BENNETT (SHARI) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001946-MR
SHARI BENNETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01869
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; JOHN P. HAMM,
APPOINTING AUTHORITY; AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
PERSONNEL BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND COMBS, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Shari Bennett appeals from an Opinion and Order
of the Franklin Circuit Court upholding the decision of the Cabinet for Health and
Family Services to terminate her employment before the end of her initial sixmonth probationary period. This decision had been previously upheld by the
Kentucky Personnel Board. Appellant contends that her dismissal was unlawfully
discriminatory due to a physical disability. Upon review, we discern no error and
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 16, 2005, Appellant was hired by the Cabinet as a Nurse
Consultant/Inspector (NC/I), grade 16, in the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), Division of Health Care Facilities and Services. Appellant’s duties with the
OIG generally required her to inspect nursing homes and healthcare facilities to
ensure that they met government standards. She also investigated complaints made
against those entities. There is no dispute that Appellant was amply qualified for
this position at the time she was hired. Appellant worked for nearly six months in
the OIG’s Louisville branch, but she was terminated from her position prior to
completion of her six-month probationary period due to her allegedly
unsatisfactory performance. This appeal concerns the circumstances surrounding
that decision.
On December 5, 2005, Martha Brame, the Regional Program Manager
of the Louisville OIG branch, sent a letter to the director of the OIG’s Division of
Health Care Facilities and Services in Frankfort recommending that Appellant be
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separated from her employment due to poor performance. Specifically, it was
contended that Appellant consistently failed to produce satisfactory written
narrative reports in compliance with the OIG’s “principles of documentation”
following a complaint investigation or a health care facility review. The letter
included numerous accounts of occasions on which Appellant had presented
complaint narratives, investigative reports, and surveys that contained such errors
as misspelled words, grammatical mistakes, incomplete sentences, confusing
structure, incorrect formatting, and poor documentation. The letter also stated that
Appellant had received ample one-on-one help and instructions with respect to
these deficiencies but had failed to show notable improvement afterwards and had
shown no initiative to correct identified problems. According to Brame, on one
occasion, the errors were so numerous that “it was extremely difficult to determine
if [Appellant] actually completed a thorough investigation.” The letter further
documented a number of instances in which Appellant was asked to correct and
resubmit reports but she failed to make all of the requested corrections. The letter
also set forth a number of other minor incidents reflecting arguably inappropriate
conduct on Appellant’s part, but the clear basis for Brame’s recommendation that
Appellant not be retained was her alleged inability to complete her narrative
reports in the required manner.2
2
The letter concludes with the following paragraph: “Ms. Bennett has shown no initiative to
correct identified problems. She continues to make excuses for errors in her work product and
does not accept accountability. After one to one meetings, she continues to make numerous
grammatical errors in her final product for review. A considerable amount of time spent with
Ms. Bennett correcting her work has proven to be fruitless as she shows no improvement.
Therefore, I am requesting Shari Bennett not gain permanent status.”
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On December 6, 2005, the OIG asked the Appointing Authority to
separate Appellant from her position as NC/I prior to her achieving permanent
status “due to unsuccessful completion of her probationary period.” The OIG’s
memorandum to the Appointing Authority asserted that Appellant had
“demonstrated consistent problems with performance issues, including completing
the required paperwork appropriately as reported by her Branch Manager[.]”
While the matter was pending before the Appointing Authority,
Appellant visited an eye doctor and procured a doctor’s note indicating that she
had a history of esotropia in the left eye with secondary amblyopia (or “lazy eye”).
Appellant gave this note to Martha Brame upon returning to work. Later, after her
termination from employment, Appellant was diagnosed as being legally blind in
her left eye due to these conditions.
On December 12, 2005, Appellant was officially notified by the
Appointing Authority that she would be terminated from her position as NC/I prior
to completion of her probationary period. Following her termination, Appellant
filed an appeal with the Personnel Board in which she alleged that her dismissal
was inappropriate because it was based on discriminatory grounds. Specifically,
Appellant alleged that she suffered from a physical disability as a result of
problems with her eyesight and that the Cabinet had fired her because of this.
A hearing was subsequently held, during which the Personnel Board’s
Hearing Officer heard testimony from a number of witnesses who had worked with
Appellant. The “Background” section of the Hearing Officer’s “Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order” recites in extensive detail the
substance of all witness testimony and the exhibits presented at the hearing. Since
the facts presented in that section are familiar to the parties and are neither novel
nor unusual, we need not reference them all herein. However, certain testimony
bears mention.
