WOODS (JERRY), ET AL. VS. TAYLOR (M.L.)
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RENDERED: MAY 6, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002126-MR
JERRY1 WOODS AND HAZEL WOODS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00072
M. L. TAYLOR
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Jerry Woods and his wife, Hazel Woods (collectively
“Woods”), have appealed from the Wayne Circuit Court’s October 1, 2009,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which found that M.L. Taylor
held a prescriptive easement for the use of a roadway which crossed their lands.
After a careful review of the record, the briefs, and the law, we affirm.
1
Although this action was commenced against Jerry Woods, the Appellant’s name is actually
Jeffrey. This error was made known to the trial court at the beginning of the trial in this matter,
and although the trial court verbally ordered the style of the case be changed, the written record
was not amended to correct the mistake. We shall not undertake to do so sua sponte since the
error is irrelevant to this appeal.
In June of 2005 Taylor purchased approximately 308 acres consisting
of several contiguous tracts of land. For a period of time after Taylor purchased
the property, he accessed his lands via an old roadbed along his southern boundary
known as the Old Duncan Valley-Cooper-Slick Ford Road (“Old Duncan Valley
Road”). Taylor was informed at the time of his purchase that the old roadbed was
the only way to access his property.
On April 22, 2006, Woods purchased a triangular-shaped one-acre
tract of land to the south and east of Taylor’s land which Woods had occupied
since approximately 1997. The Woods’ property sits in a valley at the base of the
mountain upon which the Taylor tracts are situated. The Old Duncan Valley Road
lies along the northern boundary of the Woods’ property. A new road had been
constructed along the southern border of the Woods’ tract sometime around 1911
and this new road is now used by the general public in place of the Old Duncan
Valley Road.
Woods did not believe Taylor had a right to use the old roadbed to
access his property because no references to a right-of-way existed in the deed or
chain of title to their tract. Woods believed Taylor had received an easement
across his neighbor’s lands to the north, thereby extinguishing any need to use Old
Duncan Valley Road for access. Thus, Woods caused a metal fence to be erected
to impede or block the roadway. Taylor removed a portion of the fencing and
continued to use the passway he believed to be his only means of access to his
property. Woods then constructed a wooden fence to block Taylor from utilizing
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the roadbed for access. Discussions between Taylor and Woods regarding opening
the access were fruitless and Taylor filed the instant suit seeking to quiet title to the
use of the road and for the diminution in value of his property caused by the
restriction to his access.
A bench trial was convened on February 9 and February 27, 2009.
The court heard testimony and took evidence from Taylor, Woods, surveyors and
title examiners hired by each party, and local residents familiar with the area in
question and its historical use. Based on the nature of the suit, there was
conflicting evidence presented.
Taylor presented evidence that the Old Duncan Valley Road was the
only access he had to his property and that it had been in continuous use for over
fifty years by previous owners for general ingress and egress and by others for
timber cutting and oil production. Taylor testified no objection had been lodged to
the use of the old roadbed until Woods blocked the access by constructing the
fence. He stated the easement referred to in his deed to cross the lands of his
northern neighbor was unusable because no pathway was visible or identifiable,
the area to be crossed was being used as a farm and for running cattle, the neighbor
maintained fences and locked gates obscuring his access, numerous bridges and
water crossings would have to be constructed, and the cost to construct a new
roadbed would be prohibitive.2
2
Taylor testified the easement in question would require construction of approximately 2500
feet of roadway across the neighboring field. He stated the cost would be in excess of
$105,000.00 for the basic work, not including bridges, water crossings, title acquisition costs, or
any construction on his own lands. He noted he had paid approximately $85,000.00 for the
property he owned.
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Taylor presented testimony from neighbors and landowners familiar
with the area who indicated their knowledge that the Old Duncan Valley Road had
been the exclusive means of access to Taylor’s land for many years. These
neighbors testified to timber cutting activities upon the subject property as well as
their own recreational uses such as deer hunting. Each stated that they had only
ever used the Old Duncan Valley Road as access to the property and were unaware
of any other access point. These witnesses stated they each accessed the property
several times each year using the Old Duncan Road.
Mike Bell, whose family owns a parcel of land completely surrounded
by Taylor’s lands, testified his family’s only access to their property was via the
old roadbed. He stated he had used the road since he was a boy to access the
family ground and anytime work was performed on their lands, the roadbed was
the exclusive means of access. He testified that he had contacted the Wayne
County Attorney about sending a letter to Woods when he noticed the roadway had
been blocked.
Taylor’s surveyor, James A. West, testified that in addition to the
survey he completed for Taylor, he had previously surveyed Woods’ property for
the previous owner. West identified the location of the Old Duncan Valley Road
and stated the roadbed is still visible to the naked eye. He also testified that he had
examined the purported easement across Taylor’s northern neighbor and had
located a portion of a roadbed in a wooded area, but otherwise was unable to locate
the right-of-way called for by the deeds. West was only able to access Taylor’s
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lands by use of the Old Duncan Valley Road and was unable to cross Taylor’s
northern neighbor’s land.
