GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC. VS. ROBERTSON (DOLORES ANN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000483-MR
GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-005173
DOLORES ANN ROBERTSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS E.
ROBERTSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS AND WINE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, appeals the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s judgment and order of December 1, 2008, in favor of Dolores Ann
Robertson individually and as executrix of the estate of Thomas E. Robertson.
Because Garlock was not entitled to a directed verdict and because the award of
punitive damages was proper, we affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedure
Thomas Robertson was employed as a pipefitter-welder from 1961 until he
retired in 1999. During that time he came into contact with a variety of asbestoscontaining products, including Garlock gaskets. He was diagnosed with lung
cancer in March 2006 and passed away as a result of that disease in July 2006.
Robertson’s widow, Dolores, brought an action on behalf of his estate
alleging multiple claims against multiple defendants, including claims against
Garlock for strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty, claiming
Robertson’s exposure to asbestos-containing Garlock gaskets had contributed to
his illness and led to his death.1 She also brought a claim in her individual capacity
for loss of consortium. Prior to trial, Dolores settled claims against all defendants
except Garlock and E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Company.2
Following a lengthy trial, a jury returned a verdict against the defendants and
awarded damages to the estate totaling $1,471,870.00, including $97,418.00 for
necessary and reasonable medical expenses, $565,158.30 for loss of income,
$400,000.00 for physical and mental pain and suffering, $9,294.10 for necessary
and reasonable funeral expenses, and $400,000.00 in punitive damages. The jury
1
The complaint also named fourteen other defendants and an amended complaint added one
more. Some defendants named in the complaint filed third-party complaints, adding thirty-one
third-party defendants.
2
The estate’s claim against DuPont was a claim of negligence only.
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also awarded Dolores $50,000 on her loss of consortium claim. Twenty-five
percent of the liability for the compensatory damages was apportioned to Garlock;
the $400,000 punitive damage award was assessed only against Garlock.
Therefore, Garlock was ordered to pay $667,967.50 to the estate and $12,500 to
Dolores. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Garlock contends the circuit court erred when it denied motions
for directed verdict because Robertson’s estate failed to establish that Garlock
produced defectively-designed gaskets, and failed to establish that Garlock knew
or should have known of any dangers created by those gaskets. In particular,
Garlock contends there was insufficient evidence that its gaskets were
unreasonably dangerous or posed a known health hazard, or that a feasible safer
alternative gasket design exists. Garlock also argues the award of punitive
damages was unconstitutional because there was no evidence of reprehensible
behavior; Garlock further contends punitive damages were not available under
Kentucky law, specifically Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.184. Finally,
Garlock asserts the punitive damage instruction was erroneous because it failed to
define “malice.” We address each argument in turn.
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Motions for directed verdict as to liability
Our review of a trial court’s denial of a directed verdict motion is limited.
“All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the
reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should
be given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact.” Lewis
v. Bledsoe Surface Min. Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Ky. 1990) (citations
omitted). Further, “[t]he prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences
which may be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 462. We may reverse a denial of a
motion for a directed verdict only upon concluding that the fact finder’s decision
was palpably or flagrantly against the evidence. Id. When the evidence is in direct
conflict on an element of strict liability, the jury’s verdict will be upheld. See Post
v. American Cleaning Equipment, 437 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky. 1968).
The estate prevailed at trial under two theories. The first, a strict liability
claim, was based on the theory that the product was defective, either in its design,
or due to the manufacturer’s failure to provide adequate instructions or warnings,
or both.3 See Restatement (Third) Torts: Product Liability § 1 (1998). The second
claim was that Garlock negligently failed to provide adequate warnings about the
dangers of its gaskets. In the instant case, the jury found that Garlock was both
strictly liable and negligent in causing Robertson’s illness and death.
3
“Questions of design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or warnings arise
when the specific product unit conforms to the intended design but the intended design itself, or
its sale without adequate instructions or warnings, renders the product not reasonably safe. If
these forms of defect are found to exist, then every unit in the same product line is potentially
defective.” Restatement (Third) Torts: Product Liability §1 cmt. A (1998).
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Strict liability: feasible safer alternative
Garlock posits that a plaintiff asserting a claim for strict liability based on a
design defect must demonstrate the existence of a feasible safer alternative to the
product which caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury. There is support in our
jurisprudence for that position.4 “Kentucky law . . . stands for the proposition that
design defect liability requires proof of a feasible alternative design.” Toyota
4
This is true despite a more nuanced explanation of the law of strict liability found in other
sources:
The manufacturer is presumed to know the qualities and
characteristics, and the actual condition, of his product at the time
he sells it, and the question is whether the product creates “such a
risk” of an accident of the general nature of the one in question
“that an ordinarily prudent company engaged in the manufacture”
of such a product “would not have put it on the market.”
