WHITWORTH (RINGO STAR) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001674-MR
RINGO STAR WHITWORTH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Ringo Star Whitworth appeals from an order entered by the
Meade Circuit Court on July 31, 2009, denying his motion for relief under CR2
60.02(e) and (f) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to raise
1
Senior Judge Ann O'Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
the claim via RCr3 11.42. Upon review of the briefs, the record and the law, we
affirm.
Whitworth killed his girlfriend, Patricia Hardesty, in December of
2000 by repeatedly stomping her head on the pavement, a crime to which he
confessed. He was indicted on a charge of murder4 and appointed counsel advised
him to accept the Commonwealth’s recommendation of thirty years and enter a
guilty plea.
On March 11, 2002, Whitworth entered a guilty plea. Upon finding
his plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, the trial court
sentenced Whitworth to thirty years in prison on March 21, 2002. Whitworth
never filed a direct appeal of the conviction, nor did he seek relief pursuant to RCr
11.42.
On April 30, 2007, Whitworth filed a motion to correct, alter or vacate
judgment and sentence pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and (f). The motion alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel in that his attorney had misadvised him he needed
to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty; he could never appeal; and generally
failed to explain to him the law regarding intoxication and domestic violence
defenses. Whitworth also moved for a full evidentiary hearing and appointment of
counsel. The court entered an order allowing Whitworth to proceed in forma
pauperis and appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to represent him.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4
KRS 507.020.
-2-
Ultimately, counsel filed a response saying Whitworth’s pro se motion was
adequate and no supplement would be forthcoming.
The Meade Circuit Court convened an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant
to the request of Whitworth’s counsel, the hearing was limited to whether
Whitworth was denied due process by his attorney’s alleged failure to investigate
and, thereafter, advise Whitworth about the defenses of voluntary intoxication and
domestic violence. The only witness at the hearing was Hon. Steve Mirkin,
Whitworth’s trial attorney.
Mirkin testified he discussed the impact of alcohol intoxication with
Whitworth because the facts indicated the beating was fueled by alcohol. Because
the hearing is not included in the record before us, we quote from the trial court’s
findings of fact:
Mirkin did not believe an instruction pertaining to
voluntary intoxication would be of much benefit to the
jury. He testified that he discussed that with [Whitworth]
and explained that even if they went to trial and received
an instruction on wanton manslaughter, which reduced
the charge to a Class B felony, that [Whitworth] was still
looking at ten (10) to twenty (20) years and to serving 85
percent of the term of sentence.
Mirkin also discussed a domestic violence defense with Whitworth but doubted its
viability because there was no corroborating evidence. Mirkin explained his
thought process as follows:
What I explained to him was that if he got convicted of
murder, he ran the risk of a life sentence. His early
parole eligibility would be twenty. If he got the
minimum on a murder conviction, he would be looking at
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twenty and his early parole term would be seventeen.
Likewise, if we were able to get this down to a Class B,
to a Manslaughter 1, um, he would still be sentenced ten
to twenty and my guess was that if we could get it down
to a Class B, it would be probably a compromised verdict
and he would more than likely end up at the twenty-year
range rather than the ten range and he would still serve
seventeen. Under the thirty that was offered, and we
tried very hard to get you guys to come down a little bit
more and had no success, under the thirty that was
offered, he’d still see the parole board in twenty, so there
was only a difference of three years and his parole term
between the minimum and what was offered but, more
importantly, he would have an out date. I think he would
probably under the terms was calculated at that time he
would probably serve out after about 23 and so the
discussion we had was, look there’s no way you’re going
to get an acquittal out of this. I just didn’t see it and I
didn’t see anything better being likely to happen than a
Class B with a sentence at the high range. I thought there
was a real strong substantial, I couldn’t put in numbers,
but a substantial likelihood of a life sentence or a fiftyyear sentence or somewhere along those lines, which
would give him absolutely no guarantee of ever walking
out of prison. But with the thirty, he knew somewhere
between twenty and twenty-three years he’d be out and
that is what we talked about. That was my
recommendation to him. Of course, it’s a
recommendation, it’s his call. Ultimately, after we had
talked about it, he agreed to do it. You know, I did not
make that decision for him, I gave him my opinion,
which is part of my job. And that was what we had
talked about. Basically reserving to Mr. Whitworth the
knowledge when he went to prison that he was young at
the time, he was twenty, twenty-one, he was a young
man. When he was at the latest in his early forties, he
would be guaranteed to walk out of the door, whereas if
we lost and he was given a life sentence, or fifty-year
sentence or forty-five year sentence or something like
that, he absolutely had no guarantee to ever walk out the
door.
-4-
The trial court concluded Whitworth’s complaint, that counsel failed to explore
intoxication and domestic violence defenses, should have been raised as a
collateral attack via RCr 11.42 since, citing McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948
S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997), “CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could ‘reasonably have been
presented’ by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.” The court went on to say
that if CR 60.02 was the appropriate vehicle by which to raise counsel’s
ineffectiveness, the uncontroverted facts establish that trial counsel:
(a) Was experienced;
(b) Investigated the defenses of alcohol intoxication and
domestic violence;
(c) Discussed these defenses with [Whitworth]; and
(d) Evaluated the defenses and made a decision not to use
the defenses.
It is from this order, denying CR 60.02 relief, that Whitworth now appeals.
The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
following a guilty plea is well established in Kentucky. For a defendant to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel when a guilty plea has been entered, he must
show that: (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) the deficient
performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the
errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not
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have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986).
We have reviewed the record. As noted by the trial court, Whitworth
did not raise the issue of counsel's alleged failure to discuss certain defenses with
him until he moved for CR 60.02 relief. However, a party cannot use a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate judgment to raise issues that could have been presented via
direct appeal or RCr 11.42 motion. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856
(Ky. 1983). Having failed to follow the proper procedure, Whitworth is not
entitled to relief.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Meade Circuit Court
denying CR 60.02 relief, is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ringo Star Whitworth, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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