MORSEMAN (SHAWN A.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001932-MR
SHAWN A. MORSEMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. RENÉ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND COMBS, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Shawn A. Morseman appeals from the Webster Circuit
Court order of restitution in the amount of $48,597.02 to Amica Mutual Insurance
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Company. On appeal, Morseman argues that the trial court erred in its
determination as to the amount of restitution, to which the Commonwealth
disagrees. After a review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable
law, we reverse the order of restitution and remand this matter to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Morseman was indicted along with his wife for Second Degree Arson by
Complicity and Fraudulent Insurance Acts by Complicity in Webster Circuit Court
on April 27, 2006. These charges resulted from the burning of Morseman’s house
around December 14, 2005, and the subsequent reporting of fraudulent oral and
written statements to his insurer. A plea agreement was ultimately entered in
which the Commonwealth dismissed the arson charge and recommended a fiveyear sentence to be probated with the conditions to include restitution in the
amount of $48,597.02 to Amica Mutual Insurance Company. In addition, if the
conditions of the plea agreement were kept, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss
the charges (without prejudice) against Morseman’s wife. The trial court accepted
Morseman’s plea of guilty and found that the plea was made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.
Thereafter, on the date of his sentencing, Morseman moved to change his
plea, which the trial court overruled.2 Morseman was sentenced according to the
Commonwealth’s recommendation. When Morseman questioned the amount of
restitution, the Commonwealth agreed to prove the amount of restitution at a
2
The trial court allowed Morseman’s counsel to withdraw on the same date.
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hearing. The trial court then noted on the order of probation/conditional discharge
that the “defendant reserves the right to contest the restitution amount upon review
of the records.”
The hearing was held on March 18, 2009, via a telephone conference. The
sole testimony was from a claims adjustor for Amica Insurance Company who
confirmed that the amount paid to Morseman was $48,597.02. This amount
represented three types of payments:
Type A (dwelling):
Type C (contents/personal property):
Type D (additional living expenses):
Total:
$34,108.87
$5,638.15
$8,850.00
$48,597.02
Morseman offered no evidence regarding the amount of restitution owed but did
submit a memorandum on April 3, 2009, arguing that he should only be required to
pay restitution for payment Type C ($5,638.15 for contents/personal property)
since he only plead guilty to Fraudulent Insurance Acts. On May 21, 2009, the
trial court ordered Morseman to pay restitution in the amount of $48,597.02.
Morseman then filed a motion to reconsider which was overruled. It is from this
determination of restitution that Morseman now appeals.
On appeal, Morseman presents a single argument, namely, that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering restitution in an amount that represented losses
sustained from a crime for which Morseman was not guilty. In response, the
Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when setting
the amount of restitution as the amount was a condition of the plea agreement and
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conforms to the relevant restitution statutes. Additionally, the Commonwealth
argues that the trial court’s findings at the restitution hearing were not clearly
erroneous as there was substantial evidence that Morseman’s acts resulted in the
full amount claimed by the insurance company/victim. With these arguments in
mind, we now turn to the applicable law.
Restitution has been defined as compensation paid by a convicted person to
a victim for property damage and other expenses sustained by that victim because
of the convicted person's criminal conduct. KRS 532.350(1). In short, restitution is
merely a system designed to restore property or the value thereof to the victim.
Upon ordering restitution, the trial judge is required to set the amount of restitution
to be paid. KRS 532.033(3).
The purpose of restitution, as explained in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 721
S.W.2d 706, 707 (Ky. 1986), is not an “additional punishment exacted by the
criminal justice system . . . . It is merely a system designed to restore property or
the value thereof to the victim.” In addition, according to Hearn v.
Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. 2002), the “trial court has the statutory
authority to establish restitution and is in the best position to make the appropriate
and well-informed decision in a fair and impartial manner.”
Upon ordering restitution, the trial judge is required to set the amount of
restitution to be paid. KRS 532.033(3). Further, the judge ordering restitution is
required to monitor payment to assure that restitution is in fact paid. KRS
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532.033(4). Thus, KRS Chapter 532 places the issue of restitution solely within
the discretion of the trial judge.
The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was
“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
Because KRS 532.033(3) charges the trial court with setting the amount of
restitution, the statute contemplates that the trial court is the fact-finder in the
matter. Accordingly, appellate review of the trial court's findings of fact is
governed by the rule that such findings shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. CR 59.01. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported
by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d
409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence which, when taken alone or
in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in
the mind of a reasonable person. Id.
While the parties argue extensively about the evidence relating to the arson
indictment, we find this to be immaterial to our determination. We believe the
statutes concerning restitution provide no authority to impose restitution in an
amount other than in the amount of actual loss incurred from appellant's illegal
conduct for which he was convicted. KRS 533.030 speaks of monetary damages
suffered “as a result of the crime.” Given that Morseman only pled guilty to
Fraudulent Insurance Acts by Complicity and not Arson, the amount of restitution
must have a nexus with the crime to which he pled guilty. Thus, we must reverse
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the order of restitution and remand this to the trial court to make specific findings
on the monetary damages suffered as a result of Morseman’s complicity to the
fraudulent insurance acts.
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the order of restitution and remand this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent
from the opinion of the majority.
The indictment against Morseman was for second degree arson by
complicity and fraudulent insurance acts by complicity. A plea agreement between
the Commonwealth and Morseman resulted in negotiated concessions and
conditions as to disposition of the case.
The trial court was well within its discretion in the determination that
Morseman should make restitution for the full amount of the sums he received as a
result of the insurance fraud. The fact that he was able to negotiate a favorable
outcome of the criminal case should not relieve him of the duty to restore sums
fraudulently obtained. The plea agreement entirely undermines Morseman’s claim
herein.
I would affirm the trial court on grounds that its ruling was supported
by substantial evidence and did not constitute any abuse of discretion.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Dickman
Covington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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