GOETZ (GREGORY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 1, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001941-MR
GREGORY GOETZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE, V., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00349
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, AND KELLER, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Gregory Goetz appeals from the denial of his RCr 11.42
motion following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Goetz argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel as trial counsel failed to request jury instructions
reflecting voluntary intoxication and wanton endangerment and that trial counsel
failed to properly prepare the witnesses prior to their testimony. After a thorough
review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we
affirm.
Goetz was convicted of First-Degree Robbery and being a Persistent
Felony Offender in the First-Degree. In affirming his conviction on direct appeal,
the Kentucky Supreme Court set out the facts which emerged from trial and
addressed Goetz claimed errors:
[O]n or around July 1, 2003, Appellant's girlfriend dropped him off at
a Motel 6 because his drug-induced behavior was worsening.
Appellant took with him a stockpile of drugs including cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin, OxyContin, Valium, Lortab, Tylox, and
Klonopin. Although the exact timeline and quantities are unclear,
Appellant testified that on the morning of July 3, 2003, he took the
following drugs: 1) an OxyContin pill, 2) his last “shot” (syringe-full)
of methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, or some combination of the
three, and 3) either one or two handfuls of Klonopin pills.
Before noon that day, Appellant's nephew visited him at the
motel. According to the nephew, while he was there Appellant took a
handful of pills, behaved in a paranoid and depressed manner, and
stated that he was going to borrow money from his mother.
Appellant's mother had died in 1998, five years earlier. Appellant
testified at trial that he had no memory of this visit or anything after
the last handful of Klonopins that he took to help him sleep off his
withdrawal.
Around 1:00 p.m. the same day, Appellant entered Martin's
Pharmacy wearing sunglasses, a black baseball cap, and a dark shirt.
According to the store employees, he first walked to the back of the
store, and then returned to the front of the store where the pharmacy
counter was located. The only people in the store were a student
pharmacy technician and a pharmacist. Appellant pulled a handgun,
pointed it at the technician, and ordered him to get on the ground. He
told the pharmacist: “I want your C2 drugs.1 I don't want to hurt
anyone, but I will, I will kill you.” The pharmacist told Appellant that
he would cooperate. He emptied the contents of three drawers, and
assured appellant that it was what he wanted. As the pharmacist went
to get a sack for the pill bottles, Appellant warned him that if he
pushed a button or did anything to alert anyone, he would shoot the
technician. The pharmacist put the bottles into the sack and handed
them to Appellant.
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Appellant ordered the man to the floor and warned them to stay
on the floor for five minutes, and then told them that a friend was
watching to make sure they complied. Appellant left. Before a minute
had passed, the pharmacist got up and called the police. A passerby
outside also observed Appellant leaving and called in to the police a
possible robbery of Martin's Pharmacy.
Officer Lester Caudill was in the area and he responded to a
dispatch about the robbery. He caught up with a car matching the
reported description and called in the license plate number of the
fleeing vehicle. Dispatch reported that the vehicle was registered to
Appellant. A high speed chase ensued and other officers in the area
assisted in the pursuit. Upon reaching a dead-end, Appellant
abandoned his car and fled into some woods nearby. Police officers
searched the abandoned vehicle, finding a black hat, sunglasses, a
black t-shirt, pharmacy pill bottles, and an ID card bearing Appellant's
name. Other officers combed the woods in search of Appellant.
According to Appellant's testimony, it was during the police
chase that his blackout ended. Appellant emerged from the woods and
approached Rick Turner, who was outside flying kites with his son
and nephew. Appellant was shirtless and carrying a bundle wrapped in
a dark t-shirt. Appellant told Turner that he'd been in a car accident
and had no insurance so he did not want to call the police. Appellant
asked for a ride to Cold Springs, but Turner told him he was getting
ready to take his nephew to Alexandria, and offered to take him that
far.
Appellant sat in the front passenger seat and put his bundle on
the floor of Turner's van. Turner noticed pill bottles, which he
recognized as coming from a pharmacy, and what appeared to be the
outline of a gun in Appellant's rolled up t-shirt. Earlier in the day,
Turner had noticed some police activity, including a helicopter search,
along another part of the highway. Turner asked Appellant if he was
the one the police were looking for. Appellant denied it. Appellant
used Turner's cell phone, and told the person he called to pick him up
at “my brother's,” then asked Turner to drop him off at Goetz Auto
Sales (which was owned by Appellant's brother). As soon as
Appellant exited the car, Turner called 911 and told the operator that
he had just dropped off a man at Goetz Auto Sales who appeared to
have pill bottles and a gun.
