KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION VS. WHEELER (BETTY JO), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002229-MR
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00184
BETTY JO WHEELER AND
FLYNN ENTERPRISES, INC.
APPELLENTS
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission
(hereinafter “Commission”) appeals from the October 9, 2009, opinion and order
of the Todd Circuit Court that reversed the Commission’s order, which stated that,
because Betty Jo Wheeler had not timely filed for trade adjustment assistance
(hereinafter “TAA”) and trade readjustment allowance (hereinafter “TRA”), she
was ineligible for the benefits. Because we agree that substantial evidence
supports the Commission's findings and that it correctly applied the law, we
reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wheeler worked for Flynn Enterprises as a repair woman at its factory
in Elkton, Kentucky, for seventeen (17) years. On December 28, 2005, Flynn
Enterprises closed its facility. The closing of the facility resulted in Wheeler and
five hundred co-workers losing their jobs. Thereafter, Wheeler applied for and
received unemployment insurance benefits from the Kentucky Division of
Unemployment Insurance (hereinafter “Division”).
Besides unemployment insurance, the Division administers a federal
program for the United States Department of Labor. The program allows persons
who lose their jobs because of foreign competition to receive additional
unemployment benefits, which as explained above, are known as TAA and TRA
benefits. Although the states administer the programs, it is a federal program that
is subject to federal law.
TAA benefits include job training, job counseling, job placement
assistance, and other similar services designed to help qualified persons make
finding new jobs easier. TRA benefits are monetary allowances similar to regular
unemployment insurance benefits. These benefits help support unemployed
workers after the initial unemployment insurance benefits are exhausted while they
seek new employment and receive TAA services.
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Under the TAA/TRA programs, once an employer’s layoff is certified
as having been caused by foreign competition, its employees may be eligible for
the program’s benefits. The process is for the employer to give the names of the
affected employees to the Division. Then, the Division sends these employees
written notice of their possible eligibility for TAA/TRA benefits and instructions
for filing for the benefits, including the deadlines for application. If an
administering body, here the Division, is unable to substantiate all the employees’
names and addresses, it may publish general notices through local media outlets.
Employees must file for the benefits prior to the deadlines established
by federal law. The deadlines in effect at the time of the plant closing, December
2005, required a TRA applicant to file within either sixteen (16) weeks of losing a
job or eight (8) weeks of certification that the job loss had been caused by foreign
competition. The Division maintains that federal law provides no exception to the
application deadline even if the employee never received written notice of the
deadline.
In late 2005, Flynn Enterprises announced that it would close its
Elkton facility because of foreign competition. Then, several of Flynn’s
employees, including Wheeler, signed a petition for the closure to be certified as
eligible for TAA and TRA benefits. The petition, numbered 58197, was granted
and became effective on December 8, 2005.
Before the plant closed, the Division sent its Rapid Response Team to
Flynn Enterprises several times to inform the employees of eligibility for benefits
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after the plant’s closure. Wheeler and several other employees were not informed
about the meetings, and thus, did not attend them. In addition, Flynn Enterprises
provided the Division with a list of employees affected by the plant closure. On
December 22, 2005, the local office of the Division mailed notices to the
employees on the list. The letter informed recipients that they may be eligible for
TAA/TRA benefits and set forth the deadline for enrollment. The deadline was the
sixteenth week after the worker’s most recent total separation or the last day of the
eighth week after certification is issued. Besides the letter to employees, the
Frankfort office of the Division also published notice about applying for benefits
through the local media, including newspapers, radio and television stations.
It is disputed as to whether Wheeler’s name was on the employer’s
list, but it is undisputed that Wheeler did not receive written notice from the
Division. In fact, at the hearing on the matter, administrative notice was taken that
the Division’s electronic records do not show that Wheeler ever received a letter
giving her notice of her right to the benefits. Further, administrative notice was
taken that no proof existed that the benefits had ever been discussed with Wheeler.
While Wheeler was in general aware of her potential eligibility for
TAA/TRA benefits, she did not know the application deadline. She applied for the
TRA benefits on May 25, 2006, when her regular unemployment benefits ended.
