HUGHES (LARRY LEE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 12, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002081-MR
LARRY LEE HUGHES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00072
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Larry Lee Hughes appeals pro se from the McCracken
Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for relief pursuant to RCr1 11.42,
following an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Upon receiving an anonymous tip concerning drug activity taking place
inside a home, Paducah police officers went to the residence of Hughes, and his
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
wife, Ida, and engaged in what the officers described as a “knock and talk.” The
officers maintain that Ida consented to a search of the residence. During the
search, the officers discovered crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia, secured the
residence, obtained a search warrant, and during a second search, discovered
additional crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
Based upon the foregoing, Hughes was indicted for possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree, second offense (class C felony);
use/possession of drug paraphernalia, second offense (class D felony); and of being
a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the first degree. If convicted of the PFO
charge, Hughes faced between 10 and 20 years’ imprisonment. Hughes entered
into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth under which the PFO charge would
be dropped, and he would receive five years’ imprisonment on the remaining
charges, to run concurrently. A final judgment was entered in accordance with the
plea agreement.
Hughes filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr
11.42, alleging that his counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to
suppress the evidence from the search of his residence; failing to investigate his
case and interact with him; and misadvising him regarding his entry of a guilty
plea. The trial court denied his motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing,
from which Hughes appealed. On appeal, this court remanded the matter to the
trial court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Hughes’ claim
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that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the
evidence, since the claim could not be clearly refuted on the face of the record.2
At the evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth played an audiotape
recording of the officer’s “knock and talk” and search of the Hughes’ residence.
The tape supported the officers’ claim that Ida consented to the search, and Hughes
did not expressly deny the officers consent to search. Additionally, Hughes’
counsel testified that Ida informed him that she did in fact consent to the search of
the residence. Counsel testified that he did not file a motion to suppress evidence
seized from the search because based on the audiotape, Ida’s statement, and other
evidence, counsel believed the motion would not succeed. Instead, counsel
negotiated a plea offer with the Commonwealth for a five-year sentence if Hughes
agreed to not file a motion to suppress the evidence. According to Hughes’
testimony, his counsel discussed the offer with him, and advised him to accept it.
On appeal, Hughes argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for
relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 since his counsel was ineffective by not filing a
motion to suppress. We disagree.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth the standards by which to
consider whether counsel was ineffective. To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that the counsel’s performance
was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, so that in the absence of
2
Hughes v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002302-MR, 2007 WL 2745376 (Ky.App., Sept. 21,
2007).
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counsel’s deficient performance a different result was reasonably probable. Id. at
693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Further, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, we must
determine whether a reasonable probability exists that without counsel’s alleged
deficient performance, the defendant would not have entered the guilty plea, and
instead, insisted on going to trial. Casey v. Commonwealth, 994 S.W.2d 18, 22
(Ky.App. 1999) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441,
1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366,
370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).
In the case at bar, a review of the record supports a finding that a motion to
suppress the evidence from the search of Hughes’ residence would have been
unsuccessful due to his wife’s granting consent to the search and no evidence,
besides Hughes’ testimony, to support his assertion that he expressly denied the
search. Counsel’s testimony indicates that in order to avoid a potential 20-year
sentence, he negotiated a plea agreement for Hughes to serve two concurrent fiveyear sentences, and advised Hughes to accept the offer. Beecham v.
Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Ky. 1983) (holding that counsel’s
advice to plead guilty is not indicative of any degree of ineffective assistance).
Hughes presents no argument to suggest this was not a reasonable trial strategy, or
was deficient representation in any way. See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116
S.W.3d 463, 469 (Ky. 2003) (holding that a defendant must overcome the
presumption that his counsel’s actions were reasonable trial strategy).
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Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying Hughes’ motion for relief pursuant to
RCr 11.42 was not in error.
The order of the McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Lee Hughes, Pro se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Julie Scott Jernigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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