Officers were dispatched to Goetz Auto Sales in Alexandria,
where they apprehended Appellant with a paper bag of pill bottles and
a gun still in his hands. At trial, both the pharmacist and the technician
identified Appellant as the person who robbed the pharmacy.
The charges against Appellant were tried from October 25-26,
2006. The trial court was faced, in limine, with the prosecution's
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motion to exclude evidence that the defendant's drug problem
authorized any form of legal defense based on insanity. The
Commonwealth cited this Court's opinion in Lickliter v.
Commonwealth, which stated that drug addiction, by itself, is not a
disease constituting or leading to “mental illness” so as to afford a
defense to a criminal charge.
The trial court granted the motion at a hearing before trial. Trial
counsel requested clarification of the court's ruling, specifically asking
whether he could present evidence regarding the effect the narcotics
had on Appellant. The trial judge stated that the defense could bring a
doctor in to testify as to the effect of the drugs, but that attorneys and
witnesses were prohibited from offering any testimony or comment
that Appellant's drug abuse problem amounted to any form of legal
defense based on insanity….At trial, the court pointed out defense
counsel's failure to request instructions on any lesser-included
offenses. Appellant notes that his trial counsel responded for the
record that his basis for failing to request additional jury instructions
was the court's pretrial ruling on insanity. Here, Appellant argues that
his earlier objection preserved for review his intoxication instruction
claim and his claim for lesser-included offenses. In the alternative,
Appellant seeks review under the palpable error standard.
We conclude that because Appellant did not offer a jury
instruction on voluntary intoxication or wanton endangerment, nor
move to instruct the jury, nor object to the instructions, this issue is
unpreserved…
Entitlement to an instruction depends on the introduction of
evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
defense exists. According to the Kentucky Penal Code, voluntary
intoxication is a defense to a criminal charge if it negates an element
of the offense. When the jury finds that, because of intoxication, the
defendant could not form the necessary intent for the charged crime,
the result is not acquittal but a conviction for a crime with a lesser
mental state. Thus, voluntary intoxication is not an absolute defense,
but acts to reduce the mental state from intentional to wantonness or
recklessness. However, to mitigate a defendant's intent, mere
intoxication is not enough. There must also be sufficient evidence to
raise a doubt that the defendant knew what he was doing. Evidence of
being under the influence of drugs is in the same category as alcohol
intoxication in that it may be considered by the jury and may act to
reduce the degree of the crime….
While it was possible that the result would have been different
if instructions on voluntary intoxication and wanton endangerment
had been provided, we cannot say on these facts that there was a
probability of a different result. Furthermore, we do not conclude that
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failure to instruct on the lesser included offense or defense of
intoxication in the case at bar was shocking or jurisprudentially
intolerable under the circumstances of this case. Thus, we perceive no
manifest injustice, and accordingly affirm appellant's conviction for
robbery in the first degree.
Goetz v. Commonwealth, 2004-SC-001002-MR, 2007 WL 3225437 (Ky. Nov. 1,
2007) (internal footnotes omitted).
Thereafter, Goetz filed this RCr 11.42 motion with the trial court.
Goetz argued (1) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to request jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and wanton
endangerment; (2) that counsel failed to adequately prepare the witnesses by
failing to inform Goetz that his status as a convicted felon would be revealed if he
testified; (3) that counsel was ineffective by failing to prevent the disclosure of his
criminal history through the defense witnesses; and (4) counsel failed to present
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial.
After conducting a
hearing
on the matter, the trial court issued a thirty-two page order denying Goetz’s RCr
11.42 motion. In so doing, the trial court found that Goetz did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel as trial counsel pursued a reasonable trial strategy
in not requesting the voluntary intoxication instruction and the accompanying
instruction for the lesser included offense of wanton endangerment, but instead
went for an acquittal by attempting to negate the intent element of Robbery in the
First-Degree.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth was overwhelming. Moreover, the court believed
that in light of Goetz’s refusal to accept the Commonwealth’s offer of twenty-three
years because he felt the sentence was too great, it was reasonable to not pursue a
course of action that may have resulted in a sentence of twenty-five years. The
court also opined that the record indicated that trial counsel prepared and presented
a reasoned defense. Additionally, the trial court found that Goetz was surprised on
the stand when he had to reveal that he was a convicted felon, and that the
remaining witnesses did mention his criminal history in their testimony. However,
the court found that such deficiencies did not result in any prejudice as the
references to his criminal past were brief and as a precaution the court gave an
admonition to the jury curing any error. Lastly, the court found that only Goetz
could present his defense.1
The trial court likewise found that trial counsel did not provide
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. It held that counsel
presented evidence of Goetz’s drug addiction at trial and then during the penalty
phase urged the jury to understand the ravages of drug addiction, and that Goetz
failed to offer any witness to testify to additional mitigating evidence. It is from
this order that Goetz now appeals.