Woods presented testimony from the previous owner of their property
who stated that, to her knowledge, the general public had not made use of the Old
Duncan Valley Road during the term of her ownership and, further, that she had
used the right-of-way across Taylor’s northern neighbor in the 1960s or 1970s to
visit her brother. Testimony was presented by Mrs. Woods’ grandmother that she
had lived in the area for 63 years and had never seen any use made of the old
roadbed. Similar testimony was presented by Mrs. Woods’ mother who had lived
in the area for over fifty years. A family friend testified that he had assisted the
Woods in clearing and grading their property, that he had placed rock on the old
roadbed so the Woods could utilize it as a driveway, and that no rock was
previously there. Another family friend testified that he had viewed Taylor’s
property in the 1980s when it was up for sale and he was able to access the
property using a visible roadbed along what he believed was the reserved right-ofway across Taylor’s northern neighbor.
Mrs. Woods testified that she grew up on the property she now owns
and has no recollection of seeing a roadbed anywhere on the property. She stated
that she and her husband had done a significant amount of work to create a
driveway along their northern boundary to service a garage they later decided not
to build. She produced receipts for gravel she said was purchased to create the
driveway. Mrs. Woods also testified she had been approached by Taylor regarding
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purchasing a right-of-way across her property, but she had refused. She stated that
nowhere in her chain of title was there a mention of any easement or right-of-way
across her property. She was aware of Taylor’s reserved easement across his
northern neighbor’s lands. She stated she had walked that path across Taylor’s
lands and claimed it was gravel “down to the field” and there were no impediments
across the passway.
Woods presented testimony from Greg West, a licensed surveyor,
who had reviewed the work of Taylor’s surveyor, James A. West. Greg West
believed the Old Duncan Valley Road ceased being used as a public road sometime
prior to 1926, based on his review of the public records and highway maps from
that period. He testified he had examined the property and found the easement
across Taylor’s northern neighbor to be an easier course of travel, although
significantly longer, than that of using the roadbed in controversy.
At the close of all of the evidence, both parties moved for a directed
verdict. The trial court informed the parties it would personally be viewing the
property in question and instructed both parties to submit legal memoranda
outlining their respective positions on the issues to be decided. Only Taylor
submitted the requested memorandum. On October 1, 2009,3 the trial court entered
its findings of fact and conclusions of law finding: 1) the easement across Taylor’s
northern neighbor was not visible or available; 2) Taylor’s predecessors in title and
others have continuously used the roadway to access Taylor’s lands; 3) the Old
3
The record contains no explanation for the seven-month delay from the conclusion of the trial
to the entry of the trial court’s order.
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Duncan Valley Road had not been closed or abandoned by any action of the
Wayne County Fiscal Court; 4) Taylor had no access to his land other than through
the use of the disputed roadway; 5) Taylor was entitled to an easement by
prescription for the use of the Old Duncan Valley Road based on the open,
notorious, forcible, exclusive and hostile use of his predecessors and others for a
period in excess of fifteen years; and 6) the width of the easement was to be “based
on the actual width used in the past and shall not exceed” fifteen feet. The court
ordered the roadway to remain open for travel and unobstructed, and directed
Woods to remove the fence constructed across the roadway. The order was made
final and appealable on October 22, 2009. This appeal followed.
Woods contends the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law were clearly erroneous. Woods argues the conclusions of law were
unsupported by the findings of fact or by the evidence presented at trial. It is
further argued that the trial court erroneously found Taylor had no other access to
his lands, other than the Old Duncan Valley Road, and that Taylor had established
his right to a prescriptive easement to use same. We affirm.
It is well settled that a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment
on factual issues for those of a trial court unless they are clearly erroneous with due
regard given to the trial court’s opportunity to view and judge the credibility of the
witnesses. CR4 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). See
also Monin v. Monin, 156 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. App. 2004). Factual findings are not
clearly erroneous if supported by evidence of substance. Owens-Corning
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
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Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998); Uninsured
Employers’ Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. 1991). Substantial
evidence is evidence, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has
sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.
Golightly, 976 S.W.2d at 414; Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky. App.
2002); Largent v. Largent, 643 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1982). The trial court's
conclusions of law, however, are subject to independent de novo appellate
determination. A & A Mechanical, Inc. v. Thermal Equipment Sales, Inc., 998
S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky. App. 1999); Morganfield National Bank v. Damien Elder &
Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1992). With these standards in mind, we will address
each of Woods’ contentions.
First, Woods contends the trial court clearly erred in concluding that
the Old Duncan Valley Road has never been closed by the Wayne County Fiscal
Court. Woods argues no evidence was presented indicating the road was ever
adopted into the county road system, much less whether it had been closed. Thus,
Woods claims the trial court’s conclusion of law was unsupported by the evidence.