Considerations such as feasibility of making a safer product,
patency of the danger, warnings and instructions, subsequent
maintenance and repair, misuse, and the products’ inherently
unsafe characteristics, while they have a bearing
on the question as to whether the product was manufactured “in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” are all factors
bearing on the principal question rather than separate legal
questions. In a particular case, as with any question of substantial
factor or intervening cause, they may be decisive.
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough by McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776, 780-81 (Ky. 1984)
(quoting Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980); emphasis in
original). According Montgomery Elevator then, proof of the feasibility of a safer design, while
a relevant consideration, is not necessarily required for a strict liability claim.
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Motor Corporation v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004).5 It is at least
generally so that
Liability is imposed for a defective design when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.
Restatement (Third) Torts: Product Liability § 2 (1998). We need not now
directly address whether absence of proof of a feasible alternative design, in and of
5
This broad statement was made in the context of a crashworthiness claim, a type of products
liability claim which necessarily requires proof of a “reasonably safer design, practical under the
circumstances,” for reasons that do not translate to products liability claims more generally. See
Gregory, 136 S.W.3d at 35. The conclusion was also based upon rules articulated in Jones v.
Hutchinson Manufacturing, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973), and Ingersoll-Rand Company v.
Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. App. 1989). Jones, in which the product at issue was a grain auger,
is distinguishable on several grounds: the Court noted farming is commonly known to be a
dangerous activity, the machine alleged to be faultily designed was consistent with industry
standards (which were not found to be careless), and the negligence of the plaintiff’s father was
the sole cause of the injury. Rice was based on two statutory presumptions which the plaintiff
failed to rebut and which were not made an issue in the instant case. Those presumptions are
contained in KRS 411.310 as follows:
(1) In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, that
the subject product was not defective if the injury, death or
property damage occurred either more than five (5) years after the
date of sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years after
the date of manufacture.
(2) In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, that
the product was not defective if the design, methods of
manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally recognized
and prevailing standards or the state of the art in existence at the
time the design was prepared, and the product was manufactured.
KRS 411.310.
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itself, insulates a manufacturer from liability. In this case, Garlock’s argument that
Dolores failed to present such evidence is refuted by the record.
A key piece of evidence supporting the position of the estate and Dolores
was Garlock’s own advertisement for asbestos-free products, admitted into
evidence as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 27. Although this advertisement was from the
1990s, it included the promotion of its feasible alternative, non-asbestos gaskets
which it began developing years earlier. The advertisement drew the reader’s
attention with a bold-type headline stating: “IT’S TIME TO STOP USING
ASBESTOS AND NOBODY HAS BEEN MORE AWARE OF IT THAN
GARLOCK.” This was followed by text including the following.
Time is running out for asbestos. . . . Beginning in the
1960’s [sic], Garlock extended its R&D programs to
include the search for better performing materials. . . [I]n
the 1970’s [sic], Garlock began introducing a series of
cost-effective and highly successful asbestos-free sealing
products. . . . We became the leader in high quality,
asbestos-free gasketing and packing materials . . . .
[L]ong before federal regulations were being considered,
Garlock was up and running with proven asbestos-free
products.
(Plaintiff’s Ex. 27; emphasis in original). With respect to gaskets in particular, the
ad proclaimed the superiority of these alternatives to asbestos gaskets, stating, “For
handling high pres[sure] and extreme environments, Garlock’s asbestos-free
gaskets and packings have no equal. Both offer excellent resiliency and recovery.
Without [sic] the loss in sealability caused by the creep relaxation of asbestos
gaskets.” (Id.; emphasis in original). The ad included additional similar references
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intended to convey Garlock’s belief that its asbestos-free gaskets could accomplish
the same functions as its asbestos-containing products.
Exhibit 73 is also promotional material created by Garlock for its asbestosfree sealing products.6 A witness for Dolores testified it was produced sometime
after 1980, but could give no more specific date; however, the exhibit indicates that
Garlock was founded in 1887 and that this material was produced as part of its
100th anniversary. The exhibit claimed that “Garlock took the lead in the asbestosfree market almost 20 years ago. Today, Garlock customers throughout the world
are replacing asbestos with a minimum of difficulty, because our time-tested
asbestos-free products are measurably superior in performance.” (Plaintiff’s Ex.
