WHITESIDE (ROBERT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001162-MR
ROBERT WHITESIDE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE IRV MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-003458
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Robert Whiteside appeals from the June 10, 2009,
judgment of conviction and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court. As the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting certain evidence and as the
indictment was not faulty, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Appellant’s home was burglarized on November 22, 2004. He made a
claim to his insurance company, State Farm, requesting payment of $27,000.00 in
personal property losses. Appellant was paid approximately $14,000.00 on the
claim, of which sum approximately $4,000.00 was for stolen wheels and tires. In
May of 2005, Appellant filed a second claim, based on another burglary. At that
time, State Farm decided to investigate the first claim and discovered that the
receipt that had been tendered for the wheels and tires appeared to have been
falsified. Appellant was subsequently indicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court for
one count of fraudulent insurance acts over $300.00.
At trial, the Commonwealth asserted that Appellant’s November
2004, claim for compensation for wheels and tires was fraudulent. Included in the
Commonwealth’s evidence was information regarding the second insurance claim
made in May 2005. Appellant was found guilty of the crime, sentenced to two
years’ imprisonment to be probated for five years, and was ordered to pay a fine
and restitution to State Farm. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to
comply with the notice requirement of KRE2 404(c) when it introduced the
evidence of the second insurance claim. Appellant further argues that the trial
court erred by allowing the evidence.
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a trial
court's evidentiary rulings.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
2
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-2-
S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial [court's] decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. at 581.
KRE 404(c) requires that the prosecution give reasonable pretrial
notice to the defendant of its intent to introduce KRE 404(b) evidence. KRE
404(b) evidence is evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” and “is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” KRE 404(b). However, such evidence may be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
Id.
In response to Appellant’s arguments regarding the evidence of the
May 2005 insurance claim, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence, because the evidence did not fall
within the purview of KRE 404(b). KRE 404(b) addresses the introduction of
other crimes, wrongs or acts. Although the rule does not specifically state what is
included in “acts”, Kentucky Courts have traditionally considered “acts,” for the
purpose of the rule, to mean bad acts. See, e.g., Dant v. Commonwealth, 258
S.W.3d 12 (Ky. 2008); Garland v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 529 (Ky.
-3-
2003)(overruled on other grounds); Dillman v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.3d 126
(Ky.App. 2008). The Commonwealth never alleged that the second insurance
claim was a crime, a wrong, or a bad act, and no charges were ever brought against
Appellant with regard to this second claim. Instead, the evidence was introduced
in order to illuminate the sequence of events that led to the insurance company’s
investigation of Appellant’s first claim. The trial court allowed the evidence for
this purpose and the Commonwealth agreed to avoid any specifics regarding the
second insurance claim. Accordingly, there was no violation of KRE 404(b) and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.3
Finally, Appellant argues that his indictment was faulty because it
failed to contain any language regarding materiality. This issue was raised at trial
and the trial court allowed amendment of the indictment.
The trial court may allow amendment of an indictment “any time
before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” RCr4 6.16. Furthermore, it
has been held that an indictment “need not detail the essential elements of the
charged crime, so long as it fairly informs the accused of the nature of the charged
crime . . . and if it informs the accused of the specific offense with which he is
charged and does not mislead him.” Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 752
(Ky.2005) (quotations omitted).
3
The Commonwealth makes the alternative argument that if the evidence was KRE 404(b)
evidence, it was properly admitted. However, because we have already held that the evidence
does not fall within the scope of KRE 404(b), we need not address that argument.
4
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4-
The indictment at issue provides, in relevant part:
defendant, Robert L. Whiteside, committed the offense of
Fraudulent Insurance Acts Over $300, when he
knowingly and with intent to defraud or deceive,
presented or caused to be presented to State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co., false and/or altered documents in
support of an insurance claim, knowing that the
documents contained false, incomplete, or misleading
information and the claim benefit or money exceeded
$300.
The indictment apprised Appellant of the nature of the crime with which he was
charged, the specific offense with which he was charged, and it was not
misleading. Accordingly, we discern no flaw in the indictment.
For the foregoing reasons, the June 10, 2009, judgment of conviction
and sentence order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Casey McCall
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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