BAYNUM (TANYA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001357-MR
TANYA BAYNUM
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00376
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Tanya Baynum appeals from her conviction in the Kenton
Circuit Court on one count of third-degree rape, one count of custodial
interference, and two counts of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, for
which she was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. After a thorough review of
the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we agree with Baynum
that the jury instructions given by the trial court were reversible error. Therefore,
we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
The facts of this case were testified to at a multiple-day jury trial. The
Commonwealth presented evidence that Baynum had a sexual relationship with
T.R. when Baynum was 28 and T.R. was 15. T.R. moved into Baynum’s home in
January of 2008.1 T.R. stayed with Baynum for almost a month.2 During that time
he often interacted with Baynum’s three children helping with their homework and
playing with them. At first another minor, C.C., also lived at Baynum’s residence.
C.C. was in love with Baynum but left when he saw a relationship developing
between Baynum and T.R. After C.C. left, T.R. began sleeping in the same bed as
Baynum. Shortly thereafter, a sexual relationship began. The two professed their
love for each other and discussed getting married and having children together.3
T.R. testified that he smoked marijuana and methamphetamine with
Baynum. T.R. testified that the first time he smoked methamphetamine with
Baynum was the night the two met and that he thought the methamphetamine was
hers. T.R. testified that on a second occasion he smoked methamphetamine with
Baynum after two individuals came to her trailer and provided her with the drug.
During this time, T.R.’s mother (Millburn) tried to locate him. Eventually,
C.C. informed Millburn that T.R. was staying in a trailer with somebody named
1
T.R. had been living with his grandfather after his mother had a crack cocaine relapse in
February 2007.
2
While T.R. stayed with Baynum, he never told his mother or grandfather where he was staying.
3
This was corroborated by a letter written by Baynum to T.R.
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Tanya, and C.C. told Millburn the name of the street on which she would find the
trailer. Millburn drove to the trailer and knocked on the door.4 When Baynum
answered, Millburn told her that she was looking for T.R. Baynum acknowledged
that she knew who T.R. was but told Millburn that he was not there. Baynum later
told Millburn that T.R. had stayed with her for a few days but left with someone
from Ohio. Millburn called the police, and Officer Robert Linton arrived at the
scene. Linton requested to search Baynum’s trailer, and she consented. Linton left
after finding no evidence linking T.R. to the trailer and instructed Baynum to call
the police if she saw T.R. Millburn proceeded to post flyers with T.R.’s
photograph.
On February 22, 2008, Millburn received a tip from C.C.’s younger brother,
S.C., that he was getting ready to meet T.R. at a White Castle. Officer Ki Ransdall
went to the White Castle with a warrant to take T.R. into custody. Officer
Ransdall met S.C. prior to T.R.’s arrival and parked his cruiser behind White
Castle. When S.C. sighted T.R. at a gas station across the street, Officer Ransdall
then arrested T.R.. Officer Ransdall had to remove T.R. from the backseat of a car
in which Baynum was a passenger. Thereafter, T.R. stayed at various locations
including Millburn’s residence, his father’s residence, a mental health facility, and
a rehabilitation facility. During this time, T.R. asked Millburn for permission to
marry Baynum when he turned 16.
4
During this encounter, T.R. left through the trailer’s back door and hid under the porch. When
he saw his mother looking in another direction, T.R. ran to a creek behind the trailer and hid for
approximately 45 minutes.
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Millburn arranged for a meeting with Baynum and T.R. Millburn recorded
the meeting, and the Commonwealth played the tape at trial. On the recording
Baynum admitted that T.R. had stayed with her for a month, that the two had a
sexual relationship, and that she possessed methamphetamine that she intended to
sell to raise cash to buy birthday presents for her child. Millburn took the tape to
the police. Thereafter, Baynum was interviewed by the police and admitted that
she knew that T.R. was 15. Baynum claimed that T.R. had told her to lie to
Millburn so that he could go live with his father. After hearing this evidence, the
jury convicted Baynum of one count of third-degree rape, one count of custodial
interference, and two counts of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. It is
from this conviction that Baynum now appeals.