On appeal, Goetz presents four arguments. First, he argues that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to request
1
Goetz was originally charged as a felon in possession of a handgun; thus the court reasoned he
should have been aware that this issue could come out at trial.
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voluntary intoxication and wanton endangerment instructions after presenting the
sole defense of voluntary intoxication. Second, he was denied effective assistance
of counsel when trial counsel failed to advise Goetz that his status as a convicted
felon would be revealed if he testified at trial. Third, he was denied effective
assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to prepare the defense witnesses in
advance of trial. Fourth, he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial
counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence at sentencing. With these
arguments in mind, we now turn to our applicable law.
We review the trial court's denial of an RCr 11.42 motion for an abuse
of discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citing 5 Am.Jur.2d
Appellate Review § 695 (1995)).
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under RCr
11.42, a movant must satisfy a two-prong test showing both that counsel's
performance was deficient, and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice
resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair, and as a result was
unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). See also Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky. 2002).
As set out in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2002):
The Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for ineffective
assistance of counsel: First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
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guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d
674, 693 (1984). To show prejudice, the defendant must show there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in
the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
Bowling at 411-412.2
Moreover, the burden is on the movant to overcome a strong
presumption that counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under
the circumstances counsel's action “might have been considered sound trial
strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
In appealing from the trial court's grant or denial of relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, the appealing party has the burden of showing
that the trial court committed an error in reaching its decision. Brown v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008). We note that as both parts of
the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of
law and fact, the reviewing court must defer to the determination of facts and
credibility made by the trial court. Brown, supra, citing McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Ky. 1986).
Where the court has held an evidentiary hearing, as in the instant case,
the issue on appeal becomes whether the court was clearly erroneous in finding
2
We must keep in mind that “Strickland articulated a requirement of reasonable likelihood of a
different result but stopped short of outcome determination.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207
S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006).
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that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v.
Payton, 945 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky.1997) (internal citation omitted). A finding is
not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998).
Moreover, in reviewing the trial court's post-hearing ruling on an RCr
11.42 motion, we “must defer to the determinations of fact and witness credibility
made by the trial judge.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky.
1998), overruled on other grounds, by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151
(Ky. 2009).
Additionally,
At the trial court level, “[t]he burden is upon the accused to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which
would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by ... RCr 11.42.”
Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky.1968). On
appeal, the reviewing court looks de novo at counsel's performance
and any potential deficiency caused by counsel's performance.
Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir.1997); McQueen v.
Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310-1311 (6th Cir.1996), overruled on other
grounds by, In re Abdur'Rahman, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.2004).
Brown v. Commonwealth., 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008).
With this in mind we now turn to Goetz’s presented arguments.
Goetz first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to request voluntary intoxication and wanton
endangerment instructions after presenting the sole defense of voluntary
intoxication.
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KRS 501.080 states that intoxication can be a defense to a criminal
charge if that condition “[negates] the existence of an element of the offense.”
A slight degree of drunkenness alone does not require an intoxication instruction.
See Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) overruled on other
grounds, Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981). An intoxication
instruction is only necessary when the intoxication was so great that the evidence
indicates the defendant did not know what he was doing in committing the crimes.
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 451 (Ky. 1999). Appellant's
testimony raises a jury question as to whether Appellant was too intoxicated to
form the intent to commit assault. See Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676,
680 (Ky. 1977) (Holding that while defendant's testimony was almost certainly
preposterous, it raised a jury question on whether the defendant was too intoxicated
to form the intent to commit a crime).
When the jury finds that, because of intoxication, the defendant could
not form the necessary intent for the charged crime, the result is not acquittal but a
conviction for a crime with a lesser mental state. Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962
S.W.2d 845, 857 (Ky. 1997). Thus, voluntary intoxication is not an absolute
defense, but acts to reduce the mental state from intentional to wantonness or
recklessness. 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 11.30.
