HICKS (ERIC B.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001617-MR
ERIC B. HICKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00364
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, STUMBO AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Eric B. Hicks appeals two orders of the McCracken Circuit
Court which combine to deny his Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion
in its entirety. Finding the performance of Hicks’ trial counsel was not deficient
and the circuit court’s findings of fact were adequate, we affirm.
On November 22, 2002, Hicks was indicted on one count of theft of property
over $300 and one count of possession of burglary tools. His attorney entered
negotiations with the Commonwealth to reduce the theft charge to a misdemeanor.
During this time, the Commonwealth offered Hicks a recommended sentence of
three years’ imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea. Hicks now claims he
instructed his trial counsel to accept the Commonwealth’s offer on his behalf; no
plea agreement was entered, however.
A superseding indictment was entered against Hicks on February 7, 2003,
charging him as a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) in the first degree in addition
to the charges of theft and possession of burglary tools. The PFO charge was
based on prior felony convictions in Arkansas and Louisiana. Following the
second indictment, the Commonwealth offered a recommended sentence of five
years’ imprisonment in exchange for Hicks’ guilty plea. Hicks asserts he again
instructed his attorney to accept the offer. Again, no plea agreement was entered.
Hicks proceeded to trial. A jury found him guilty of all charges. He was
sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years, probated for two years plus time
served. Hicks filed a direct appeal. This Court affirmed the conviction, and the
Supreme Court denied Hicks’ motion for discretionary review on May 10, 2006.
After his probation was revoked on October 20, 2005, Hicks filed a motion to
modify the judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. It
was denied, and Hicks did not appeal.
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Hicks filed his RCr 11.42 motion on May 11, 2009, which included a
request for more specific findings of fact.1 There was initially some confusion at
the circuit court regarding the timeliness of Hicks’ motion, but the court ultimately
concluded he had filed it within the deadline established by RCr 11.42(10). The
circuit court then partially denied the motion, conducted an evidentiary hearing,
and entered an order denying the remaining portions of Hicks’ motion.
On appeal, Hicks argues the circuit court improperly failed to make more
specific findings of fact following his CR 52.02 motion. He also contends, as he
did before the circuit court, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to accept
the Commonwealth’s plea offers on his behalf and failing to investigate his prior
felony conviction in Louisiana, for which he was pardoned. Hicks also now
maintains his trial attorney’s performance was deficient because she failed to
object to improperly authenticated evidence of his convictions in Louisiana and
Arkansas.
The Commonwealth contends Hicks’ motion should properly have been
dismissed for two procedural reasons: (1) because it was time-barred pursuant to
RCr 11.42(10) and (2) because it is his second post-conviction motion.
RCr 11.42 (10) requires a criminal defendant to file his motion within three
years of the date his conviction becomes final, with certain limited exceptions
which are not at issue here. As noted previously, Hicks’ conviction became final
on May 10, 2006, and he filed his RCr 11.42 motion on May 11, 2009. At first
1
The timing of the motion for additional findings suggests Hicks was requesting the circuit court
to make findings supplemental to its Order of Judgment.
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glance, the motion appears to be one day late. Further examination, however,
reveals May 10, 2009, fell on a Sunday. The next business day was May 11.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 446.030(1)(a) provides that when a filing
deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the deadline is extended to the next day the
court is open to the public. Hicks’ motion was therefore not late.
According to the Commonwealth’s second theory, a defendant is entitled to
only one post-conviction motion. That is not the rule. Defendants are barred from
using various post-conviction motions to repeatedly raise the same grounds for
appeal (or grounds they could and should have raised in previous motions).
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1970).
While there is room for overlap between the two motions,
RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 have different purposes, and in many cases a defendant
may permissibly move to vacate a sentence using both devices. “The purpose of
CR 60.02 is to bring before a court errors which (1) had not been put into issue or
passed on, and (2) were unknown and could not have been known to the moving
party by the exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise
presented to the court.” Young v. Edward, Technology Group, Inc., 918 S.W.2d
229, 231 (Ky. App. 1995) (citing Davis v. Home Idem. Co., 659 S.W.2d 185 (Ky.
