ENGLE (CHARLES) VS. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002170-MR
AND
NO. 2009-CA-002209-MR
CHARLES ENGLE,
Executor of the Estate of
JEANETTE JEWELL ROSE,
Deceased
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL BALLOU, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00861
BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
INC., d/b/a BAPTIST REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING AS TO CASE NO. 2009-CA-002170;
AFFIRMING AS TO CASE NO. 2009-CA-002209
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Issac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute(s)
(KRS) 21.580.
MOORE, JUDGE: This matter involves an appeal and protective cross-appeal of a
defense verdict in a medical negligence action regarding care and treatment
provided to Jeanette Rose by Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a Baptist
Regional Medical Center (Baptist). After careful review, we reverse the defense
verdict and remand this matter for a new trial.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 15, 2003, Rose was admitted to Baptist for surgery due
to a broken hip. Following her surgery, Rose became constipated and had bowel
problems. Between November 27 and 29 of 2003, her large intestine ruptured. Dr.
Chadwick Eustis ultimately removed part of Rose’s large and small intestines.
In late December, 2003, Rose was discharged from Baptist to a nursing home. She
died on March 17, 2004, from septic shock.
Following these events, Charles Engle, in his capacity as the executor
of Rose’s estate, brought this medical negligence action against Baptist. He
alleged that Baptist was negligent in failing to (1) properly assess Rose’s
condition; (2) continue to monitor Rose’s condition; and (3) provide Rose with
proper medications and treatment to prevent the development of her constipation.
This matter was tried before a jury from October 6 to October 9, 2009,
with Engle and Baptist each presenting expert testimony. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Baptist. Engle appeals the verdict, and Baptist has filed a
protective cross-appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
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A. Engle’s Appeal
The subject of Engle’s appeal is the trial court’s decision on an
evidentiary matter, which we review under an abuse of discretion standard. Welsh
v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 41, 51 (Ky. App. 2001). The evidence in
question is a twenty-four page report relating certain findings of the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services, Department for Community Based Services (DCBS),
resulting from a DCBS investigation of Engle’s allegations concerning Baptist’s
care and treatment of Rose. Baptist moved to introduce this report as evidence in
an effort to rebut Engle’s allegation that Baptist was negligent in caring for Rose.
Contained in the report is a form labeled “DPP-115A,” entitled
“Notification of Protective Services Investigative Findings Adult Abuse, Neglect,
or Exploitation.” The DPP-115A form identifies Rose by name and contains
DCBS’s findings concerning whether a preponderance of evidence supported that
Baptist’s care and treatment of Rose qualified as “abuse, neglect, or exploitation as
defined by KRS 209.020.” Below that information, the result of DCBS’s
investigation indicates that a preponderance of evidence does not support that
Baptist’s care and treatment of Rose constituted abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
Also contained in this report is another DCBS document, thirteen
pages long, entitled “Adult Narrative/Investigation/Assessment Form Mandatory
on All Adult Protection and General Adult Referrals.” The narrative is unsigned,
but purports to reflect an investigation of this matter conducted by DCBS social
worker Charlotte Jean Woodring. The narrative specifies that the focus of the
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DCBS investigation was “caretaker neglect,” and identifies Engle’s allegations of
Baptist’s neglect. It addresses a substantial amount of evidence introduced in this
matter, including the circumstances surrounding Baptist’s care for Rose, interviews
with treating physicians, and other medical records. It also purports to contain
several of Woodring’s opinions and conclusions regarding the weight of that
evidence. In particular, the narrative states that “[b]ased on medical records and
interviews, caretaker neglect is unsubstantiated. All the facilities followed written
physician’s orders, no neglect was seen and Mrs. Rose’s deteriorating condition is
due to her multiple diagnoses and advanced age and not due to any caretaker
neglect.” It also states that no evidence of neglect exists.
Finally, the report contains a memorandum authored by “Anna
Turpin, RN, NC/I.”2 It also purports to review several of the medical records at
issue in this matter. The memorandum concludes by stating: “Based on the
findings of this record review it appears the care and services were delivered in an
appropriate and timely manner.”
Immediately following Baptist’s motion to introduce the DCBS report
into evidence, Engle objected. The record reflects the substance of Engle’s
objection:
Baptist’s counsel: Judge, just a second of your time so I
don’t have to do it at the end. I’ve got the report from the
state you ruled was admissible under [Kentucky Rule(s)
of Evidence (KRE)] 803(8)(b), and I’d like to move that
2
The memorandum describes Turpin as a “nurse consultant/inspector” for DCBS. Turpin’s
“RN” designation appears to qualify her as a registered nurse. Turpin did not testify in this
matter.
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into proof as Defendant’s Exhibit 12 pursuant—pursuant
to the self-authentication rule, KRE 902, domestic public
documents.
Engle’s counsel: Judge, I objected earlier, and I’d also
object further because it’s not relevant since it is a—an
abuse/neglect standard that they are investigating, as
opposed to a negligence standard that we are here today.
