RICE (JEREMY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002212-MR
JEREMY RICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00300
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Jeremy Rice appeals from an order of the Fayette Circuit
Court denying his RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rice makes a number of arguments, but one is dispositive of this appeal. He
argues that he was denied his right to counsel when trial counsel failed to appear at
a critical stage of the proceedings. We agree and reverse and remand this case for
a new trial.
The facts as recited by our Supreme Court on direct appeal were as
follows:
On the night of April 24, 2003, Tammy Sanders and
her boyfriend, Chris Manley, were inside their home
when an unknown stranger knocked on their front door
between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Ms. Sanders opened
the door and let the stranger, Wanda Hughes, into her
home. Ms. Hughes stated that she was lost and asked if
she could use the telephone. Ms. Sanders obliged, and
thus allowed Ms. Hughes to use her phone. Apparently,
Ms. Hughes was unsuccessful in reaching the other party
on the line, and she left the house shortly thereafter.
Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on that same night, Ms.
Sanders and Mr. Manley heard another knock at their
front door. Ms. Sanders answered the door and
discovered that it was Ms. Hughes once again. This time,
Ms. Hughes asked Ms. Sanders if she was familiar with
the location of a particular address. She was not familiar
with the address and then proceeded to call Mr. Manley
from the bedroom to see if he possibly recognized it. At
that point, a person entered into the house wearing a
mask and carrying a gun. While being ordered to lie
down on the floor, Ms. Sanders was hit in the back,
causing her to fall and dislocate her arm. While on the
ground, she noticed several other masked individuals
entering her residence as well.
Mr. Manley was located in the hallway of the house,
where he proceeded to raise both of his hands upon
seeing the masked men. While on the floor, Ms. Sanders
heard a loud noise followed by Mr. Manley yelling that
he had been shot. The masked men asked both Manley
and Sanders where they kept the drugs, money, and
“good stuff.” Ms. Sanders told them she did not know
what they were talking about, and offered them instead
her purse and where to find her jewelry in the house.
Eventually, the assailants picked up a few items and
proceeded to leave the residence.
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At trial, the testimony of Chris Manley and Tammy
Sanders was very similar. Mr. Manley testified that he
encountered one of the intruders in the hallway. This
intruder pointed a gun at Mr. Manley, demanding that he
give him money and drugs. The assailant backed Mr.
Manley into the bedroom where he ordered him to get
down on the floor. Soon after Mr. Manley complied, the
burglar shot him in the leg. Mr. Manley testified at trial
that two other assailants entered the bedroom, with one
putting a gun to the victim’s head and the other taking
change that the couple had been saving.
Neither Ms. Sanders nor Mr. Manley could identify
the individuals who violently entered their residence on
the night of April 24, 2003. However, Ms. Sanders was
able to recognize Wanda Hughes from a photographic
line up. Following the identification, Ms. Hughes was
arrested and agreed to help the local authorities find the
other individuals involved. While Ms. Hughes aided the
police in identifying three of the participants, she was not
able to positively identify Appellant as being at the crime
scene. However, a co-conspirator in the robbery, Arian
Brown, did testify that the Appellant was an active
participant in the robbery.
On March 8, 2004, a Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Appellant on one count of robbery in the first
degree, one count of burglary in the first degree, and one
count of being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree. The indictment included several co-conspirators
as well. In addition, Appellant was charged with assault
in the first degree for shooting Mr. Manley. A trial
commenced in July 2004, with Appellant and two other
co-defendants being charged for their participation in the
burglary. Appellant was ultimately acquitted of assault
in the first degree, but the jury was hung on the
remaining charges of robbery in the first degree, burglary
in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender
in the second degree.
A second trial was scheduled for December 14, 2005,
in which Appellant was to be tried along with another codefendant. However, the other co-defendant accepted a
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plea agreement with the Commonwealth prior to the
commencement of trial. Appellant was therefore tried on
the charges by himself. The jury found Appellant guilty
of robbery in the second degree and burglary in the
second degree. In addition, the jury found Appellant to
be a persistent felony offender and recommended that the
ten year sentence for robbery and ten year sentence for
burglary both be enhanced to twenty years. Thus, the
jury recommendation, accepted by the trial judge, was
that Appellant serve a total of forty years.
Rice v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 732, 733 -734 (Ky. 2006).
Rice appealed his conviction, but it was affirmed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court. Rice thereafter filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to
RCr 11.42 on the grounds that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit
court denied the motion without a hearing. This appeal followed.
The only argument we need address is Rice’s first one. He argues that
he was denied assistance of counsel at a critical stage in his trial when his trial
counsel missed a pretrial hearing. “It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a
right to be represented by counsel that extends beyond the actual trial to every
critical stage of the proceedings.” Stone v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 233,
237 (Ky. 2007).
. . . The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a ‘critical stage’
in various terms: “any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might
derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial; a
“moment when available defenses may be irretrievably
lost, if not then and there asserted[;”] a period when
counsel’s attendance is necessary to “mount a meaningful
defense[;”] a stage when “potential substantial prejudice
to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and
the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice[.”]
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Thus, an analysis of a critical stage necessarily involves a
retrospective inquiry as to the nature and consequences
of each step in the proceedings. Particular attention must
be given to how counsel would have benefited the
defendant at these moments. In other words, was there
the likelihood that representation by counsel would have
benefited Appellant?
