MILLER (CHARLES) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001559-MR
CHARLES MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RUSSELL D. ALRED, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 04-CR-00216, 04-CR-00217,
04-CR-00218 AND 04-CR-00219
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of the denial of a motion to vacate
judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. This
Court remanded the appellant, Charles Miller’s, case to the Harlan Circuit Court
for an evidentiary hearing. The court held an evidentiary hearing and denied
Miller’s RCr 11.42 motion. Miller now appeals that decision. For the foregoing
reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case to the trial
court for re-sentencing.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Miller was indicted by a Harlan County Grand Jury on June 29, 2004.
The Grand Jury handed down five separate indictments, four of which are the
subject of Miller’s RCr 11.42 motion. The four indictments included ten counts of
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree (“TICS I”), which are
Class C Felonies. As Class C Felonies, thus the maximum length of aggregate
sentences as a result of these felonies is twenty years based upon the language in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080 which provides that the longest
extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of
crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.
Miller pled guilty to the ten counts in the four indictments in an
agreement with the Commonwealth where he would accept a thirty (30) year
prison sentence. As set forth above, this was ten (10) years more than the longest
term he could have received.
On August 23, 2006, Miller, pro se, filed an RCr 11.42 motion
asserting that:
1. Defense counsel misadvised him that he would be
eligible for parole in two and a half years if he accepted a
thirty-year sentence when in fact he would not be eligible
for over seven years;
2. Defense counsel failed to explain the law in relation to
the facts of his case or the potential defenses available at
trial so that, in addition to the misleading parole
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information, his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent
and voluntary;
3. Defense counsel failed to interview potentially
exculpatory witnesses or move to suppress any of the
evidence against him; and
4. Defense counsel failed to challenge a multitude of
charges arising out of single drug sales.
The trial court denied Miller’s motion without appointing counsel or having
an evidentiary hearing. Miller appealed that decision to this Court. We held that
while Miller could have knowingly and intelligently waived the maximum
aggregate sentence limitation, the trial court erred in failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. Miller v. Com., 2009 WL 102853 (Ky. App. 2009) (2007-CA0010032-MR). We based this on the dictates of Myers v. Com., 42 S.W.3d 594,
597 (Ky. 2001), and the fact that the record did not set forth with specificity why
Miller chose to waive the sentence limitation. We remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and in the order entered August 3,
2009, found as follows:
After having heard the testimony of Robert Thomas and
review the exhibits filed in the record it became apparent
to this judge that the Defendant made a knowing,
intelligent and voluntarily [sic] waiver of the statutory
cap found in KRS 532.110 and in exchange for the
waiver the Defendant received the Class B Felony
Indictment being dismissed. It was clear to this Court
upon the testimony of defense attorney, Mr. Robert
Thomast hat [sic] he in fact did an excellent job in
enabling his client to escape the more serious Class B
Felony charge in exchange for receiving Class C Felony
charges. If the Class B Felony charge had remained and
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the Defendant were convicted of said charge he could
have received substantially more time than the thirty
years that he did receive.
Miller now appeals the decision of the trial court to deny his RCr 11.42
motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant
must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that but for the
deficiency, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). With respect to a
guilty plea, there is also a requirement that the movant show that counsel’s
performance so seriously affected the case, that but for the deficiency, the movant
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 54 USLW 4006
(1985). Courts must also examine counsel’s conduct in light of professional norms
based on as standard of reasonableness. Fraser v. Com., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky.
2001). With this standard in mind, we examine the trial court’s decision.
DISCUSSION
Miller asserts that his counsel was ineffective in advising him to waive the
statutory aggregate maximum limitation. KRS 532.110 provides that:
(1) When multiple sentences of imprisonment are
imposed on a defendant for more than one (1) crime,
including a crime for which a previous sentence of
probation or conditional discharge has been revoked, the
multiple sentences shall run concurrently or
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consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of
sentence, except that:
(c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
shall not exceed in maximum length the longest
extended term which would be authorized by KRS
532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of
the sentences is imposed. In no event shall the
aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed
seventy (70) years[.]