On appeal, Baynum presents three arguments. First, the trial court erred to
Baynum’s substantial prejudice when defense counsel was barred from recalling a
Commonwealth witness and presenting a defense. Second, that the jury
instructions on each count of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor were
identical and thus did not protect Baynum against non-unanimous verdicts or
double jeopardy. Third, the trial court sentenced Baynum to numerous penalties
not authorized by any Kentucky statute.
In response, the Commonwealth presents three arguments that we do not
find dispositive. Accordingly, we shall briefly address each in turn. First the
Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly refused to permit the defense to
recall T.R., whom the defense had already cross-examined. In support thereof, the
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Commonwealth states that the issue regarding whether T.R. should be recalled as a
witness is moot because: (a) defense counsel announced that she was not going to
recall T.R., and (b) the avowal testimony of Remy (an individual whose identity is
unknown to this Court) did not provide any evidence that should have been
admitted at trial. Upon our review of this argument, we find it unpersuasive and
decline to address it further.
Second, the Commonwealth argues that Kentucky law places defense
counsel in an ethical dilemma when the jury instructions do not delineate between
crimes. Either counsel objects and calls the court’s attention to the incorrect jury
instructions or counsel is silent knowing that his client will benefit from an
automatic reversible error. In support thereof, the Commonwealth asserts that
RCr 10.26 is not a substitute for the contemporaneous objection rule contained in
RCr 9.54, in reliance on Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky.
2002)(“The palpable error rule set forth in RCr 10.26 is not a substitute for the
requirement that a litigant must contemporaneously object to preserve an error for
review. RCr 9.22. The general rule is that a party must make a proper objection to
the trial court and request a ruling on that objection, or the issue is waived.”). The
Commonwealth urges this Court to recommend to the Kentucky Supreme Court
that it reconsider the state of our current case law. Additionally, the
Commonwealth argues that any error was harmless as the evidence at trial clearly
showed that on two different occasions Baynum shared crystal methamphetamine
with the fifteen-year-old victim. We decline to address this argument as this
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assumes that defense counsel understood the instruction to be in error and made a
conscious decision not to object. There is no evidence that this was the case sub
judice.
Third, the Commonwealth argues that the judgment did not conform to the
recent case of Smith v. Commonwealth, 2010 WL 1005907 (Ky. 2010), wherein the
same trial court imposed requirements almost identical to those imposed sub judice
on a sex offender during his conditional discharge. Said requirements were held to
be beyond statutory authorization by the Kentucky Supreme Court in an
unpublished decision. The Commonwealth further argues that given the trial court
could not have been aware of the Smith holding prior to issuing the order in the
case sub judice, this Court should only vacate the portions of the sentence that are
beyond the trial court’s statutory authority and leave the remainder of the sentence
intact. After our review of the Commonwealth’s argument, we do not find the
argument to be dispositive and as such, we decline to address the merits of said
argument. Moreover, we assume the trial court will consider the effect of Smith on
remand.
With these arguments in mind, we now turn to the dispositive issue on
appeal, that the jury instructions on each count of first-degree unlawful transaction
with a minor were identical and thus did not protect Baynum against nonunanimous verdicts or double jeopardy.
At the outset, we note that Baynum has conceded that this issue concerning
the jury instructions was not properly preserved for our review. Thus, Baynum
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requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26. We shall conduct a review
pursuant to RCr 10.26. RCr 10.26 states:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by the court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
Manifest injustice requires showing a probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law. Martin
v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). “To discover manifest injustice, a
reviewing court must plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine whether
the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin
at 4.
Further refining the parameters of RCr 10.26, the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006), undertook an analysis of
what constitutes a palpable error:
For an error to be palpable, it must be easily perceptible,
plain, obvious and readily noticeable. A palpable error
must involve prejudice more egregious than that
occurring in reversible error. A palpable error must be so
grave in nature that if it were uncorrected, it would
seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. Thus,
what a palpable error analysis “boils down to” is whether
the reviewing court believes there is a “substantial
possibility” that the result in the case would have been
different without the error. If not, the error cannot be
palpable.