1983)). On the other hand, “[t]he purpose of an RCr 11.42 proceeding is to review
a judgment and sentence for constitutional validity of the proceedings prior to
judgment or in the sentence and judgment itself.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981
S.W.2d 545, 552 (Ky. 1998). So long as the issues addressed are different in each
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motion, and would not have been better addressed in a previous motion, a
defendant is not precluded from filing motions pursuant to both CR 60.02 and RCr
11.42.
In Hicks’ case, he properly filed motions pursuant to both CR 60.02 and RCr
11.42. His CR 60.02 motion addressed the valuation of the property Hicks stole.
He argued the items were erroneously valued at greater than $300; had this motion
been granted, the theft charged would have been reduced to a misdemeanor and
there would be no basis for a PFO charge. Hicks’ RCr 11.42 motion, on the other
hand, alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The two motions
therefore addressed distinct issues, and it would not have been more appropriate
for Hicks to raise his ineffective assistance claim in the CR 60.02 motion. The
RCr 11.42 motion was not barred.
Request for more specific findings of fact
Also in his RCr 11.42 motion, Hicks included a request that the circuit court
enter more specific findings of fact pursuant to CR 52.02. That rule provides in
relevant part, “Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own
initiative, or on the motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment, may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly.” CR 52.02. CR 52.04 prohibits appellate challenges to a
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court’s order on the basis of insufficient findings of fact in the absence of such a
motion.
On appeal, Hicks asserts the circuit court improperly failed to enter more
specific findings in its order denying his RCr 11.42 motion. More precisely, he
claims the circuit court should have made more detailed findings of fact regarding
his prior convictions in Louisiana and Arkansas. This argument fails.
Failure to file a post-judgment motion requesting more specific findings of
fact “constitutes a waiver and precludes appellate review.” Crain v. Dean, 741
S.W.2d 655, 658 (Ky. 1987) (citing CR 52.04 and Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d
423 (Ky. 1982)). While Hicks did make a motion for more specific findings after
his conviction, he filed that motion prior to the order he now appeals. He did not
request more specific findings from the trial court on the issue of his prior out-ofstate convictions, in the context of his RCr 11.42 motion, and he raises the alleged
lack of specificity of that order now for the first time. The circuit court’s order is
not erroneous for failure to make specific findings.
Ineffective assistance: plea offers
The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to competent
representation by counsel during adversary proceedings. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Defendants
who do not receive competent representation are entitled to have their sentences
vacated and to receive a new trial. Id. To be successful, a criminal defendant must
demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against
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an objective standard, and (2) that the deficient representation caused the defendant
prejudice. Id. It is the defendant’s burden of proof to show he received ineffective
assistance from his trial attorney. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 878, 879
-880 (Ky. 1969). “[W]hen the trial judge [conducts] an evidentiary hearing, a
reviewing court must defer to the determination of the facts and witness credibility
made by the trial judge.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky.
2001) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151,
158-59 (Ky. 2009)).
Hicks contends his trial counsel was ineffective for twice failing to
communicate to the Commonwealth that he wished to accept a plea offer. The
circuit court did not find Hicks’ contentions persuasive.
With respect to the five-year offer, the record supports the circuit court’s
conclusion. Hicks can be seen shaking his head “no” on the video of a pretrial
hearing on March 7, 2003, when the circuit judge asks whether the parties have
come to an agreement. Hicks’ trial attorney also testified that Hicks had instructed
her to reject the offer the day before the hearing. Based on this evidence, it was
not error for the circuit court to find trial counsel’s performance was adequate.
Hicks did not meet his burden.
It was likewise proper for the circuit court to conclude Hicks’ trial counsel
performed adequately in not accepting the offer of three years’ imprisonment.2
2
The testimony of Hicks’ trial attorney was that she did not remember Hicks accepting the threeyear offer, but that she did remember trying to negotiate the theft charge to a misdemeanor. If, in
fact, Hicks had expressed his desire to accept the agreement, and his trial counsel continued
attempting to negotiate a reduced charge without communicating Hicks’ acceptance, that would
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The circuit court did not find it credible that Hicks had wanted to accept a plea deal
at any point in the negotiations because doing so would have required that Hicks
admit guilt; instead, Hicks maintained his innocence all along. We are bound by
the circuit court’s determination of facts and credibility, and the evidence did not
overcome the strong presumption that the performance of Hicks’ counsel was not
deficient.