Baptist’s counsel: I think neglect and negligence have
the same root word. That’s exactly what—
Engle’s counsel: Well, neglect is almost—in that kind of
situation is a criminal offense, and as we’ve adequately
pointed out, this is not a criminal case.
Baptist’s counsel: But investigated whether or not the
care was appropriate is perfectly relevant. It’s exactly on
point.
Engle’s counsel: I believe it says adult abuse, neglect, or
exploitation investigation.
Baptist’s counsel: Well, if you find the—the finding is,
care and services were delivered in an appropriate and
timely manner.
The Court: This isn’t that thing you already gave me,
right, this is something else?
Baptist’s counsel: Yeah, this is the thing that—you
remember a couple of days ago that [Engle’s counsel]
moved to exclude it off my witness list, and we agreed it
was admissible under hearsay exception. Truthfully,
we’ve already had this argument. This is just me putting
it into proof now that you’ve ruled it’s admissible, and I
don’t need a witness to do that under [KRE] 902(2)
because it’s self-authenticating.
The Court: Well, I don’t remember, to be honest, but if
we’ve already done it, then [Engle’s counsel’s] objection
is noted.
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Following this exchange, the trial court admitted the DCBS
investigative report into evidence under KRE 803(8), the exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence which generally applies to public records. Following the
trial in this matter, the jury found in favor of Baptist.
On appeal, Engle claims to have raised, in the exchange cited above,
the following objections regarding the DCBS report: (1) the DCBS report was
hearsay evidence that was not exempted by KRE 803(8); (2) the DCBS report was
irrelevant, per KRE 401, even if KRE 803(8) did exclude it from the general
prohibition against hearsay evidence; and (3) even if the DCBS report was
admissible hearsay and relevant, its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Based upon these objections, Engle argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the DCBS report into evidence.
Baptist, on the other hand, urges that there is no merit to Engle’s
objections and further contends that the above-cited exchange between their
respective counsels only reflects that Engle objected to the DCBS report on the
basis of relevance. Thus, Baptist contends that Engle failed to properly preserve
his first and third objections for our review.
1. Engle properly preserved a hearsay objection to the admissibility of the
DCBS report.
As to Baptist’s argument that Engle failed to preserve his first
objection for our review, we disagree. In relevant part, KRE 103 provides:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
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evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected; and
(1) Objection. If the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The context of the exchange between Engle’s counsel and Baptist’s
counsel, cited above, demonstrates that Engle effectively raised an objection to the
admissibility of the DCBS report on the basis of hearsay. Baptist’s counsel
referenced a prior occasion where Engle had objected as to the report’s
admissibility, and Baptist’s counsel represented that the trial court had resolved the
admissibility issue based upon its conclusion that a hearsay exception applied, i.e.,
KRE 803(8)(b). From that context, the apparent basis of that prior objection
necessarily included hearsay because, if the DCBS report was irrelevant, a hearsay
exception, even if applicable, would not make it admissible. See, e.g., Prater v.
Cabinet for Human Res., 954 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Ky. 1997) (“KRE 803(6) and KRE
803(8) only satisfy the hearsay aspects of the business or public record, itself. If a
particular entry in the record would be inadmissible for another reason, it does not
become admissible just because it is included in a business or public record.”)
While Engle may not have initially made this objection on the record, he
apparently renewed this objection on the record at the start of this exchange, and
the trial court apparently overruled it.
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2. The DCBS report was hearsay, and KRE 803(8) did not exempt it from the
rule against hearsay.
We have determined that Engle properly raised and preserved a
hearsay objection to admitting the DCBS report into evidence. Furthermore, we
agree with Engle’s contention that the DCBS report was hearsay that was not
admissible as evidence under KRE 803(8). In Jordan v. Commonwealth, 74
S.W.3d 263 (Ky. 2002), the Supreme Court of Kentucky scrutinized an
investigative report substantially similar to the DCBS report at issue in this matter,
a report known as a “DSS-150.” The DSS-150 was written by DCBS’s
predecessor agency, the Cabinet for Human Resources, Department for Social
Services.3 Similarly, the DSS-150 concerned an investigation of abuse, neglect,
and dependency allegations; contained a social worker’s nonjudicial determination
that an allegation was “substantiated”; and the DSS-150 was presented as rebuttal
evidence in a case involving similar facts, but a different standard of law (i.e., it
was presented by the Commonwealth as rebuttal evidence in a criminal rape trial).
Id. at 267. After considering this report, the Supreme Court determined that the
trial court abused its discretion by allowing it into evidence:
[A]s this Court held in Prater v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, [954 S.W.2d 954 (1997),] such records are
hearsay that cannot be admitted as a public record or
report under KRE 803(8), can only be admitted as a
record of regularly conducted activity under KRE 803(6)
if that provision’s more stringent foundation
3
The Cabinet for Human Resources was renamed the Cabinet for Families and Children. See
Thomas v. Cabinet for Families & Children, 57 S.W.3d 262, 265 at n.1 (Ky. 2001). DCBS is a
department within the Cabinet for Families and Children.
