HENDERSON (LEON DAY), JR. VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002242-MR
HENDERSON LEON DAY, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 03-CR-00036 & 03-CR-00180
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER AND WINE, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE: Henderson Leon Day, Jr. appeals from a Laurel
Circuit Court denial of his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
motion for post-conviction relief. Day claims that his guilty plea was not
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Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
knowingly and intelligently entered based upon the following allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) defense counsel (counsel) misadvised him
concerning his sentence; (2) counsel did not sufficiently investigate the case; and
(3) counsel failed to advise him that he could enter a conditional plea. Following a
review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable case law, we affirm the
circuit court judgment.
After receiving a complaint about drug activity at Day’s residence,
Laurel County Sheriff’s deputies went to the home to investigate and to execute an
arrest warrant on Day. The deputies saw a “Beware of Dog” sign hanging on a
fence in the front of the residence. The officers walked to the back yard and found
Day and Dennis Saylor, who admitted to making methamphetamine. The deputies
executed a protective sweep of the property and the residence for officers’ safety
and secured the area. Thirty minutes later, Day consented to a search of the
property. Day was arrested.
While awaiting the disposition of his narcotics case, Day was charged
with one count of solicitation to commit murder for soliciting someone to kill a
Laurel Co. Sheriff’s deputy.
On February 11, 2004, Day pled guilty to the charges of criminal
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm and
manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, for which he
was charged in case number 03-CR-00180. The plea carried a concurrent sentence
of twenty-seven years’ imprisonment for each count. On the same day, Day pled
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guilty to one count of criminal solicitation to commit murder, for which he was
charged in case number 03-CR-00036. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Day
received twenty years’ imprisonment on the solicitation charge to run concurrently
with his sentence in case number 03-CR-00180. Day was represented by separate
attorneys for each case. Both attorneys were present during the guilty pleas.
On March 25, 2005, Day filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion requesting
that the trial court set aside his convictions. Day claimed that his guilty pleas were
the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 8, 2008, defense counsel
filed a supplemental pleading in support of Day’s RCr 11.42 motion. Without
holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court vacated Day’s guilty plea with
respect to the charge of criminal conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine
while in possession of a firearm under case number 03-CR-00180. The trial court
denied Day’s request for post-conviction relief on the remaining convictions. This
appeal follows.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Generally
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
movant must show first that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A
showing of deficient performance requires a movant to show that counsel made
such egregious errors that the movant was effectively denied his right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. Id.
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The trial court’s review of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. Id., 466 U.S. at 689; 104 S.Ct. at 2065. When judging counsel’s
performance, courts must question whether counsel provided “reasonably effective
assistance.” Id., 466 U.S. at 687; 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The reasonableness of the
representation must be determined in light of the prevailing professional norms.
Id., 400 U.S. at 688; 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Second, the movant must demonstrate that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his case. Id., 466 U.S. at 687; 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The
movant must show that counsel's errors were so serious that they deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. Id. With respect to a guilty plea, however, the movant
must also show that counsel’s performance so seriously affected the case, that, but
for the deficiency, the movant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59; 106 S.Ct. 366, 370; 88 L.Ed.2d
203 (1985).
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42
motion if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively determined by
a review of the record. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001).
B. Standard of Review
It is well established that the defendant has the burden to convincingly
establish that he was deprived of his right to counsel. RCr 11.42; Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). On appeal, we must examine
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counsel’s performance and any deficiency that existed under a de novo standard.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008).
The Strickland test, as detailed above, involves mixed questions of
fact and law. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Ky. 1968).
Appellate courts must show deference to the findings of fact and credibility
determinations made by the trial court. Id. Those findings may only be set aside if
they are clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Black
Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1964).
C. Grounds for Post-Conviction Relief
First, Day claims that counsel failed to advise him that the
Commonwealth recommended a sentence of ten years on the charge of solicitation
to commit murder. As described above, Day received a total sentence of 27 years’
imprisonment with all charges from both cases running concurrently. Whether he
received 10 or 20 years’ imprisonment for the solicitation charge did not have an
overall effect on his sentence. The total sentence would have been 27 years
regardless.
Moreover, our review of the record does not support Day’s contention
that he was unaware of the recommended sentence during the plea. The following
is an excerpt from the plea colloquy between Day and the Court:
Court: Do you have any complaints about your
representation?
