HARRIS (LEONDO) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 22, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001342-MR
LEONDO HARRIS
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
NO. 2009-SC-000394-DG
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 05-CR-002347 & 05-CR-002918
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: This case comes before this Court on remand from the
Supreme Court of Kentucky for further consideration in light of that Court’s recent
decision in Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2011). After careful
review, we hold that Harris’s appellate counsel was not ineffective under Hollon.
On January 23, 2007, Leondo Harris was convicted of first-degree rape,
first-degree robbery, and first-degree sexual abuse of T.W. and was sentenced to a
term of fifty years’ imprisonment. The relevant facts of this case were sufficiently
stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion affirming Harris’ conviction on direct
appeal:
T.W. testified that as she was leaving a pay-phone near
her home on Virginia Avenue in Louisville shortly before
9:00 p.m. on November 5, 1996, she was accosted by an
African-American man wearing a black sweat-shirt with
its hood pulled over his head and around his face. The
man showed her a handgun and directed her to an
unlighted alley between two buildings where he first
robbed her of the small amount of cash in her possession,
rummaged in her bra for more cash, ordered her to
remove her shirt and lower her pants, and then vaginally
raped her. During the assault, the man several times
threatened T.W. with the gun and ordered her not to look
at him. Once the man had fled, T.W. sought help at a
nearby apartment, where the occupants helped her call
911. At trial, T.W., one of the persons who assisted her,
and two of the police officers who responded to the 911
call all testified that in the immediate aftermath of the
assault T.W. was distraught, that she was crying and
sobbing uncontrollably, and that her clothes were
disheveled. A short time later, T.W. was interviewed by
the detective assigned to the case, but she had not
recognized her assailant and was unable to provide more
than a very general description. Following the interview,
she was taken to the hospital where she was examined
and a vaginal smear collected. The detective placed that
evidence in storage. When no leads developed, the
police eventually declared the case “cold” and placed it
in abeyance.
In the meantime, advances in technology led to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's creation of the
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), “a massive
centrally-managed database linking DNA profiles culled
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from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection
programs,” United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 819
(9th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to CODIS, local law
enforcement agencies collect DNA samples from, among
other sources, crime scenes and individuals convicted of
qualifying state offenses. See KRS 17.170-17.175. The
DNA is analyzed, and the resulting profiles are
incorporated in the database, making possible nationwide
computer searches for matches between the evidence
from different crime scenes as well as between the crime
scene evidence and the known-offender profiles. In
2000, Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act, Pub.L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726
(2000), which provided grant money to the states to fund
lab work in hopes of eliminating some of the enormous
backlog of collected but unanalyzed samples. Tracey
Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special
Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? 33 J.L.
Med. & Ethics 102 (Spring 2005). Due to one such
grant, in 2005 the State Police Crime Lab in Frankfort
reworked the evidence gathered in T.W.'s case and from
semen present on the vaginal swabs obtained a male
DNA profile that proved to be a perfect match with
Harris's offender profile. T.W.'s case was reopened, and
on August 4, 2005 a Jefferson County Grand Jury
indicted Harris. Not long after the indictment, the
Commonwealth obtained a new blood sample from
Harris and confirmed the match between his DNA and
that obtained from T.W.'s rape kit.
Harris's case was first called to trial on January 31, 2006,
but at that time the Commonwealth admitted that it had
not yet located T .W. and requested a continuance.
Harris objected and moved that the case be dismissed
without prejudice. The trial court apparently understood
his motion as a demand for a speedy trial, but given the
obvious importance of the witness, the seriousness of the
charges, and the fact that the prosecution was then only
about six months old, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and rescheduled trial for June 27, 2006. On June
23, 2006, the Commonwealth again requested that the
trial be continued. Although it had located T.W., another
key witness-the detective initially assigned to T.W.'s case
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in 1996-was on vacation. Again Harris objected, but
again the trial court rescheduled trial, this time for
August 22, 2006. When that date rolled around, Harris
requested more time-to file a KRE 412 motion and to
interview witnesses-and so once again trial was
postponed. Harris was finally tried in October 2006,
about fourteen months after his indictment and almost ten
years after the alleged offense.
Harris v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-SC-000142-MR, 2008 WL 2484934 (Ky.,
June 19, 2008).
