HARRIS (JOSEPH D.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001626-MR
JOSEPH D. HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00066
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS AND DIXON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Joseph D. Harris, pro se, appeals from the denial of his
motion for post-conviction relief under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. Harris argues that: (1) the trial court failed to consider his arguments
and make findings; and (2) his counsel was ineffective in several regards
throughout the trial. After reviewing the record and briefs, we affirm.
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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The Muhlenberg County Grand Jury indicted Harris on the following
charges: (1) manufacturing methamphetamine, or by complicity and while in
possession; (2) possession of a methamphetamine precursor with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine; (3) escape in the second degree; and (4) being a
persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. The Commonwealth filed a
motion to amend the indictment by removing the phrase, “while in possession of a
handgun,” from Count 1, which the trial court granted. Following a trial, the jury
found Harris guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, escape in the second
degree, and being a PFO in the first degree. Harris was sentenced to a total of
thirty years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. Harris v. Commonwealth, 2007SC-000671-MR (rendered March 19, 2009). Subsequently, Harris filed a motion
for relief under RCr 11.42, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary
hearing. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be developed as necessary.
Harris first argues that trial counsel failed to consider his arguments
and failed to make findings in accordance with RCr 11.42(6). In addition to
Harris’s concession that the failure to make findings does not constitute reversible
error unless the failure is brought to the attention of the trial court, this argument is
completely refuted by the seven page order of the trial court, which thoroughly
addressed each of the arguments in his motion and made findings accordingly.
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Harris next argues that his trial court was ineffective in several regards,
which we will address in turn.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
movant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for
the deficiency, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The standard for
assessing counsel's performance is whether the alleged acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Id. The defendant bears the burden of
identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute deficient performance.
Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In measuring prejudice, the relevant inquiry is
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The burden is on the movant to overcome a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 689,
104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999).
Harris argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when
the Commonwealth cross-examined his co-defendant, Keith Douglas Edwards,
about accumulating products to manufacture methamphetamine with Harris prior
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to their arrests. Contrary to Harris’s assertions, his counsel did object to the
Commonwealth’s line of questioning. The trial court overruled the objection. On
direct appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth’s cross-examination
of Edwards was proper. Harris, supra, at 9. Therefore, Harris’s argument that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object is refuted by the record and entirely
without merit.
Harris next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an
expert witness to demonstrate that a jar found in his possession contained only
water and not chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Harris was
not indicted for possession of methamphetamine. Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 218A.1432 states that a person is guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine when he “knowingly and unlawfully . . . with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine possesses two (2) or more chemicals or two (2) or
more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine.” There was
testimony that washing a jar can be a vital part of methamphetamine production.
Moreover, there was evidence that Harris possessed chemicals and numerous items
of equipment in addition to the jar. Even if counsel had obtained an expert to
testify that the jar contained only water, Harris has not demonstrated how this
evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Harris next argues that the Commonwealth withheld facts and failed to
disclose favorable evidence. He does not state how his counsel was ineffective in
this regard. The claim that the Commonwealth withheld facts and evidence could
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and should have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it
here. See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 467-68 (Ky. 2003).
Finally, Harris argues that it was error for the Commonwealth to state
that his witnesses were convicted felons. He further argues that counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a mistrial on this basis. All of Harris’s witnesses
were, in fact, convicted felons. Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 609 permits
the introduction of the existence of a felony conviction for impeachment purposes.
Therefore, Harris’s counsel had no grounds for requesting a mistrial.
Accordingly, the order of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph D. Harris, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David B. Abner
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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