That date, however, was after the deadline of sixteen (16) weeks following her job
separation. Subsequently, Wheeler received a notice of determination, on July 7,
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2006, that TRA benefits were unavailable to her because she failed to meet the
application deadline.
Wheeler appealed the decision to the Appeals Branch of the Division,
which held a hearing on September 11, 2006. The Referee entered a decision on
September 13, 2006, affirming the initial notice of determination. Then,
Wheeler appealed the Referee decision to the Commission, which issued an order
unanimously affirming the Referee’s decision.
Next, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 341.450, Wheeler
appealed the Commission’s decision to the Todd Circuit Court and joined Flynn
Enterprises as a party. At that time, Flynn Enterprises presented new evidence.
The evidence was the list of employees that Flynn Enterprises alleges it provided
the Division, and the list had Wheeler’s name on it. But the court correctly noted
in its October 9, 2009, opinion and order that since the list was not included in the
certified administrative record provided to the court on appeal, it could not use it.
At any rate, the court reversed the Commission. The court held that
the decisions of the Referee and the Commission were arbitrary and capricious.
Clearly, Wheeler did not receive notice of the deadlines for applying for
TAA/TRA benefits, and hence, was denied the benefits for which she was
otherwise qualified. Wheeler’s failure to receive notice of the application deadline
was due to agency’s error, and thus, the court held a violation of its statutory duty.
It concluded that Wheeler had a property interest in her TAA/TRA benefit claim,
and thus due process required that she receive timely notice and eligibility
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requirements for the benefits. The court deemed the failure for Wheeler to have
the opportunity to file for these benefits as a violation of her due process.
The Commission appeals the Todd Circuit Court order. According to
the Commission, it does so at the behest of the United States Department of Labor
because the Commission is obligated to administer the program for the Labor
Department.
ISSUE
The issue is whether an administrative agency’s failure to give written
notice of the deadline for application of benefits to an employee, who was
otherwise qualified, is fatal to her receipt of such benefits when the employee files
after the deadline. The Commission maintains that its findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence and that it correctly applied the federal law, and
therefore the court erred when it reversed the Commission. In contrast, Wheeler
argues that the Commission violated her due process rights. And Flynn
Enterprises, as appellee, highlights that Wheeler, due to error on the part of the
Division and not Flynn Enterprises, did not receive proper notice, and therefore,
the Division is responsible for the error. We will now review the decision of the
Todd Circuit Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The judicial standard of review of an unemployment benefit decision
is twofold. First, it must be ascertained whether the Commission’s findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence, and next, whether the agency correctly
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applied the law to the facts. See Thompson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
Com’n, 85 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky. App. 2002). Substantial evidence is defined as
evidence, taken alone or in light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Moreover, as
stated in Kentucky Unemployment Ins., Com’n v. Landmark Community
Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Ky. 2002), “[w]e must also
determine whether the decision of the administrative agency was arbitrary or
clearly erroneous, which is defined as “unsupported by substantial evidence.”
Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning Com’n v. Prall, 840 S.W.2d 205, 208
(Ky. 1992).
Hence, our review is such that a final order of an administrative
agency will be affirmed if this Court finds the agency applied the correct rule of
law to facts supported by substantial evidence. Vanhoose v. Com., 995 S.W.2d
389, 392 (Ky. App. 1999). Therefore, the fundamental question before us is
whether the facts found by the Commission are “supported by substantial
evidence,” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n v. Springer, 437 S.W.2d 501, 502
(Ky. 1969), and, if so, whether the Commission “incorrectly applied the correct
rule of law to the facts presented to it.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n v.
Stirrat, 688 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ky. App. 1984).
ANALYSIS
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The initial question before the Court is whether the Commission's
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. With regard to this
question, we observe that the parties do not dispute the Referee or the
Commission’s factual findings. Some disagreement exists as to whether Wheeler’s
name was on the employer’s list provided to the Division for written notification.