Ineffective assistance: failure to investigate
In providing effective assistance, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,
691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Hicks argued before the circuit court that his trial counsel was ineffective for
improperly investigating a prior felony conviction in Louisiana. He contended that
because he was pardoned for the Louisiana crime, that offense should not have
been counted toward his PFO conviction.
On appeal, Hicks has added another basis on which he believes his trial
counsel’s assistance was ineffective. He now asserts his trial counsel’s failure to
have constituted deficient performance.
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properly research and apply the law led to the inclusion of inadmissible evidence.
More specifically, Hicks argues evidence of his prior convictions was not properly
authenticated, and it was erroneous for his trial attorney to fail to object to its
admission.
First, the performance of Hicks’ trial counsel was not deficient for failing to
investigate the prior felony convictions. The relevant portion of Kentucky’s firstdegree PFO statute provides:
A persistent felony offender in the first degree is a person
who is more than twenty-one (21) years of age and who
stands convicted of a felony after having been convicted
of two (2) or more felonies, or one (1) or more felony sex
crimes against a minor as defined in KRS 17.500, and
now stands convicted of any one (1) or more felonies.
As used in this provision, a previous felony conviction is
a conviction of a felony in this state or conviction of a
crime in any other jurisdiction provided:
(a) That a sentence to a term of imprisonment of one (1)
year or more or a sentence to death was imposed
therefor; and
(b) That the offender was over the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time the offense was committed; and
(c) That the offender:
1. Completed service of the sentence imposed on any of
the previous felony convictions within five (5) years
prior to the date of the commission of the felony for
which he now stands convicted[.]
KRS § 532.080(3). Notably, the statute does not limit PFO convictions to only
those felonies for which a defendant has not been pardoned. Further, in Kentucky
“a pardon does not preclude the pardoned offense from enhancing punishment for
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a habitual criminal.” Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, 828 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Ky.
App. 1992) (citing Stewart v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1972)).
It is true that Louisiana law provides for an automatic pardon for certain
felony offenders: “A first offender never previously convicted of a felony shall be
pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence without a
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.”
LSA-R.S. 15:572B(1). However, Louisiana law permits felonies for which one has
been pardoned to be considered in PFO-type prosecutions: “Notwithstanding any
provision herein contained to the contrary, any person receiving a pardon under the
provisions of [LSA-R.S. 15:572B(1)] may be charged and punished as a second or
multiple offender as provided in R.S. 15:529.1.” LSA-R.S. 15:572(E).
Under the law of both states, then, the fact of Hicks’ pardon would not have
eliminated the Louisiana felony conviction from consideration for a PFO charge.
It was not deficient for Hicks’ trial counsel to fail to investigate the matter any
further, and additional investigation of the Louisiana charge would not have
changed the outcome of Hicks’ PFO conviction.
We will likewise not reverse the circuit court’s denial of Hicks’ RCr 11.42
motion on the basis that trial counsel’s failure to investigate led to the
consideration of inadmissible evidence. Hicks has presented this issue for the first
time on appeal, and the matter is therefore not properly preserved. We review the
matter for palpable error only. RCr 10.26.
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Even if it was technically inappropriate to admit records from Louisiana and
Arkansas, Hicks cannot show he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to object
to their admission.3 Had Hicks’ trial counsel objected to the omission of the
foreign records, the result of such objection would not have been acquittal on the
PFO charge. Rather, the Commonwealth would have been given the opportunity
to gather competent evidence of the prior convictions and present it. See
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2003). Hicks has not denied
that he was convicted of felonies in both Louisiana and Arkansas, and he has not
alleged properly authenticated records of his convictions in those states cannot be
produced. He has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate his trial attorney’s
actions, if deficient, caused him prejudice.
Conclusions
Hicks’ RCr 11.42 motion to vacate the sentence was timely, but he was not
entitled to relief under that rule or under CR 52.01. We therefore affirm.
STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT
SEPARATE OPINION.
3
“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eric Bernard Hicks, Pro Se
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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