky
John Preston Thompson
Grayson, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.