The list itself, however, was not a part of the administrative record, and therefore,
not considered. Moreover, it is stipulated that Wheeler, for whatever reason, did
not receive written notice and was not made aware of the Rapid Response Team
meetings at the plant. At any rate, an appellate court will uphold a Commission’s
decision that is supported by substantial evidence even in the presence of
conflicting evidence. Kentucky Com’n. on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d
852, 856 (Ky. 1981)
Having determined that the Commission’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we next review whether the Commission applied the correct
rule of law. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n,
437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969). Our decision in the present case turns on the
application of federal law because TAA/TRA is a federal program. Both the
Division and the Commission are bound by federal law in the administration of the
program.
In the administration of these programs, federal law requires that
affected employees must apply for benefits prior to the deadline. The relevant
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version of 19 United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.) § 2291 (2009), that was in
effect at the time of facts herein required application deadlines as follows:
(a) Payment of a trade readjustment allowance shall be
made to an adversely affected worker covered by a
certification . . . if the following conditions are met:
....
(5) Such worker –
(A)(i) is enrolled in a training program approved by
the Secretary . . . and
(ii) the enrollment required . . . occurs no later than the
latest of –
....
(I) the last day of the 16th week after the worker's most
recent total separation from adversely affected
employment[.]
(II) the last day of the 8th week after the week in which
the Secretary issues a certification covering the worker[.]
That is to say, the deadlines in effect at the germane time period required
applicants to for TRA benefits to apply within sixteen (16) weeks of losing the job
or eight (8) weeks of the date the layoffs were certified as having been caused by
foreign competition. Wheeler lost her job on December 8, 2005. The petition was
certified as of December 8, 2005. The last day of the sixteenth week of Wheeler’s
unemployment was April 1, 2006. Thus, Wheeler, under the deadlines in effect in
2006, had to apply for TRA benefits by April 1, 2006. Inopportunely, she applied
for the TRA benefits on May 25, 2006.
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Close perusal of the administrative law governing the benefits shows
that federal law does not place an absolute obligation upon administrative agency
to ensure that written notice is received by all affected employees. Because
incidents will occur where administrative agency will not be supplied with a
complete and accurate list of all employees, other means of giving notice are
allowed. Federal law states:
(2) Newspaper notices.
(i) Upon receipt of a copy of a certification issued by the
Department affecting workers in a State, the State agency
shall publish a notice of such certification in a newspaper
of general circulation in areas in which such workers
reside. Such a newspaper notice shall not be required to
be published, however, in the case of a certification with
respect to which the State agency can substantiate, and
enters in its records evidence substantiating, that all
workers covered by the certification have received
written notice required by paragraph (d)(1) of this
section.
20 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 617.4(2)(i) (1986). Here, the Division
did use local media, including newspaper, radio, and television, to publicize the
certification. The publication of the certification permits employees, who for some
reason did not receive written notice, constructive notice. The Division did so
advertise the certification and its benefits, and therefore, Wheeler had constructive
notice.
Furthermore, even though federal law provides that employees who
do not apply for benefits by the deadline are unable to receive them, the statutory
scheme allows for an extension of the deadline for certain conditions and under a
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specific time frame. The pertinent version of 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(5)(A)(ii)(III)
provides that even though an affected employee is required to enroll in training
either within eight weeks of employer’s certification or sixteen weeks after
complete separation from work in order to receive TRA cash benefits, extenuating
circumstances might merit a forty-five day extension. But to take advantage of the
time extension, Wheeler would have had to apply for the extension by May 16,
2006, which was a little over a week before she applied for the benefits on May 25,
2006. Additionally, the grant of an extension is limited to very specific conditions,
and failure to receive written notification from the administrative agency about the
deadline is not one of the conditions. See U.S.C.A. § 2291(c)(1).
Furthermore, we observe that state law may not be used to circumvent
Trade Act time limits. As provided in 20 C.F.R. § 617.50(d):
(d) Use of State law. In making determinations or
redeterminations under this section, or in reviewing such
determinations or redeterminations under § 617.51, a
State agency shall apply the regulations in this part 617.
