SCHOETTMER (GREGORY JOSEPH) VS. SCHOETTMER (LARA MARIE)
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RENDERED: MARCH 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001850-MR
&
NO. 2009-CA-001851-MR
GREGORY JOSEPH SCHOETTMER
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. FEELEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00753
LARA MARIE SCHOETTMER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; ISAAC,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Gregory Joseph Schoettmer appeals and Lara Marie
Schoettmer cross-appeals from an order of the Oldham Circuit Court pertaining to
their dissolution proceedings. On appeal, Greg argues the trial court erred by: (1)
determining that the entire amount of equity in the parties’ residence was marital;
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
(2) ordering three years of additional maintenance; (3) misvaluing the parties’
horses; and (4) ordering him to pay an additional $7,500.00 in attorney’s fees. On
cross-appeal, Lara argues the trial court erred by: (1) limiting the award of child
support to $700.00 per month; (2) removing Lara’s previous designation as
primary residential parent and ruling that Gregory shall have the primary input
regarding their children’s education; (3) ordering the marital real estate to be
reappraised post-decree. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Greg and Lara were married in 1998. There are two minor children
born of the marriage. Greg is employed as a pilot and manager for UPS. During
the marriage, Lara worked as a full-time stay-at-home mother and tended to the
parties’ horse breeding operation. At the time of trial, Lara was involved in a
program to obtain a master of arts degree in teaching. The marital residence was
located on 28 acres in Oldham County. At the time of trial, the property was
valued at over $700,000.00. Greg filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
2006. On July 20, 2007, the trial court entered an interlocutory decree dissolving
the marriage. After taking the evidence, the trial court, on March 26, 2009, entered
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order dividing the marital property,
awarding maintenance to Lara, and granting joint custody of the children. Both
parties filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate, which the trial court granted in part
and entered an amended order on September 3, 2009. This appeal followed.
Greg first argues that the trial court erred by determining that all the
equity in the marital residence was marital and that the deed was dispositive of the
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issue. Greg purchased the property three years before the marriage, although the
parties cohabitated there before marriage. A new house was constructed on the
property and Greg made numerous improvements to the property and made
mortgage payments. Other improvements to the property were made throughout
the marriage. On July 31, 2001, Greg conveyed the property to himself and Lara,
in joint survivorship. Lara’s name was added to the deed in consideration of love
and affection.
In Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky stated:
The disposition of parties' property in a dissolution-ofmarriage action is governed by KRS 403.190, and neither
record title nor the form in which it is held, e.g.,
partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship, is
controlling or determinative.
The court goes on to state, however, discussing the holding of O’Neil v. O’Neil,
600 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.App. 1980), that:
even though title is not determinative, nevertheless it is
evidence for the court to consider. Clearly, the donor’s
intent is the primary factor in determining whether a
transfer of property is a gift….The donor’s testimony is
highly relevant of the donor’s intent; however,
the intention of the donor may not only be “expressed in
words, actions, or a combination thereof,” but “may be
inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances,
including the relationship of the parties, as well as the
conduct of the parties.”
Id. at 268-269.
In its March 26, 2009 order, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found
that:
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The consideration was a gift, i.e., “the love and affection
of Gregory J. Schoettmer for his wife, Lara M.
Schoettmer.” The parties took the steps to “memorialize”
the manner in which they both shared and contributed to
the acquisition, maintenance, and support the twenty
eight acre farm since March of 1995. That Deed was
evidence of the parties’ intention that Lara would be an
equal “partner” and one-half owner of the premises in all
respects. It was always understood by the parties that the
farm was “ours.” Lara’s input was sought by Greg on the
location of the property to purchase. As (the builder)
built the house on the property, Lara picked out the
carpet, wallpaper, bathroom tile and paint.
Further, the deed itself contained a “consideration certificate” which specifically
states that the parties understand that “the property herein conveyed is transferred
by gift and without consideration.” Both parties acknowledged this section of the
deed instrument with their signatures.
Subsequently, following the parties’ motions to alter, amend or vacate
the March order, on September 4, 2009, the trial court amended its prior legal
conclusion regarding the property to determine that the transfer was not a gift. The
court stated that love and affection are deemed valuable consideration for the
transfer of a deed and therefore, it could not be considered a gift. When transferred
for valuable consideration, it “lost its non-marital character.”
Regardless of the legal conclusion the trial court made as to the nature
of this transfer, the critical point in this analysis is that the trial court found that it
was Greg’s intent to give Lara an undivided one-half interest in the real estate.