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requirements are met, and “even if a public agency’s
investigative report satisfies the foundation requirements
of KRE 803(6), that does not authorize a carte blanche
admission of each individual entry contained in the
report.” KRE 803(6)(b) provides that “[n]o evidence in
the form of an opinion is admissible under this subsection
unless such opinion would be admissible under Article
VII of these Rules if the person whose opinion is
recorded were to testify to the opinion directly.” In
Prater, we specifically held that “[t]he recorded opinions
and conclusions of social workers are not admissible,”
and a social worker’s “professional determination” that
an allegation of abuse is “substantiated” is nothing more
than improper opinion testimony. The testimony
concerning information contained in the DSS-150 form
did nothing more than put before the jury an unidentified
social worker’s written belief that appellant’s father was
guilty of abusing D.W. Under Article VII of the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence, the social worker who
prepared the DSS-150 form could not have testified to
this conclusion. The trial court erred when it allowed the
Commonwealth to introduce this opinion testimony
through testimony concerning the contents of the DSS150 form.
Id. at 268-9. (Internal footnotes omitted; emphasis theirs.)
In closing, the Jordan Court held that the introduction of this report
prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights because it improperly bolstered the
credibility of the witnesses against him. Id. at 269. The Jordan Court further
determined that the trial court’s decision to admit this report into evidence
constituted error and grounds for a new trial. Id.
In light of Jordan, KRE 803(8) did not exempt the DCBS report at
issue in this matter from the rule against hearsay. Thus, the trial court erred by
allowing it into evidence under that exception.
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Baptist makes no argument that any error resulting from the
introduction of the DCBS report was harmless; nor, for that matter, do we find this
error to be harmless. In Jordan, the Supreme Court held that this kind of report,
entered into evidence without safeguards, did nothing more than put before the jury
an unidentified social worker’s written belief that a party committed abuse. Id.
Here, we find that the DCBS report, entered into evidence without the
safeguards described in Jordan, did nothing more than put before the jury yet
another social worker’s improperly admitted, written belief—that a preponderance
of evidence does not support that Baptist deprived Rose of services necessary to
maintain her health and welfare. See KRS 209.020(16). As Baptist’s counsel
pointed out during the discussion cited above, this is nearly indistinguishable from
stating an opinion that Baptist met the applicable standard of care in a negligence
action. And, as Jordan holds, such an opinion improperly bolstered the credibility
of Baptist’s witnesses and undermined the credibility of any evidence to the
contrary.
We need not address Engle’s remaining objections. We believe the
erroneous introduction of this evidence prejudiced Engle’s substantial rights and
mandates reversal and a new trial.
B. Baptist’s cross-appeal
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Although Baptist received a defense verdict, it filed a cross-appeal
regarding the trial court’s instructing the jury on punitive damages. Engle’s
complaint, filed November 24, 2004, requested an unspecified amount of punitive
damages. Baptist requested answers to interrogatories, and one of Baptist’s
interrogatories asked Engle to categorize and specify the amount of his damages.
In his answer to Baptist’s interrogatory, Engle made no reference to punitive
damages.
The trial in this matter concluded on October 9, 2009. After the close
of evidence at trial, but before the matter was submitted to the jury, Engle moved
to supplement his answers to Baptist’s interrogatories because he wished to specify
a sum of punitive damages for the jury to consider. Baptist objected, contending
that Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 8.01(2) precluded Engle from
supplementing his interrogatories at that time. In support, Baptist cited Fratzke v.
Murphy, 12 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 1999), which “recognized that a trial court can
authorize answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories for good cause, as
late as during the trial itself.”4 Baptist urged that Engle’s motion was untimely
because both sides had already finished presenting their cases. Nevertheless, the
trial court granted Engle’s motion to supplement his answers to Baptist’s
interrogatories, and the question of punitive damages was submitted to the jury.
In its cross-appeal, Baptist repeats its argument that Engle’s motion
was improper solely because it occurred after both sides had presented their
4
In Tennill v. Talai, 277 S.W.3d 248, 251 (Ky. 2009), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
interpreted Fratzke in this manner.
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respective cases. Baptist urges that, should we remand this matter, Engle should
be precluded from seeking punitive damages upon retrial.
However, Baptist presents no authority supporting that a motion to
supplement answers to interrogatories is improper within the meaning of Fratzke if
it is made after the close of evidence but prior to submitting a matter to the jury.
Moreover, Fratzke merely holds that a motion to supplement answers to
interrogatories may be granted as late as during trial. We have determined that a
new trial is warranted in this matter, the new trial in this matter has yet to occur,
and Baptist presents no authority that would prohibit Engle from moving to
supplement his answers during the course of retrial. Therefore, we find no error in
the trial court’s decision to grant Engle leave to amend his answers to Baptist’s
interrogatories.
III. CONCLUSION
As to Engle’s appeal, we reverse this matter and remand it to Whitley
Circuit Court for retrial in accordance with this opinion. As to Baptist’s crossappeal regarding the trial court’s decision to grant Engle leave to supplement his
interrogatory answers, we find no error and affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT:
Sara Beth Gregory
Thomas E. Carroll
Monticello, Kentucky
Charles D. Aaron, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
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