MELTON (BILLY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002271-MR
BILLY MELTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00089
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: On September 24, 2004, a Monroe County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Billy Keith Melton with murder, two counts of first-degree
rape, two counts of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, complicity to
tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a witness, and being a seconddegree persistent felony offender. The charges against Melton arose from a series
of events which occurred on September 17-18, 2004, and resulted in the death of
Jodi Pace. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court set out the underlying facts as
follows:
On September 17, 2004, Pace, a fourteen-year-old,
had gone to spend the night with Kassandra Hudson, her
eighteen-year-old friend. Together the girls contacted
Melton to see if he could obtain methamphetamine for
them. After several calls, Melton agreed to pick up the
girls.
Amanda Coe, Melton's cousin, lived with him at
the time of the incident. Melton, Coe, and Coe's baby
went to pick up Pace and Hudson. Upon arriving at
Melton's home in Tompkinsville, Pace and Hudson were
informed that Melton had not yet obtained the
methamphetamine for them. While they waited, Coe
witnessed Melton giving the two girls a handful of pills
and marijuana. Coe testified that Melton gave them
Loricet, Percocet, Oxycontin, Xanax, and an unidentified
pill. At some point Melton agreed to provide Pace and
Hudson with one gram of methamphetamine each in
return for sex. Shortly after that, Melton had sexual
relations with the girls.
Pace and Hudson began to question Melton about
the methamphetamine, so he gave them more pills.
According to the testimony of Scottie Key and Clinton
Rowe, Melton then had sexual relations with both girls
again, although they were then passed out. Key and
Rowe, who had shared a cell with Melton after his arrest,
came forward and testified concerning various statements
he had made in their presence in which he had bragged
about the events that night. The testimony of Key and
Rowe confirmed the sex-for-methamphetamine theory. In
addition, both testified that on various occasions Melton
had specifically said he had given the drug Seroquel to
Pace.
At some point in the early hours of September
18th, Coe informed Melton that Pace was not well and
that they should get her help. Melton refused and
threatened to harm Coe if she attempted to use the phone.
Later that morning, Melton was informed that Pace was
unresponsive. Melton, aware that Pace had overdosed,
delayed calling for help in order to give Coe time to
collect the pill bottles and dispose of them in the woods
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adjoining his property. Further, Melton threatened to
harm Coe if she told authorities what had happened.
Once the pills were removed and Hudson was hidden,
Melton called 911 for an ambulance.
An ambulance was dispatched to Melton's
residence at 9:21 a.m. During his conversation with the
911-operator, Melton claimed he did not know who the
girl was. He stated that she had arrived with three other
girls the evening before. Further, Melton stated that the
girls were visiting with Coe when he went to sleep on the
couch, but that Pace had not responded when they tried to
wake her that morning. Pace was taken to the hospital
and pronounced dead on arrival by the Monroe County
Deputy Coroner.
Once the ambulance left with Pace, Melton and
Coe took Hudson back and dropped her off near her
home. As a result of the night's events, Hudson was also
taken to the hospital. It was there that officers found her
later on September 18th.
Officers from the Kentucky State Police (KSP)
became involved shortly after Pace arrived at the
hospital. KSP Detectives interviewed Melton on the
afternoon of September 18, 2004. Melton provided a
story similar to that given to the 911-operator. With
Melton's written consent, the officers searched Melton's
house, his car, and the surrounding property. As a result
of that search, the officers recovered various pill bottles,
rolling papers, and a can modified for use with
methamphetamine.
Melton was subsequently interviewed at the
Monroe County Sheriff's office. KSP Detective Atwood,
having obtained a conflicting story from Coe, gave
Melton his Miranda warnings and began a taped
interview. Once again, Melton told the detective that four
girls had arrived the night before to visit Coe. Melton
repeated his assertion that no alcohol or drugs were used
while he was present and that Pace had been fine when
he went to sleep. When questioned, Melton did admit to
having sexual relations with two of the girls. Melton told
Detective Atwood that it had been a “group deal” with
the two girls. After completing his statement, Melton
admitted that marijuana had been used. He stated he had
not mentioned it because he did not believe it was a drug.