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Day: No.
Court: Did you want your lawyers to do anything that
they have not done?
Day: No.
....
Court: Did you read the motions to enter a guilty plea?
Day: Yes.
Court: After you read them, did you sign them?
Day: Yes.
Court: Did you sign them voluntarily?
Day: Yes.
Court: Do you understand that on the charge of criminal
solicitation to commit murder you face 10 to 20 years in
the penitentiary and a fine of up to $10,000.00?
Day: Yes.
...
Court: Do you understand that on the charge of
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine while in
possession of a firearm you face 20 to 50 years or life?
Day: Yes.
Court: Do you understand that on the charge of
manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of
a firearm you face the same penalty?
Day: Yes.
....
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Court: Have you had all the time you need to speak with
both of your attorneys concerning the Commonwealth’s
written recommendation and each of your cases?
Day: Yes.
Court: In return for your guilty pleas, the
Commonwealth recommends as follows: On 03-CR00036, the Commonwealth recommends, on count one,
27 years, and on count three, 27 years. The
Commonwealth agrees to dismiss the remaining counts.
. . . with counts one and three to run concurrent with
each other and 03-CR-00180. It is the Commonwealth’s
understanding that parole eligibility is 20%. In case
number 03-CR-00180 the Commonwealth’s
recommendation reads as follows: 20 years to serve.
The Commonwealth agrees this sentence to run
concurrent with 03-CR-00036. It is the
Commonwealth’s understanding that parole eligibility for
the above offense is 20%. Is that your understanding of
the agreement that the Commonwealth has agreed to
make in each of your cases?
Day: Yes.
Day signed a written plea agreement before the above colloquy. The
written agreement and the questions asked by the trial court both indicate that Day
clearly understood the Commonwealth’s offer and the recommended sentence.
Second, Day claims that counsel did not contact him prior to
the date of the plea and failed to sufficiently investigate the charge of solicitation
to commit murder. Although Day alleges that counsel failed to investigate the
case, Day fails to articulate facts or defenses that counsel should have investigated.
In his brief, Day simply states that an investigation had not been conducted;
otherwise counsel would have known that, “there was no evidence to support the
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charge.” However, an RCr 11.42 proceeding is not the time to litigate the
sufficiency of the evidence. Nickell v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Ky.
1970).
Further, the plea colloquy does not support Day’s contentions. During
his plea, Day agreed that he was satisfied by his attorneys’ representation. He
claimed that he had sufficient opportunity to discuss his case.
In addition, the solicitation to commit murder charge runs
concurrently with the other charge. Under Hill, Day must show that he would not
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel’s failure
to investigate the case. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; 106 S.Ct. at 370 (1985). In light of
the offer of concurrent sentences and the maximum penalties of the other charge, it
is unlikely that Day would have insisted on going to trial even if his counsel had
fully investigated the charge.
Third, Day argues his attorney failed to advise him that he should only
accept a conditional plea in case number 03-CR-00180. Day claims that the police
conducted an illegal search of his home. He argues that, without counsel’s failure
to advise him that he should only enter a conditional plea, he would have gone to
trial, appealed if convicted, and then prevailed on appeal.
This claim is a thinly veiled attempt to argue that the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress. There is no right to enter a conditional
guilty plea. In his motion to enter a guilty plea, Day acknowledged that he
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understood that he had the right to appeal his case to a higher court. He also
acknowledged that by pleading guilty he waived that right.
Although Day claims that the search of his home was “in fact illegal”,
this comment is mere speculation. Facts and circumstances existed that could
reasonably lead counsel to believe that an appeal of the trial court’s denial of Day’s
motion to suppress would be unsuccessful. Although officers remained on the
property for thirty minutes prior to receiving consent to search, the dangerous
nature of manufacture of methamphetamine increases the need for a secure
premises and the need for a thorough protective sweep. See Bishop v. Com., 237
S.W.3d 567 (Ky. App. 2007) (a strong chemical smell consistent with manufacture
of methamphetamine created exigent circumstances based on public safety).
In light of the plea agreement offered by the Commonwealth and the
facts surrounding the search, defense counsel’s failure to advise Day that he should
only accept a conditional guilty plea is not unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Laurel Circuit Court Order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Henderson Leon Day, Jr., pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
W. Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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