In Myers, 42 S.W.3d at 597, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that KRS
532.110 “benefits the offender by shielding him or her from an endless
accumulation of consecutive sentences.” In Myers, the defendant pled guilty to
Manslaughter II, Wanton Endangerment and Driving Under the Influence while
attempting to Elude Police. The Court found that “the maximum aggregate
sentence limitation contained in KRS 532.110(1)(c) can be the subject of a
knowing and voluntary waiver by a person in whose favor the limitation
operates[.]” Id. at 598.
The Supreme Court recently decided that its reasoning in Myers was
flawed. In McClanahan v. Com., 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010), the Court found that
“whether agreed upon or not, the trial court’s imposition of such a sentence is a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Sections 27 and 28 of
the Kentucky Constitution, and is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 698. The Court
went on to hold that:
Under Myers, the parties and the trial court may
completely disregard KRS 532.110(1)(c) by accepting
plea agreements to the contrary. Yet we see nothing in
the language of the statute to suggest that the General
Assembly intended to excuse plea agreements from the
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mandatory provisions contained in the statute. Whether
recommended by an errant jury or by the parties through
a plea agreement, a sentence that is outside the limits
established by the statutes is still an illegal sentence. We
do not see how an illegal sentence set by a jury . . . does
any more to “nullify the sentencing laws” than an illegal
sentence imposed by a judge pursuant to a plea
agreement. There is no sound rationale by which we
should condemn the one as we condone the other. Under
our Constitution, it is the legislative branch that by
statute establishes the ranges of punishments for criminal
conduct. It is error for a trial jury to disregard the
sentencing limits established by the legislature, and no
less erroneous for a trial judge to do so by the acceptance
of a plea agreement that disregards those statutes.
Because it is the trial judge, and not the jury or the
prosecutor or the defendant, that actually imposes a
sentence by signing his or her name to the final
judgment, it is to the judiciary that the legislative
commandments of KRS 532.080(6)(b) and KRS
532.110(1)(c) are directed. A sentence that lies outside
the statutory limits is an illegal sentence, and the
imposition of an illegal sentence is inherently an abuse of
discretion. Our conviction in this regard is not swayed
by the argument that Appellant consented to the illegal
punishment. . . . the statutory limitations restrain only
the authority of a judge to impose an unlawful sentence;
they do not restrain a party’s ability to agree to one. We
would not compel the executive branch to carry out a
sentence of corporal punishment, . . . simply because the
defendant consented. Our courts must not be complicit
in the violation of the public policy embedded in our
sentencing statutes by turning a blind eye to an unlawful
sentence, regardless of a defendant’s consent. To the
extent they hold otherwise, Myers, 42 S.W.3d 594, and
Johnson, 90 S.W.3d 39, are overruled along with any
other decisions so holding.
Id. at 701.
The Commonwealth, however, argues that this change in the
interpretation of the law cannot be retroactively applied to Miller’s case. Citing
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Reed v. Reed, 484 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Ky. 1972), the Commonwealth argues that a
change in the law is not grounds for relief, post-conviction, unless there are
aggravating circumstances where strong equities exist. It argues that such does not
exist in Miller’s case. We disagree.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has made clear in McClanahan that a
sentence which exceeds the maximum aggregate sentence is an unlawful one,
regardless of a defendant’s consent to it. Furthermore, the ruling in McClanahan
may be retroactively applied in this case. Pursuant to Leonard v. Com., 279
S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009), when the order denying the RCr 11.42 motion is
final, a new rule could not be retroactively applied. However, the motion in this
case was still pending before this Court when the new rule in McClanahan was
announced. As set forth above, the Court has opined that such a sentence is void in
that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. Clearly strong equities exist in
such a case. Thus, we must remand this case to the Harlan Circuit Court for
resentencing.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rachelle N. Howell
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David B. Abner
Frankfort, Kentucky
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