After further reflection, Melton told Detective Atwood
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that if he gave him the tape of the first interview, he
would give him another statement. Detective Atwood
informed Melton that he could not do that, but that he
would listen to anything Melton wanted to say. Melton
made no further statements. Melton was arrested
following this interview.
An autopsy on Pace revealed that the cause of
death was an overdose of Seroquel. Lab reports also
revealed the presence of Xanax, oxycodone, and
hydrocodone. Given the circumstances surrounding
Pace's death, officers obtained a rape collection kit on
both Pace and Hudson. After obtaining a warrant, a rape
suspect collection kit was obtained from Melton. Lab
tests showed that samples of DNA taken from both Pace
and Hudson matched Melton's DNA. In addition,
Hudson's sample contained DNA from an unknown
source.
Melton v. Commonwealth, 2007 WL 4139640 (Ky. 2007).
Following a trial in October 2005, a jury convicted Melton on all
counts except for the charges of unlawful transaction with a minor. The jury fixed
his sentence at life imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. On direct appeal,
the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Melton’s conviction. Id. On October 19,
2009, Melton filed a pro se motion to alter, amend, or vacate his conviction
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. On November
10, 2009, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Melton now appeals from this
order.
Melton argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
several key respects. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Melton must satisfy a two-part test showing that his counsel's performance
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was deficient and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome
of the proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
The burden falls on a movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel's
assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at
2065; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999). An evidentiary
hearing is necessary only when the record does not conclusively refute the
allegations in the motion. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky.
2001). The issue upon review of the denial of a RCr 11.42 motion without a
hearing is whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction. Baze v.
Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2000) overruled on other grounds by
Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009); Lewis v. Commonwealth,
411 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1967).
Melton first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
seek a competency examination prior to trial. Melton contends that his trial
counsel had reason to question his competency but failed to request a hearing. In
support of this argument, he refers to a December 2001, report by Dr. John M.
Gatschenberger, Ph.D., who evaluated Melton for a disability determination. Dr.
Gatschenberger diagnosed Melton as mildly mentally retarded. Melton claims that
he informed his trial counsel of this evaluation and specifically asked counsel to
request a competency evaluation. Melton contends that trial counsel was deficient
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in failing to request a competency evaluation or to inform the court that Melton’s
competency was in question.
Criminal prosecution of a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial
is a violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992).
Further, once facts known to a trial court are sufficient to place a defendant's
competence to stand trial in question, the trial court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the question. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95
S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86, 86
S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”)
504.100(1) directs a court to “appoint at least one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist
to examine, treat and report on the defendant's mental condition” when it “has
reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” See
also RCr 8.06.
Neither the record nor Melton’s motion supports his assertion that
counsel should have requested a competency evaluation. While Dr.
Gatschenberger’s report diagnosed Melton as mildly mentally retarded and with
limited intellectual functioning, the report does not suggest that Melton lacked the
capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to participate rationally in his defense. See KRS 504.060(4) and RCr 8.06.
Furthermore, Dr. Gatschenberger’s testing was limited because Melton could not
see well enough due to his poor eyesight. He also opined that most of Melton’s
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problems were due to his antisocial behavior and his abuse of alcohol and other
drugs. Both of these factors tend to undermine Melton’s assertion that he was
incompetent at the time of trial.
Finally, the trial court noted that, during the evaluation for his
presentence investigation report, Melton reported he was in good mental condition.
Again, this evidence undermines Melton’s assertion that trial counsel had reason to
question his competency to stand trial. Under the circumstances, we agree with the
trial court that Melton has failed to show his trial counsel had reasonable grounds
to request a competency evaluation.
Melton next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
pursue lesser charges or defenses to the charge of first-degree rape. Melton
correctly notes that he was charged with first-degree rape because Pace and
Hudson were “physically helpless” at the time he engaged in sexual intercourse
with them. KRS 510.040. The term “physically helpless” means,
that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an
act. “Physically helpless” also includes a person who has
been rendered unconscious or for any other reason is
physically unable to communicate an unwillingness to an
act as a result of the influence of a controlled substance
or legend drug…
KRS 510.010(6).
