COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. DIETZ (STEPHANIE)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001907-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00354
STEPHANIE DIETZ
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Commonwealth appeals the Kenton Circuit Court’s
grant of Stephanie Dietz’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a search
of her person. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court’s grant of
Dietz’s motion to suppress is incorrect as a matter of law. After a thorough review
of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we disagree with the
Commonwealth and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s grant of Dietz’s motion to
suppress.
The following facts were testified to at a suppression hearing and the trial
court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dietz was a
passenger in a vehicle operated by Lawrence Jones. While the vehicle was
traveling along a street in Covington, Kentucky, Officer Hoyle observed that the
tail lights of the vehicle were not illuminated. Officer Hoyle stopped the vehicle
for this traffic violation and engaged the driver in conversation. During the course
of this conversation with the driver, Dietz repeatedly interrupted and appeared
nervous. Officer Hoyle testified that he had a previous encounter with Dietz
approximately one and a half years earlier wherein she admitted to a drug
addiction. Being suspicious of drug activity, Officer Hoyle requested a canine
unit.
While preparing a citation for Jones charging him with operating a motor
vehicle without tail lights, Officer Richardson, a Covington Canine Unit Officer,
arrived. Officer Richardson approached the vehicle and requested that both
occupants exit the vehicle before having his dog sniff the vehicle. As both Jones
and Dietz exited the vehicle, they were patted down for weapons, but no weapons
or contraband was found on either person. Jones and Dietz then stepped to the rear
of the vehicle.
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During the canine check of the vehicle, the dog alerted on the right rear
passenger door. At this point, Officer Richardson advised Officer Hoyle1 to search
Jones and Dietz. At the same time as the search of Dietz and Jones, Officer
Richardson searched the vehicle for drugs; however, no drugs were found inside
the vehicle. During the second search of Dietz, methadone was discovered inside
her pocket.
Relying on Morton v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 566 (Ky.App. 2007), and
Owens v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2009), the trial court concluded
that the original search of Jones and Dietz for weapons upon the exit of the vehicle
was appropriate; however, the subsequent search of Dietz lacked the additional
nexus which would support an in-depth search of her person. The trial court
concluded that there was insufficient basis to establish probable cause that she
possessed contraband based on her nervous behavior and her interruption of
Officer Hoyle.
Moreover, the court concluded that the fact that Officer Hoyle knew that
Dietz had a drug habit approximately a year and a half earlier did not establish
probable cause that she would be in possession of drugs on the evening in question.
The trial court further concluded that had the officers searched Dietz after the
completion of the search of the vehicle which produced no drugs, probable cause
may well have been established. In other words, after the canine alerted on the
vehicle but a search of the vehicle produced no drugs, then this would give rise to
1
Officer Gray of the Covington Police Department also helped search Jones and Dietz.
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the suspicion that the drugs which the dog detected may be on the occupants.
Regardless, at the time Dietz was searched, the officers did not know that the
vehicle did not contain any drugs. Thus, the trial court granted Dietz’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search of her person. It is from this
order that the Commonwealth now appeals.
In review of the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, this
Court must first determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. Under this standard, if the findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, then they are conclusive.2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
9.78; Lynn v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Ky.App. 2008). “Based on
those findings of fact, we must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's
application of the law to those facts to determine whether its decision is correct as
a matter of law.” Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002)
(citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Opell, 3 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Ky.App. 1999)). Thus, the factual findings of the trial
court in regard to the suppression motion are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard and “the ultimate legal question of whether there was reasonable
suspicion to stop or probable cause to search is reviewed de novo.”
Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001).
At a suppression hearing the trial court acts as the finder of fact. As such, it
has the sole responsibility to weigh the evidence before it and judge the credibility
2
We note that the Commonwealth does not contest the basic factual findings of the trial court.
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of all witnesses. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 695, 151 S.W.2d 763, 764-765
(1941). The trial court has the duty to weigh the probative value of the evidence
and has the discretion to choose which testimony it finds most convincing.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Dehart, 465 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ky. 1971).
The trial court is free to believe all of a witness's testimony, part of a witness's
testimony, or none of it. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky.
1996); see also Gillispie v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 472, 279 S.W. 671, 672
(1926). With this standard in mind we turn to the parties’ arguments.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court’s order granting Dietz’s
suppression motion is incorrect as a matter of law and the trial court’s application
of the facts to the law is clearly erroneous. In support thereof,3 the Commonwealth
argues that there was nothing improper in the subsequent search of Dietz and that
the drugs found on Dietz should fall under the inevitable discovery rule.
Dietz argues that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision that
the search was unlawful and the decision to suppress the evidence seized during
3
The Commonwealth also argues that the vehicle in which Dietz was a passenger was properly
stopped; there was nothing improper concerning Officer Hoyle’s use of a canine unit and no
unreasonable delay occurred; there was nothing improper in removing Dietz from the vehicle.
Dietz argues that the majority of issues presented by the Commonwealth are not before this
Court because the trial court ruled in favor of the Commonwealth concerning whether the vehicle
was properly stopped; the propriety of the canine unit and any delay; and the removal of Dietz
from the vehicle and the pat-down for weapons. Dietz also argues the delay in implementing the
dog search was too long. After our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the
applicable law, we have concluded that the trial court’s findings of fact concerning these issues
were properly supported by substantial evidence and are thus conclusive. Moreover, we do not
find error in the trial court’s legal conclusions concerning these issues. Dietz additionally argues
that under KRS 22A.020, this Court should refrain from addressing the propriety of the use of a
dog to search Jones’s vehicle as it might prejudice Dietz’s right to directly appeal this issue
should an appeal by Dietz ever become necessary. This argument is rendered moot given that
we are affirming the trial court’s grant of Dietz’s motion to suppress.
