THE SAWYER PLACE COMPANY VS. ADLER (MARJORIE), ET AL
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001112-MR
THE SAWYER PLACE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND II, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-02465
MARJORIE ADLER; STEVEN G.
ADLER; DAVID BERGMAN; JOHN B.
BERGMAN; KATHY BERGMAN;
LAURENCE BERGMAN; THOMAS
BERGMAN; DANIEL J. FIEGELSON;
JODI FIEGELSON
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001113-MR
THE SAWYER PLACE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND II, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-02710
BEDROCK INVESTMENT, LLC
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE.1
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE:
These appeals both arise from a judgment of the
Boone Circuit Court which ordered the sale of two farms pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 389A.030. The appellant, the Sawyer Place Company,
argues that the trial court erred in finding that the properties were indivisible and in
finding that there was no joint venture between the parties who own the farms.
We affirm.
The two properties at issue in these appeals, the Carpenter Farm (2009-CA001112-MR) and the Garber Farm (2009-CA-001113-MR), are located in Boone
County and comprise 545.6 and 273.5 acres respectively. The properties were
originally acquired in 1967 by three friends, George Stewart, Harvey Bergman and
Milton Bergman, who each held a one-third interest in the farms. In the 1990s,
they conveyed their interests in the farms to various corporations and family
members. In regard to the Carpenter Farm, Stewart conveyed his one-third interest
to the Sawyer Place Company, an Ohio corporation owned by his family. Harvey
Bergman transferred his one-third interest to his four children and their spouses.
Milton Bergman’s one-third interest passed at his death to his two sons. The
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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Carpenter Farm is currently owned by the Sawyer Place Company, Marjorie Adler,
Steven G. Adler, David Bergman, Lauren Bergman, Thomas Bergman, Kathy
Bergman, David J. Feigelson and Jodi Feigelson.
As to the Garber Farm, Stewart conveyed his one-third interest to the
Sawyer Place Company (Sawyer). The Bergmans transferred their two-thirds
interest to Bedrock Investment (Bedrock), a Kentucky limited liability company.
The value of these properties has risen considerably since the time they were
purchased, due in part to the construction of the I-275 expressway and the
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport. The Garber Farm’s value
rose from its purchase price of $80,000 in 1967 to over $4 million when it was
appraised in August 2007.
From the time the farms were acquired, the owners made various
unsuccessful attempts to develop both properties or to lease the mineral rights to
the Carpenter Farm. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Stewart and
Bergman families deteriorated due to a conflict culminating in a lawsuit over some
property they once co-owned in New Orleans. The Bergmans demanded that the
families sever their interests in the Carpenter and Garber Farms (as well as other
jointly-owned property which is not at issue in these appeals). The Adlers,
Bergmans, Feigelsons and Bedrock filed suits against Sawyer in the Boone Circuit
Court to have the Carpenter Farm and the Garber Farm sold at public auction. The
two suits were consolidated by agreed order on January 6, 2009.
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Sawyer opposed the sale on the ground that it would not yield a fair value
given the current depressed real estate market. Sawyer also contended that the
farms could be partitioned without impairing their value. Sawyer accordingly filed
counterclaims requesting partition of the property; alleging that the parties had a
joint venture and that therefore the plaintiffs owed Sawyer and its representatives
duties of loyalty and good faith; and that they should be barred from bidding on the
properties if they were auctioned, or, if they were permitted to purchase the
properties, that Sawyer’s interest should be held in a constructive trust so that
Sawyer could receive the benefit of any future sales.
Following a bench trial, the court found that partitioning the farms would
materially impair their value, and that the parties did not have a joint venture. The
trial court ordered that the Carpenter Farm and Garber Farm be sold, and referred
the matter to the Boone County Master Commissioner to conduct a public sale.
These appeals by Sawyer followed.
We begin by noting that this case was tried by the circuit
court sitting without a jury. It is before this Court upon
the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
and upon the record made in the trial court. Accordingly,
appellate review of the trial court's findings of fact is
governed by the rule that such findings shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. A factual finding is not
clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken
alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a
reasonable person. The trial court's conclusions of law,
however, are subject to independent de novo appellate
determination.
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Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005) (internal citations
omitted).