73). The ad also asserts Garlock’s asbestos-free products will help customers
“realize significant savings” and generally extols the benefits of asbestos-free
gaskets.
Such evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that an
alternative product was available at the time Robertson was exposed to asbestos in
Garlock gaskets, even in the face of the countervailing evidence Garlock presented.
Garlock attempted to cast this alternative product in a different light by
presenting testimony that the consumers of the gaskets were ultimately responsible
for deciding whether to use asbestos-free or asbestos-containing gaskets. Garlock
witnesses testified that use of the wrong gasket could result in a joint failure,
causing serious injury or death to people nearby. Presumably, the purpose of
6
The ad includes information about gasketing products, packing materials, seals, joints, and
industrial textiles.
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eliciting this testimony was to suggest that asbestos-free gaskets (as opposed to an
improperly-sized gasket, for example) created greater safety risks than asbestoscontaining gaskets and were therefore not always a reasonable alternative. When
challenged, however, this evidence was shown to be hypothetical as there was no
testimony that the alternative asbestos-free gaskets were, in fact, less efficient or
more dangerous than the asbestos-containing gaskets. Given the weak nature of
Garlock’s evidence on this matter, and the comparatively strong nature of the
estate’s evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded there was a feasible
safer alternative.
Redundant instructions and possibility of inconsistency
Included in the portion of Garlock’s brief which addresses a safer feasible
alternative is the following passage: “Because failure to warn is a ‘subset’ of
design defect under KY [sic] law, See: Sturm Roger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586 SW2d 19
(Ky. 1979) [sic], the inclusion of the failure to warn language under Instruction
No. 2 resulted in a redundancy with the contradictory result of a requirement to
warn about a product that may be found, as a matter of law, not unreasonably
dangerous.” We treat this statement as presenting a separate argument. However,
we find this argument unpersuasive.
Instruction No. 1 permitted the jury to find for Robertson under a theory of
strict liability, while Instruction No. 2 instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff if
it found Garlock had negligently failed to adequately warn of its product’s dangers.
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Garlock appears to argue that in a “failure to warn” case, it is error to instruct both
on a strict liability theory and a negligence theory.
This issue arose in Tipton v. Michelin Tire Company, 101 F.3d 1145 (6th
Cir. 1996). In Tipton, as in the instant case, the jury was instructed on both strict
liability and negligence. Unlike Robertson’s case, however, the jury in Tipton
found for the defendant under the theory of strict liability and for the plaintiff
under the negligence theory. In so doing, the jury implicitly found the product in
question was not in a defective condition for purposes of strict liability, but that it
was defective for purposes of negligence. The Tipton court held the two findings
were inconsistent and reversed. Here, there is no such inconsistency, and we agree
with the appellees that any error in the instructions, if one existed at all, was
therefore harmless.
Strict liability: unreasonable danger
Garlock did not present evidence contradicting the estate’s evidence
that friable asbestos, if inhaled, can cause cancer and death. And, it acknowledged
that 75% to 85% of the raw material in its suspect gaskets was asbestos. However,
Garlock’s defense was that during the gaskets’ manufacture, all the potentially
friable asbestos was encapsulated in a material that, so long as it was undisturbed,
prevented the asbestos fibers from being entrained in the air. Yet this does not
present the whole story the jury heard.
The jury also heard that when an installed asbestos gasket, having
been subjected to extremes of pressure and temperature, can no longer maintain a
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seal between two pieces of metal, it must be replaced. The first step in
replacement is removal of the old gasket. Clearly this is an ordinary and
predictable part of the use for which Garlock’s asbestos-containing product was
intended. Removal of the old gasket is a pipefitter’s job and usually destroys the
encapsulating material, rendering the asbestos friable, and entraining asbestos
fibers in the pipefitter’s breathing zone. See, e.g., Bailey v. North American
Refractories Co., 95 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Ky. App. 2001)(for a description of a
similar process that entrained asbestos fibers in the air where they could be inhaled
by workers).
Having heard this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that
Garlock was aware that the normal use of its product would result in a pipefitter’s
inhalation of friable asbestos.
Garlock’s countervailing evidence on this issue came primarily from
an industrial hygienist, Donna Ringo, who conducted studies which failed to reveal
that the removal of asbestos gaskets created levels of asbestos exposure which
violated Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) emission limits.
The estate’s experts, however, testified that there were problems with the methods
Ringo employed which called her conclusions into question.