Appellant testified that she had only met with Martha Brame on two
occasions. During the first occasion, the two discussed concerns with the
Appellant’s writing skills. During the second occasion, which occurred on
November 22, 2005, Appellant was asked to read a scenario on a line-by-line basis
with Brame and Paula Horn, the branch’s Assistant Manager, in attendance.
Appellant testified that she was interrupted frequently and did not have her reading
glasses, so she struggled to stay focused on what she was reading. According to
Appellant, Brame asked her what was wrong with her eyes and told her, “You
can’t see, can you?” Appellant explained to Brame that she had worn glasses since
she was two years old. The following day, Appellant scheduled an appointment
with an eye doctor, and she visited him on December 9, 2005. The doctor’s note
produced by this visit was allowed into the record for the limited purpose of
showing that Appellant visited an eye doctor.
Appellant further testified that her termination came as a shock to her
because she believed she had been doing just fine at work. She further indicated
that a number of the issues raised in Brame’s recommendation letter were minor in
nature and that, as to the reporting issues, she believed she had received inadequate
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training. She also blamed her poor eyesight for the typographical or grammar
errors contained in her reports. Appellant also indicated that at one point Brame
had instructed other NC/Is to refrain from helping her with her work.
When questioned by the Cabinet, Appellant admitted that she had
never requested any accommodation due to her eyesight or discussed the need for
such with Brame due to her eye condition. She also admitted that she had not
discussed her eyesight with Brame prior to the meeting of November 22, 2005, and
that she had not mentioned any problems with her eyesight when she was
presented with her intent-to-terminate letter.
The Cabinet presented multiple witnesses who testified to Appellant’s
consistent inability to comply with the OIG’s reporting and documentation
requirements despite repeated efforts to assist her in that regard. One such witness,
Linda Murphy, another NC/I in the Louisville office and Appellant’s preceptor,
acknowledged that four months into Appellant’s employment she had been
instructed by Martha Brame to not help Appellant anymore. Other witnesses
repeated this testimony. However, Murphy believed that this was done to gauge
Appellant’s progress. Murphy denied being aware of any problems with
Appellant’s eyesight and testified that she had not had any conversations with
Brame regarding this issue. The majority of the other witnesses who were
questioned testified similarly.
Jerry Mayo, a supervisor serving under Martha Brame at the
Louisville OIG branch at the time of the events in question, testified that Brame
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was consistently unhappy with Appellant’s narrative reports and that he had
worked with Appellant on three different occasions to address the matter. Mayo
testified that a number of Appellant’s reports had been sent back for her to correct
because they contained serious flaws and that she was the NC/I who had the most
trouble preparing her reports. He believed that Appellant had had difficulty
transitioning from the typical “charting” done by a nurse to the narrative reports
required by the OIG. Mayo also could not recall ever having a conversation with
Appellant regarding her eyesight.
Paula Horn, the Assistant Manager of the Louisville OIG branch,
testified that she had numerous conversations with Appellant about her work
product and that Appellant’s level of performance in that regard was very poor.
Horn indicated that Appellant failed to follow direction with respect to correcting
her reports and that she never caught on to writing in a narrative format. Horn
denied being aware of problems with Appellant’s eyesight and agreed that she
should not have been allowed to become an employee with status.
Martha Brame further testified to Appellant’s work difficulties and
noted that she had met with Appellant several times regarding these issues. Brame
recalled one occasion on which she had asked Appellant where her glasses were,
and she was told that Appellant was wearing contacts. Brame also recalled being
told by Appellant that she had started wearing glasses at a young age “because of
some kind of disease.” Brame also acknowledged telling some of the NC/Is to stop
helping Appellant because she wanted to enforce office protocol, which held that
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NC/Is were to ask their preceptor or another manager for help if needed. Brame
testified that no other NC/I required as much attention with respect to her reports
as Appellant and that she had asked that Appellant be terminated simply because
she did not think that Appellant could do the job. Brame also testified that
Appellant had never asked for any accommodations with respect to her eyesight
and that she had never discussed Appellant’s eye problems in any detail prior to
her termination. However, she did acknowledge receiving a doctor’s note from
Appellant regarding her eyesight issues prior to her termination.