Sawyer argues that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that
the properties could not be divided without materially impairing their value.
KRS 389A.030(3) provides that
indivisibility of the real estate shall be presumed unless
an issue in respect thereto is raised by the pleading of any
party, and if the court is satisfied from the evidence that
the property is divisible, without materially impairing the
value of any interest therein, division thereof pursuant to
KRS 381.135 shall be ordered.
The party claiming divisibility, which in this case is Sawyer, bears the burden of
going forward. Collins v. Lewis, 314 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Ky. App. 2010) citing
Acton v. Acton, 283 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky. App. 2008). Once some evidence that
the property can be partitioned without materially impairing its value is presented,
as Sawyer did in its answer and counterclaim, the party seeking the sale bears the
burden of proving that division would materially impair the property’s value. Id.
Although the appellees argue that Sawyer failed to provide sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption of indivisibility, at trial the appellees’ attorney conceded that
Sawyer had successfully rebutted the presumption. He stated that he should
present his case first, that the “burden is still on me” and that he (Sawyer) “has put
the presumption [of indivisibility] into issue.” In its final judgment, the trial court
correctly stated that
The Defendants have made pleadings stating that the
property is divisible and at trial they presented evidence
contrary to the presumption of indivisibility. Therefore,
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this Court will not consider the presumption of
indivisibility, but will instead determine whether the
property in question is divisible on the basis of the facts
presented at trial.
Sawyer argues that the proof offered by the appellees failed to overcome
Kentucky’s public policy favoring the division of property over a forced sale. In
Taylor v. Farmers & Gardeners Market Ass’n, 295 Ky. 126, 173 S.W.2d 803
(1943), for example, it was stated that
the law favors a division of land in kind rather than a sale
and a division of the proceeds, and this rule particularly
obtains where the property sought to be divided or sold is
farm land or other parcels of real estate reasonably
susceptible of division.
Id at 806 (internal citations omitted).
Sawyer contends that neither of the appellees’ witnesses, Daniel
Feigelson nor Harvey Bergman, was qualified to testify as a lay witness regarding
the value of the farms. It is also contended that the trial court erroneously gave
excessive weight to factors such as the accessibility and terrain of the farms rather
than to evidence regarding their value.
Although neither Feigelson nor Bergman presented himself as an expert in
property valuation, lay witnesses are nonetheless permitted to give valuation
testimony. “[W]e have not adhered to the rule that witnesses must be expert land
appraisers in order to state their opinions as to real estate values[.]”
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Slusher, 371 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Ky. 1963).
“A witness, to be qualified to testify as to the value of realty, must know the
property to be valued and the value of the property in the vicinity, must understand
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the standard of value, and must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable
inference.” Id., quoting 32 CJS Evidence §545, p.299. Sawyer contends that
Feigelman and Bergman did not possess these qualifications.
Feigelman and Bergman testified as to their extensive experience in property
management and real estate investment. Feigelman is the chief financial officer of
the Bergman Group, Inc., d/b/a NAI Bergman, a property management and
brokerage company. He owns 4.1% of the Carpenter Farm. He is a licensed real
estate agent, and has been a shareholder in the Bergman Group since 1990. He is
married to Harvey Bergman’s daughter. He testified that he has personal
experience buying, selling and shaping parcels of real estate. He testified that he
possesses extensive personal knowledge of both farms, which he visits on a
monthly or bimonthly basis. He testified that he did not know of any way to divide
the farms which would maximize their potential, and that he could not figure out
how to “carve out” a piece.
Harvey Bergman is one of the original purchasers of the farm. He is a
principal of the Bergman group and an owner of Bedrock. He has been a
developer for fifty-nine years. In his opinion, the physical character of the land
makes it impossible to partition the farms without impairing their value. Bergman
testified that the Garber Farm has limited access points, with hilly terrain between
those points. The Carpenter Farm has a very small frontage on I-275. He testified
that if that portion was sold, access to the rest of the farm would be lost.
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The trial court was very careful to limit Feigelson and Bergman’s testimony
to their personal observations of the properties at issue, and to reasonable
inferences that could be drawn from these experiences. Their testimony was well
within the parameters set forth in Slusher.