Id. at 349.
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At trial, the court issued Instruction Number 8 to the jury which stated:
You will find the Defendant, Tanya Baynum, guilty of
First Degree Unlawful Transaction with a Minor under
this Instruction and under Count III of the indictment, if
and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in Kenton County between January 23, 2008,
through February 22, 2008, and before the finding of the
Indictment herein, she knowingly induced, assisted or
caused [T.R.] to engage in the use of methamphetamine;
AND
B. That [T.R.] was less than 16 years of age;
AND
C. That the Defendant knew [T.R.] was less than 16 years
of age.
The trial court also issued Instruction Number 11 which stated the exact same
language as Instruction Number 8 except Instruction Number 11 referenced Count
IV of the indictment. In contrast Instruction Number 8 made no reference to any
count of the indictment. The jury found Baynum guilty under both counts.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed a similar situation in
Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009). In Miller, palpable error
review was likewise sought for an unpreserved objection to jury instructions on the
same grounds now argued by Baynum. The Court in Miller ultimately held that
such an unpreserved error may rise to the level of palpable error. In so holding, the
Miller Court undertook a learned discussion on the applicable law in Kentucky,
which we have set forth herein:
In this regard, “[i]t is [ ] elementary that the burden is on
the government in a criminal case to prove every element
of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the failure to do so is an error of Constitutional
magnitude.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566,
-8-
576 (Ky. 2002). Plainly, a defendant cannot be convicted
of a criminal offense except by a unanimous verdict. Ky.
Const. § 7; Cannon v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 50, 163
S.W.2d 15 (1942); RCr 9.82(1). Therefore, we have held
that:
[w]hether the issue is viewed as one
of insufficient evidence, or double
jeopardy, or denial of a unanimous
verdict, when multiple offenses are
charged in a single indictment, the
Commonwealth must introduce
evidence sufficient to prove each
offense and to differentiate each count
from the others, and the jury must be
separately instructed on each charged
offense.
Miller at 695 citing Miller v. Commonwealth 77 S.W.3d
at 576.
The Court in Miller further noted:
Prior to our recent decision in Harp v. Commonwealth,
266 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. 2008), it was possible for an
instructional error such as this to be “cured” by the
Commonwealth's introduction and explanation of the
identifying characteristics from which the jury could
determine the existence of facts proving each of the
offenses, rendering any error in the instructions harmless.
See Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky.
2008). Then, in Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d
583, 593 (Ky. 2008), we recognized that “the arguments
of counsel are not [now] sufficient to rehabilitate
otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury instructions”
because the arguments of counsel are not evidence.
Harp further corrected dictum in Bell which supported
the proposition that counsel could “cure” defects in
identical instructions in closing argument, reaffirming the
proposition that:
a party claiming that an erroneous jury
instruction, or an erroneous failure to give a
necessary jury instruction [is harmless
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error], bears a steep burden because we have
held that “[i]n this jurisdiction it is a rule of
longstanding and frequent repetition that
erroneous instructions to the jury are
presumed to be prejudicial; [thus,] an
appellee claiming harmless error bears the
burden of showing affirmatively that no
prejudice resulted from the error.”
Harp, 266 S.W.3d at 818.
Thus, it is now settled that a trial court errs in a
case involving multiple charges if its instructions to the
jury fail to factually differentiate between the separate
offenses according to the evidence. Combs, 198 S.W.3d
at 580. Here, because the trial court used identical jury
instructions on multiple counts of third-degree rape and
sodomy, none of which could be distinguished from the
others as to what factually distinct crime each applied to,
Appellant was presumptively prejudiced. Nor has the
Commonwealth met its burden to show affirmatively that
“no prejudice resulted from the error.” Harp, 266
S.W.3d at 818. Therefore, the identical jury instructions,
here, can not be considered harmless.