Garlock also argues that the fact that OSHA regulations did not
require warnings on its product when first placed into commerce was proof the
product was not dangerous. The estate’s experts disputed this contention,
testifying that in their interpretation of OSHA regulations, there may have been a
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requirement for warnings based on the fact that foreseeable use of the products
when removed rendered them friable.
Finally, Garlock disputes the validity of the appellees’ experts’ testimony
because none was an industrial hygienist. In advancing this argument, Garlock
claims the testimony of its industrial hygienist – the only one to testify – should
have been conclusive on the matter. However, Garlock had the opportunity to
cross-examine the appellees’ witnesses and call attention to the fact that their
expertise was in a different field of study, not specifically industrial hygiene. The
jury could then weigh the credibility of all the testimony in light of the experts’
respective areas of expertise. Our review of the record indicates this did occur.
While Garlock has identified evidence which weighs against a verdict in
favor of Robertson’s estate, it has failed to convince us the verdict was achieved as
the result of passion or prejudice and not based on substantial evidence. Lewis,
798 S.W.2d at 461-62. The testimony conflicted as to whether Garlock’s gaskets
were dangerous, and the jury was entitled to weigh that testimony, ascribing
credibility as it saw fit. So long as there is substantial evidence supporting a
verdict, as there is here, we lack any basis for disturbing it.
Negligence: failure to warn
Garlock next contends it was entitled to a directed verdict on the negligence
claim as well because, similarly to the strict liability claim, the estate failed to
demonstrate Garlock knew or should have known its asbestos-containing gaskets
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were hazardous. Accordingly, contends Garlock, there was no duty to warn
Robertson of any hazards.
In a negligence action, a manufacturer is required to warn only about
foreseeable dangers associated with its products. See Restatement (Second) Torts
§ 388 (1965). Garlock contends it was not obligated to warn pipefitter-welders
such as Robertson about the dangers of asbestos in its gaskets because the
manufacturer was not aware of said dangers and had no reason to be aware of
them. To this end, Garlock contends that while there was proof Garlock knew raw
asbestos and asbestos insulation created risks of serious harm, that does not lead to
the conclusion the manufacturer had any reason to believe its asbestos-containing
gaskets in particular were dangerous.
As stated above, however, there was evidence to the contrary; Garlock
gaskets, when used in the manner pipefitters tend to use them, produce dust which
they breathe, thereby creating a risk of exposure to asbestos that causes cancer. It
was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Garlock could foresee that removal of
its asbestos-containing gaskets in the ordinary course of replacing them would
entrain into the breathing zone of a pipefitter the very asbestos Garlock used in its
manufacture of gaskets.
Other evidence of such foreseeability was presented in the form of testimony
by a former employee of Rohm & Haas, a consumer of a considerable quantity of
Garlock’s asbestos-containing gaskets. The employee testified that as early as
1973, it was Rohm & Haas policy to require protective measures (breathing masks,
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for example) when removing asbestos-containing gaskets. The company’s internal
memoranda from that year reveal concern that exposure to asbestos from the
removal of asbestos-containing gaskets created hazards to the health and safety of
employees.
Given such evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that if a
consumer of Garlock’s product could foresee such hazards to its employees’
health, so could Garlock.
In sum, we conclude that none of Garlock’s arguments challenging the
denial of its motions for directed verdict as to liability is sufficiently persuasive to
justify reversal.
Punitive damages
Garlock also appeals the circuit court’s denial of its motion for a directed
verdict on the issue of punitive damages, asserting the plaintiffs were not entitled
to them because: (1) there was no evidence Garlock’s conduct was reprehensible,
and therefore an award of punitive damages violates federal due process
requirements; and (2) Garlock’s behavior was not so outrageous under Kentucky
law as to merit punishment and deterrence. Garlock also argues the circuit court
erroneously failed to include the definition of malice in the jury instructions.
Jury Instruction No. 4 permitted the jurors to assess punitive damages
against Garlock if they were “satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that
Garlock acted with reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of others,
including Mr. Robertson[.]” It went on to list factors the jurors could consider in
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making their decision, including the “reprehensibility” factors enumerated in BMW
of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The instruction did not use or
define the word malice.
Punitive damages under the United States Constitution
Constitutional challenges to punitive damage awards are reviewed de novo.
Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 931 (Ky. 2007) (citing
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 121
S.Ct. 1678, 1685-86, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) provides “the
substantive standard for determining the jury award’s conformity with due
process.” Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 431, 121 S.Ct. at 1683, fn. 4. In Gore,
the United States Supreme Court instructs reviewing courts to consider three
guideposts:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513,
1520, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. at 1599).