As to matters committed by this part 617 to the
applicable State law, a State agency, a hearing officer, or
a State court shall apply the applicable State law and
regulations thereunder, including procedural
requirements of such State law or regulations, except so
far as such State law or regulations are inconsistent with
this part 617 or the purpose of this part 617: Provided,
that, no provision of State law or regulations on good
cause for waiver of any time limit, or for late filing of
any claim, shall apply to any time limitation referred to
or specified in this part 617, unless such State law or
regulation is made applicable by a specific provision of
this part 617.
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Hence, as to the specified time limits state law does not control. In essence, the
federal regulations prohibit state law exceptions to the time limits in those
regulations, and consequently, state law may not be used to circumvent Trade Act
time limits. 20 C.F.R. § 617.50(d). Other jurisdictions have so held, too. See
Reed v. State Dept. Labor, 272 Neb. 8, 717 N.W.2d 899, 906 (Neb. 2006); Lowe v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 877 A.2d 494, 498 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2005); Schultz v. Division of Employment Security, 293 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2008).
A public policy rationale for such seemingly inflexible provisions is
that it fosters uniform administration by the states of federal programs. Allowing
states to deliver federal programs necessitates that particular deference be paid to
the interpretations of the responsible federal agencies. See Ford v. Com.,
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 48 Pa. Cmwlth 580, 409 A.2d 1209,
1211 (Pa. Cmwlth 1980). In addition, as noted in this jurisdiction, if the
Commonwealth fails to follow federal regulations, it might risk losing Trade Act
funding. See Lowe, 877 A.2d at 496.
In fact, as explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron, whether a
court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute depends first on whether
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104
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S. Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). The statutory language of the Trade
Act of 1974 is unambiguous, and we must follow it.
While we recognize and sympathize with Wheeler’s contention that
the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, and as such, violated her
due process rights, our review of an administrative agency’s adjudicatory decision
is somewhat limited. And as we have pointed out, the judicial standard of review
of an unemployment benefit decision is whether the Commission’s findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency correctly applied
the law to the facts. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834-35
(Ky. App. 1998), citing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment
Ins. Com’n, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969). Further, we must resolve whether
the decision of the administrative agency was arbitrary or clearly erroneous. A
decision is said to be of such character if it is “unsupported by substantial
evidence.” Prall, 840 S.W.2d at 208. Moreover, if there is any substantial
evidence to support the decision of the administrative agency, “it cannot be found
to be arbitrary and will be sustained.” Taylor v. Coblin, 461 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky.
1970). Consequently, a final order of an administrative agency will be affirmed if
this court finds the agency applied the correct rule of law to facts supported by
substantial evidence. Vanhoose, 995 S.W.2d at 392. We have so determined that
the agency had substantial evidence and correctly applied the rule of law.
Therefore, we conclude that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary. This
reasoning also applies to the court’s reversal of the Commission’s decision. In that
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opinion, the court held that the decisions of the Referee and the Commission were
arbitrary and capricious. Again, we understand the reasoning of the court. Clearly,
as noted by the court, Wheeler did not receive notice of the deadlines for applying
for TAA/TRA benefits, and hence, was denied the benefits for which she likely
was otherwise qualified. But we must disagree with the court’s determination that
Wheeler had a property interest in her TAA/TRA benefit claim, and thus due
process required that she receive timely notice and eligibility requirements for the
benefits. While this Court is sympathetic to the Todd Circuit Court’s judgment, we
are required to review de novo the proper interpretation of statutes, such as the
Trade Act of 1974. We conclude that the Referee and the Commission did not err
in denying Wheeler benefits since she did not apply for these benefits by the
deadline. Federal law controlling this program provides no remedy for Wheeler’s
late filing for the benefits. The Commission correctly applied the law, and the
Todd Circuit Court erred in reversing the Commission’s order.
CONCLUSION
In this case, even though the equities weigh heavily in favor of
Wheeler, the Court cannot ignore the clear provisions of the prevailing federal
statutory scheme. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Commission's findings and that it correctly applied the law. We reverse and
remand the Todd Circuit Court’s opinion and order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
James C. Maxson
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BETTY JO
WHEELER:
Harold M. Johns
Elkton, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, FLYNN
ENTERPRISES, INC.:
James D. Cockrum
Griffin Terry Sumner
Louisville, Kentucky
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