HUDSON (RAY) VS. LECHNER (MARK), ET AL.
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RENDERED: APRIL 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001799-MR
RAY HUDSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-004438
MARK LECHNER;
CHRIS DISCHINGER; AND
LDG DEVELOPMENT, LLC
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Ray Hudson appeals from the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s summary judgment against him in favor of Appellees Mark Lechner, Chris
Dischinger, and LDG Development, LLC upon Appellant’s claim for damages
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
based on unjust enrichment. Upon our review, we hold that the trial court erred
when it sua sponte entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to this
allegation. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
In July and August of 2006, Appellant loaned approximately $25,400
to a man who referred to himself as Master Khalid A. Raheem, I. Raheem told
Appellant that he owned properties located at 712 South 35th Street and 858 South
22nd Street in Louisville and wished to use the loans to make repairs at those
properties. In exchange for the loans, Raheem gave Appellant promissory notes
purporting to encumber the properties and he told Appellant that he would be
repaid when the properties were sold. However, it was later determined that
Raheem did not own either property and was instead only leasing the properties
from Appellees, the actual owners. Raheem subsequently defaulted on the leases
and was evicted.
Raheem failed to repay Appellant as agreed, and on September 1,
2006, Appellant filed mechanics’ and materialman’s liens asserting an interest in
the two properties. Although the recorded liens listed Appellee LDG and Raheem
as owners of the properties, Appellant never notified LDG or the other Appellees
of his intent to file the liens prior to filing them. The record also reflects that none
of the Appellees ever signed any promissory notes regarding the properties.
Appellant subsequently filed suit against Raheem in an effort to
recover the loan amount. Appellant then filed an amended complaint in which he
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accused Raheem of fraud and added Appellees as defendants. In the amended
complaint, Appellant contended that he was entitled to recover the amounts loaned
to Raheem from Appellees pursuant to KRS 376.010, which addresses mechanics’
and materialman’s liens. In the alternative, Appellant argued that he was entitled
to recover from Appellees under the common-law theory of quantum meruit, or
unjust enrichment. He claims that building materials purchased with the loan
proceeds had been used to improve Appellees’ properties, thereby increasing their
value.
Appellees sought summary judgment against Appellant on the
grounds that Appellant was not entitled to foreclose the mechanics’ and
materialman’s liens because of a failure to comply with the procedural
requirements associated with such liens. In response, Appellant conceded that his
lien claims were time-barred because he had failed to sue Appellees within twelve
months of filing the liens, as required by KRS 376.090.2 Consequently, the trial
court dismissed Appellant’s claims brought pursuant to KRS 376.010 because of
his failure to timely file suit. However, the trial court also dismissed Appellant’s
claim based on unjust enrichment despite the fact that Appellees had not addressed
this claim in their motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant concedes that his lien claims were time-barred
as a matter of law pursuant to KRS 376.090, so he does not challenge the trial
2
KRS 376.090(1) provides, in relevant part: “Any lien provided for in KRS 376.010 shall be
deemed dissolved unless an action is brought to enforce the lien within twelve (12) months from
the day of filing the statement in the clerk’s office, as required by KRS 376.080.”
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court’s entry of summary judgment as to those claims. Instead, he contends that
summary judgment was prematurely granted as to his claim of unjust enrichment
because Appellees had not sought summary judgment regarding that issue. The
standards for reviewing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment are wellestablished and were concisely summarized by this Court in Lewis v. B & R Corp.,
56 S.W.3d 432 (Ky. App. 2001):
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should
be granted only if it appears impossible that the
nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor. The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, and then the burden shifts to the
party opposing summary judgment to present “at least
some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Id. at 436 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). Because summary judgments
involve no fact finding, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. 3D Enters.
Contr. Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 174 S.W.3d 440,
445 (Ky. 2005); Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Ky. App. 2000).
“Recovery under the theory of quantum meruit can be had regardless
of the absence of an enforceable contract.” Quadrille Bus. Sys. v. Kentucky
Cattlemen’s Ass’n, Inc., 242 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Ky. App. 2007).
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A contract implied by law allows for recovery quantum
meruit for another’s unjust enrichment. It is not based
upon a contract but a legal fiction invented to permit
recovery where the law of natural justice says there
should be a recovery as if promises were made. The
courts supply the fiction of the promise to permit the
recovery. Furthermore recovery quantum meruit may be
had irrespective of the intentions of the parties, and
sometimes even in violation of them.
Perkins v. Daugherty, 722 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Ky. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
“However, merely because work was performed that benefited another does not
necessarily warrant recovery.” Quadrille, 242 S.W.3d at 365. Instead, a party
claiming the applicability of quantum meruit must establish four elements:
1. that valuable services were rendered, or materials
furnished;
2. to the person from whom recovery is sought;
3. which services were accepted by that person, or at
least were received by that person, or were rendered with
the knowledge and consent of that person; and
4. under such circumstances as reasonably notified the
person that the plaintiff expected to be paid by that
person.
Id. at 366, quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 38 (2001).
The trial court held that Appellant had satisfied the first element of
this test because he loaned money to Raheem but concluded that Appellant had
“failed to meet his burden” as to the remaining three elements. The trial court said:
The loans were not made to LDG. LDG did not accept or
receive services from Hudson. There is absolutely no
evidence that LDG had knowledge of Hudson’s or
Raheem’s actions. Finally, nothing in the record
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indicates that Hudson ever expected LDG to repay
Raheem’s obligations on the loans. To the extent that
Hudson alleges that improvements were made to the two
properties that benefited LDG, he had brought forth no
evidence that he did any work or that he provided the
materials for any work. At best, he loaned money under
the belief that the money would be used to make
improvements.
. . . It was incumbent upon Hudson to bring forth at least
some evidence of how his efforts benefited LDG and he
did not.
From the foregoing it is clear that the trial court granted relief not
sought and misallocated the evidentiary burden. A non-moving party is only
required to produce the type of proof identified by the court when faced with a
“properly supported summary judgment motion.” See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991). “ ‘[U]nless and until the
moving party has properly shouldered the initial burden of establishing the
apparent non-existence of any issue of material fact,’ the non-movant is not
required to offer evidence of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Goff v. Justice, 120 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Ky. App. 2002), quoting Robert Simmons
Const. Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., 390 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1965). Here,
Appellees had not yet made an effort to challenge Appellant’s claim of unjust
enrichment. Instead, the trial court appears to have rejected Appellant’s claim of
its own accord. The prevailing rule on this point is well-stated as follows:
Appellees cite us to no authority that allows a trial court
to circumvent the civil rules and enter summary
judgment sua sponte where the legal issues have not been
submitted for determination. While a court might be
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justified in using its inherent powers to dismiss sua
sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is
fundamental that a trial court has no authority to
otherwise dismiss claims without a motion, proper notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. CR 56.01 and
CR 56.02 clearly provide that a “party” may seek a
summary judgment. The rules do not contemplate such a
proceeding on the court’s own motion.
Storer Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Bd. of Educ.,
850 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. App. 1993). Perhaps there are exceptions to this rule,
but nothing presented here reveals a need to avoid routine application of the rule.
Consequently, upon the record before us, Appellant was under no
obligation to produce evidence in refutation of an argument that had not been
made. Accordingly, the trial court’s summary judgment on Appellant’s unjust
enrichment claim is reversed and this cause is remanded for further consistent
proceedings.3
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel Manly
Louisville, Kentucky
Dennis J. Stilger
Louisville, Kentucky
3
We note, however, that this decision should not be viewed as a bar on any future summary
judgment proceedings if they are found to be appropriate.
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