SCHROEDER (DARIN CRAIG) VS. JESSAMINE COUNTY SCHOOLS, ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002042-MR
DARIN CRAIG SCHROEDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00609
JESSAMINE COUNTY SCHOOLS;
LU S. YOUNG, IN HER INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
AND JANET GRANADA, IN HER
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON AND KELLER, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Darin Craig Schroeder appeals an order of the Jessamine Circuit
Court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to Schroeder’s claims
arising out of the non-renewal of his teaching contract. Finding no error, we
affirm.
In summer 2007, Schroeder was hired pursuant to a limited contract to
teach math at East Jessamine High School (EJHS) for the 2007-08 school year.
Appellee Janet Granada is the principal of EJHS, and Appellee Lu S. Young is the
superintendent of Jessamine County Schools. Schroeder began the school year
utilizing a teaching method wherein his students were self-taught and learned at
their own pace. During the fall, Schroeder voiced concerns to Granada and other
teachers regarding the math curriculum at EJHS, contending that it was not
properly “aligned” with the Kentucky “Program of Studies” pursuant to 702 KAR
7:125 § 6(1)(a) and 704 KAR 3:303. Granada evaluated Schroeder’s class on
several occasions during the fall and concluded that his teaching methodology was
unsuccessful, with numerous students failing the class. At the conclusion of the
fall semester, Granada decided not to renew Schroeder’s contract for 2008-09, and
she asked the personnel department to post a job opening for a math instructor in
the 2008-09 school year. During the spring semester, Schroeder adapted his
methodology toward a more traditional teaching model; however, 65% of his
students still received failing grades.
On March 19, 2008, Schroeder sent an e-mail to the Kentucky
Department of Education and the Kentucky Attorney General contending
irregularities existed in the alignment of the EJHS math curriculum and the state
program of studies. Michael Miller, the director of the Department of Education’s
Division of Curriculum Development responded to Schroeder’s e-mail, explaining
that his office had investigated the allegations and was satisfied that the EJHS
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curriculum was properly aligned. Approximately one week later, Granada advised
Schroeder, along with another teacher, that their contracts would not be renewed
for the 2008-09 school year.
In June 2008, Schroeder filed a complaint against Appellees alleging
retaliation, defamation, negligent supervision, and outrage. In October 2009, the
trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Schroeder now
appeals the trial court’s order, contending summary judgment was improper as to
his claim of retaliation.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must
view the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving all
doubts in her favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 480 (Ky. 1991). The trial court may grant summary judgment only if it
concludes no disputed issues of material fact exist for trial. Id. On appeal of a
summary judgment, we must determine whether the trial court correctly found that
the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. Because
summary judgment involves questions of law, we need not defer to the trial court’s
conclusions; accordingly, we review the record de novo. Blevins v. Moran, 12
S.W.3d 698, 700-01 (Ky. App. 2000). Furthermore, “we, as an appellate court,
may affirm the trial court for any reason sustainable by the record.” Kentucky
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991).
Schroeder asserts that he presented a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant
to Kentucky’s Whistleblower Act, KRS 61.102, which “protects state employees
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from reprisal for reporting actual or suspected agency violations of the law.”
Davidson v. Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Ky. App. 2004). In
Davidson, a panel of this Court explained:
In order to demonstrate a violation of KRS 61.102, an
employee must establish the following four elements: (1)
the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the employee is
employed by the state; (3) the employee made or
attempted to make a good faith report or disclosure of a
suspected violation of state or local law to an appropriate
body or authority; and (4) the employer took action or
threatened to take action to discourage the employee
from making such a disclosure or to punish the employee
for making such a disclosure.
Id. at 251 (internal citation omitted).
It is undisputed that Schroeder satisfied the first two elements of the statute.
As to the third element, Schroeder asserts that he voiced his concerns regarding the
curriculum alignment during the fall 2007 semester to colleagues at EJHS;
subsequently, he notified the Department of Education and the Attorney General,
disclosing the alleged violations. Appellees contend Schroeder’s claim fails
because the disclosure was not protected by the Whistleblower Act, as it was
publicly available information. We agree.
In Davidson, this Court concluded that the report of publicly known
information was not afforded protection under the Whistleblower Act, relying on
federal precedent in light of the similarity between Kentucky’s statute and its
federal counterpart. Id. at 255. In deciding the issue, we quoted Meuwissen v.
Department of Interior, 234 F.3d 9, 13 (Fed. Cir. 2000), which held that “‘[a]
disclosure of information that is publicly known is not a disclosure’ within the
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meaning of the federal Whistleblower Protection Act.” Id. This Court went on to
note that the employee in Davidson “did not report anything . . . which was not
already known, such as secretive agency procedures.” Id.
In the case at bar, Schroeder reported to the Department of Education that
the EJHS math curriculum was not aligned with the correct version of the state
program of studies; however, Schroeder acknowledged that the allegedly noncompliant EJHS curriculum documents were publicly available on the Jessamine
Public Schools’ website. Based on these undisputed facts, Schroeder failed to
establish a prima facie case for retaliation pursuant to KRS 61.102, since the
information disclosed was publicly known and consequently, not protected by the
statute. Id. We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellees, and we decline to address the alternative arguments raised on
appeal.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Jessamine
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Michael P. Rowland
Lexington, Kentucky
Christopher S. Turner
Barbara A. Kriz
Lexington, Kentucky
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