The denial of counsel at a critical stage is not subject
to harmless error analysis once a lawyer-less stage has
been deemed as critical. “It is settled that a complete
absence of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation
warranting reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both,
as applicable, without analysis for prejudice or harmless
error.” (Internal citations omitted).
Id. at 238.
Our analysis begins with discussing what took place during the
pretrial hearing. The hearing took place the day before trial. During that hearing,
a number of evidentiary issues were discussed; primary among them was whether
the fact that Rice had been acquitted of the assault could be disclosed to the jury.
Connected to that was the issue of whether it could be testified to that Rice was the
one who shot Mr. Manley. Since Rice had been acquitted of the assault, the court
found these issues too prejudicial to the two defendants. The shooting was
prejudicial to Rice because he had been acquitted. The trial judge felt it was
prejudicial to Rice’s co-defendant because the jury may want to punish him for the
assault since Rice could not be. However, since the shooting occurred during the
robbery, the Commonwealth argued the shooting should be allowed to be
discussed. The judge crafted a solution, allowing testimony that Rice had a gun,
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went toward the back of the house to where Mr. Manley was located, and that a
shot was heard. Rice was not able to fully participate in these discussions because
he was without counsel. At one point, Rice requested that the trial judge explain
her ruling stating that he was confused and that without his counsel being present
he was having a hard time understanding.
Also, during this hearing, Rice’s co-defendant moved to exclude
evidence that Ms. Sanders was pregnant at the time of the burglary. Because
Rice’s counsel was not present at this hearing, he was unable to join in the motion.
The trial court refused to exclude this evidence. Rice appealed this issue to the
Kentucky Supreme Court which held that because he did not join in the motion, it
was not preserved for review, Rice at 738, but ultimately held it was still
admissible.
Further, during this hearing, the trial court stated that an
admonishment would be given to the jury that neither of the defendants was on
trial for the shooting of Mr. Manley. This admonishment was never given at trial.
This issue was also appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found no error, but
also stated that Rice had a duty to speak up and remind the court about the
admonition. Id.
A number of evidentiary matters were discussed and Rice was unable
to meaningfully participate in the hearing because he was without counsel.
Evidentiary issues are important to trials. Had Rice’s counsel been at the hearing,
Rice’s defense could have benefited. Counsel may have reminded the court about
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the promised admonishment, helped craft the shooting evidence in a more
favorable way for Rice, and joined in the motion regarding the pregnancy.
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed some of these issues and found
no prejudice to Rice or no trial court error, we do not analyze this lack of counsel
issue in terms of prejudice or error. If this was a critical stage of the proceedings,
the lack of counsel was a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. We find this
was a critical stage and reverse Rice’s conviction.
Rice’s other arguments are moot because we are granting him a new
trial.
For the forgoing reasons, we reverse and remand this case to the trial
court for a new trial.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINON.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I must dissent. I do
not believe that the pre-trial hearing for which Rice’s counsel was absent
constituted a “critical stage” of the proceedings, pursuant to Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d
292, 312 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Stone v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 233, 238
(Ky. 2007). There is no reason why Rice’s attorney could not have objected to the
admission of the evidence during trial, or requested admonitions to the jury
concerning the evidence. Therefore, because there was a chance to rectify during
trial the fact that the evidence was introduced, the pre-trial hearing that was
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conducted the day before trial cannot constitute a “critical stage” of the
proceedings.
Alternatively, even though the “absence of counsel at a critical stage
of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation warranting
reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as applicable, without analysis for
prejudice or harmless error,” the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained that “in
determining whether a particular stage was critical, [the] Court must undertake an
analysis that is similar to an inquiry for actual prejudice.” Stone, 217 S.W.3d at
238. In the present case, on direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court
determined that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence at issue.
Therefore, because the trial court committed no error in admitting the evidence, it
logically follows that Rice was not prejudiced by the admission of that evidence.
Consequently, because there was no actual prejudice, the pre-trial hearing, where
the court determined that the evidence was admissible, was not a critical stage.
Thus, the absence of Rice’s counsel from that hearing did not constitute a
constitutional violation.
Moreover, based upon the circuit court’s order denying Rice’s RCr
11.42 motion and the Commonwealth’s brief on appeal, I question whether Rice’s
arguments on appeal regarding the absence of his counsel from the second pre-trial
hearing are the same arguments that he raised in the circuit court. The
Commonwealth contends that Rice’s bases for his absence of counsel arguments
are different on appeal than those that he presented in the circuit court.
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Additionally, regarding his claim that his counsel was absent from the second pretrial hearing, the circuit court’s order denying his RCr 11.42 motion states as
follows:
Rice alleges that trial counsel was not aware of the
existence of an audiotape interview between [his codefendant] and a detective. Rice has not provided any
evidence to support his argument that trial counsel did
not know about the tape. . . . Rice has failed to show
what new information would have been obtained by trial
counsel had he been present at [the] hearing[].
Based on the circuit court’s foregoing analysis, it does not appear that Rice
presented the same arguments regarding his absence of counsel claim in the circuit
court as he raises on appeal. Thus, we should not consider these arguments for the
first time on appeal. See Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky.
1976) (“The appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial
judge and another to the appellate court.”). Accordingly, I would not reverse for a
new trial based upon this issue.
I pause to note that while the appellate court should not micromanage
the circuit court’s controlling of its own docket, holding a pre-trial hearing in the
absence of defense counsel lends itself to the likelihood of a request for appellate
review.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Meggan Smith
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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