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Garlock’s only constitutional challenge is its argument that there was no
evidence supporting the jury’s determination that its conduct was reprehensible,7
that reprehensibility is the “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award[,]” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at
575 at 1599), and that absent evidence of reprehensibility, an award of punitive
damages violates due process. We find Garlock’s argument unpersuasive.
Campbell tells us that there are at least five factors bearing on the
reprehensibility guidepost. Those factors require that we consider
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to
or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1515-16 (citing Gore 517 U.S. at 576-77).
Applying these factors, we find first that the harm to Robertson was
primarily physical: all the evidence demonstrated that he contracted lung cancer
and died. Although Robertson incurred economic liabilities in the form of medical
expenses and lost income, those damages were merely incidental to the primary
injury. The harm cannot be classified as economic as opposed to physical, and
therefore analysis under this factor supports an inference that Garlock’s behavior
was reprehensible.
7
Garlock repeats its argument, addressed and rejected earlier in the opinion, that there was no
proof that its product was defective or unreasonably dangerous.
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As the estate notes, there was evidence that from the time Garlock learned of
the disease-causing properties of asbestos (perhaps as early as the 1930s) until it
considered including a warning in some of its packaging (the late 1970s), Garlock
intentionally disregarded the health of pipefitters who removed Garlock gaskets for
replacement by grinding them off pipe flanges. Such evidence could support the
inference that Garlock thereby evinced an indifference to the health of the persons
who used its product; it thereby supports an inference of reprehensibility.
Evidence also supported the conclusion that Garlock’s behavior was not an
isolated incident but a pattern of repeated actions that placed asbestos in the hands
of consumers whose ordinary use of the product risked their health. The testimony
of one of Robertson’s former supervisors, as well as testimony of Robertson’s
brother, supported the conclusion that many pipefitter-welders had been so
exposed on a routine basis. A witness from Garlock testified that, while the
manufacturer began placing warning labels on gasket materials in 1977, the
warnings were ineffective as they were unlikely to reach end-users of the gaskets,
namely Robertson and other pipefitter-welders. Combined with the testimony of
the retired pipefitter-welders that they had never seen a warning on any asbestoscontaining gasket, this evidence supported the conclusion that Garlock’s tortious
failure to warn was repeated. This supports an inference of reprehensibility.
Finally, the estate also notes that it presented evidence that Garlock
interfered with testing of its gaskets to minimize the appearance of the risk to
which pipefitters were exposed. This evidence, argues the estate, supports another
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factor in the reprehensibility analysis – that the harm Robertson suffered was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, and not mere accident.
Therefore, considering the Campbell reprehensibility factors, we
cannot agree with Garlock that there was no evidence of reprehensibility.
Punitive damages under Kentucky law
Garlock’s next argument is that Kentucky law does not permit an award of
punitive damages in the instant case. We disagree.
Applying the jural rights doctrine, Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky.
1998), declared that KRS 411.184(1)(c) unconstitutionally limited the availability
of punitive damages to “conduct that is carried out . . . with a subjective awareness
that such conduct will result in human death or bodily harm.” Williams, 972
S.W.2d at 269. Therefore, it remains that, as a matter of state law, “punitive
damages could be recovered for negligent conduct which exceeded ordinary
negligence whether such conduct was expressed as gross negligence, recklessness,
wantonness, or some other such term.” Id. at 263. Read in the context of Horton
v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985), the defendant’s
actions must amount to “something more than the failure to exercise slight care . . .
there must be an element of either malice or willfulness or such an utter and
wanton disregard of the rights of others as from which it may be assumed the act
was malicious or willful.” Cooper v. Barth, 464 S.W.2d 233 at 235 (Ky. 1971).
Garlock contends its conduct could not be outrageous – and therefore could
not warrant punitive damages – because it exercised “slight care,” as evinced by its
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compliance with OSHA regulations. This argument fails for two reasons. First,
whether Garlock complied with OSHA regulations was a disputed fact with
substantial evidence supporting a reasonable jury’s conclusion either way.8
Second, even if Garlock had complied with all applicable OSHA regulations,
whether Garlock’s behavior evinced a reckless disregard for the health and safety
of others remained an issue of fact for the jury. Testimony was presented that
compliance with OSHA regulations did nothing to reduce the risk of cancer as the
result of exposure to asbestos. Therefore, regulatory compliance cannot be said to
have been dispositive of the issue. Given all the evidence, much of which has been
described earlier in this opinion, the jury was entitled to conclude that Garlock’s
failure to discover the dangers inherent in the removal of their gaskets and the
failure to adequately warn Robertson constituted “gross negligence, recklessness,
wantonness, or some other such term.” Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 263.