That finding was supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a determination that it was clearly erroneous. Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d
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577, 581 (Ky. 2006). In reviewing factual findings, due regard is granted to the
family court in viewing and weighing the credibility of the evidence. Ironton Fire
Brick Company v. Burchett, 288 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Ky. 1956).
Although this was a gift from Greg to Lara, the nature of the gift,
being an undivided one-half interest in real estate, converted any non-marital
interest Greg may have had in this property into marital property. The trial court
also found that any increased value in the property subsequent to the transfer was
due to the joint efforts of the parties, and, therefore, marital property.
The trial court found that the value of the property at the date of the
dissolution decree was $722,500.00 and that the marital interest was $623,213.00.
(Fair market value minus a mortgage debt of $99,287.00.) In the amended order,
the trial court determined that the property should be reappraised at the current
market value with an even division between the parties. The court found that
equity demanded a new appraisal. Lara argues that the trial court erred by ordering
the marital residence to be reappraised and valued at the time of the amended order
rather than at the time of the decree of dissolution. We disagree. In Culver v
Culver, 572 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Ky.App. 1978), the Court states:
if marital property has appreciated in value after the
separation or decree dissolving the marriage because of
general economic conditions rather than the efforts of
only one of the parties, then such appreciation in value
should be considered in the division of the marital
property.
Applying that theory consistently would require the court to also recognize and
consider in its division of property the decrease in value due to general economic
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conditions post-decree. The trial court, in considering all factors, properly ordered
the reappraisal.
Next, Greg argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
Lara maintenance in the amount of $3,000.00 per month for a total period of four
and one-half years.
“Maintenance determinations are within the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky.App. 1987). Also, “[t]he
determination of whether to award maintenance is highly discretionary with the
trial court after its consideration of the dictates of KRS 403.200.” Beckner v.
Beckner, 903 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Ky.App. 1995). KRS 403.200(2) requires trial
courts to consider all relevant factors, including several that are enumerated in the
statute, in setting maintenance awards.
The trial court fully considered the KRS 403.200 factors in awarding
maintenance to Lara. We disagree with Greg that the award is patently unfair or
unreasonable. We cannot conclude that trial court abused its discretion.
Next, Greg argues that the trial court erred by valuing the parties’ two
remaining horses at $4,000.00 each. In its order, the trial court made specific
findings as to the values of the horses, Mariah and Paprika. The trial court did not
make specific findings regarding the values of Patriot and Fudge, however the
court assigned them values of $4,000.00 each in the property equalization chart.
Because Greg did not move the trial court for more specific findings as required by
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CR 52.04, this issue is waived. Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky.
1982).
Finally, Greg argues the trial court erred by awarding Lara an
additional $7,500.00 in attorney’s fees. The award of attorney’s fees under KRS
403.220 is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger,
52 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001). The trial court considered the applicable statute.
There is a significant disparity in the parties’ earning capacities. Greg has not
demonstrated that the award of an additional $7,500.00 was an abuse of discretion.
On cross-appeal, Lara argues that the trial court erred by limiting the
child support award to $700.00 per month.
In Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky.App. 2001), this
Court stated:
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion in
considering a parent's assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support. A reviewing court should
defer to the lower court's discretion in child support
matters whenever possible. As long as the trial court's
discretion comports with the guidelines, or any deviation
is adequately justified in writing, this Court will not
disturb the trial court's ruling in this regard. However, a
trial court's discretion is not unlimited. The test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles.
(Footnotes omitted).
The trial court gave no indication whether it was applying the child
support guidelines contained in KRS 403.211 or whether it had deviated from the
guidelines as permitted by KRS 403.212(5). The trial court imputed a yearly
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income of $36,500.00 to Lara. Beyond this imputation there are no factual
findings or conclusions of law supporting its award of $700.00 per month. Lara
addressed this issue in her motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment. The trial
court’s order as it stands leaves us nothing to review. Therefore, we reverse and
remand for the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the issue of child support.
Lara next argues that the trial court erred by providing Greg with the
primary input regarding the children’s education. The standard of review
regarding child custody issues is whether the trial court's decision was clearly
erroneous and constituted an abuse of discretion. Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d
153 (Ky. 1974). The appellate court will only reverse a family court's child
custody decision if the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the decision reflects
a clear abuse of the considerable discretion granted family courts in custody
matters. Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986).
Lara has not cited to any authority demonstrating that the trial court
erred in this regard. Given the deference owed to the trial court in these matters,
we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, the order of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Delores Pregliasco
Louisville, Kentucky
James L. Theiss
LaGrange, Kentucky
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