WOOLBRIGHT (GARY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001689-MR
GARY WOOLBRIGHT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHIL PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00414
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Gary Woolbright appeals an order of the Barren Circuit Court
denying his RCr 11.42 motion to set aside his conviction due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
In March 2003, a Barren Circuit Court jury convicted Woolbright of
wanton murder, receiving stolen property (anhydrous ammonia) with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), and first-degree possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). Woolbright received an aggregate sentence of 55 years’
imprisonment, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the Kentucky
Supreme Court in an unpublished opinion. Woolbright v. Commonwealth, 2003SC-0368-MR (Aug. 25, 2005). In that opinion, the Court set forth the following
background facts:
On November 14, 2001, Joseph Tibbs visited Appellant's
house with Michael Parker. At some point, Parker
stepped outside the house to look at some cars on the
property. What transpired inside the house during this
period is disputed. According to Appellant, while Parker
was outside, Tibbs pulled a gun from his jacket and
demanded that Appellant give him money. Appellant
testified that he went to his bedroom, got Five Hundred
Dollars ($500) in cash, and presented it to Tibbs. Tibbs
indicated the amount was insufficient, so Appellant again
went to the back of the home to retrieve more money, but
also armed himself with a gun. When he returned, he
threw his wallet to distract Tibbs' attention. The ploy
worked and when Tibbs looked away, Appellant placed
the handgun at the back of Tibbs' head. According to
Appellant, Tibbs flinched, causing the gun to discharge.
Appellant stated several times at trial that the gun fired
accidentally; that is to say, he only meant to scare Tibbs
with the firearm but did not intend to shoot him.
Nonetheless, a single bullet passed from the back of
Tibbs' head through the front, though it did not kill Tibbs
immediately. Tibbs lay on the floor bleeding and making
a gurgling noise, which, according to Appellant,
distressed him greatly. Appellant then stuffed a plastic
bag down Tibbs' throat, completely occluding his airway.
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Tibbs died thereafter. Dr. Tracy Corey, Chief Medical
Examiner for the Commonwealth, testified that it was
possible Tibbs could have survived the gunshot wound if
immediate treatment had been sought, but that the plastic
bag in his throat removed that possibility. In other words,
the gunshot wound to Tibbs' head was the primary cause
of death, though the occlusion of his airway was a
significant contributing factor.
Appellant later called 911 and Kentucky State Police
Trooper Terry Alexander responded to the scene. As he
pulled up to Appellant's residence, he observed Appellant
emptying his pockets onto the hood of a truck. One of the
items was a baggie containing what was later confirmed
to be a quantity of methamphetamine. A smaller quantity
was found in Appellant's pocket. As Trooper Alexander
approached the residence, he detected the strong smell of
ammonia; an underground bunker near the house
revealed eleven tanks of anhydrous ammonia. Appellant
thereafter was arrested.
In July 2006, Woolbright filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate
his sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Thereafter, Woolbright filed
several supplementary pleadings relating to his claims. In August 2009, the Barren
Circuit Court denied Woolbright’s motion for post-conviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing. Woolbright now appeals, contending he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing regarding four instances of alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is warranted only “if
there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of the record.”
Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993). “Conclusionary
allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary
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hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky.
2002), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151
(Ky. 2009). “A hearing is also unnecessary where the allegations, even if true,
would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction.” Harper v. Commonwealth,
978 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1998).
We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance, a movant must show that
counsel made serious errors amounting to deficient performance and that those
alleged errors prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, accord Gall v. Commonwealth,
702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985).
I. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigation Evidence
Woolbright contends trial counsel failed to investigate and present favorable
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. To support his claim, Woolbright
relies on letters written by his son, daughter-in-law, and ex-wife. The letters were
attached to his pro se RCr 11.42 motion, and generally describe Woolbright as a
good person. Woolbright speculates that if counsel had called these family
members to testify on his behalf, he would have received a lesser sentence.
We find this argument unpersuasive. Although Woolbright characterizes
trial counsel as failing to present any evidence in mitigation, a review of the record
refutes this claim. During the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel elicited
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compelling testimony as to Woolbright’s good character from both his daughter
and his former girlfriend. Woolbright also testified at length during the guilt phase
regarding his personal struggles, including his grief over the loss of an infant son to
SIDS and the death of a son to an aneurysm. “When the same jury sits in both
parts of a bifurcated proceeding in a . . . murder trial, all evidence introduced in the
guilt phase may be considered by the jury during the sentencing phase.” Harper,
978 S.W.2d at 317. Furthermore, the record reveals that, during the penalty phase,
counsel effectively cross-examined the Commonwealth’s probation and parole
witness regarding potential sentences and parole eligibility. Counsel also gave a
closing statement imploring the jury to give Woolbright the minimum sentence,
emphasizing his lack of a criminal history, age, and desire to be with his family.
We conclude Woolbright’s allegations on this issue are refuted by the
record; consequently, counsel was not ineffective and no evidentiary hearing was
warranted.