The trial court clearly had before it substantial evidence that the Old
Duncan Valley Road existed prior to 1926 and was used by the traveling public by
virtue of the introduction of numerous maps and plats of the area at trial. The trial
court also had the testimony of several witnesses that the roadbed in question had
continued to be used after the New Duncan Valley Road was constructed. Based
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upon this testimony we believe sufficient evidence was presented to support a
conclusion that the road had not been abandoned.
However, and perhaps more importantly, Taylor’s claim to use the
road was not predicated upon its being a county road, but rather upon his claim of a
prescriptive easement. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the Wayne County
Fiscal Court had not closed or abandoned the road was unnecessary to its ultimate
resolution of the issue that a prescriptive easement existed. The conclusion could
easily be seen as surplusage, and we are unable to discern any prejudice to Woods’
substantial rights or perceive any unjust result created as a result of the finding.
Therefore, any error in the trial court’s finding is harmless at best.
Second, Woods alleges the trial court erred in concluding the width of
the roadway to be open for Taylor’s use should be based on that width used in the
past. Woods argues this issue was never addressed in the testimony or arguments
of counsel, thus the trial court’s conclusion is clearly erroneous. We disagree.
Our review of the record indicates that at the behest of the parties, the
trial court personally inspected the passway and the lands of Woods and Taylor.
The court therefore had the benefit of its own observations in addition to the
testimony of the live witnesses. Testimony was adduced regarding the types of
vehicles and equipment which had historically used the roadbed, and that two
tracks were clearly visible along and near the center of the road. In light of the
testimony presented, coupled with the trial court’s ability to draw upon its personal
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observations, we are unable to hold the trial court’s conclusion to set the maximum
width of the road to remain open was in error.
Next, Woods argues that the trial court erred in concluding Taylor had
no other access to his lands other than the Old Duncan Valley Road. Woods takes
issue with the trial court’s factual findings regarding the availability of Taylor’s
northern right-of-way. Woods also contends the evidence does not support the trial
court’s finding that Taylor had no other means of accessing his property apart from
the Old Duncan Valley Road. Our review of the record indicates the trial court’s
findings are correct.
As we have previously stated, the trial court heard testimony
regarding the condition of the reserved right-of-way across Taylor’s northern
neighbor and personally observed the same. Contrary to Woods assertion, the trial
court did not find that Taylor had no other means of accessing his property, nor
was the trial court called upon to do so. Rather, the trial court’s findings of fact
stated only that the reserved right-of-way claimed by Woods to be useable was not
visible or available. In viewing the property, the trial court found a fence “which
appeared to have been in place for several years and cattle running in the field
upon which access depended.” Nowhere in the record do we find support for
Woods’ contention that the trial court ruled that Taylor had no other access to his
property other than via the Old Duncan Valley Road. Likewise, we are unable to
conclude the trial court erred in its conclusion that the northern right-of-way was
impassable.
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Finally, Woods argues that the trial court erred in concluding Taylor
had established a prescriptive easement in and to the Old Duncan Valley Road. In
support of this argument, Woods claims the trial court’s finding regarding the
continuous nature of the use of Old Duncan Valley Road by Taylor’s predecessors
and others was unsupported by the evidence. Woods further argues that the trial
court failed to state the “specific fifteen-year period which the prescriptive
easement was used continuously.” We disagree.
Several witnesses were presented to testify regarding their use of the
Old Duncan Valley Road and to the use by others. Witnesses for both parties
stated the Taylor lands had been accessed using the Old Duncan Valley Road for
logging and oil production purposes, recreation and hunting uses, and to reach
lands to Taylor’s north. Each witness testified as to seeing these activities at
different times, some dating back to the 1940s or 1950s. Taken as a whole, the
combined testimony clearly supports the trial court’s finding that the roadbed had
been in continuous use by Taylor, his predecessors, and others.
The trial court concluded that the continuous use to have occurred
was in excess of fifteen years. Woods argues this finding is incomplete and clearly
erroneous because it does not reference the specific period of time upon which the
trial court based its decision. However, Woods cites us to no authority supportive
of this argument that such specificity is required, and we believe none exists.
The evidence adduced at trial reveals that Taylor’s immediate
predecessor purchased the property in 1985 and used the old roadbed over the
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apparent objection of Woods’ immediate predecessor during his tenure of
ownership. Numerous other witnesses testified to logging and oil activities
occurring in the 1980s and 1990s upon Taylor’s lands and stated that the Old
Duncan Valley Road was utilized for access at those times. Thus, the testimony
established that the actual, open, notorious and hostile use of the Old Duncan
Valley Road had occurred for a minimum of twenty years next preceding the filing
of the instant action, and likely for many decades longer. Accordingly, the trial
court’s finding cannot reasonably be held to be in error.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wayne
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gordon T. Germain
Monticello, Kentucky
Harlan E. Judd, Jr.
Burkesville, Kentucky
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