On September 15, 2008, the Hearing Officer recommended that the
Personnel Board dismiss Appellant’s appeal. In support of that decision, the
Hearing Officer made the following Findings of Fact:
1. The Appellant, Shari Bennett, was hired by the
Appellee, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, as a
Nurse Consultant/Inspector, grade 16, in the Office of the
Inspector General, Division of Health Care Facilities and
Services, with her duty station in Louisville, Kentucky,
on June 16, 2005. With approximately twenty-five years
of pertinent experience, the Appellant appeared to be
well-qualified for the position as described. [See
Appellant’s Exhibits 1 and 2.] Along those lines, it
should be noted that there was no evidence submitted at
[the] hearing to indicate that at any point during the
Appellant’s career was she unable to perform any aspect
of her job due to an alleged eye condition.
2. The Appellant appears to have been trained for her
position in the typical manner. She was first required to
review various resource materials and complete various
computer module certifications. She was then sent on
various survey assignments with the help and assistance
of NC/I preceptors who were charged with imparting the
knowledge and guidance necessary to eventually perform
the duties of her job. In short, the Appellant appeared to
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receive most of her training while on the job with the
assistance of a more experienced NC/I.
3. An important element of an NC/I’s job is to properly
prepare a report following a complaint investigation or
health care facility review. These reports are done in the
narrative form and are to follow what is known as the
“principles of documentation.” It is imperative that these
reports be prepared correctly as they constitute legal
documents which may be relied upon in a court of law.
4. Within a month or two on the job, NC/Is begin
preparing reports on their own with the help and
guidance of their preceptor. The reports are reviewed
and corrections are suggested by the trainee’s preceptor.
Once the corrections are made, the report is passed up the
chain to Martha Brame, Jerry Mayo, or Paula Horn for
review. If corrections to the report are required, they are
returned to the NC/I. If the report passes muster, it is
then sent on to Frankfort.
5. The Appellant testified that she met twice with Martha
Brame. The first time they discussed Ms. Brame’s
concern with the Appellant’s writing skills. The
Appellant was asked to repeat a computer module which
she satisfactorily completed. The second meeting
occurred on November 22, 2005, and Paula Horn was
also in attendance. The Appellant was asked to read over
a report she had prepared on a line-by-line basis. The
Appellant testified that during this meeting, Martha
Brame asked her what was wrong with her eyes and told
the Appellant, “You can’t see, can you?”
6. The next day the Appellant scheduled an eye doctor
appointment which she attended on December 9, 2005.
The doctor’s notes marked as Appellant’s Exhibit 4 stem
from this visit and were given to Martha Brame either on
Friday, December 9, 2005, or on the following Monday,
December 12, 2005. The Appellant testified that she is
legally blind in the left eye and was experiencing
problems with her eyes during the November 22, 2005
meeting. It should be noted that Appellant’s Exhibit 4
was introduced for the limited purpose of confirming that
the Appellant went to an eye doctor’s appointment. The
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contents of Appellant’s Exhibit 4 as entered into the
record do not constitute evidence that the Appellant is
disabled due to her eye condition.
7. The Appellant did not speak to anybody concerning
her eye condition prior to the November 22, 2005
meeting with Martha Brame and Paula Horn. The
Appellant also never requested accommodations to assist
her in performing her job duties as a result of her eye
condition. The Appellant testified that she has worn
corrective lenses since the age of two. Other than
wearing glasses, especially when using the computer,
prior to the subject termination, the Appellee was
unaware that the Appellant suffered from an eye
condition which the Appellant believed affected her
ability to perform her job duties or her ability to prepare
investigative reports.
8. Martha Brame instructed various NC/Is and other
employees at the Appellee’s Louisville office to
discontinue helping the Appellant well into the
Appellant’s tenure in what appears to be an effort to
gauge the Appellant’s progress on the job. Though
atypical, such action appears to be justified on the basis
that Ms. Brame did not have faith in the Appellant’s
ability to write a satisfactory report on her own.
9. On December 5, 2005, Martha Brame prepared the
memorandum marked as Appellant’s Exhibit 6. The
memorandum lists in detail the basis for Ms. Brame’s
request that the Appellant not be allowed to successfully
complete her initial probation. Despite including some
minor offenses which were corrected by the Appellant
upon admonition, the overriding theme of the
memorandum had to do with the Appellant’s continued
inability to grasp some of the finer details, such as using
proper grammar and correct spelling, when she authored
her reports. The memorandum and request for
termination was prepared by Martha Brame before she
had received the doctor’s notes marked as Exhibit 4 from
the Appellant.