Jury instruction
8
At trial, Garlock asserted it went beyond OSHA requirements and placed warnings on the
materials from which its asbestos-containing gaskets were formed in the manufacturing process,
despite the fact that it was not required to do so. This assertion was based upon Garlock’s
position that the asbestos in the gaskets was encapsulated and therefore needed no warning.
Experts for Robertson’s estate, however, testified that the asbestos became friable – and the
encapsulation had no protective effect – when put to foreseeable use by pipefitter-welders such
as Robertson. The evidence on this was therefore in controversy.
Garlock also asserted at trial that, based on the results of the study conducted by
industrial hygienist Donna Ringo, the rate of asbestos emitted from the gaskets was below the
permissible amount established by OSHA regulations. As noted previously, the validity of that
study was called into question by various witnesses for the estate, and the jury was entitled to
believe or disbelieve the claim that Garlock was in fact compliant.
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Finally, Garlock contends the circuit court erred in failing to define “malice”
in the jury instruction in accordance to KRS 411.184(1)(c). That section of the
statute provides,
“Malice” means either conduct which is specifically
intended by the defendant to cause tangible or intangible
injury to the plaintiff or conduct that is carried out by the
defendant both with a flagrant indifference to the rights
of the plaintiff and with a subjective awareness that such
conduct will result in human death or bodily harm.
KRS 411.184(1)(c). As noted, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared
KRS 411.184(1)(c) unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, Garlock argues that two cases – Caneyville Volunteer Fire
Department v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790 (Ky. 2009) and
Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999) – combine to overturn Williams’
prohibition against abolishing jural rights and Williams’ declaration that the
definition of malice in KRS 411.184(1)(c) is unconstitutional.
We first address Gilbert, in which the Supreme Court abolished the
common law cause of action for breach of promise to marry. Garlock reads this
case as permitting the courts to eliminate common law causes of action. This
contention is apparently based upon the following passage: “when this court finds
a common law cause of action to be anomalous, unworkable or contrary to public
policy, it will abolish the action.” Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 776 (citing D&W Auto
Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1980)). Neither that
statement, nor Gilbert’s holding, however, affects the holdings of Wilson. The
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Gilbert court specifically held the jural rights doctrine was not implicated in its
decision because the ruling did not “eradicate[e] the ability of a party to seek a
remedy for such a wrong, but rather . . . modif[ied] the form that remedy may
take.” Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 776. The Supreme Court made it a point to
specifically distinguish Williams from Gilbert; Gilbert therefore does not alter
Williams’ holding in any way.
Neither does Caneyville alter Williams’ holding. The Supreme Court in
Caneyville addressed the interplay of the oft times conflicting principles of
sovereign immunity and jural rights. Ultimately, the Court in Caneyville upheld
the statutory protection from suit the legislature granted to firefighters and fire
departments stating, “[t]he reigning authority on the matter holds that sovereign
immunity (as embodied in Ky. Const. §231) will trump jural rights (Ky. Const.
§§14, 54, 241) because it is a specific provision of the Constitution, rather than a
general provision.” Caneyville, 286 S.W.3d at 801 (citation omitted). The holding
of Caneyville applies to firefighters and fire departments because of their unique
role in the history of the government of the Commonwealth and does not overrule
Williams. There is no issue of sovereign immunity in the instant case, and
therefore the legislature’s attempt to alter the ability to recover punitive damages in
KRS 411.184(1)(c) does not enjoy the protections of the statute at issue in
Caneyville.
Gilbert and Caneyville do not address KRS 411.184(1)(c) and are
distinguishable on the other grounds noted. They do not overrule Williams.
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Therefore, it would have been improper to include in the jury instruction the
unconstitutional statutory definition of malice set forth in KRS 411.184(1)(c).
Conclusion
Because the jury’s verdict was based upon reasonable conclusions supported
by substantial evidence, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Garlock’s motions
for a directed verdict. We also affirm the assessment of punitive damages against
Garlock as the award did not violate federal due process standards and was
permissible under Kentucky law. Garlock was not entitled to a jury instruction on
the definition of malice codified in KRS 411.184(1)(c). Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John K. Gordinier
Ilam E. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
Joseph D. Satterley
John R. Shelton
Louisville, Kentucky
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