II. Failure to Object to Prejudicial Evidence
In Woolbright’s direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
The Commonwealth introduced a total of thirteen
firearms obtained during a search of Appellant's home
following his arrest. Appellant implicated two of these
guns in the killing of Tibbs-the gun he used to shoot
Tibbs and the gun Appellant alleged Tibbs brought into
his house. Appellant now objects to the introduction of
the remaining eleven, arguing that the Commonwealth
failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the guns
and the crimes charged. At trial, defense counsel's
objection to their introduction was overruled on the basis
that the firearms were relevant to the weapons
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enhancement provisions attached to both the trafficking
and possession charges pursuant to KRS 218A.992.
Woolbright, 2003-SC-0368-MR, slip op. at 13.
Although counsel vigorously argued to exclude the weapons on relevance
grounds, counsel did not specifically object that the introduction of the firearms
was more prejudicial than probative under KRE 403. Woolbright now contends
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the firearms as
prejudicial. Woolbright asserts that the eleven additional guns were cumulative
and inflamed the jury.
The record indicates that, despite the introduction of the guns, defense
counsel effectively argued to the jury that the additional weapons were not relevant
to the case. Although instructed on firearm enhancement, the jury declined to
enhance Woolbright’s sentence, concluding that he did not possess a firearm
during the commission of the drug offenses.
In arguing ineffective assistance, to establish actual prejudice, Woolbright
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 694. A reviewing court must also consider
the totality of the evidence presented to the jury. Id. at 695.
In the case at bar, Woolbright merely speculates that his defense was
prejudiced by counsel’s decision. Considering the totality of the evidence in this
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case, we are not persuaded that the result of the proceeding would have been
different had counsel objected to the introduction of the weapons pursuant to KRE
403. Because this alleged error is refuted by the record, no evidentiary hearing
was warranted.
III. Failure to Retain a Forensic Expert
Woolbright asserts counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
retain a forensic expert to rebut the testimony of the chief medical examiner, Dr.
Corey. Woolbright opines that Dr. Corey’s conclusion that the plastic bag was a
significant contributing factor in Tibbs’s death rendered defense counsel unable to
present “any defense” to the Commonwealth’s theory of wanton murder.
Woolbright speculates that, had counsel retained a forensic expert, counsel would
have been prepared to present a proper defense.
At the outset, we note that instructing the jury on wanton murder was proper
given the facts of this case, where Woolbright admitted pointing a loaded gun at
the back of Tibbs’s head. Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky.
1990). Woolbright fails to offer any specific way a forensic expert could have
rebutted Dr. Corey’s testimony relating to Tibbs’s cause of death. Further,
Woolbright’s contention that counsel failed to present a defense to the
Commonwealth’s case is without merit and refuted by the record. Counsel
vigorously defended Woolbright, establishing a defense theory that Woolbright
acted in self protection because Tibbs was high on methamphetamine when he
pulled a gun on Woolbright and demanded money. Under the totality of the
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evidence, we are not persuaded that counsel was deficient for failing to retain a
forensic expert, and no hearing was warranted.
IV. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress
Woolbright asserts counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a
motion to suppress statements made by Woolbright during his initial interview
with Detective Eldon Isenberg of the Kentucky State Police.
Detective Isenberg arrived at the scene and briefly questioned Woolbright
about what had happened. The tape recording of the conversation was played for
the jury, and the jury was also provided with a transcript. According to the
transcript, Detective Isenberg advised Woolbright of his constitutional rights, and
Woolbright responded, “I want to see my attorney now.”2 Detective Isenberg then
asked if Woolbright wanted to tell him what happened. Woolbright told Detective
Isenberg, among other things, that he shot Tibbs because Tibbs had pulled a gun on
him and demanded money.
Woolbright now contends that counsel was
deficient for failing to move the court to suppress these statements.
We are mindful that “[a] defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or
counsel adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render
2
The tape recording is not in the record on appeal, and it is not audible on the courtroom
videotape. As the transcript was apparently utilized at trial without objection, we assume it
accurately represents the conversation.
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reasonably effective assistance.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70, 71
(Ky. 1997). In Strickland, the Court offered the following guidance to lower
courts:
[A] court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often
be so, that course should be followed.
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
Here, we need not determine whether counsel’s failure to file a suppression
motion constituted deficient performance under Strickland because we conclude
that Woolbright failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Commonwealth
v. Young, 212 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky. 2006). Woolbright’s argument overlooks the
plethora of evidence against him, including a frantic 911 telephone call where he
confessed to the shooting, the testimony of Trooper Alexander regarding
Woolbright’s admissions of guilt at the scene, and the testimony of Michael Parker
who was standing outside the house when Tibbs was shot. In light of the totality of
the evidence presented, Woolbright’s statements during the initial conversation
with Detective Isenberg were mostly cumulative; consequently, Woolbright has
not established a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different had counsel moved to suppress the statements. See Greene v.
Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128, 135-36 (Ky. App. 2008). Because the record
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refutes Woolbright’s contention that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance, no hearing was required.
After careful review, we conclude that Woolbright was not entitled to
post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court
properly denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Finally, we are not
persuaded the combined effect of counsel’s alleged deficiencies resulted in
cumulative error.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Barren Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Dixon Bullock
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
W. Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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