JEFFREYS (RENEE) M. VS. JEFFREYS (MARK S.)
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Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000894-MR
RENEE M. JEFFREYS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. MEHLING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01631
MARK S. JEFFREYS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND WINE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Appellant, Renee Jeffreys, appeals a decision of the Kenton
Family/Circuit Court. She contends that the award she received for maintenance
and division of marital debts was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further
conclusions of law.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married on April 12, 1997, in Washington, D.C.
They had two children during the marriage, KAJ born August, 29, 2001, and VEJ
born May 31, 2003. At the time of their divorce, the parties owned a residence
located at 218 Wallace Avenue in Covington, Kentucky. The house was valued at
$385,000, but they owed approximately $400,260.30 on first and second
mortgages. The house needed repairs and Appellee, Mark Jeffreys, had received
an insurance check for repairs. Appellant, Renee Jeffreys, filed for Chapter 7
Bankruptcy protection and had some debts discharged.
In addition to the amount owed on their residence, as of the date of
separation, the parties owed the following on credit cards:
Bank of America
$48,230.78
Chase
8,579.30
Cong. Fed Cr. Union
147.17
American Express
23,844.00
Bank of America
14,800.00
Bank of America
639.00
Wa Mu
28,387.00
Delta American Exp
17,848.25
Total
142,485.25
The trial court found that of the total debt, approximately $118,000 was in Mark’s
name while the remaining $24,000 was in Renee’s.
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Mark had a retirement account with his employer, Procter and Gamble with
an estimated value of $52,844 and was earning $129,000 plus bonuses each year.
Renee had earnings of $25,000 each year. Each party had IRA accounts with
Smith Barney. Mark’s was valued at $14,595.10 and Renee’s at $10,289. Renee
also had a Roth IRA valued at $4,100. Finally, Mark had P&G stock options
which would vest in September of 2009.
The trial court did not award maintenance to either party and held that the
second mortgage debt owed to Renee’s mother, Diana Minges, to “be
nondischargeable pursuant to 11[United States Code] U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) Section
523 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”
The trial court also divided the marital debt between the parties as follows:
13. Husband shall assume all debt currently in his
name and shall hold Wife harmless from this
marital debt. Wife shall assume all debt currently
in her name and shall hold Husband harmless from
this marital debt. The Court notes that Wife has
filed for bankruptcy and therefore the debts she is
to assume under this order of the Court, aside from
that of the debt owed to Ms. Minges, may be
discharged. Therefore, the following shall indicate
the debt(s) each party shall be responsible for
under this Order of the Court:
....
14. As the aforementioned tables describe,
Husband shall be responsible for $118,002.25 of
the marital debt, while Wife shall be responsible
for $24, 483.00 of the marital debt. This amount is
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in addition to the $110,269.30 marital debt
Husband and Wife owe to Ms. Minges. The Court
notes that the amount of debt to be assumed by
Husband is a total of $93,519.25 more than the
amount for which Wife shall be responsible. Any
debt incurred post separation not already
designated shall be the responsibility of the party
who incurred it.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Court at 8-9.
Renee now contends that the trial court made incorrect findings of fact,
conclusions of law regarding maintenance, debt division and the dischargeability
of the second mortgage held by her mother, and appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 provides that “[f]indings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Findings
are considered to be clearly erroneous if they are manifestly against the weight of
the evidence. Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Ky. 2008); Wells v.
Wells, 412 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1967).
In reviewing a court’s division of property in a divorce action, an appellate
court must defer to the discretion of the trial court. Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d
342 (Ky. 1978). The test for abuse of discretion is “whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Com. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
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DISCUSSION
Renee first contends that the trial court erred in failing to award her
maintenance.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.200 provides, in part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation . . . the court may grant a maintenance order
for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to him, to provide for his
reasonable needs[.]
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned
to him, and his ability to meet his needs
independently[.]
....
(c) The standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance
is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of
the spouse seeking maintenance.
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“Under this statute, the trial court has dual responsibilities: one, to make relevant
findings of fact; and two, to exercise its discretion in making a determination on
maintenance in light of those facts.” Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 826
(Ky. 1992).
In McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Ky. App. 2008), the court
held that “a final judgment shall not be set aside because of the failure of the trial
court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless the
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written motion pursuant to
CR 52.02.” In the present case, Renee did not file a motion to amend or clarify the
findings of fact set forth by the trial court. Thus, the findings must be upheld.
Renee also contends that the trial court erred in dividing the debts between
the parties. Specifically, she argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that she
could not discharge the debt owed to her mother, Diana Minges, as a second
mortgage on their real estate. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b) or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt…
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph
(5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a
divorce or separation or in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other
order of a court of record, or a determination made
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in accordance with State or territorial law by a
government unit[.]
We agree with Renee’s argument that federal courts maintain exclusive
jurisdiction in determining whether a debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re
Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 106 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky. 1996). See also Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 151 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Ky. App. 2004). Thus, the trial court committed
error in making a conclusion of law that the debt to Diana was not dischargeable.
Finally, Renee contends that the trial court erred in dividing the marital
debts. Specifically, she contends that the Bank of American debt of $14,800 and
the Wa Mu debt in the amount of $28,397 were in Mark’s name. In fact, she
contends, these debts were discharged in her bankruptcy proceeding. As set forth
previously, Renee did not bring to the attention of the trial court through motion
that additional findings needed to be made. Thus, we find the issue is not
preserved.
We therefore, affirm in part, reverse in part the decision of the trial court,
and remand this action for further conclusions of law regarding the issues of
maintenance and the dischargeability of the debt to Diana Minges.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bradley G. Braun
Covington, Kentucky
Holly A. Daugherty
Dawn M. Gentry
Covington, Kentucky
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