Specifically as to the Garber farm, Sawyer argues that the trial court gave
excessive weight to evidence that partition was inappropriate because the property
contains a farm house and cell phone towers, is inaccessible and has divergent
topography. As to the Carpenter Farm, Sawyer argues that the trial court
improperly focused on the fact that the farm has access issues and that rolling hills
comprise part of the topography. Sawyer argues that the trial court failed to
address evidence (or lack of evidence) as to value, or how the facts showed that
partitioning the farms would materially impair their value. Although the trial court
did not explicitly link each of its specific findings to its ultimate conclusion that
division would lead to an impairment in value, its findings fully support such a
conclusion.
Sawyer argues that the court should have focused solely on value, leaving
the issue of how to divide the property to the commissioners. But the physical
characteristics of the properties, and the viability of division are so interrelated that
we fail to see how the court could have addressed the issue otherwise, or how it is
erroneous to consider that lack of access and a difficult terrain could lead to an
impairment in value. Sawyer has cited several Kentucky cases which have
affirmed the partition of property that is hilly or variegated in nature, including
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Taylor, 173 S.W.2d 803 and Leslie v. Sparks, 172 Ky. 303, 189 S.W. 463 (1916).
These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that access issues and a
rolling topography are irrelevant to the issue of partition. In Pack v. Ross, 264
S.W.2d 887, 888 (Ky. 1954), for example, the property at issue was described as
follows:
Thirteen acres of bottom land were on the west or north
side of Hood Creek as it meanders, while all the
remaining acreage was on the east side of the creek and
consisted of 8 acres of bottom land, 8 acres of sloping,
cleared land, and 17 acres of steep timberland.
The chancellor in that case concluded that the property should not be divided,
“because of the diverse nature of the terrain and the fractional interests of the
parties[.]” Id.
Sawyer next argues that the trial court improperly considered evidence
concerning the presence of limestone beneath the Garber Farm. Sawyer contends
that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the minerals were situated under the farm
in such a way as to preclude a fair division of the property and furthermore, that
there is not a reasonable probability that mining will be permitted on the Garber
Farm in any case due to zoning restrictions. “Admission of incompetent evidence
in a bench trial can be viewed as harmless error, . . . if the trial judge did not base
his decision on that evidence, or if there was other competent evidence to prove the
matter in issue[.]” Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954, 959
(Ky. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Even if the trial court improperly admitted
evidence regarding the presence of limestone, it was harmless error because the
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trial judge did not base his decision on that evidence, only mentioning in passing
that the zoning issue is currently on appeal. In any event, there was other
substantial, competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that
division would impair the value of the properties.
Finally, Sawyer argues that the trial court erred in not finding the existence
of a joint venture between the parties, and hence no corresponding fiduciary duties.
The trial court based its decision on a finding that (1) there was no written or
express agreement among the parties to enter into such a venture; (2) Bergman
entered into written agreements in his other business arrangements; and (3) the
parties did not have a plan for the property.
Sometimes referred to as a joint adventure, a joint
enterprise is “an informal association of two or more
persons, partaking of the nature of a partnership, usually,
but not always, limited to a single transaction in which
the participants combine their money, efforts, skill, and
knowledge for gain, with each sharing in the expenses
and profits or losses.” . . . In Huff v. Rosenberg, Ky.,
496 S.W.2d 352 (1973), we enumerated the elements
essential to a joint enterprise, viz: “(1) an agreement,
express or implied, among the members of the group; (2)
a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a
community of pecuniary interest in that purpose among
the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the
direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of
control.” . . . As to element number 3, it is necessary to
the relationship that there be a sharing of the profits and
losses; though in the absence of an express agreement,
the sharing of losses may sometimes be implied from an
express agreement to share profits.
Roethke v. Sanger, 68 S.W.3d 352, 364 (Ky. 2001).
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We agree with the trial court that there was insufficient evidence to show
that the parties were in a joint venture to the extent that a constructive trust should
be created to protect Sawyer’s interests. If anything, the evidence showed
ongoing, irreconcilable disagreement between the parties as to how the properties
could or should be developed.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is
affirmed.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE
OPINION.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Todd V. McMurtry
Kevin F. Hoskins
Crestview Hills, Kentucky
Anthony G. Covatta
Cincinnati, Ohio
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