COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. ALI (YUNUS)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001628-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00349
YUNUS ALI
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, NICKELL, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky has appealed from the
August 28, 2009, order of the Kenton Circuit Court sustaining Yunus Ali’s motion
to suppress the evidence seized from him following a traffic stop. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
On June 11, 2009, Ali was indicted by a Kenton County Grand Jury
on one count of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree.1 Ali
moved the trial court to suppress “all items seized from the Defendant by any law
enforcement officers, prosecutorial personnel.” A hearing was held on the motion
at which the arresting officers testified. The trial court granted the motion and this
appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends the arresting officers had
probable cause to conduct the search of Ali’s person and thus, the trial court erred
in granting suppression. We disagree.
Factual findings made by a trial court in its ruling on a motion to
suppress are reviewed on appeal for clear error, while its legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 568-69 (Ky. App.
2007). In the case sub judice, the facts are clear and are not in dispute. We have
reviewed the record and, finding no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings,
we deem the historical facts set forth by the trial court to be conclusive. Baltimore
v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003). Thus, we must focus
solely on the trial court’s conclusions of law, to which we owe no deference.
Nevertheless, we believe the trial court was correct in suppressing the evidence.
The trial court set forth the pertinent factual background and granted
the suppression motion in a well-reasoned order which we set forth in full and
adopt as our own.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415, a Class D felony.
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This matter came before the Court on the Defendant’s
motion to suppress filed on July 31, 2009. Having heard
argument on the matter and being in all ways sufficiently
advised, the Court grants the motion.
On May 5, 2009, at 12:45 a.m. Officer Jeff Mangus
observed a car being driven with its high beams on and
the occupants not wearing their seatbelts at Nineteenth
Street in Covington, Kentucky. Officer Mangus testified
that he had received complaints of narcotics sales in that
area. After stopping the car for traffic violations and
speaking with the driver, Officer Mangus called for a K-9
unit. Specialist Mike Lusardi and his canine partner
arrived at the scene while Officer Mangus was
completing the written citation for the violations.
The driver and the Defendant, a passenger, were asked to
step out of the car while Specialist Lusardi led his dog
around the car. The dog alerted near the door beam
between the front and rear passenger seats. Spec. Lusardi
searched the car and found marijuana residue on the
floor. After finding the residue, Spec. Lusardi searched
the Defendant and found a rock of what appeared to be
crack cocaine in the Defendant’s shoe.
The Defendant was arrested and charged with possession
of a Controlled Substance, First Degree. He challenges
the stop, asserting that United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948) holds that a passenger should not be searched
unless there is probable cause, independent of that to
search the car, to search him.
In the instant case, the initial encounter was prompted by
Officer Mangus’ observation of a traffic violation when
he saw the car being driven with its high beams on and
the defendant’s seat belt dangling unengaged from the
door post. He lawfully stopped the car and requested
proof of driver’s license and registration. When the
driver produced a learner’s permit and the Defendant
produced a suspended license, Officer Mangus called for
a narcotics dog, which arrived while Mangus was filling
out the citation. A dog’s sniff does not per se constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment and does not require
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probable cause or reasonable suspicion. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-45, 77
L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). A dog sniff performed on the
exterior of a defendant’s car “while he was lawfully
seized for a traffic violation” did not rise to the level of a
constitutionally cognizable infringement. Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 838, 160
L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). An otherwise lawful canine sweep
that is ancillary to a legitimate traffic stop may constitute
an unlawful search if the suspect is detained beyond the
time necessary to complete the traffic stop. See United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80
L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). Mr. Ali does not challenge the length
of the detention while the narcotics dog was led around
the car.
The Defendant and driver were asked to step out of the
car while the dog was walked around the car. The dog
alerted on the door post separating the passenger front
and rear seats. At that point, the car was searched and
the residue found. The Defendant was searched for drugs
and a rock of crack cocaine was found in his shoe. The
dog’s alert to the passenger car door justified the officer’s
warrantless search of the car.
However, occupants of a car continue to have a
heightened expectation of privacy, which protects against
personal searches without a warrant. See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143
L.Ed.2d 408, 416 (1999). There exists a “unique,
significantly heightened protection afforded against
searches of one’s person.” Id. Even a limited personal
search intrudes upon cherished personal security and is
an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience. Id. The “traumatic consequences [like those
involved in a personal search] are not to be expected
when the police examine an item of personal property
found in a car.” Id. Thus, personal searches of vehicle
occupants are not authorized under the automobile
exception as a result of the occupant’s mere presence
within a vehicle, where there is probable cause to search.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87, 68 S.Ct.
222, 224-25, 92 L.Ed.2d 210, 216 (1948).
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In Morton v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. App.
2007) a drug dog’s detection of drugs inside the
defendant’s vehicle gave police probable cause to search
the defendant after he exited the car. Mr. Morton was the
sole occupant of the car and the court stated in dicta that
the probable cause to search would not extend to a
passenger without some additional substantive nexus
between the passenger and the criminal conduct. In the
instant case, the finding of marijuana residue on the floor
justified the search of the driver, but because there was
no testimony from either officer about why they thought
the Defendant had drugs on his person the warrantless
search of the Defendant was not justified.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to suppress is
granted.
Our review of the pertinent case law reveals the trial court correctly
found the arresting officers had probable cause to search the vehicle as well as its
driver. However, this probable cause did not extend to the officers’ conduct of the
warrantless search of Ali’s person. They did not articulate any reasoning for this
search other than Ali’s mere presence in the vehicle. Under Di Re and Morton,
such a failure is fatal to the Commonwealth’s argument. The Commonwealth’s
reliance on Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. App. 2006), and
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), is
misplaced. The evidence was properly suppressed.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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