10. The testimony of Jerry Mayo was found to be
extremely credible and unbiased. Taken together with
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the testimony of Linda Murphy, Paula Horn, and Martha
Brame, it is apparent that the Appellant continued to use
incorrect grammar and misspell words and otherwise
failed to use the principles of documentation when
writing her reports well into her probationary period.
11. There was no evidence of record that demonstrated
that Martha Brame, or anyone involved in the decision to
terminate the Appellant prior to the end of her probation,
took into consideration the Appellant’s problems with her
eyesight when making such decision. The doctor’s note
marked as Appellant’s Exhibit 4 only indicates that the
Appellant has a medical condition involving her left eye.
To the layperson, it does not serve to communicate that
such condition was disabling or otherwise affected the
Appellant’s ability to perform her job duties. Further,
said note was not received until December 9 or
December 12, 2005, well after the decision to terminate
the Appellant had already been made.
12. By letter from J.P. Hamm, the Appointing Authority,
dated December 12, 2005, the Appellant was terminated
from her position as NC/I in the Office of the Inspector
General, Division of Health Care Facilities and Services,
Louisville office, effective close of business December
14, 2005.
Based upon these findings, the Hearing Officer made the following
Conclusions of Law:
1. … The evidence of record demonstrates conclusively
that other than the obvious (that the Appellant required
the use of corrective lenses to see properly), the Appellee
was not made aware of and had no knowledge that the
Appellant suffered from an eye condition which could be
considered disabling when the decision to terminate the
Appellant was made. It is clear from the evidence that
the Appellee had no reason to believe the Appellant’s
problems with her eyesight played a role in her inability
to complete her investigative reports in the prescribed
manner. To the contrary, the true basis for the
Appellant’s termination was clearly her ongoing inability
to grasp the concept of narrative reporting done in
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accordance with the principles of documentation. It
further appears that the instructions to various employees
at the Louisville office of the Inspector General given by
Martha Brame to discontinue helping the Appellant with
her reporting duties occurred in approximately the
Appellant’s fourth month of her probation and though
unusual, were made in an effort to determine whether the
Appellant’s reporting abilities could stand on their own.
The Appellant continued to make the same mistakes in
her reporting throughout the tenure of her employment
and was counseled concerning the same as late as
November 22, 2005. Thus, her termination was justified
on a purely legal basis.
2. The Appellant’s dismissal was neither erroneous or
arbitrary and was not in violation of KRS 18A.095(13) or
KRS 18A.095(15) because it was not based on
discrimination due to her disability.
The Personnel Board adopted the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, in full, and
dismissed Appellant’s appeal. Appellant subsequently filed an appeal with the
Franklin Circuit Court, but the court affirmed the Personnel Board’s decision upon
finding that it was supported by substantial evidence and was not otherwise clearly
erroneous as a matter of law. The current appeal followed.
Standard of Review
“Our standard of review of a circuit court’s affirmance of an
administrative decision is to determine whether the circuit court’s findings
upholding the Cabinet’s decision are clearly erroneous.” 500 Associates, Inc. v.
Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet, 204 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Ky. App. 2006). “[I]n
essence, on review the function of the Court is to ensure that the agency’s decision
is based on substantial evidence of fact in the record and that the agency did not
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apply an incorrect rule of law.” Alliance for Kentucky’s Future, Inc. v. Envtl. &
Pub. Prot. Cabinet, 310 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Ky. App. 2008); see also KRS
13B.150(2). “The test of substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone or
in the light of all the evidence it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable men.” Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481
S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972).
If the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we must
uphold that decision even if there is conflicting evidence in the record and even if
we might have reached a different conclusion had we heard the case de novo. 500
Associates, Inc., 204 S.W.3d at 131-32; see also Kentucky Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). We may not reinterpret or
reconsider the merits of the claim, nor can we substitute our judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence. 500 Associates, Inc., 204 S.W.3d at
131. We further note that “[i]n its role as a finder of fact, an administrative agency
is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility
of witnesses[.]” Aubrey v. Office of Attorney Gen., 994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky.
App. 1998); see also McManus v. Kentucky Ret. Sys., 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky.
App. 2003).