Melton contends the jury could have found that Pace was not
physically helpless at the time he engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
Consequently, he maintains that counsel should have requested instructions for
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second-degree and third-degree rape. Along similar lines, Melton argues his trial
counsel should have pursued a defense that he was unaware Pace and Hudson were
physically helpless and therefore unable to consent. Had counsel pursued this
defense, Melton maintains he would have been entitled to instructions on lesser
counts of murder and an instruction for the defense provided under KRS 510.030.1
In rejecting this argument, the trial court first noted that Melton’s trial
counsel did request an instruction for sexual misconduct. The trial court also
pointed out there was no evidence that Pace and Hudson were not physically
helpless, or that Melton was unaware that Pace and Hudson were physically
helpless. Coe testified that Pace was passed out in the automobile and that three
people had to assist her to the bedroom where Melton began removing her shoes.
Coe also testified that Pace was completely limp while they were moving her.
Similarly, Hudson testified that she passed out after taking the pills supplied by
Melton and had no clear memory of anything until the next morning. However,
she vaguely recalls someone being on top of her.
Melton does not point to any evidence directly rebutting this
testimony. Furthermore, he admits that he engaged in intercourse with Pace and
Hudson both before and after they took the pills. Rather, Melton suggests only that
he may have reasonably believed that Pace and Hudson were able to consent to
intercourse because they had engaged in intercourse with him earlier in the
1
KRS 510.030 provides as follows: “In any prosecution under this chapter in which the victim’s lack of
consent is based solely on his incapacity to consent because he was less than sixteen (16) years old,
mentally retarded, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, the defendant may prove in exculpation
that at the time he engaged in the conduct constituting the offense he did not know of the facts or
conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.”
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evening. Given the lack of any evidence to support this position, we agree with the
Commonwealth that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue this defense or to seek
alternative instructions fell within the range of acceptable trial strategy.
Melton also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
consult with a pathologist to discredit the testimony of Dr. Tracey Corey, the
Commonwealth’s medical examiner, who testified that Pace died as a result of an
overdose of Seroquel. However, Melton does not offer any evidence that he knew
of a specific expert who was willing to testify in a manner helpful to the defense or
of what such testimony would consist. Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310,
329 (Ky. 2005) overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279
S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). In the absence of such evidence, Melton’s claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective is merely speculative.
Finally, Melton asserts that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel by the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors. Since we find no
deficient performance in any of Melton’s claims of errors, there is no basis for his
claim that he was unfairly prejudiced by a cumulative effect. Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Melton’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, the order of the Monroe Circuit Court denying Melton’s
RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I dissent solely as to the competency
issue.
Melton argues that he informed his counsel of the report of Dr.
Gatschenberger, Ph.D., dated December of 2001, in which Melton was diagnosed
as “mildly mentally retarded.” He then asked counsel for a competency hearing.
Counsel arguably erred in one of two respects: (1) by not requesting the
court to order a competency evaluation or (2) at the very least, by not advising the
court of the existence of this report and thus enabling the court to make an
informed decision as to whether to order such an evaluation.
The Supreme Court of the United States has been consistently resolute in
holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing whenever sufficient doubt
exists as to mental competency. The majority opinion cites several of those cases.
Kentucky has long adhered to that rule. Our Court recently reiterated that holding
in Smith v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ky. App. 2008), where we
stated as follows:
The presentation of a criminal defendant who is
incompetent to stand trial is a violation of due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, Kentucky has enacted a statute to assure in mandatory language that a
court shall order a mental evaluation of a defendant if “upon arraignment, or
during any stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe
the defendant is incompetent to stand trial….” KRS 504.100(1) (Emphasis added.)
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In this case, the court never had the opportunity to address this issue one
way or another because counsel never raised it. Melton did not offer vague
speculation as a lame attempt at defense. He had a report from a professional
mental evaluator, a report which he gave to his counsel when asking for a mental
competency assessment.
I am persuaded that failure to advise the court of the existence of the report
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel entitling Melton at the very least to an
evidentiary hearing. Counsel’s failure to advise the court of the report made it
impossible for the court to comply with its statutory duty to order a competency
evaluation. However, once aware of the existence of this issue after the fact, the
court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion.
Consequently, I file this dissent and would remand for an evidentiary
hearing solely on the competency aspect of the RCr 11.42 motion.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
M. Brooke Buchanan
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuck
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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