However, to mitigate a defendant's intent, mere intoxication is not enough. There
must also be sufficient evidence to raise a doubt that the defendant knew what he
was doing. Lickliter v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d at 68; Stanford v.
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Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1990). Thus, in the case sub judice Goetz
was entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication. However, if Goetz had
requested a voluntary intoxication jury instruction, then this would have acted to
reduce the mental state from intentional to wantonness or recklessness, and Goetz
would have been entitled to a wanton endangerment instruction.
As noted, the trial court did not find ineffective assistance of counsel
as trial counsel pursued a reasonable trial strategy of not requesting the voluntary
intoxication instruction and the accompanying instruction for the lesser included
offense of wanton endangerment, but instead went for an acquittal by attempting to
negate the intent element of Robbery in the First-Degree. McKinney v.
Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 499, 507 (Ky. 2001) (Trial strategy to waive
instructions on any lesser offense on the theory that the jury would not believe that
Appellant was guilty of intentional murder). Therefore, we agree with the trial
court and find no error.
Goetz next argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
trial counsel failed to advise him his status of a convicted felon would be revealed
if he testified at trial.
In addressing Goetz’s next argument, we note that a defendant’s right
to testify on his own behalf must necessarily be balanced against the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which, provides that a
defendant cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimonial
communications. See Crawley v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 197, 199 (Ky.
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2003); Dillman v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Ky.App. 2008). “When
a defendant decides to testify in his own defense, he subjects himself to the rigors
of cross-examination and must answer all questions relevant to the prosecution of
the case.” See Dillman at 128. Thus, a defendant has a constitutional right not to
incriminate himself; but if he should testify, then this right is compromised to the
extent of proper cross-examination. And, as with any constitutional right, the
defendant must know of the right to waive it. See Crawley at 199. Counsel
certainly has an obligation and duty to advise a defendant of constitutional rights
and trial strategies that may compromise those rights.
We agree with the trial court that Goetz was genuinely surprised when
the prosecutor asked if he had been convicted of a prior felony. Thus, we must
conclude that trial counsel was deficient in not adequately preparing Goetz to take
the stand in light of his criminal history. However, we likewise agree with the trial
court that this did not result in actual prejudice to Goetz given the admonition
given to the jury thereafter. “A jury is presumed to follow an admonition to
disregard evidence and the admonition thus cures any error.” Johnson v.
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Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003).3 Thus, Goetz is not entitled to
relief under his second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Goetz’s third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to prepare the
defense witnesses in advance of trial, likewise does not entitle him to relief. At
trial, Goetz’s remaining witnesses briefly mentioned Goetz’s criminal past. The
trial court did not find any resulting prejudice from these inadvertent disclosures
even if trial counsel was deficient in adequately preparing the witnesses to prevent
the disclosure of Goetz’s criminal past. We are inclined to agree as the references
to Goetz’s criminal past were fleeting and were cured by the subsequent
admonition given to the jury as discussed, supra. Thus, Goetz is not entitled to
relief under his third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Goetz last argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence at sentencing. Goetz
characterizes trial counsel’s closing argument at the penalty phase as a terse appeal
to the jury to understand the ravages of drug addiction. As previously stated, the
3
As noted in Johnson, supra,
There are only two circumstances in which the presumptive efficacy
of an admonition falters: (1) when there is an overwhelming
probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's
admonition and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the
inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant, or (2)
when the question was asked without a factual basis and was
“inflammatory” or “highly prejudicial.”
Johnson at 441 (internal citations omitted).
We do not find that either exception is applicable in the case sub judice.
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trial court found that: (1) counsel presented evidence of Goetz’s drug addiction at
trial and based thereon, urged the jury during the penalty phase to understand the
ravages of drug addiction and (2) Goetz failed to offer any witness to testify to
additional mitigating evidence. Essentially, a vague allegation that counsel failed
to investigate without offering specific facts as to what such an investigation would
have revealed is insufficient to support an RCr 11.42 motion. Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 390 (Ky. 2002) overruled on other grounds,
Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). Thus, we agree with the
trial court that Goetz was not provided ineffective assistance of counsel given trial
counsel’s appeal to the jury to understand the ravages of drug addiction during the
penalty phase.
In light of the aforementioned, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Heather McGregor
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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