Analysis
KRS 18A.111 provides, in relevant part, that “an employee shall serve
a six (6) months probationary period when he is initially appointed to the classified
service. An employee may be separated from his position, reduced in class or
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rank, or replaced on the eligible list during this initial probationary period and shall
not have a right to appeal, except as provided by KRS 18A.095.” KRS
18A.111(1). Here, Appellant was terminated from her employment by the Cabinet
prior to the expiration of this probationary period. Thus, she could only challenge
this decision under the grounds set forth in KRS 18A.095. Appellant specifically
relies upon what was then KRS 18A.095(13) but is now KRS 18A.095(12),3 which
provides, in relevant part: “Any classified employee4 may appeal to the board an
action alleged to be based on discrimination due to … disability[.]”5
Essentially, then, because Appellant was terminated from her
employment prior to completion of her initial probationary period, she was
required to plead and prove an illegal, discriminatory cause for the termination – in
this case, discrimination due to disability. Appellant alleges that discrimination
occurred here because her dismissal was actually due to a disabling eye condition
and not because of any inadequacies in her work. The Hearing Officer, the
Personnel Board, and the circuit court disagreed. After reviewing the record and
the parties’ briefs, we discern no reason to reach a different conclusion. The
substance of the Hearing Officer’s recommended order clearly reflects that the
Hearing Officer had a full grasp of the testimony and the other evidence presented
3
The statute was amended in 2009. See 2009 Kentucky Laws Ch. 75 (HB 411).
4
A “classified employee” is defined as “an employee appointed to a position in the classified
service whose appointment and continued employment are subject to the classified service
provisions of this chapter[.]” KRS 18A.005(7).
5
KRS 18A.140 (1) similarly provides that “[n]o person shall be appointed or promoted to, or
demoted or dismissed from, any position in the classified service, or in any way favored or
discriminated against with respect to employment in the classified services because of his
political or religious opinions, affiliations, ethnic origin, sex, race or disability.”
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by both parties. Indeed, eleven pages of that order are dedicated to summarizing
the substance of that evidence in extensive detail. Thus, the Hearing Officer
demonstrated an obvious understanding of the facts of the case. Moreover, we fail
to see how the Hearing Officer – or the Personnel Board or the circuit court –
applied the law to those facts in an arbitrary or otherwise erroneous manner in
reaching its decision. We particularly note that the Hearing Officer was presented
with substantial evidence showing the difficulties Appellant had in complying with
the OIG’s reporting standards and her ultimate inability to rectify those mistakes in
a satisfactory manner. Moreover, the evidence of disability – and the Cabinet’s
awareness of it – produced by Appellant was sparse, at best.
Appellant argues that the testimony of three witnesses, herself and
two employees named Betty Branham and Sandy Burke, demonstrates that the
Cabinet was aware of her eye problems before the decision had been made to
dismiss her. Appellant’s brief reflects only that Branham recalled Appellant telling
her that she was not seeing well and had trouble reading, while Burke testified that
she had had a conversation with Appellant two or three days prior to Appellant’s
termination about her eyesight issues. However, this testimony is simply not
enough to compel a different result than that reached by the Hearing Officer and
the Personnel Board.
Appellant also asserts that Martha Brame received a copy of the
medical note evidencing Appellant’s eye condition prior to her termination. Thus,
Appellant argues, “when Brame became aware of the problem she should have
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notified Frankfort and sought accommodation for Bennett rather than to proceed
with dismissal.” However, as the Cabinet notes, Brame had already recommended
that Appellant be separated from her employment with the OIG before Appellant
had even visited a doctor and procured this note. Moreover, the medical report
itself contained nothing firmly indicating that Appellant’s eye condition was
disabling, and Appellant produced no medical evidence linking her work
performance to her alleged disability. Appellant also did not produce any
significant evidence showing that the Cabinet had been aware that she suffered
from a disabling condition or that she had requested (and been refused)
accommodations for that condition prior to her termination. Consequently, the
Hearing Officer, the Personnel Board, and the circuit court were fully justified in
concluding that Appellant’s termination from employment was proper.
Appellant further alleges that the fact that Martha Brame began
directing others to not help Appellant with her work constituted evidence of
discrimination. However, the Hearing Officer and the Personnel Board were fully
apprised of the circumstances surrounding this issue – as reflected in the Hearing
Officer’s Findings of Fact – and nonetheless found no grounds to overturn the
Cabinet’s termination of Appellant’s employment. We particularly note that
Brame’s directive appears to have occurred after Appellant had been on the job for
several months and after Appellant had worked with a number of individuals to
address the issues she had been having. The Hearing Officer concluded that this
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was done in “an effort to gauge the Appellant’s progress on the job.” Given the
standard of review this Court must observe, we discern no error.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
Mona S. Womack
Frankfort, Kentucky
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