Harris appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court, claiming
that he was denied his rights to a timely prosecution and a speedy trial. Harris also
claimed that his trial was rendered unfair by: 1) the under-representation of
African American males on the venire from which the petit jury was chosen; 2) the
exclusion of evidence that the complaining witness, T.W., was a convicted felon;
3) the use of jury instructions which understated the Commonwealth’s burden of
proof; and 4) the prosecutor’s misuse of closing argument to suggest that Harris
had to prove his innocence.
While Harris’ appeal was still pending, he filed a motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, alleging
various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 14, 2008, the
Jefferson Circuit Court denied Harris’ motion because the case was pending on
appeal, and the trial court had no record to review. Subsequently, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed Harris’ conviction and sentence on June 19, 2008. Harris
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then appealed the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion to this Court in lieu of refiling his
RCr 11.42 motion for review by the trial court.
Initially, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of Harris’ RCr 11.42 motion,
holding that his claims had already been presented in his direct appeal to the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Further, we held that the claims the Supreme Court
reviewed for palpable error did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC). Finally, we declined to review his claims for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel (IAAC) because at the time the opinion was rendered, that was
not a cognizable claim in this jurisdiction pursuant to Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825
S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1992). However, on April 21, 2011, the Supreme Court rendered
Hollon v. Commonwealth, supra, overruling Hicks. The Court ruled that the time
had come for recognition of IAAC claims premised upon appellate counsel’s
alleged failure to raise a particular issue on direct appeal.
Specifically, the Hollon Court stated:
We are thus persuaded that it is time, indeed past time, to
overrule Hicks and the cases relying upon it and to
recognize IAAC claims premised upon appellate
counsel's alleged failure to raise a particular issue on
direct appeal. To succeed on such a claim, the defendant
must establish that counsel's performance was deficient,
overcoming a strong presumption that appellate counsel's
choice of issues to present to the appellate court was a
reasonable exercise of appellate strategy. As the
Supreme Court noted in Smith [v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,
120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000)], “‘[g]enerally,
only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those
presented, will the presumption of effective assistance be
overcome.’” 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746 (quoting
Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)). We
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further emphasize “ignored issues” to underscore that
IAAC claims will not be premised on inartful arguments
or missed case citations; rather counsel must have
omitted completely an issue that should have been
presented on direct appeal. For further clarity, we
additionally emphasize that IAAC claims are limited
to counsel's performance on direct appeal; there is no
counterpart for counsel's performance on RCr 11.42
motions or other requests for post-conviction relief.
Finally, the defendant must also establish that he or she
was prejudiced by the deficient performance, which, as
noted, requires a showing that absent counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the
appeal would have succeeded. Smith, supra.
Hollon, supra, at 436-37. (Emphasis added). In the instant case, Harris is claiming
that he received IAAC because his appellate counsel failed to hold his direct appeal
in abeyance while he pursued his claims for IAC. Thus, his claim is that his
counsel was ineffective in handling his RCr 11.42 motion and ineffective in
handling his direct appeal for not filing a motion to hold it in abeyance. As the
court specifically stated in Hollon, there is no cognizable claim for ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel relating to counsel’s handling of RCr 11.42 matters.
Thus, we are left to evaluate whether his counsel is ineffective in not placing his
direct appeal in abeyance. Because the normal procedure is to hold the RCr 11.42
motion in abeyance pending the outcome of the direct appeal, it does not amount
to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to not hold the direct appeal in
abeyance. The trial court would have to review the record in order to determine
whether counsel was ineffective, and because Harris first filed a direct appeal that
was still pending, that record would have been at the Supreme Court. Thus, the
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trial court was unable to review any record to determine the legitimacy of Harris’
claims and denied the motion accordingly. If anything, the trial court could have
held the RCr 11.42 motion in abeyance, but it was not ineffective assistance of
counsel for appellate counsel to not petition the Supreme Court to hold the direct
appeal in abeyance.
Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s order denying the RCr
11.42 claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the reasons stated in our
initial opinion. Further, regarding Harris’ claims for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for not holding his direct appeal in abeyance, we hold that it was
not ineffective for appellate counsel to proceed with the direct appeal before
handling the RCr 11.42 motion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leondo Harris, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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