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the search was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. In support thereof, Dietz
argues that the second search of her person was unlawful; that the Commonwealth
never presented its inevitable discovery doctrine to the trial court and, thus, the
issue is not properly preserved for this Court; that by even arguing the inevitable
discovery rule, the Commonwealth admits that the second search of Dietz was
unlawful; and that the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law. With these
arguments in mind, we now turn to the applicable law.
The crux of the Commonwealth’s argument4 is that the trial court erred in its
determination that the contemporaneous search of Dietz and the vehicle did not
provide the officers with probable cause as to the search of Dietz. However, the
Commonwealth’s primary authority for this argument is the inevitable discovery
doctrine, which we have for reasons set forth, infra, determined to be inapplicable.
While the Commonwealth argues that an additional nexus existed based on Dietz’s
known drug abuse and her nervous and strange behavior during the stop, we agree
with the trial court that this was an insufficient basis to establish probable cause.
We also disagree with the Commonwealth that the trial court misapplied the
applicable law. In Morton v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 566 (Ky.App. 2007),
this Court determined that:
As for the instant case, Morton was the driver and lone
occupant of the vehicle, and the dog alerted police to the
4
The parties agree that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proof. See Commonwealth v.
Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky.App.2004) (“A warrantless search is presumed to be
unreasonable and unlawful, requiring the Commonwealth to bear the burden of justifying the
search and seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.”)(internal citations
omitted).
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presence of drugs inside the vehicle. From these facts
and our analysis in this case, and from the guidance of
case law from other jurisdictions, we conclude that a
positive canine alert, signifying the presence of drugs
inside a vehicle, provides law enforcement with the
authority to search the driver for drugs but does not
permit the search of the vehicle's passengers for drugs
unless law enforcement can articulate an independent
showing of probable cause as to each passenger searched.
Morton at 570.
The Commonwealth asserts that Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775
(Ky.App. 2006), is controlling. In Dunn, this Court relied upon the reasoning of a
sister state that the odor of burnt cannabis emanating from a vehicle gave probable
cause to search the occupants of a vehicle. We find Dunn to be distinguishable
from the case sub judice. In Dunn the smell of burnt cannabis emanated from
within a vehicle containing more than one occupant. This necessarily meant that
some or all of the occupants had, at some point, been exposed to burnt cannabis.5
In Dunn, the particularized suspicion of criminal activity arose not only as to the
vehicle but as to the occupants as well.
In the facts sub judice the canine alerted on the vehicle and not on Dietz, an
occupant. Morton permits a search of the person in control of the vehicle as a
result of particularized criminal suspicion arising from the canine alert on the
vehicle. Morton does not extend that individualized criminal suspicion to the
5
As with most any burning substance, the burnt smell which emanates disperses into the
surrounding area and all those in the area would, most likely, acquire the smell of the burning
substance. Thus, in a vehicular stop, all occupants may have acquired the smell that gives rise to
the probable cause to search each occupant.
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remaining occupants, nor does Dunn. The canine alert on the vehicle gave no
independent showing of probable cause as to Dietz, a mere occupant of the vehicle.
Moreover, this Court in Morton, supra, analyzed case law specifically addressing
the constitutional rights of a passenger; whereas, in Dunn, the constitutional rights
of a passenger were not addressed by this Court. Thus, we agree with the trial
court that Morton is controlling. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts.
Turning now to the Commonwealth’s argument concerning the inevitable
discovery rule,6 we agree with Dietz that this argument was not presented to the
trial court;7 therefore, we will not consider it now for the first time on appeal. See
Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 283 Ky. 456, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky.App.
6
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the inevitable discovery rule in Hughes v.
Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2002). Therein, the Court noted:
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court adopted the “inevitable discovery rule”
to permit admission of evidence unlawfully obtained upon proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same evidence would have been
inevitably discovered by lawful means. Id. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509.
Noting that the rationale behind excluding the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), was that the prosecution should not be put in a better
position than it would have been if the illegality had not transpired, the
Court concluded in Nix that, conversely, the prosecution should not be put
in a worse position than if no police error or misconduct had occurred.
Nix, supra, at 443, 104 S.Ct. at 2508-09.
Hughes at 853.
7
Assuming arguendo that the issue had been preserved, we disagree with the Commonwealth
that the inevitable discovery rule would necessarily be applicable to the case sub judice. The
cases which have applied the inevitable discovery rule have admitted evidence that truly would
ultimately be discovered. See Hughes, supra, (applying the inevitable discovery rule to a
decomposing body) and Richardson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 932 (Ky.App. 1998)
(evidence would have been discovered through a search incident to arrest). Similarly, the
independent source doctrine has been applied to the issuance of a search warrant. Horn v.
Commonwealth, 240 S.W.3d 665, 669-670 (Ky.App. 2007).
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1940) (“It is an unvarying rule that a question not raised or adjudicated in the court
below cannot be considered when raised for the first time in this court.”); Skaggs v.
Assad, By and Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (“It goes without
saying that errors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved
and identified in the lower court.”); Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219,
(Ky. 1976) (“[A]ppellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the
trial judge and another to the appellate court.”). Additionally, the Commonwealth
does not request a palpable error analysis under RCr 10.26. “Absent extreme
circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court
will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a
request is made and briefed by the appellant.” Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251
S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we decline
to review the Commonwealth’s argument that the drugs found on Dietz should fall
under the inevitable discovery rule.
Finding no error, we accordingly affirm the trial court’s grant of Dietz’s
motion to suppress.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Thomas M. Ransdell
Frankfort, Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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