[I]t must be evident and clear from the
instructions and verdict form that the
jury agreed, not only that [Appellant]
committed one count of sodomy, but
also exactly which incident they all
believed occurred [and voted for].
Otherwise, [Appellant] is not only
denied a unanimous verdict, but is
also stripped of any realistic basis for
appellate review of his conviction for
sodomy. In other words, without
knowing which instance of sodomy is
the basis of his conviction,
[Appellant] cannot rationally
challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal.
Bell, 245 S.W.3d at 744.
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Being error, we now hold such instructional error
as this to be palpable error, Id. “[T]he instructional error
explained above . . . constituted palpable, reversible
error.” Id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Davidson, 277 S.W.3d
232, 233, 235-36 (Ky. 2009). Yet, that is not to say that
every error in jury instructions rises to the level of
palpable error.
As this Court noted in Nichols v. Commonwealth,
142 S.W.3d 683, 691 (Ky. 2004), an alleged error is not
reviewable under RCr 10.26 unless (1) it is “[a] palpable
error,” and (2) “a determination is made that manifest
injustice [has] resulted from the error.” By definition, the
word “palpable” means “[e]asily perceived; obvious.”
Id. (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 946 (4th ed.2000)). Thus, a “palpable error” is
an error that is easily perceived or obvious. Id. In Brock
v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997), this
Court “interpreted the requirement of ‘manifest injustice’
as used in RCr 10.26 . . . to mean that the error must have
prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant, i.e., a
substantial possibility exists that the result of the trial
would have been different.” (internal citation omitted).
Here, it is obvious that the identical jury
instructions used in this case patently failed to adequately
differentiate the alleged instances of multiple thirddegree rape and sodomy. Therefore, the error was
palpable. Further, as the trial court's error “prejudiced
the substantial rights of the defendant,” the use of
identical jury instructions resulted in manifest injustice,
potentially depriving Appellant of his right to a
unanimous verdict and to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal. Id.
Miller at 695-696 (internal footnotes omitted).
In the case sub judice Baynum’s identical jury instructions on multiple
counts of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor failed to factually
differentiate the alleged instances of the crime. We do note that one jury
instruction references a particular count in the indictment and that the other
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instruction does not reference the indictment whatsoever, but we do not see this as
the differentiation between instructions that is required by Miller, Bell and Harp.
Further, we believe this instructional error to be a palpable error affecting
Baynum’s constitutional rights. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576
(Ky. 2002), and Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 695-696 (Ky. 2009).
We disagree with the argument asserted by the Commonwealth that Baynum
was only convicted of two counts of unlawful transaction with a minor and thus
she cannot realistically argue how she was actually prejudiced. We remind the
Commonwealth that the “burden is on the government in a criminal case to prove
every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the
failure to do so is an error of constitutional magnitude.” Miller v. Commonwealth,
77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002).
Second, the burden is not Baynum’s to bear. We direct the Commonwealth’s
attention to Bell, wherein the court stated “Nor has the Commonwealth met its
burden to show affirmatively that “no prejudice resulted from the error.” Bell at
744, quoting Harp, 266 S.W.3d at 818. Clearly, the Commonwealth’s violation of
Baynum’s constitutional rights in the case sub judice resulted in actual prejudice.5
Thus, under Miller, supra, we must conclude that the issued jury instructions were
5
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence at trial showed that on two different occasions
Baynum shared methamphetamine with the fifteen-year-old victim. However, the
Commonwealth then states “T.R. testified that he and Baynum smoked crystal methamphetamine
on three different occasions.” Clearly Baynum was prejudiced as without knowing which
instance of unlawful transaction with a minor served as the basis for each conviction, Baynum
cannot rationally challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See Bell v.
Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky. 2008).
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reversible error necessitating remand to the trial court for a new trial. Accordingly,
we decline to address Baynum’s remaining two arguments as they are rendered
moot by the remand for a new trial.
In light of the foregoing, we reverse Baynum’s convictions and remand to
the trial court for a new trial.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Buck
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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